Questions about Soviet Naval Strategy

[Mgellis]

Got a question for the history buffs...

As I understand it, in the Cold War, the Soviet Navy was mostly oriented around a) denying sea control to the West and b) keeping the West away from their SSBNs. If fighting had started in Europe, a major goal of the Soviet navy would have been to keep America from resupplying Europe.

Was it ever a possibility that the Soviets might have done things "in reverse"...start the fight with the war at sea? Basically, if they were planning on attacking Europe (or worried that they were about to be attacked), instead of launching nuclear weapons or invading Norway and Germany, they would sortie most of their navy and launch attacks against NATO naval forces. If they win the war at sea, after all, they do not have to win the war on land...if America cannot resupply Europe, the war on land would be almost certainly be a loss for the West, unless nuclear weapons are used, but no one wants that, and the Soviets know they can probably get a lot of what they want by asking for it at the diplomatic table from this new position of strength rather than fighting for it and risking nuclear war.

Does this make any sense? Is it plausible? Would it have been more likely at a particular time, like 1960 or 1975? What are your thoughts on this?

[Fishbed]

No, it's not viable. For Atlantic to matter, you need to have some sort of consumption/exhaustion of resources on the mainland. If there is no ground war, there's just no need for convoys, especially if you have a head-start for preparing defences. The air-part of Reforger doesn't need ships to happen. A surprise Soviet attack, for the sake of our usual calculations, could be a costly stalemate - we're talking about the Soviets in full readiness against an unorganized Nato resistance. Soviets can't get more ready than they are, but Nato sure can if you give it one week of early warning.

Anyway, whatever the events, no Soviet naval aviation or Soviet sub/surface force out there is gonna have what it takes to take out the whole US Navy + Allies and their 10+ aircraft carriers, especially if the PacFleet is going to join the fray. The goal was always to disrupt sufficiently the maritime link between America and Europe, not to stop it. If no-one needs ammo or replacement urgently on the ground in Europe, and if everything that makes the crossing is just adding to the normal operational strength of Nato (if there's no ground war) then it's all suddenly moot. Add 4 or 5 days to the travel time of every convoy, making them go way south before coming back along the Spanish and French Coast, and they won't ever see the glimpse of a air or surface launched missile (subs are another matter entirely but, well, hunting south of the Azores is also something easier said than done).

In a greater plan including all out war in Europe, the Soviet fleet would play the role of a powerful nuisance. But there's no hope of winning by putting all the stakes on its shoulders, if it was to be the centrepiece of a West-East conflict - it's not the Battle of Atlantic anymore, subs are not made in a matter of months, once they are lost they truly are. Deciding the battle of Atlantic may have taken two years, deciding a cold war naval conflict in the Atlantic would be over within a month.

[TonyAAA]

If I understand correctly, your premise if that the Soviet Navy takes out as many NATO vessels as possible in a sort of sneak attack (as their navy is weaker overall,) as an opening to a hopefully non-nuclear WW3 with the end goal of either negotiating then and there for a favorable outcome, or overrunning Western Europe which would be made easier without sufficient US support and resupply.

First of all I doubt sinking a bunch of NATO (primarily US) ships would cause any NATO country to cede its territory/sovereignty to the Soviet Union.
There would still need to be a major land war.

Even if they would, I don't think the Soviet Navy could pull it off.
For starters, just how would they coordinate this attack?

As soon most of the fleet is seen to have deployed or one NATO ship/group is attacked, the game is up. NATO forces would go on a much higher alert, possibly even on the offensive.

So the problem(s) then consist of identifying where enough NATO carrier groups/surface groups/attack subs/etc are and where they're going; then deploy enough Soviet vessels without their leaving port being detected or movement being tracked by NATO ships/subs/satellites/SOSUS/etc; then have all those Soviet vessels close to within striking distance of all the different NATO surface groups and vessels simultaneously; then attack them successfully, all without tipping their hand before attacking or causing an escalation to the nuclear level.

In short, I don't think it would work.

As you stated earlier, the Soviet navy was designed to guard its boomers and disrupt enough SLOC to slow down Reforger, not fight for all out control of the Atlantic. It never had the type of numerical or qualitative superiority of surface ships needed IMO.

[smudge56]

A very interesting discussion. As each side was constantly monitoring each other closely I assume it would be hard to completely supprise one another as well. So as soon as it was noticed that forces were being either redeployed or built up the other side would then go on high alert. But I'm just guessing.

[CaptCarnage]

I don't know if I should bring it up because of perceived realism but in Red Storm Rising the war in the Atlantic - combined with a land war in West Germany - was a delaying tactic just to dissolve NATO (getting Germany out if it)
That Atlantic bit was actually just airforce (by capturing Keyflavik AFB and perform ASuW from there) and subs. No big naval fleet operations at all. I think in that book the allies don't understand very well why the Soviets would attempt a war in the Atlantic.

[mikmykWS]

Hi Mark

I don't think so. Soviet Surface Navy was never really configured to although that may have been due more to geography and politics than actual will. This could have happened had a number of countries in Europe gone Red giving them them bases and access to support such a fleet and more emphasis on carrier aviation etc. I've always thought about a what if storyline involving the Soviets gaining most of mainland Europe post Cold War leaving only a few nations to fend off the Red Tide.

In terms of timing and capabilities the Sever exercise in 1968 was the first big one for the Soviet Navy followed by the Okean's in the 70's. Norman Polmar's Guide to the Soviet Navy is a great book on all this and I don't think its that expensive.

[.Sirius]

Hi during the cold war as previously mentioned they would be protecting their SSBN Bastions, surging their SSK,SSG,SSGN,SSN etc into the North Atlantic prior to going to war to attack the SLOC's, Soviet Surface units would have had little impact on NATO SLOC operations due to heavy NATO assets, Soviet Surface units would have operated on commerce raider operations in small task groups and protecting the SSBN Bastions.
Main threat to NATO maritime forces would have been Submarine and Airborne forces.
A good tactic used by SNAF was rolling back NATO ship defences using Badger and Backfires, normally first Badger Regt would start plinking long range ASW assets ie Towed Array ships, Regt is normally 30 Badger/Backfires each with one or two ASM's depending on type, second wave of two Regt would then start peeling back the long range missile shooters up threat of the NATO Task Group or convoy, and lastly 3 Regts would home in on the remaining NATO forces ie 90 aircraft equals 180 ASM's enough to break through remaining defences, we would train against this type of attack in the simulators.... it got messy lots of NATO losses , this type of scenario would have been a first strike option hoping to task out the US CVBG and UK CVBG in the North Atlantic leaving the Submarines to finish off the rest

[Mgellis]

Thanks, guys. This is exactly the kind of information I needed.

I'm playing around with various ideas for World War III scenarios, but I'm trying to figure out how it would NOT turn into a full scale nuclear exchange. If that happens, frankly, it's a bit grim...what you've basically got is the few surviving battle groups going for vengeance, but the last man standing still loses...there isn't really a home port to go back to anymore. I know it's just a story, but it's not fun anymore.

More questions...

1. If a crisis took place (e.g., Six-Day War) where the Soviets got involved and you actually had American and Soviet forces shooting at each other, but NOT in Europe, and the Soviets frankly had no intention of attacking Europe at that time, and there was no DIRECT threat to the US or to the Soviet Union, would it automatically escalate into a nuclear exchange? In other words, a proxy war where it was not just the proxies anymore. I'm guessing here we have a chance of the answer being, "No." How plausible is this?

2. The Soviets do invade Western Europe, going after Norway and West Germany. They gain control of some territory, but the war ends up as a stalemate with Germany and Norway looking a lot like France in World War I. Neither side uses tactical nuclear weapons--neither side is losing badly enough for anyone to make that decision. Is it plausible that both sides would glare at each other for a while but in effect say, "Okay, if you don't nuke our cities, we won't nuke your cities." Isolated tactical nukes might get used, especially at sea, but the war continues on with the Soviets hoping to wear out the West, force them to the diplomatic table, and end up with some gains in territory, even if they have not conquered the whole of Europe. NOW, we have Soviet subs going after convoys, etc. How plausible is this?

Thanks in advance.

Mark

[Mgellis]

By the way, a related idea I have is this...

If I (or anyone else) can come up with some good large campaign ideas, maybe we write up the back story here on the forums, and it becomes a "shared universe" (like the "Wild Cards" and "Thieves World" series) with the main plot and OOBs staying consistent but different scenario writers working up scenarios for different parts of the war. It does not have to be a World War III plot, either, by the way, it could be a possible future (e.g., US vs. Iran in 2017) or alternate history (e.g., Argentina goes after the Falklands again in the mid-90s, while NATO is busy dealing with the former Yugoslavia).

Any thoughts on this?

[thewood1]

I read somewhere that the number of advanced (for the 80's) ASuW missles were very limited due to a lot of the electronic components came from the West and Soviet production was very limited in the components.

Does anyone know if that was true and what impact it would have ina scenario in Command?

[mikmykWS]

Never seen any evidence to support the claim although there was a large naval munitions dump explosion and fire in Kola the 80's that may have impacted over all stocks. In general the Soviets/Russians are very good at building SSM's and in some cases they were more advanced and survivable than their western counterparts at the time. Ex. IIRC some of the bigger ASM's were thought to be somewhat hardened with titanium cones and many seemed to have has some fairly unique datalink capabilities along one missile in the salvo to act as the scout with the others actively poling for guidance queues from it. . The challenge is sorting out real data from bs on this as there is no Freedom of Information Act in Russia.

[Dimitris]

ORIGINAL: thewood1
I read somewhere that the number of advanced (for the 80's) ASuW missles were very limited due to a lot of the electronic components came from the West and Soviet production was very limited in the components.

Does anyone know if that was true and what impact it would have ina scenario in Command?

IIRC this was true for some of their ICBMs. A standard running joke was that SS-18 production rate was supposedly limited not by how many rocket motors they could make, but how many TI scientific calculators they could smuggle out of the US (and install them on the guidance packages). Maybe complete BS but has a ring to it.

[hellfish6]

ORIGINAL: Mgellis

By the way, a related idea I have is this...

If I (or anyone else) can come up with some good large campaign ideas, maybe we write up the back story here on the forums, and it becomes a "shared universe" (like the "Wild Cards" and "Thieves World" series) with the main plot and OOBs staying consistent but different scenario writers working up scenarios for different parts of the war. It does not have to be a World War III plot, either, by the way, it could be a possible future (e.g., US vs. Iran in 2017) or alternate history (e.g., Argentina goes after the Falklands again in the mid-90s, while NATO is busy dealing with the former Yugoslavia).

Any thoughts on this?

During the Yom Kippur War in '73 the US and Soviet fleets were apparently pretty antagonistic towards each other.

As an example of Soviet naval capability, though, the Soviets were unable to protect their own shipping in 1962. They relied on maskirovka (deception), rather than naval capability, to build up their forces and supply the Cubans. If the Soviets were capable of deploying naval forces to distant seas, say with cruisers and destroyers, the blockade of Cuba likely wouldn't have succeeded.

The Soviet fleet was always, I think, designed to control it's coastal waters (Black Sea, Baltic, White Sea, Okhotsk, etc) only. In these coastal waters were the SSBN bastions, of course, but the Fleet was also to protect against the very, very real ability of the US to project forces ashore. I think a lot of people forget that the Soviet Naval Infantry weren't Marines, like those of the west, but rather coastal defense troops. Yes, they had some ability to project power but again, these were all regionally oriented capabilities. Landing naval infantry on the Bosporous, for example, or Hokkaido or the Baltic islands. You wouldn't have ever seen Soviet Naval Infantry landing on Guam, for example, because they had no capacity to steam that far, let alone the logistics to support that landing.

Like the US Marines today, I think the Soviet military was deeply ingrained with their experiences of WWII. Naval Infantry was very important to the defense of the Crimea and Leningrad, and they used small tactical landings of Naval Infantry to support their offensives.

All this being said, given a finite number of heavy anti-ship missiles, I would have expected the Soviets to keep substantial numbers of them in reserve to protect against any American landing attempt or naval-based airstrikes on their coast. Maybe, doctrinally, nuclear ASMs would have been kept in reserve for this type of scenario.

[Russian Heel]

ORIGINAL: mikmyk
The challenge is sorting out real data from bs on this as there is no Freedom of Information Act in Russia.

Well, that's not entirelytrue. I have about 37 gigs of scanned documents in PDF format pertaining to the Soviet Baltic submarines from 1939-June 1941. I have everything you could imagine, but it cost a hefty sum (I'm writing a book on Soviet Baltic submarine operations from 1939-1945, I'm not weird!). Almost everything is available to the public, problem being you need to know exactly what you are looking for and how to ask and where to ask, and be prepared to spend some dough. Often it is required to make requests in person and pay through the national bank, so you would need to be present here to get the documents which also makes it harder for your average person to do. It is more of a bureaucracy issue than anything, and of course there is a lot of stuff still kept secret, it is a lot less material than people think.

[Der Zeitgeist]

ORIGINAL: Mgellis

By the way, a related idea I have is this...

If I (or anyone else) can come up with some good large campaign ideas, maybe we write up the back story here on the forums, and it becomes a "shared universe" (like the "Wild Cards" and "Thieves World" series) with the main plot and OOBs staying consistent but different scenario writers working up scenarios for different parts of the war. It does not have to be a World War III plot, either, by the way, it could be a possible future (e.g., US vs. Iran in 2017) or alternate history (e.g., Argentina goes after the Falklands again in the mid-90s, while NATO is busy dealing with the former Yugoslavia).

Any thoughts on this?

I'm actually working on a plausible plot for a NATO-WP confrontation in 1985/86, some kind of alternate history to give my scenarios a bit of believable political background.

The major premise is that the crisis of the "renewed cold war" from 1982/83 (NATO INF deployment, KAL007, Able Archer) doesn't end in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU. In my world, the man died in 1932, during the Soviet famines (as he almost did in real life).

So there's no one proclaiming Glasnost and Perestroika in 1986, Chernenko dies and is replaced by someone even more afraid of Reagan than Andropov ever was. On May 8, 1985, a bomb explodes on the memorial service for the 40th anniversary of the end of World War 2 in Eastern Berlin, being blamed on fascist terrorists from Western Germany.

It all goes downhill from there.[:'(]

[SSN754planker]

This whole discussion is right down my alley. So here goes my take. IF things went sour and things turned to war, The Soviet Union would not just do a "naval war." One of the benchmarks of strategy is "the seat of purpose is always on the land." Their navy wasn't built for a head on confrontation with the US navy. It was built to deny sea areas. Such as the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea. They had well thought out plans to take at least northern Norway. NATO knew of this and in case of war they had a US marine division going to Norway. I believe the Marines even had equipment prepositioned there. It was also thought that at the very least, they would neutralize Iceland, either by air attack or as Tom Clancy envisioned, an actual assault. Larry Bond in a recent interview after Clancy's death confirmed that the US military took the idea of a Soviet assault on Iceland seriously and had plans to counter it.

The idea of taking out Iceland was mainly to facilitate easier access to the shipping lanes for Soviet submarines. That would have disrupted resupply to Europe in a ground war.

[Russian Heel]

ORIGINAL: Der Zeitgeist


The major premise is that the crisis of the "renewed cold war" from 1982/83 (NATO INF deployment, KAL007, Able Archer) doesn't end in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU. In my world, the man died in 1932, during the Soviet famines (as he almost did in real life).

So there's no one proclaiming Glasnost and Perestroika in 1986, Chernenko dies and is replaced by someone even more afraid of Reagan than Andropov ever was.

Who? Tikhonov I guess? Maybe Solomentsev? Ponomaryov?

[Der Zeitgeist]

ORIGINAL: Russian Heel

ORIGINAL: Der Zeitgeist


The major premise is that the crisis of the "renewed cold war" from 1982/83 (NATO INF deployment, KAL007, Able Archer) doesn't end in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU. In my world, the man died in 1932, during the Soviet famines (as he almost did in real life).

So there's no one proclaiming Glasnost and Perestroika in 1986, Chernenko dies and is replaced by someone even more afraid of Reagan than Andropov ever was.

Who? Tikhonov I guess? Maybe Solomentsev? Ponomaryov?

I don't know yet, I haven't gotten around to study the different members of the politbureau yet. Thanks for your suggesttions though, I will probably start with these men. [:)]

I think for the scenario to be plausible, it would either have to be someone old, who just snaps when the pressure from the West gets too much (Reagan would keep up the pressure, not dialing it down as he did after Able Archer), or it could be someone younger, maybe someone who lost his family in World War 2 and still bears a grudge against the Germans and sees any provocation from the West as a potential threat to the Motherland.

The whole idea is to get away from a scenario that just assumes that the Soviet Union would suddenly decide to invade Western Europe, which is simply ahistorical and doesn't reflect the whole political-military doctrine of the USSR. I'm trying to build a sequence of events that leads to a conflict out of genuine fear and perceived nuclear threat from NATO.

[Russian Heel]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Tikhonov

He was 80 in 1985 (When he was fired as Chairman of the Council by Gorbachev) and was also blind to the economic problems in the country and firmly against perestroika and he was the man that put Andropov in as the General Secretary. His age might be a factor for eliminating him as a candidate, its the reason he used Andropov as his puppet. He couldn't find a puppet after Chernenko died so Gorbachev got elected.

[Mgellis]

Let's try a well-known one...

What if the Soviets tried to run the blockade of Cuba in 1962? The American Navy fires on them, sinks a few of the ships, etc. Meanwhile, the one Foxtrot submarine that nearly fired nuclear-tipped torpedoes actually does fire them--would they be able to tell on sonar that ships are breaking up and other bad things are happening? That might be the reason for using their special weapons. Suffice that some American vessels go down, too.

Realistically, what happens now? Both sides fire all their ICBMs? Limited bomber strikes with conventional weapons against proxy states to indicate "a high level of displeasure" over what has happened--the U.S. bombs some Cuban bases and the U.S.S.R. bombs some Turkish ones? Kennedy gets on the phone to Khrushchev and, without either of them admitting they are both scared silly by what has happened, start to work out some kind of agreement? Something else? What do you think?