Five Ways D-Day Might Have Ended in Disaster

[DTomato]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/fiv ... ster-10601

[TulliusDetritus]

I never bought, trusted the "D-Day's gonna be a disaster!! D-Day's gonna be a disaster!!!!"

Let's take the place where amphibiuos operations were the state of art (the Pacific War that is). Only one landing was repulsed in the whole war: first invasion of Wake Island. Then they [Japanese] came back in force 2 weeks later and they succeeded.

I always suspected this was Churchill pulling the strings [;)] One more alibi to er... not open a second front. Yes, there was Dieppe. But does this one really count? This was more a raid than a proper invasion, backed by enormous amounts of air, sea power, as D-Day was...

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

I never bought, trusted the "D-Day's gonna be a disaster!! D-Day's gonna be a disaster!!!!"

Let's take the place where amphibiuos operations were the state of art (the Pacific War that is). Only one landing was repulsed in the whole war: first invasion of Wake Island. Then they [Japanese] came back in force 2 weeks later and they succeeded.

I always suspected this was Churchill pulling the strings [;)] One more alibi to er... not open a second front. Yes, there was Dieppe. But does this one really count? This was more a raid than a proper invasion, backed by enormous amounts of air, sea power, as D-Day was...

warspite1

Of course there was a possibility that D-Day could fail.

The comparison with the Pacific is simply wrong. Many of the landings – certainly in the early war - were essentially unopposed – not amphibious invasions into the teeth of the enemy at all – indeed the Japanese did not have the specialist equipment for such operations – contributing to the balls up they made at Wake.

When the US came back at the Japanese, the disparity in forces was overwhelming (although did not stop terrible losses on some islands).

But Normandy was a different kettle of fish altogether. Yes, the material superiority was vital, but so too was the weather staying kind, the bravery and fortitude of the airmen the troops and the sailors to see the job through when things were in danger of unravelling (particularly in evidence at Omaha), the success of the deception program and of course the German mistakes in the deployment of their armoured units. All military operations have the potential for balls up - amphibious landings into the teeth of the enemy even more so.

As for the “Churchill pulling the strings” comment. Please…..

Launching an invasion of the continent in 1943 would have stood a very good chance of failure for a number of reasons – less knowledge of what was needed for an invasion to succeed for one thing. No Mulberries either – making dependence on the weather even more important.

Remember, a failed invasion would have been a disaster – not a temporary set-back. That, quite rightly, was the reason Churchill – supported by the General Staff – was unwilling to launch such a premature expedition.

[Capt. Harlock]

Let's take the place where amphibiuos operations were the state of art (the Pacific War that is). Only one landing was repulsed in the whole war: first invasion of Wake Island.

Not correct. The Japanese also landed at Milne Bay, and were forced to evacuate after about two weeks of fighting.

[ezzler]

Pacific and Europe not the same thing at all.

How many Panzer divisions did the Japanese have potentially ready to drive down to the beach? Or how many army corps within 2 days stroll of the invasion beaches?

None.

German OB West
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

German Army Group B Reserve
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel

2 Panzer Division
Generallieutnant Heinrich Freiherr Luetwitz

116 Panzer Division
GeneralLt Gerhard Count von Schwerin


7th Army Reserve
Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann
replaced by Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser on 28 June.

5 Fallschirmjager Division
Generallieutnant Gustav Wilke


LXXXIV Corps
General der Artillerie Erich Marchs (KIA 12 June)
repl. by Gen der Fallschirmtruppe Eugen Meindel on 12 June (Meindel also led II FJ Corps)
repl. by Gen. der Infanterie Wilhelm Fahrmbacher on 13 June.
repl. by Generalleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz on 17 June

Schnelle Brigade 30
Oberstleutnant Hugo Freiherr von und zu Aufsess

77th Infantry Division
Generalieutenant Rudolf Stegmann
repl. by Oberst Rudolf Bacherer on 18 June

91st Luftlande Infantry Division
Generalmajor Wilhelm Falley
repl. by Oberst Bernhard Klosterkemper on 6 June
repl. by Oberst Eugen König on 10 June

243rd Infantry Division
Generalieutenant Heinz Hellmich
repl. by Oberst Bernhard Klosterkemper on 17 June

709th Infantry Division
Generalieutenant Karl Wilhelm von Schlieben


LXXIV Armeekorps
General der Infantrie Erich Straube

353rd Infantry Division
Generalleutnant Paul Mahlmann

266th Infantry Division
Generaleutnant Karl Sprang


XXV Armeekorps
General der Infanterie Wilhelm Fahrmbacher
repl. by Generalleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz on 12 June
repl. by General der Infanterie Wilhelm Fahrmbacher on 17 June

265th Infantry Kampfgruppe
Generalieutenant Walter Duevert

275th Infantry Kampfgruppe
Generaleutnant Hans Schmidt

343rd Infantry Division
Generalleutnant Erwin Rauch


XLVII Panzer Corps
General der Panzertruppe Hans Freiherr Funck


LXXXI Corps
General der Panzertruppe Adolf Kuntzen

346th Infantry Division
Generalleutnant Erich Diestel

711th Infantry Division
Generalmajor Josef Reichert


II Fallshirmjager Corps
General Eugen Meindl

352nd Infantry Division
Generaleutnant Dietrich Kraiss

3rd Fallschirmjäger Division
Generalieutenant Richard Schimpf

17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Götz von Berlichingen
Brigadeführer Werner Ostendorf
repl. by Standartenführer Otto Binge on 17 June
repl. by Oberführer Otto Baum on 20 June


I SS Panzer Corps
Obergruppenführer Sepp Dietrich

716th Infantry Division
Generalieutenant Wilhelm Richter

21st Panzer Division
Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger

Panzer Lehr Division
Generalieutenant Fritz Bayerlein
repl. by Generalmajor Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Groβ-Zauche und Kaminetz on 8 June

12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend
Oberführer Fritz Witt
repl. by Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer on 14 June
repl. by Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer on 16 June

1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler
Oberführer Theodor Teddy Wisch


II SS Panzer Corps
Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser
repl. by Gruppenführer Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner (“Franz Zeidner” in German) on 1 July

2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich
Gruppenführer Heinz Lammerding

9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen
Gruppenführer William Bittrich

10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg
Gruppenfuhrer Heinz Harmel

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The comparison with the Pacific is simply wrong. Many of the landings – certainly in the early war - were essentially unopposed – not amphibious invasions into the teeth of the enemy at all – indeed the Japanese did not have the specialist equipment for such operations – contributing to the balls up they made at Wake.

Actually the Japanese were the first ones to develop modern amphibious operations. When? During their war against China. They had the equipment (the Dai Hatsu and the Toku Dai Hatsu), the doctrine (air superiority and support, naval supremacy) and the special troops.

When the war started in december 1941 they showed the world how well they launched amphibious operations. Against weak and doomed garrisons, ok. But still, these operations were very complex and they succeeded.

As for the “Churchill pulling the strings” comment. Please…..

Oh well, his own memoirs clearly show this point (not to mention later scholars) Almost ALL the high American officers, bosses (and also the Aussies) knew Churchill had his own agenda, and he stubbornly sticked to it, like the Duracell Bunny [:D] The Balkans etc etc etc. So not enough shipping to open the second front, but you see, ships auto-magically appear (not a problem anymore) if the Balkan scenario is considered...

Normandy, a direct blow against Germany was NEVER Churchill's plan. From this conclusion he tried to find the hypotheses that proved his "conclusion" was er.. correct [;)]

And the hypotheses were the things that might go wrong. Of course, victory is never guaranteed, but when you consider the guy who was airing these warnings (the end is near, my friends!) was precisely the guy who wanted to avoid a DIRECT blow, then err... I smell a big fat rat.

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: ezz
Pacific and Europe not the same thing at all.

And real and on paper divisions are not the same thing either. Werhmacht in *1944*. Enough said [8D]

[british exil]

The Wehrmacht still went on to fight another year, they were "finished" in autumn of 44 but rupulsed the Holland campaign (A bridge too far) and surprised the allies in the Battle of the Bulge.

They were not boy scouts, they were veterans, know how to survive and how to kill.

Mat

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: british exil

The Wehrmacht still went on to fight another year, they were "finished" in autumn of 44 but rupulsed the Holland campaign (A bridge too far) and surprised the allies in the Battle of the Bulge.

They were not boy scouts, they were veterans, know how to survive and how to kill.

Mat

I don't dispute that. They kept fighting near the Führerbunker [8D]

What was the real TOE of Werhmacht divisions by 1944? 50%? 40%? Where was the Luftwaffe? Well, veterans... and new recruits (old men and almost kids) to replace the massive losses taken in the east...

[t001001001]

There was 1,000,000 things that could have gone wrong at D-Day and prolly 999,998 things did. Those guys still got it done.

[gradenko2k]

Japanese amphibious landings were decidedly not state-of-the-art. They had no doctrine for naval gunfire support coordination, no doctrine for close air support coordination, and they only managed naval and air supremacy insofar as the enemy had little to none. You said it yourself - they were repulsed at Wake Island!

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The comparison with the Pacific is simply wrong. Many of the landings – certainly in the early war - were essentially unopposed – not amphibious invasions into the teeth of the enemy at all – indeed the Japanese did not have the specialist equipment for such operations – contributing to the balls up they made at Wake.

Actually the Japanese were the first ones to develop modern amphibious operations. When? During their war against China. They had the equipment (the Dai Hatsu and the Toku Dai Hatsu), the doctrine (air superiority and support, naval supremacy) and the special troops.

When the war started in december 1941 they showed the world how well they launched amphibious operations. Against weak and doomed garrisons, ok. But still, these operations were very complex and they succeeded.

Warspite1

Yes the Japanese built these craft and the doctrine to allow limited invasions of lightly held or undefended enemy territory. Please tell me how many Japanese amphibious operations were mounted directly against hundreds of thousands of well dug-in troops, supported by coastal batteries, beach defences (wire, tank-traps, pill-boxes etc etc), and an ability to hurry large numbers of troops and tanks to the beachhead very quickly?

I do not understand how you can compare the typical landings in the Pacific theatre, with D-Day. They are chalk and cheese.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The comparison with the Pacific is simply wrong. Many of the landings – certainly in the early war - were essentially unopposed – not amphibious invasions into the teeth of the enemy at all – indeed the Japanese did not have the specialist equipment for such operations – contributing to the balls up they made at Wake.

As for the “Churchill pulling the strings” comment. Please…..

Oh well, his own memoirs clearly show this point (not to mention later scholars) Almost ALL the high American officers, bosses (and also the Aussies) knew Churchill had his own agenda, and he stubbornly sticked to it, like the Duracell Bunny [:D] The Balkans etc etc etc. So not enough shipping to open the second front, but you see, ships auto-magically appear (not a problem anymore) if the Balkan scenario is considered...

Normandy, a direct blow against Germany was NEVER Churchill's plan. From this conclusion he tried to find the hypotheses that proved his "conclusion" was er.. correct [;)]

And the hypotheses were the things that might go wrong. Of course, victory is never guaranteed, but when you consider the guy who was airing these warnings (the end is near, my friends!) was precisely the guy who wanted to avoid a DIRECT blow, then err... I smell a big fat rat.

warspite1

Ah the good old conspiracy theory - where's SLAAKMAN [;)]

So Churchill preferred a Mediterranean strategy, so what? That is not hidden, that is not the debate. Was a successful invasion of northwest Europe in 1944 a foregone conclusion - and thus could it actually have been achieved earlier?

The answer to the first is no, and the answer to the second is possibly - a VERY slim possibly. But its so very easy with hindsight, sitting in our comfortable 21 st century world making claims like this. Unlike us, playing war games, if Churchill or FDR got it wrong, the Allies could lose the war or it could be dragged on for many years more. With the sensible application of overwhelming force, the western Allies would win through. Launching strategically correct, but half-arsed, I'll-prepared adventures was a way of chucking away that superiority, not to mention losing thousands of men - and by the way, I think Churchill was fully aware of that from personal experience, Gallipoli anyone?

But you believe your conspiracy theory and that the reasons for the delay in launching D-Day, (and the subsequent stories of how it could have failed) are all fantasies in the mind of one man desperate to cover his tracks.......

[msvknight]

I suspect if Panzers had got to the beach they would have been able to smash 1 or maybe 2 of the beaches. This would have left a gap between the two beachheads, but probably would not have caused them to fail. Once the beachheads were reinforced, breaking out would probably have proved to be easy than historically proven because any tanks getting to the beach would have been pulverized by the naval and air assets being brought to bear. I imagine a 15" shell hitting a beach would create a fairly significant tank trap even if it did miss. In Sicily two 6 inch cruisers were able to make a significant contribution to stopping the Hermann Goering Division, and the Normandy support forces were much bigger. The major shock would have been when the storm hit on the 21st. If they had not formed a single beachhead by that point, the Americans in the west would have been without a supply port.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Michael Knight

I suspect if Panzers had got to the beach they would have been able to smash 1 or maybe 2 of the beaches. This would have left a gap between the two beachheads, but probably would not have caused them to fail. Once the beachheads were reinforced, breaking out would probably have proved to be easy than historically proven because any tanks getting to the beach would have been pulverized by the naval and air assets being brought to bear. I imagine a 15" shell hitting a beach would create a fairly significant tank trap even if it did miss. In Sicily two 6 inch cruisers were able to make a significant contribution to stopping the Hermann Goering Division, and the Normandy support forces were much bigger. The major shock would have been when the storm hit on the 21st. If they had not formed a single beachhead by that point, the Americans in the west would have been without a supply port.

warspite1

Not sure I follow that. How would a breakout be easier if only 3 of the beaches had been secured? How would the smashing of German formations be easier than historically? The tanks would not be on the beach sitting around with tank crews making sandcastles. Destruction of tanks and enemy formations would be more difficult because they would be up close and personal with the Allied troops desperately clinging to their beachheads. The reinforcement of those beaches would be thus even more difficult.

With only 3 beaches in place, the Germans have a smaller area to seal off and contain too.

[Saint Ruth]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus
And real and on paper divisions are not the same thing either. Werhmacht in *1944*. Enough said

Actually, most of the 10 Panzer divisions in France on D-Day were near full strength. They were also fully rested and had spent the previous months training, so they weren't "paper" divisions.

I recall reading (perhaps Max Hastings Armageddon?), the Germans lost 2,500 tanks in Normandy versus nearly twice that for the Allies.
I doubt the fellows on Operation Goodwood thought they were fighting paper divisions! [:)]

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Yes the Japanese built these craft and the doctrine to allow limited invasions of lightly held or undefended enemy territory. Please tell me how many Japanese amphibious operations were mounted directly against hundreds of thousands of well dug-in troops, supported by coastal batteries, beach defences (wire, tank-traps, pill-boxes etc etc), and an ability to hurry large numbers of troops and tanks to the beachhead very quickly?

You are grossly underestimating what the Japanese did methinks. And most importantly you are grossly overestimating the "Atlantic Wall"... You cannot- repeat- cannot defend a coast which goes from Denmark to Spain! It's a military impossibility.

You must be necessarily weak everywhere. And just because there are many enemy troops in the vicinity, this does not mean they will kick you out 10 minutes after the landings.

In fact, they could not manage to throw the enemy to the sea, go figure, no matter the many divisions around. And just in case someone retorts "Hitler did not allow these moves" what happened when they finally were on the move? The Tactical Air Force basically destroyed them. Again, where was the Luftwaffe?

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: Saint Ruth

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus
And real and on paper divisions are not the same thing either. Werhmacht in *1944*. Enough said

Actually, most of the 10 Panzer divisions in France on D-Day were near full strength. They were also fully rested and had spent the previous months training, so they weren't "paper" divisions.

I recall reading (perhaps Max Hastings Armageddon?), the Germans lost 2,500 tanks in Normandy versus nearly twice that for the Allies.
I doubt the fellows on Operation Goodwood thought they were fighting paper divisions! [:)]

The whole force was indeed understrengthened. And without air support. Really, just because you read 7 Infantry Division this does not mean the division is at 100%. They were not in most cases. Of course, in the situation conferences, Hitler did not pay attention to this little irrelevant details...

Sometimes, he ordered four divisions to attack when in fact each divisions had the fighting force of a batallion. Four divisions are four divisions, they should crush the enemy, as they did in 39, 40 and 41... [8|]

And this elite German soldier thing is also unreal. Hitler himself had said it: "the best ones already died". To replace these guys -WHEN they were replaced- you think the kids and old men were already elite veterans simply because they were germans? [;)]

[Saint Ruth]

here are many enemy troops in the vicinity, this does not mean they will kick you out 10 minutes after the landings.

In fact, they could not manage to throw the enemy to the sea, go figure, no matter the many divisions around. And just in case someone retorts "Hitler did not allow these moves" what happened when they finally were on the move? The Tactical Air Force basically destroyed them. Again, where was the Luftwaffe?

The Tactical Air Force didn't basically destroyed them. Panzer Lehr lost 95 or so vehicles (not tanks, vehicles) moving to the Normandy area. They were delayed substantially.

OF course they could have thrown the enemy into the sea if there had been 10 panzer divisions sitting within 5 miles of the Normandy beaches. I can't see how you can say D-Day would have succeeded regardless of how many German soldiers were at Normandy.

[Saint Ruth]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus
And this elite German soldier thing is also unreal. Hitler himself had said it: "the best ones already died". To replace these guys -WHEN they were replaced- you think the kids and old men were already elite veterans simply because they were germans? [;)]

The average age of the German soldier in 1944 was actually 34 in 1944.

The fact is if they were washed up old men with paper strength tanks, how did they hold the allies in Normandy for 7 weeks (until Operation Cobra -- thought the battle wasn't over then) and destroy 4,000 Allied tanks and inflict a quarter of a million casualties on them?
Why do you believe the US and British/Canadians were so useless?