China et al

[Symon]

Bwaahaahaahaahaa . Was talking to a couple of the other devs about China and came up with a very evil idea to slow things down a bit. Involves some pretty monster editing of the Extended Map road network with a view towards reducing movement rates and particularly supply flow costs across that vast expanse of rice paddies. And then extend the concept south and west.

The serendipity virus is going around, since John 3rd just sent an email about the same paradigm (slowing things down) with his own thoughts and proposals. Woof !! He wanted to tweak Burma and India, as well as China, with his proposals. Looked at Burma and India and thought to self, ‘self, we can do this’.

Oh yeah, bwaahaahaahaahaa , we can make China/Burma/India hard. Good for regiments on foot or bikes, but utter hell for stacks of any kind. And no more unsupported J tank regiments terrorizing the countryside. Well, they can, but they will run away from their supports and supply, and get cut off and killed; even with Chinese units. Hootz gazottiez.

As is was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be; world without end, amen, amen.

Ciao. John

[Lecivius]

I like evil ideas [;)][:D]

[oldman45]

Such evil thoughts from a good catholic.... I think you and John are on to something here.

[ny59giants]

I was the one whispering in John 3rd's ear about China. I'm just worried if they become too hard, then Australia looks like a big piece of real estate to go after.

[fcharton]

Hi John,

This JFB now learning China from an Allied perspective has a question and a comment...

Suppose supply flow is made real viscous, and slow and inefficient, apart from Manchuria, the coast and a few industrial basins (Sichuan and Hunan, ie Chungking and Changsha). Suppose the same is true for the mountain and jungle area in northern Burma. What happens to the KMT? Most of those big chinese units begin the game in central or western China, and the current system barely feeds them. Under the new paradigm, you probably wouldn't get much from Burma. Wouldn't every one except those units around Chungking and Changsha starve and be reduced over time?

In this case, the net effect would be to change the strategy for Japan from "move at once, with tanks, and those big units that start the game on the coast, and push the KMT around", to "wait a year in base, until the KMT has nothing left to eat, perhaps bombing the industry to speed the effect, and just collect the prize"?

I'm not saying this is not feasible, but just that, given the number of troops Japan and the KMT have in China, the balance is very difficult to achieve.


The comment now. Whereas slowing supply flow makes a lot of sense, reducing movement rates is, imho, pure design for effect. Apart from a few hexes, all the area east of Chengtu was very densely populated at the time, and there were roads and tracks pretty much everywhere. Out of the Yellow River plains, movement rates in eastern China are already very low. In reality, I think you should have minor roads almost everywhere in the eastern half of the country.

Francois

[John 3rd]

Just sent this to JWE through email but will print it here:


I REALLY like the trail idea a bunch! Raising supply cost is excellent and will also have the direct effect of tying each side to the Railroads running through the area. Works for me.

Really would like some sort of REAL model for the monsoon months in Burma. Just finished a book (The Burma Road) and it was EXCELLENT. Really talks about how movement was impossible except on developed roads and the RR. If troops moved 3-4 miles in a day it was considered excellent. My thoughts come back to a House Rule in Burma that when the Monsoon is active a unit must stay deployed when moving. No Strategic Movement except on RRs.

Any chance of you making the China—Burma Road (Trail) changes anytime soon?

Great minds think a like is all I have to say!

[spence]

Whereas my opponent has contributed to my "Burma Road" thread I guess this is the place to be rather than there.

My opponent(IJA) is conducting an offensive into India with 8-10 divisions supported by substantial armor, artillery and armor. Yet he has not sent any significant amount of the supply to sustain this offensive by sea to Rangoon (Port Blair is Allied held and I am able to monitor shipping bound to/from Rangoon...basically there has been none). He says that the majority of the supply to sustain this offensive comes to Burma via Thailand rather than over the Himalayas through China. This does indeed shorten the supply line to a still substantial 250+/- miles (to get to the railroad in Burma though it doesn't consider the rotten communications into India at all. The IJA was a horse-drawn army (like most in 1940). For a horse drawn cart to travel through rather tough jungle 12 days of transit one way seems a somewhat optimistic estimate of the time required. Horses eat a lot and the jungle vegetation is not what they need so they would need to carry it with them: enough for a round trip. And every pound of fodder decreases the load of things like gasoline and ammunition by an equal amount.

Two Armies were motorized: the British and the American. Both have lots of motorized supply compared to the Japanese. Historically both extended their supply lines successfully by a significant amount from their port/rail-head supply depots. Of some significance is the fact that the British did so in Burma (late 44-45). In the game we have both inhibited in most of their operations by the presence of their motorized support which takes forever to unload from an Allied TF. In fact this seems to be the only significance of motorized support.

Seems to me that in terms of ability to supply troops distant from rail-heads or ports motorized support should be an advantage and more importantly non-motorized support should be at a disadvantage. If properly programmed lack of motorized support would slow down a Japanese offensive in China or Burma by putting them on a fairly short logistical string. Like wise it would keep the Chinese from getting too frisky in the same way. And "short strings" would do little effect operations over most of the map or in highly developed areas such as the DEI, Japan, and SE Oz.

Could this not be done by changing the movement cost for support units in such a way that motorized support units pay less for given terrain than non-motorized support units so supply goes to/through them better than to/through non-motorized units.

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: spence
........
Could this not be done by changing the movement cost for support units in such a way that motorized support units pay less for given terrain than non-motorized support units so supply goes to/through them better than to/through non-motorized units.

Unfortunately, given the present game engine, this is not possible.[:(]

[Symon]

ORIGINAL: fcharton
Hi John,
This JFB now learning China from an Allied perspective has a question and a comment...
.. .. ..
Francois

Hi Francois,

First, this is a test beta thingie. We're messing with it for our own purposes, but John 3rd thinks it might be fun and wants to give it a test drive. Will have to be used a bit to make sure that there aren't any unanticipated effects such as you mention before it gets put in the standard Extended Map.

I'm just moving some of the road spiderweb down one level. Road spiderweb is still there, but pink instead of red. Railroads are still there and roads alongside main RRs are still bright red. Kept the primary roads and some of the secondary roads. Just made the others "minor" roads. It's prophylactic more than anything else.

Supply still moves along the main (primary and secondary) roads as before; same cost, same rate. Just the multiplicity of alternative paths have been given a higher cost, hopefully confining or at least encouraging operations along the arterials. As for Burma, supply should flow to the KMT about like it does presently. As well as some physical flow down the pipe, the KMT gets an automagic supply bonus so long as the Burma road is "open". If the Burma road is "closed", it doesn't matter what the form of the roads are in Burma. Haven't really looked closely at Burma since I was just doing China, but John asked if I would, so okey dokey. Will take your cautions to heart.

@John
It's painstaking, but shouldn't take too long. Raining like heck down here every day; can't dance and can't cut the grass, so why not do "projects" [8D]

Ciao. JWE

[Symon]

Hi Francois,

Actually, my friend, I'm using my (very old and treadworn) experience to play with this. I have memories of the road network in Viet Nam in 1969/70. I recall one displacement where we started from Red Beach at Qui Nhon and were headed for Plei Plang on Route 19. We stopped at Radcliff and Pleiku and got to our FZ in 4 days (for them who was there, we were the 319th AFAR and shooting behind Mei Doch).

Even though "improved" by the engineers, the road was a horror show. I simply can't imagine how GM 100 woulda thought they coulda pushed through. I saw the markers and pulled off to pay my respects. My diary for that day says it was "f***ing miserable, hot muggy, buggy. Pulled off to pay respects to the French at Marker 61." Road could barely let my WC by and the rest of the column through. But my Battery First was a righteous man and stopped the column and got out to see what his dumb ass butter bar was doing. I explained and I will be dipped in shit if he didn't holler and every single one of the long service vets didn't gather around that marker stone. But that was 1954.

But still, what we (westerners) think of as primary and secondary roads ain't what them folks think of as primary or secondary roads. Even (improved) Route 19 was a serious horror show in 1970. Cannot imagine how it would have looked to GM 100. back in 54 And what the heck would the China transport network have looked like under the circumstances.

Sorry, Francois, just thinking about long ago. Hope it makes sense.. Ciao John

[bigred]

ORIGINAL: Symon

Hi Francois,

Actually, my friend, I'm using my (very old and treadworn) experience to play with this. I have memories of the road network in Viet Nam in 1969/70. I recall one displacement where we started from Red Beach at Qui Nhon and were headed for Plei Plang on Route 19. We stopped at Radcliff and Pleiku and got to our FZ in 4 days (for them who was there, we were the 319th AFAR and shooting behind Mei Doch).

Even though "improved" by the engineers, the road was a horror show. I simply can't imagine how GM 100 woulda thought they coulda pushed through. I saw the markers and pulled off to pay my respects. My diary for that day says it was "f***ing miserable, hot muggy, buggy. Pulled off to pay respects to the French at Marker 61." Road could barely let my WC by and the rest of the column through. But my Battery First was a righteous man and stopped the column and got out to see what his dumb ass butter bar was doing. I explained and I will be dipped in shit if he didn't holler and every single one of the long service vets didn't gather around that marker stone. But that was 1954.

But still, what we (westerners) think of as primary and secondary roads ain't what them folks think of as primary or secondary roads. Even (improved) Route 19 was a serious horror show in 1970. Cannot imagine how it would have looked to GM 100. back in 54 And what the heck would the China transport network have looked like under the circumstances.

Sorry, Francois, just thinking about long ago. Hope it makes sense.. Ciao John

What is FZ,
afar 319,GM 100, WC, and marker 61? Sorry for my lack on 60's mil terminology.
Is mile marker 61 a battlefield?

[fcharton]

ORIGINAL: bigred
What is FZ,
afar 319,GM 100, WC, and marker 61? Sorry for my lack on 60's mil terminology.
Is mile marker 61 a battlefield?

FZ = fire zone
AFAR = airborne field artillery regiment (319 is its number, a fairly famous outfit, fought in St Mihiel in 1917, and then dropped over Ste Mere Eglise during D-Day)
GM 100 = groupement mobile 100, a French unit which fought a lon retreat along the RC 19 (colonial route 19), from An Khe to Pleiku. It was one of those weird battles in the French indochina war (with Cao Bang, or Dien Bien Phu): defeats that are remembered as victories
Marker 61 = milestone for the 61th kilometer of route 19, this is at the end of the road, and the retreat

WC is a command car, Dodge WC series, I think

@John: this is probably very similar to the roads you have between Kunming and Burma. This is mule/man country, anything with an engine will suffer (except if it has tracks). Maybe the correct way to model this is to penalize (not favour) motorized support and similar "wheeled" units. Something like different movement rates for things that walk and things that roll?

Francois

[John 3rd]

I am all FOR this idea. Will gladly allow RA 6.0 to be a guinea pig for this sort of grand experiment.

[spence]

@John: this is probably very similar to the roads you have between Kunming and Burma. This is mule/man country, anything with an engine will suffer (except if it has tracks). Maybe the correct way to model this is to penalize (not favour) motorized support and similar "wheeled" units. Something like different movement rates for things that walk and things that roll?

Quite a few Armies have walked into battle...and become exhausted and run out of supply. Horses are even less durable than men...horrendous terrain is likely to be just as harsh on horses as on trucks. And the horses move considerably less supply than trucks for the men and use a much higher percentage of their load carrying capability carrying just their own fodder.
In the short term and over short distances horses and men might move faster through terrible terrain but then the horses would die and the men would be trying to figure out recipes for those of the local amphibians that they can eat without going into convulsions. As a means of sustaining an Army's supply horses are not as good as trucks.


World War I is known for its massive expenditures of ammunition but the British figured out after the war that they had sent more tons of horse fodder over to France than they had sent tons of ammunition. So they motorized their army because more of it and more of its supply could be moved more efficiency. And improper nourishment quickly renders horses unfit for use. The Germans suffered from this problem in Russia...with limited rail space as they advanced they opted for other things and their horses were forced to get along with what they could forage...when winter came that meant next to nothing. The jungles of Burma offer lots of green stuff but little in way of what horses really need. In the American Civil War horses suffered around 10000 dead a month...pretty close to the same rate as personnel casualties from all causes.

(Just how much horseflesh was hanging around Asia available to the combatants to expend?)

[Mac Linehan]

ORIGINAL: fcharton

ORIGINAL: bigred
What is FZ,
afar 319,GM 100, WC, and marker 61? Sorry for my lack on 60's mil terminology.
Is mile marker 61 a battlefield?

FZ = fire zone
AFAR = airborne field artillery regiment (319 is its number, a fairly famous outfit, fought in St Mihiel in 1917, and then dropped over Ste Mere Eglise during D-Day)
GM 100 = groupement mobile 100, a French unit which fought a lon retreat along the RC 19 (colonial route 19), from An Khe to Pleiku. It was one of those weird battles in the French indochina war (with Cao Bang, or Dien Bien Phu): defeats that are remembered as victories
Marker 61 = milestone for the 61th kilometer of route 19, this is at the end of the road, and the retreat

WC is a command car, Dodge WC series, I think

@John: this is probably very similar to the roads you have between Kunming and Burma. This is mule/man country, anything with an engine will suffer (except if it has tracks). Maybe the correct way to model this is to penalize (not favour) motorized support and similar "wheeled" units. Something like different movement rates for things that walk and things that roll?

Francois

John, Francois, I purchased Bernard Fall's "Street Without Joy" and "Hell in a very small place" from a used book store in 1984 (IIRC). Both were well written and very enjoyable.

The politics or policies of the nations involved are unimportant; it is the courage and perseverance of the men (on both sides) that earn my respect and admiration. If I recall, Fall mentions, in Street, that France had one helicopter in Indochina at that time.

Gents, the mod ideas presented in this thread have, of course, fired me up. Count me in... <grin>

Of course, I don't do any of the work, but enjoy the results. My appreciation to all of those involved.

Mac

[JeffroK]

All my brilliant ideas gone!!!!

Does matrix see this "time out" as a problem or WAD??

[fcharton]

ORIGINAL: spence
Horses are even less durable than men...horrendous terrain is likely to be just as harsh on horses as on trucks. And the horses move considerably less supply than trucks for the men and use a much higher percentage of their load carrying capability carrying just their own fodder.

Actually, those would not be horses but donkeys and mules, and sometimes weirder pack animals like camels in northern China, zogs (crossbreeds of yak and cows) around Tibet, and sometimes oxen too. These animals carry a lot more than a horse (a dozen mules will move a ton of supplies), are very resistant. And yes, you'd have quite a few of those in north and western china, because it was the only transportation means at the time.

I'm not sure the comparison with WWI Europe works, because Europe had a decent grid of roads and railroads, which is pretty much what's lacking in Burma, or southwestern China.

Francois

[spence]

Actually, those would not be horses but donkeys and mules, and sometimes weirder pack animals like camels in northern China, zogs (crossbreeds of yak and cows) around Tibet, and sometimes oxen too. These animals carry a lot more than a horse (a dozen mules will move a ton of supplies), are very resistant. And yes, you'd have quite a few of those in north and western china, because it was the only transportation means at the time.

It really doesn't matter what kind of animal is carrying the boxes of ammunition or whatever. The animal moves less overall. Its own food weighs more per mile moved and consumes more of its load carrying ability than the equivalent of gasoline for a truck weighs or consumes.

It should be noted that the power of a truck engine is rated as 100+ HORSEPOWER (in the obsolete English system). Tactical mobility is not the issue. As far as strategic logistical ability and strategic mobility is concerned the trucks win.

And even on the well developed roads of Europe and European Russia the horses died from overwork in such numbers as to diminish the strategic mobility and logistical sustenance of the German Army. Pretty hard to argue that Burma would have been easier on "horseflesh" than the steppes of Russia.

[Symon]

Great stuff you guys. I'm always impressed at the detailed level of knowledge of folks on these boards, particularly as relates to logistics. So it is with a heavy heart and a great deal of trepidation that I must say it just can't happen.

The engine works the movement thing by checking the LCU Type (Inf, Armor, Arty, Eng, HQ, AA, CD) and applying it to the terrain (or road) type it is attempting to move through. The engine does not consult the 'interior' of an LCU, it just looks at Type. Can you imagine the work needed to consult every moving LCU and determine, from its 'device' list how many tanks, and/or vehicles, and/or MotSup devices it has as a % of unit totals, and what the affect different %s will have on movement rate? We're talking at least 6 man months.

Even then, it couldn't be done, because, as prolific as Michaelm is, he is limited by the 2 Commandments. The First and Greatest Commandment is "Whatever thou doest, it MUST default to the commercial stock version!" The Second Commandment is "Thou shalt honor the First Commandment!"

Everything Michaelm has done for us has been done with attribute fields in the database. Gotta special attribute, then the algorithm goes one way. Don't got it, algorithm goes vanilla. But there's simply no way to tag a very complex movement algorithm, with multiple check and recalc levels, with an attribute.

Hate to get technical, but ya'll modders need to know the limitations of what's possible. That's why Babes is simply a "code specific" tweak to things. Everything we do MUST fit within the code parameters; that is OUR First and Greatest Commandment.

Ciao. JWE

[Symon]

Well, on to less depressing subjects. Here's a preview of China. Still need to do some work on the lower left corner, Nanning round the coast to Canton. Comments welcome.