Island Skipping in the South Pacific (Intro)

[Erik B]

I hope this is will be fun reading as well as something of a very basic newbie strategy/game overview. I have finished messing around with a few aspects of the game, have read the manual, and chosen to write this AAR of Scenario 11 (Operation Cartwheel) as the Americans. I chose that scenario because it has one side poised to take the offensive and thus I could learn about base support, build up, and supply without having to worry about thrusts from a superior IJN. For those that haven't memorized all the scenarios - #11 has the Allies having solidified their position at Guad. and PM and poised to set in place the encircelment of Rabaul. Difficulty is set to historical.

I plan to post three kinds of summaries - Operational Overview (Theater Strategy), Operational implementation (how I intend to carry out my Theater Strategy), and Tactical Plan (the specific commands/actions and use of the game interface) on basically a game time week by week basis.

Most importantly, I would urge the more experienced players to provide criticisms and comments as we go along. I hope that this will be a good point/counter point that will help other in getting up to speed on what looks like a wonderful game that lacks a good tutorial.

[Erik B]

June 15, 1943 Espiritu Santo

Thunderstorms rolled over the South Pacific Theater as my transport plan set down on the airfield. HQ staff met me at the tarmac - eager as I to set Operation Cartwheel in motion. To my liking, I have been provided only the most general of commands, free to develop my own operational plan. I freshened up and then strode into the war room, eager to get to work.

OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW: Upon looking at the Order of Battle and Strategic maps, I was struck by the fact that we faced both an opportunity and a danger. There were two axis of advance we could proceed along - one up directly up The Slot where a number of Japanese bases seemed dangerously exposed to the air power I could send out of Lunga and a second along the Eastern Short of New Guinea, easily reachable by the air assets at Mosby and Dobadura. If I could keep the Japanese guessing as to where the next attack would fall, it would keep them forced to split their supplies, weakening them along their wide front and exposing multiple convoys to air and submarine attack.

The danger would be that the still potent IJN would spring a surprise, defeating taskforces in detail and sending me back to Pearl to a meaningless desk job. I hadn't figured out a fool-proof way to avoid that problem. While Pearl had promised me that we could break the Japanese codes, that didn't seem to be in the cards and so I would instead rely on the coastwatchers, my subs, and local air superiority to give me enough warning avoid a catastrophic defeat of either of the two main battle groups. I did inform that as a SOP we would attempt to keep one battlegroup always under good air cover from our bases, feinting attacks but never committing to simultaneous attacks along both axis were I could be vulnerable to a defeat in detail. It probably was wishful thinking that the Japanese would be so generous but, for now, it seemed the best course of action.

Our trump card seemed the air superiority in the theater of operations. If we could "bypass" those J. bases that were well defended and seize other areas in the rear, we could avoid head-long assaults into well dug in troops. With the allies agreeing that defeat of the Nazis would be the first priority, I couldn't simply throw troops into the meat grinder. Rather we would find weaknesses on the Japanese flanks and then use those newly acquired bases and their airfields to choke off the Japanese supplies coming from the West. That seemed to set the stage for some exciting moments, as those new bases would also be vulnerable to counterattacks as I rushed supplies and men and the Japanese moved to throw the Leathernecks back into the ocean. I hoped that when we were ready to act the flat tops could protect the first waves of supply and let me establish new

Meeting with my staff, we developed the following targets and time-table for Operation Cartwheel.

June - Use air to soften up Japanese bases at Lae, Munda, Vila; Secure Kiriwina and Woodlack to solidfy internal LOCs
July - Seize Lae and Vila
August - Consolidate gains and continue air operations in theater
September - Launch assaults against Finshafen and Buin
October - Launch assault against Hoskins; Consolidate gains on New Guinea and Bougainville
November – Continue build up
December seize Admiralty I. bases and Kaviengy

We knew that plans would change but, for now, the time table seemed possible and would keep our forces disciplined to make sure we did not over extend our supplies.

I bid the staff goodnight and awaited a briefing from my tactical command in the morning. We needed to work on putting the air operations together ASAP.

[Erik B]

June 15, 1943 Espiritu Santo

Operational Implementation & Tactics

Implementation:

To carry out the first phase of Operation Cartwheel we had decided to solidify our internal LOCs and to soften the Japs up for future operations. We also needed to keep them guessing as to where the first blow would hit.

We also decided to give our Seabees some experience while ensuring a tight control over the airspace in the Soloman Sea. We therefore would look to seize Woodlark I. this week, covering what we hoped would be an easy landing with a carrier taskforce and the Aussies cruisers. We would begin constructing an airbase on Woodlack, with the expectation we would eventually detach 1 fighter group and 1 patrol group to operate out of the base. If things went well, the week of the 22nd we would move onto Kirawina with the forces we had assembled in the area.

Tactics:

We decided that in addition to allowing local commanders and captains discretion, we would order ALL of the level bombers operating from Mosby and Gila Gila to attack Lea (switching to Salamau on the 19th). Out of Lunga, we ordered ALL of the level bombers to attack Vila. We detached 2 fighter squadrons to carry out escort missions, with the rest assigned to long range CAP. We ordered the Aussie Cruiser Group north some 60 miles NE of Woodlark, ordering them to engage in surface combat and to hold position until engaged. We also ordered a Carrier group into the Solomon Sea to provide additional air cover. Finally, we assembled the 46th and 857th engineering groups from Gila Gila and directed them toward Woodlark to begin work on the new base.

As the week progressed, we also found it necessary to assemble some of our ships in our main bases for supply missions. Our briefing has been less than clear on exactly how to do this. For now we will assign them to local commander (computer) control and routine convoys and see what results that produces. If there seems little progress, by next week we will begin direct oversight of this critical aspect of theater operations.

We also are unclear on exactly how to use the barges that command has put at our disposal. A couple of re-reads of our briefing materials continued to make that less than clear. Must ask for a specialized briefing next week.

Finally, we got disturbing reports late in the week from both Lunda and Dobadura that air capacity was down sharply and it was limiting our ability to hit the Japs bases. Fed up, I decided that during the week of the 22nd we would be focusing on supply operations, experience that should pay off later in the campaign

[denisonh]

Enjoying the narrative. Keep the reports coming.