IJN Battleship availability chart

[ChuckBerger]

I'm working on destroyers... but that will take awhile. In the meantime, I did the battleships, since there's only a couple of them.

One question: Kirishima's TROM, as reproduced at Combined Fleet, has her receiving "serious damage after being swamped by successive waves" while returning home from the Pearl Harbor raid, enough to require drydock time. www.combinedfleet.com/kirishima.htm I put this in the chart, but I've never heard this before, and couldn't find any other account of it. Anyone?

Otherwise, again not too many surprises in doing the battleship chart, as their stories are fairly well known. Striking how little the IJN battleships actually did, aside from the 4 Kongos. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.

I also wonder whether Ise/Hyuga/Fuso/Yamashiro could've all been converted to full CVs, with more or less the same resources as the Ise/Hyuga hybrid conversions plus Shinano conversion took. That might have given 4 additional CVs for Phillipine Sea.

[wdolson]

The problem with the IJN BBs was they were too expensive to lose until it was way too late. The gun club kept thinking there was going to be a decisive battle line engagement at some point, but it was a doomed strategy about as useful as still digging WWI trenches for a static front in 1943.

Bill

[SierraJuliet]

Yet another case of hindsight having a bearing on the way we play the game. If those big ships are going to go down at some point they had better do something useful before they do so.

[crsutton]

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.

Lately, I've been seeing them escorted by mere E's [:D]. I understand why, but it's funny to me. Japan is already short on DDs. Every one that you sink just makes it worse.

[spence]

. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.

Considering how they performed at Leyte Gulf was all that training useful? Was the sea too calm for their gunnery expertise off Samar[8|]?

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: spence

. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.

Considering how they performed at Leyte Gulf was all that training useful? Was the sea too calm for their gunnery expertise off Samar[8|]?

Pretty hazy and smoky at Leyte Gulf with some rain squalls to boot. No amount of expertise could compensate for the lack of visibility and modern fire control systems. Frequent course changes due to constant air harassment was a factor too. The surprised Allies were still fighting on a whole different level at that stage of the war. It was like a blind bear trying to take on a rat terrier. [;)]

[spence]

Except that the IJN blind bear had 3 to 1 odds in DDs and then got to add in all those cruisers and 4 BBs. IJN cruisers and destroyers did quite well during the war although no so well off Samar. Japanese BB fleets and the senior admirals commanding them did no better than the Italians or the Germans. The Japanese BBs don't even have a tactical victory to their credit similar to Bismarck sinking the Hood.

[wdolson]

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.

Lately, I've been seeing them escorted by mere E's [:D]. I understand why, but it's funny to me. Japan is already short on DDs. Every one that you sink just makes it worse.

No need for Fleet destroyers on the Taberfane Express, just the old torpedo boats to keep your subs at bay

I'll swap them out for the Matsu when they start arriving next month. I like those little 30+ knot E-class ships, I wish I'd two hundred more...

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill

Interesting background on Kurita. I wonder how things would have changed if there had been one of the "go down with both broadsides firing" types in overall command. The Japanese would likely have suffered even worse losses, but what might they have gained in return?

[jamesjohns]

Interesting background on Kurita. I wonder how things would have changed if there had been one of the "go down with both broadsides firing" types in overall command. The Japanese would likely have suffered even worse losses, but what might they have gained in return?

Please correct me if I am wrong but just more deaths for both sides and no real influence on the course or outcome of the war. Perhaps more of Taffy 3 but if they would have continued would they not have been then between more of 7th fleet to the south and 3rd fleet to the north?

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill

They fired off an incredible amount of ammo for the modest damage that they inflicted. They were just too dependent on visual spotting and spotting was quite difficult that day. I read that all the treaty cruisers and pre war BBs had very slow turrets and with the older fire control systems frequent course changes really affected gunnery. The Japanese ships at Leyte had to constantly change course to avoid the numerous harassing air attacks that the Americans threw at them. Combine that with the poor visibility and you can then understand why they were not hitting much.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill

I always liked Kurita. Great admiral, seems to me, just ended up on the "wrong" side.

I thought the committal of the Kongos at Guadalcanal was OK, but I think the IJN got gunshy afterwards. They lost both, but it seems to me that they were unlucky with the Hiei while the Kirishima did get straight dominated. Let's also not forget that prior to the battles on November 13-14 (or was it 14-15?), they did successfully bombard Henderson during a night and just about knocked it out of action. No operational Henderson and the USMC is in trouble, which I think predicated the naval battles. Remember also that the IJN technically had carrier superiority at this time of the war, though perhaps they didn't know it. Those bombardment shells were something, at least so far as I can surmise from semi-scientific/semi-artistic schematic drawings.

[spence]

they did successfully bombard Henderson during a night and just about knocked it out of action. No operational Henderson and the USMC is in trouble,

They just about knocked it out of action is key. By the end of the day Marine SBDs and fighters were bombing and strafing the transports which were the BB's raison d'etrre. Although the reinforcements landed gave the Japanese a "one off shot" at capturing Henderson Field by land the principle effect in the end was to give them more mouths to feed with fewer ships.

Further the bombardment seems not to have been repeatable in the short term. And so the day after the day after the bombardment the situation for the IJA reverted to what it had been before: food, ammunition and medical supplies dependent on the vagaries of the wind and the tide (which governed the arrival of the barrels in which those commodities were stored). IJ merchant hulls were not welcome in Ironbottom Sound.

[ChuckBerger]

Kurita at Samar faced a conundrum...

On the one hand, there would never be a better opportunity (or indeed, any opportunity at all) for the IJN to inflict damage in surface action on the American fleet. This he must have known. So if the goal was to inflict damage, no matter what the cost, he made the wrong call.

Yet he also must have known that his opportunity to inflict serious damage was limited. He had just witnessed the extreme difficulty his force had prosecuting a naval battle while under constant air attack, and undoubtedly he knew that the air attacks would continue and probably intensify. Plus the likely presence of US battleships. So even though this was the best remaining opportunity for the IJN battle fleet to inflict damage on the Americans, still it was not a very good opportunity. At best, he was looking at trading his ships for another couple of US CVEs, or maybe at the outside some of Oldendorf's old battleships.

And then he must also have known, in his heart of hearts, that this was not a "decisive" battle, in the sense of a battle that could change the outcome of the war. It wasn't 1942 anymore. There was no longer any real opportunity for Japan to win the war, or even to fight to a stalemate. Even if he managed to repel the Philippines invasion completely, all that does is buy a few months. I think all Japanese leaders must have known this by 1944, even if they didn't admit it to anyone or to themselves.

In the face of all that, what's a reasonable "goal" for Kurita? If it's to inflict damage at any price, he made the wrong decision. If it's not to waste his men's lives for little return, and no real strategic impact, then he made the right decision. I think on balance his choice was the right one. But then again, I think Japan should have surrendered in 1944, if not earlier...

[wdolson]

In a sense it was a decisive battle, but one in which Japan could only lose. After Leyte the IJN didn't have the capability to put ships to sea to do much of anything. The one exception was the Yamato's suicide mission to Okinawa and that was such a shoestring operation they only had enough fuel for a one way trip and could only escort with one CL and a handful of DDs.

Bill

[spence]

Sorry for hi-jacking this thread. It just that IMHO IJN battleships are grossly over-rated as to crew readiness and overall capability.

There are a lot of photos of the Battle Off Samar in which the IJN BB's got exactly the battle that they had practiced for all those long years. Supposedly they practiced in bad weather. Having spent several years at sea this picture seems to show pretty close to the best one can expect. The picture is also notable since it is one of the few photos in existence wherein both a US ship and an IJN ship are visible (I think the original was taken from one of the other CVEs which was somewhat further away than the photo indicates - it may be a digitized enhancement of the original where the ship from which the photo was taken is in the foreground: ~2000 yds away from Gambier Bay)

http://www.brianacuff.com/Samar/28.jpg

[wdolson]

I think there were some things going on at Samar are not well modeled in the game. For one thing visibility was poor that day as someone commented above and the Japanese depended on optical rangefinders. The quality of bunker sea in use was much worse than earlier in the war. The Japanese ended up in a stern chase which prevented them from bringing all guns into action.

I don't know for sure, but I suspect the BB crews' quality had also declined during the war. It was common in other navies to draw crew members away from established crews to serve on newly commissioned ships. The IJN expanded less than most other navies during the war, but they did commission a lot of smaller ships as well as a number of carriers. Even if the crews hadn't been drawn off, they may have just been rusty from years of inaction.

Bill

[Symon]

Just a teensy thought for all the IJ BB enthusiasts, out there. And a small take on why the IJN didn't use them

A rough run-in, in the Solomons by 8th Fleet. Rabaul to Guadalcanal is ~650 nm. That’s 2 days at nominal cruise speed; one-out, one-back.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 880 + 280 = ~1160 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed, and up to 6900 tons at full speed (although 4030 tons would be a better allowance assuming 50/50 cruise/full power fuel consumption).

A more robust run-in by elements of 4th Fleet. Truk to Guadalcanal is ~1350 nm. That’s 8 days out and back (4 days one way), at nominal cruise speed.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 3520 + 1056 = ~4575 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed. Allowing for a 1 day full power run-in and 1 day full power withdrawal that’s ~3450 tons at cruise, and 6850 tons at combat. That’s 10300 tons of fuel for a 2xBB bombardment mission. Of course Yamato used ~20% more fuel/day than the ‘typical’ IJ BB, so is it any surprise that she was used as a hotel and floating gas station?

Ciao. JWE.