I have a new campaign Dien Bien Phu for download by Larry Browning. Many thanks to Larry for sharing his campaign with us.
What would have happened if America had intervened? The debate in the Truman and Eisenhower cabinets continued right up until the last gun fell silent.
The French had successfully defended a remote outpost against the Viet Minh in 1952. Incredible as it may seem after the event, the French did have some reason to believe their Operation Castor would succeed. 10,000 men had held another base, Na Som, for a year and every attempt by General Giap to take it was defeated. The French believed their success at Na Som could be replicated at Dien Bien Phu. Lacking the manpower to hold more than one base, the French evacuated Na Som, and so permitted General Vo Nguyen Giap to focus his entire attention on one target.
The base could be supplied only by air, from Hanoi, 350 kilometers to the East. The number of men deployed, 16,000, was insufficient even with the comfortable assumptions made about the Viet Minh's abilities. The French merely shrugged off the weakness. Last, no war is won simply by setting up a fortress inside enemy territory. This leaves the initiative to the adversary. So confident were the defenders that the French artillery commander sneeringly rejected the offer of additional artillery. He was later to commit suicide during the battle when it became ghastly clear that he had seriously underestimated the Viet Minh gunners.
French estimates were that, at the most, two Viet Minh divisions could be sustained at Dien Bien Phu, 500 km from the Chinese border, and that minimal artillery support was available. The Viet Minh, using 75,000 labor, cut a brand-new, 100 km trail through the jungle, thus creating a continuous trail between China and Dien Bien Phu. They built up a major logistics base specifically for the campaign, 55 miles Northeast of the base. The Viet Minh deployed an additional 33,500 labor to supply the siege; among other items, these workers moved 20,584 tons of rice on bicycles, horses, and junks.
Far from two divisions, the Viet Minh sent in five of their six divisions. When the French realized what was happening, they decided it was too late to pull back the garrison. General Giap had approximately 100,000 troops, combat and support; the French had a mixed force of 13,000. Five of the defenses crack parachute battalions had been withdrawn on rotation to other stations, and they had to be parachuted back into the perimeter one by one. General Giap had 288 guns and mortars over 57mm; the French had 88.
The French could not reinforce the base once the Viet Minh reduced the perimeter; they could not escape. They should not, by any logic, have been there in the first place. That they would lose was evident very soon to the defenders, and they resigned themselves to the inevitable in a curiously fatalistic manner. Their country had no concern to spare for them; perhaps the indifference of Metropolitan France arose because almost all the troops involved were from the Foreign Legion or Colonial regiments. France had just nine years before emerged from one of the darkest periods of its history, and it was getting bogged down in Algeria too. Perhaps events taking place 8,000 miles away in a different world were beyond identifying with for a traumatized France. There was great opposition to the war within France itself, with a divided political leadership. Moreover, everyone knew that only talks could provide a solution and France was disinclined to invest more in the war.
The officers and men fought on for no other reason than their self-image: they were professional soldiers, from storied regiments with obscure customs, and if they were going to lose, they were going to fight to the last round just because that is what they believed professional soldiers did. The battalions at Dien Bien Phu included the cream of the French paratroops. These men had their own mystique, including disdaining cover when attacking.
Their gallantry was perhaps theatrical by the reserved standards of the British and the make-fun-of-everything Americans. When the end came, the survivors did not charge the attackers, determined to die rather than surrender. Suicide rather than defeat was not the way of the French. Each man fought to the last. By the end of April, only 2,000 men including walking wounded and sick were left. The starving defenders fought till they were overrun, many out of ammunition and forced to resort to using their bare hands. Having done everything they humanly could, however, the survivors calmly surrendered.
One of the more bizarre incidents in modern warfare concerns the French deserters. The French have an amazing bureaucracy, and this is shown in the meticulous detailing of deserters, mainly Algerian, Moroccan, and Vietnamese irregulars. Deserters are listed as 1161. During the course of the battle, about 2,000 men announced to their commanders that they were deserting. Their commanders - and here is that Gallic fatalism again - let them go. But there was no place for them to go, as the base was surrounded on all sides. So the deserters deserted - to the middle of the camp - and made themselves as comfortable as possible while the fighting raged non-stop around them, draining the steadily dwindling resources of the base, and even relaxing with some prostitutes. One account says the French did not have the resources to attend to the deserters. This event and the way the French handled it boggles the mind. One wonders what the fate of the deserters would have been in just about any army one can think of.
Vietnamese sources acknowledge 7,900 killed and 15,00 wounded. The French losses were 1726 killed, 1694 missing, and 5234 wounded. When the garrison surrendered, 10,863 men (and one woman, a nurse) were marched into captivity, interspersed throughout the withdrawing Viet Minh columns, so that the victors should not suffer bombing on their way home.
The prisoners were marched 500 km to captivity. Americans speak of the Bataan Death March, but consider this. The 10,863 POWs were in Vietnamese hands for only three months before their release subsequent to the Geneva accords. But only 3,280 returned. Such a high percentage of prisoners dying in captivity within so short a time would certainly be treated as a war crime in our times. In those days, with World War II having ended, the French figures are not even a coda. Nonetheless, we can see how indifferent France was to her men at Dien Bien Phu, that after some initial outrage the affair was forgotten. In another peculiar twist to events, the Vietnamese returned every single item taken from each prisoner - pictures, money, watches, ID cards and even coins. Yet these were the same victors who mistreated thousands of men to their deaths.
Viet Minh Forces (General Vo Nguyen Giap)
304 Division
308 Division
312 Division (General Tran Do)
316 Division
351 Division (identified as an artillery division in one account)
Corps Expeditionnaire (Incomplete list), Colonel Christian Marie Ferdinand de la Croix de Castries
13 battalions were in Dien Bien Phu at the peak of French strength; we may or may not have successfully identified all of them.
2nd Airborne Battle Group
9th Airmobile Group (3 battalions)
?? Squadron M-24 Chaffee (three troops of 3 each, 1 HQ; tanks flown in dissembled)
3/13 Foreign Legion Demi Brigade (two battalions)
3/3 Algerian Rifles
5/7 Algerian Rifles
1/4 Moroccans
1/2 Foreign Legion Regiment
2/1 Colonial Parachute Regiment (third battalion to return)
5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion (first battalion to return)
6th Colonial Parachute Battalion (second battalion to return)
2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion (fourth to return)
1st Colonial Parachute Battalion (fifth to return)
8th Colonial Parachute Battalion
3rd Tai Battalion (Several Tai companies sent to Dien Bien Phu overland from other bases were ambushed and destroyed before they reached their destination.)
4th Colonial Artillery Regiment
35th Airborne Light Artillery Battalion
1st Foreign Legion Heavy Mortar Company (4.2" mortar)
?? Heavy Mortar Company
?? Heavy Mortar Company
Artillery included:
1 155mm battery
6 105mm batteries
4 quadruple 50-calibre heavy machine guns
29th and 44th MASH (consolidated into one hospital)
3rd, 5th, and 6th Airborne Surgical Teams
The large number of French battalions is misleading because most battalions averaged 380-500 strength and were commanded by majors.
One tank survived the battle.
