Had Yamamoto survived...

[GaryChildress]

If Yamamoto hadn't been killed and instead stayed the rest of the war as Japanese CinC, would there have been much difference? Would he have perhaps been able to delay some of the Japanese defeats?

[Cpt Sherwood]

I doubt it. It is hard to make chicken soup using chicken poop.

[geofflambert]

But what if Yamamoto had come back as a zombie?[X(]

[Mundy]

Agreed.  Yamamoto wasn't above bungling things as Midway showed.
 
Ed-

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Mundy

Agreed.  Yamamoto wasn't above bungling things as Midway showed.

Ed-

Yup. Several campaigns (Midway, Coral Sea and much of the Solomons) were poorly orchestrated / planned / run before his demise. This trend (and the resultant spanking the Japanese took) would likely have continued or even accelerated as he overplayed his increasingly poor hand.

[gradenko2k]

If you didn't know Yamamoto died in 43, you might think Operation Sho-Go was still one of his plans from how complex it was, so I doubt there would have been much improvement.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

If you didn't know Yamamoto died in 43, you might think Operation Sho-Go was still one of his plans from how complex it was, so I doubt there would have been much improvement.

This is what makes me think that the complexity of planning was an inherent flaw in the IJN doctrine, rather than unique to Yamamoto.

However, Sho-Go almost worked...

[gradenko2k]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna
This is what makes me think that the complexity of planning was an inherent flaw in the IJN doctrine, rather than unique to Yamamoto.

However, Sho-Go almost worked...

I would agree. Yamamoto just happened to be the guy in the driver's seat, and Pearl Harbor was dead simple enough that it worked, but the IJN was going to come up with these overly elegant plans regardless.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

If you didn't know Yamamoto died in 43, you might think Operation Sho-Go was still one of his plans from how complex it was, so I doubt there would have been much improvement.

This is what makes me think that the complexity of planning was an inherent flaw in the IJN doctrine, rather than unique to Yamamoto.

However, Sho-Go almost worked...

So-losses for Leyte Gulf were:

Allies: 1 CVL; 2 CVE; 2 DD; 1 DE, circa 200 planes

Japanese: 1 CV; 3 CVL; 3 BB; 10 CA; 11 DD, circa 500 planes

Even IF the IJN had been able to shoot up a few Allied transports and sink them with their contingents in toto (unlikely to have transpired in that fashion in any case), this was still a catastrophic loss for the IJN. It would not have been reversed by some additional damage to APA or AKAs disembarking the landing forces after the fact.

Sho-Go 'almost worked' in the same way that Midway almost was a Japanese victory and Hiroshima was a near-run thing. They had a chance right up until the point where they lost terribly and got pummeled.

[Lokasenna]

almost worked...if you consider that the war was already lost and it was really just a "fingering the hawk" move. The time for the momentum-stopping major actions was in late 1942/early 1943, not 1944/1945. The material effect of losing the landing forces wouldn't have meant much, but the effect on morale it would have had on morale is hard to estimate. And what if Admiral "likes to play soldier" Turner had been lost?!

But in seriousness, what could IJN do with a fleet of ships that had just been cut off from its fuel supply?

"fingering the hawk":

[linrom]

It's hard to say when your enemy has your plans and knows all your moves in advance. At the very least, he might have figured out that US broke Japanese naval code. And that would have made a HUGE difference. For one, US couldn't just send a few tug boats to sink all the Japanese submarines because they knew their locations as soon as they came off the production line.

[gradenko2k]

Sho-Go worked in the sense that Halsey took the bait almost exactly as the IJN had planned it.

Sho-Go did not work in the sense that even if Halsey took the bait, Kurita was completely unable to deliver.

[dr.hal]

Yamamoto was a product of his culture and as some have indicated above, that culture was the foundational source of destruction for the Japanese. The rigidity of rank and following orders, the lack of free will and the idea that to die for one's emperor rather than to live and fight another day all come together in an overwhelmingly negative approach to the task at hand, winning a war. In Japanese culture of the time, it was more important to die correctly than to win an action. What Japan needed and DIDN'T have was someone who could step outside that culture and still be acceptable. Look at Rear Admiral Tanaka... sidelined despite considerable success. Thus in answer to the question originally put forth, I don't think Yamamoto living would have made any difference. Him going earlier MIGHT have, but I doubt that too, as those who followed would not have challenged the main stream thinking of the time.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000
Halsey took the bait

Halsey taking the bait was the 'cost' side of this equation. The Japanese were unable to deliver any benefit after Halsey beat on their carriers. A plan that doesn't maximize the benefits at the lowest possible cost is a poorly designed plan. The supposition that it 'worked' is incorrect, whether or not Halsey took the bait.

[Capt Hornblower]

It would be nice to think that had Yamamoto survived into 1945 he could have been well enough respected and influential to have convinced the Emperor and the High Command of the folly of continuing the war, had he wished.

[jeffk3510]

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

If Yamamoto hadn't been killed and instead stayed the rest of the war as Japanese CinC, would there have been much difference? Would he have perhaps been able to delay some of the Japanese defeats?

That is a smiliar argument to Stonewall Jackson....

I don't think either would have made a difference..

[Barb]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

If you didn't know Yamamoto died in 43, you might think Operation Sho-Go was still one of his plans from how complex it was, so I doubt there would have been much improvement.

This is what makes me think that the complexity of planning was an inherent flaw in the IJN doctrine, rather than unique to Yamamoto.

However, Sho-Go almost worked...

So-losses for Leyte Gulf were:

Allies: 1 CVL; 2 CVE; 2 DD; 1 DE, circa 200 planes

Japanese: 1 CV; 3 CVL; 3 BB; 10 CA; 11 DD, circa 500 planes

Even IF the IJN had been able to shoot up a few Allied transports and sink them with their contingents in toto (unlikely to have transpired in that fashion in any case), this was still a catastrophic loss for the IJN. It would not have been reversed by some additional damage to APA or AKAs disembarking the landing forces after the fact.

Sho-Go 'almost worked' in the same way that Midway almost was a Japanese victory and Hiroshima was a near-run thing. They had a chance right up until the point where they lost terribly and got pummeled.

I cant fully agree with you - the question was not about sinking several APA/AKA/LSTs... It was the troops aboard. US would be SHAKEN AND SHOCKED by thousands of casualties aboard those ships! The public outrage would be such that Pearl Harbor thingy would appear like kids play. A regiment sunk means 3000 casualties. A Division 15000. Number you certainly don't want to appear on Newspapers across country.
Not to mention thousands tons of equipment, rations, munitions, airfield mats, tents, artillery, radar sets, etc. Operations at Philippines would be thrown back by several months at least.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

almost worked...if you consider that the war was already lost and it was really just a "fingering the hawk" move. The time for the momentum-stopping major actions was in late 1942/early 1943, not 1944/1945. The material effect of losing the landing forces wouldn't have meant much, but the effect on morale it would have had on morale is hard to estimate. And what if Admiral "likes to play soldier" Turner had been lost?!

But in seriousness, what could IJN do with a fleet of ships that had just been cut off from its fuel supply?

"fingering the hawk":

My understanding is that the troops were all ashore already and only some supplies were still being unloaded.

[DivePac88]

As has been said already, with Yamamoto and his still being around in 1945, there could have been an earlier cessation of the war. Because for all of his command operational and tactical failures, Yamamoto was a realist when it came to the strategic situation. He had already in 1941 mapped out the basic outcome of the conflict, and history was to prove him was reasonably acute in his timeline and outcomes.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Barb

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna




This is what makes me think that the complexity of planning was an inherent flaw in the IJN doctrine, rather than unique to Yamamoto.

However, Sho-Go almost worked...

So-losses for Leyte Gulf were:

Allies: 1 CVL; 2 CVE; 2 DD; 1 DE, circa 200 planes

Japanese: 1 CV; 3 CVL; 3 BB; 10 CA; 11 DD, circa 500 planes

Even IF the IJN had been able to shoot up a few Allied transports and sink them with their contingents in toto (unlikely to have transpired in that fashion in any case), this was still a catastrophic loss for the IJN. It would not have been reversed by some additional damage to APA or AKAs disembarking the landing forces after the fact.

Sho-Go 'almost worked' in the same way that Midway almost was a Japanese victory and Hiroshima was a near-run thing. They had a chance right up until the point where they lost terribly and got pummeled.

I cant fully agree with you - the question was not about sinking several APA/AKA/LSTs... It was the troops aboard. US would be SHAKEN AND SHOCKED by thousands of casualties aboard those ships! The public outrage would be such that Pearl Harbor thingy would appear like kids play. A regiment sunk means 3000 casualties. A Division 15000. Number you certainly don't want to appear on Newspapers across country.
Not to mention thousands tons of equipment, rations, munitions, airfield mats, tents, artillery, radar sets, etc. Operations at Philippines would be thrown back by several months at least.

You're assuming too much.

A pair of DDs, a DE and some lightly armed CVEs extracted more than their share of blood from the attacking Japanese. If the Japanese had 'broken through' at Surigao, they would have had to move South to get to the transports still. Undoubtedly, they would have faced some additional opposition on their way there.

Had Oldendorf been able to detach some of his Samar fleet north or had Halsey been able to get off a strike against the Japanese, things could have turned out much worse for the Japanese. There was no reasonable outcome wherein most of the troops would be onboard the assault ships, awaiting their sinking patiently. There could have been WORSE historical outcomes for the Japanese, even if they had come into gun range of the Americans amphibious landings off of Leyte. So, even if 'successful' in getting at the amphibious landings, the outcome could have been worse for the Japanese.