A Question

[Mike Scholl]

As WitP will deal with the whole Pacific Campaign (including even
such things as production choices and the like), will the Allied
side still be stuck with the incompetence of the two most inept
area CO's in the Pacific at the war's start? I mean MacArthur
in the Philippines and Perceval in Malaya.

"Dugout Doug" managed to get his entire air force crippled on
the ground 8 hours AFTER getting the word on Pearl Harbor. He
also through years of planning out the window by refusing to
activate "plan Orange" and move the large stockpiles of food
and supplies into Bataan before the Japanese landed---instead
opting for a pipe dream of poorly organized, trained, and led
Philippino Militia stopping the Imperial Japanese Army on the
beaches. His arrogant stupidity led to the Bataan Garrison
being put on half-rations the moment they arrived there, while
enough supply to last them a full year rotted, went up in smoke, or fed the Japanese in Central Luzon. The Philippines can't be
held indefinately.., but the could have held a lot longer and/or
cost the Japanese a lot more difficulty had someone with an
ounce of sense been in command instead of the ton of ego that
was MacArthur.

Perceval also proved an inept moral coward. Given a plan to
defend a Naval Base for which there was no fleet with a bunch
of forward airfields for which there were no planes, he proceeded
to try and hold everything (even part of Thailand) with a force
of second-line troops instead of reccognizing the realities of his
situation and opting for something more on the lines of Plan
Orange's acceptance of the inevitable loss and push to buy time.
Again, anyone with an ounce of "moral fibre" would have held
the northern area with delay and destruction parties to slow the
Japanese while preparing a defense in depth in the south which
his troops WWI style training might have had a chance to hold.

Just wondering? How much and what kind of flexibility will the
player have in WitP?

[Hoplosternum]

Well I think the problem will be more of how to enable the Japanese to get anywhere near to its historical performance against a human player. Nothing will kill the game off more than if the Japanese rarely complete the conquest of Philipines and ABDA and malaya commands usually last into 1943 if their threatened at all. It is hard to see how the same number of mistakes could be made on the allies side nor the near perfect attacks of the Japanese can be replicated without giving some kind of special powers to the Japanese.The problem then is that these powers (super Zero performance, almost unbeatable ground troops etc.) linger on in the game long after they are really warrented.

I would like to be able to change the HQ leaders but maybe having them fixed at least for an initial period may help reproduce the poor early allied performance.

It may be an interesting what if for the allies to have a better start either in Malaya, Philipines or Pearl but I think this is best left to an edited fantasy scenario not the standard game. If competant allied play can hold the Japanese well short of their historic early conquests then the game is not going to be much fun IMHO.

[mogami]

Hi, I think it's pretty easy to sit back 62 years after an event and point out where everyone made their mistakes.
In real time, bad early decisions influnence the events that follow. However it does not mean the person lacked courage or ability only that they made a poor choice and paid for it. I'm sure the reasons were what the commanders considered real and important for doing what they did. They by their actions were learning and teaching the commanders that followed what to do.
Famous leaders in history are often merely the men who replaced the men who
taught the rest how not to do something. (It would not have mattered who was in command at the start of the particular conflict, their all just as ignorant to start with.)
Often the fired guy was really more capable then his famous replacment.
It's easy to be the guy in charge after
Your units have been trained and gained some experiance
You learn the enemys strengths and weakness and begin producing weapons based on this knowledge
Your country is awake and providing support, and numbers greater then the enemies.
Your not one of the few targets the enemy is concentrating against.

I think it is a great mistake for officers to aspire to peacetime command. Your likely to be the one who catches the blame while some johnnie come lately becomes president after getting everything you were refused in the period leading to the conflict.

It does not really matter who you place in command of a hopeless
position. I promise during the game both players knowing the complete history will still commit errors and be caught by suprise.
Over/under estimate the enemy. And everything else the actual leaders were prone to do. There just will not be any actual suffering as a result. (unless you take the game too seriously)

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by Hoplosternum
Well I think the problem will be more of how to enable the Japanese to get anywhere near to its historical performance against a human player. Nothing will kill the game off more than if the Japanese rarely complete the conquest of Philipines and ABDA and malaya commands usually last into 1943 if their threatened at all. It is hard to see how the same number of mistakes could be made on the allies side nor the near perfect attacks of the Japanese can be replicated without giving some kind of special powers to the Japanese.The problem then is that these powers (super Zero performance, almost unbeatable ground troops etc.) linger on in the game long after they are really warrented.

I would like to be able to change the HQ leaders but maybe having them fixed at least for an initial period may help reproduce the poor early allied performance.

It may be an interesting what if for the allies to have a better start either in Malaya, Philipines or Pearl but I think this is best left to an edited fantasy scenario not the standard game. If competant allied play can hold the Japanese well short of their historic early conquests then the game is not going to be much fun IMHO.

You make a wonderfully logical and intelligent argument for leaving well enough alone. And I agree with you that the
thought of playing the Allied side against a computer-commanded
Japanese one will probably be a waste of time when looking
for true competition. No-one has ever managed an AI that does
a strategic offensive well. But I was thinking in terms of having
a human opponant, and what my options might be in the game
in that regard. Humans are wonderfully inventive when it comes
to finding areas to exploit in games, and I'm sure a good Japanese player or team will find some totally unexpected ways to press their initial advantages to the maximum. Just looking to
see what possible "counters" might be available.

[Mike Scholl]

Actually I waspointing out that MacArthur had ignored the results of several "man years" of staff studies done in the Thirties when
he arbitrarily decided to "****-can" Plan Orange in favor of his
own delusional fantasies. And when his fantasy bubble was popped, he immediately returned to the plan he'd abandoned.
But in the intervening period, he had actively resisted and forbidden the very stockpiling of Bataan needed to make Plan Orange viable as being "defeatist". So he wound up falling back
on a Plan for which he had not done any preparation---and his
soldiers starved and sufferred for it. Which probably accounts
for his refusal to even visit his units on Bataan---he lacked the
moral courage to face them as they starved for his sins.

[Yamamoto]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
Actually I waspointing out that MacArthur had ignored the results of several "man years" of staff studies done in the Thirties when
he arbitrarily decided to "****-can" Plan Orange in favor of his
own delusional fantasies. And when his fantasy bubble was popped, he immediately returned to the plan he'd abandoned.
But in the intervening period, he had actively resisted and forbidden the very stockpiling of Bataan needed to make Plan Orange viable as being "defeatist". So he wound up falling back
on a Plan for which he had not done any preparation---and his
soldiers starved and sufferred for it. Which probably accounts
for his refusal to even visit his units on Bataan---he lacked the
moral courage to face them as they starved for his sins.

Wow, so bitter toward McArthur. What did he do to you? Did you, like have a relative who died under his command or something?

Yamamoto

[Mike Scholl]

No.., actually I had an uncle in the 32nd Division who had the
misfortune to be under MacArthur's brilliant leadership at Buna
in late '42. It was his ascerbic comments every time MacArthur's
name came up that got me interested in studying the General's
earlier WWII record.

From the middle of 1943 through Inchon, MacArthur turned in
a hell of a performance, the high point being his "Vice Royalty"
over a defeated Japan. But if any other General had turned
in a performance as incompetent as Mac's from the middle of
1941 to the middle of 1943 he would probably have ended up
with Kimmel and Short. He was lucky to be someone who could
be painted as a Hero when we desperately needed one. Take
a good detailed look at the Philippines Campaign and the Buna
Campaign sometime---it's an eye-opener.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
Actually I waspointing out that MacArthur had ignored the results of several "man years" of staff studies done in the Thirties when
he arbitrarily decided to "****-can" Plan Orange in favor of his
own delusional fantasies. And when his fantasy bubble was popped, he immediately returned to the plan he'd abandoned.
But in the intervening period, he had actively resisted and forbidden the very stockpiling of Bataan needed to make Plan Orange viable as being "defeatist". So he wound up falling back
on a Plan for which he had not done any preparation---and his
soldiers starved and sufferred for it. Which probably accounts
for his refusal to even visit his units on Bataan---he lacked the
moral courage to face them as they starved for his sins.

Mike

Pardon me if I respectifully disagree.

For your information WPO3 was OFFICIALLY recinded in Oct.41, by presidential order and with complete agreement of the Army Chief of staff (Marshall); in favor of the defend the beaches plan. He did not "ARBITRARILY" can it. So you might as well blame FDR and Marshall for the defeat, becuase he was simply carrying out the official strategy. WPO3 was a plan which the only outcome could be enivatable defeat. Which by definition is "DEFEATEST". What self respecting commander wouldnt prefer to fight to win instead of fight to loose? You are correct that pre-stockpiling of might have eleviated some suffering early on. But then what? They would have eventually run out of food and suffered anyway. Unless you think they could have held out ontil Oct 1944?:rolleyes:

IMO, the defend the beaches plan was a viable one that had a chance to succeed; particularly if USAFFE had recieved everything promised; but even with his meager resources at hand in Dec 41. He might have succeeded in repulsing the initial landings if he commited his best troops, but that is hindsite and MacArthur had some legitamate reasons for holding those troops in reserve.

If you ask me it was FDR "arbitrarily" initiating the oil embargo when he did, that doomed the Philipines not MacArthur.

I do agree about Malaya though that was a royal screw up.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Hoplosternum


It may be an interesting what if for the allies to have a better start either in Malaya, Philipines or Pearl but I think this is best left to an edited fantasy scenario not the standard game. If competant allied play can hold the Japanese well short of their historic early conquests then the game is not going to be much fun IMHO.

Hoplosternum,

I disagree. There is no reason to require that the initial Japanese conquest must be a slam dunk to be historical or fun. The historical Japanese offensive was extremely risky that required perfectly coordinated attacks over vast areas. It succeeded brilliantly not only because its almost flawless execution, but also because of a good share of luck, timeing, and correspondently poor decisions and execution on part of the allies.

For me the only reason to play the allies would be to see if you could do better than historical early in the war, because inevitably its going to be pretty much a cake walk later on.

On the other hand the game *should* make it extemely challenging to repeat the historic Japanese initial success, because quite frankly it was an extemely ambitious challenging plan. The Japanese themselves were suprise by the swiftness and extent of their victory.

IMO there should be by no means any artificial mechanics to either ensure initial Japanese victory or Allied defeat. That would take all the fun out of the game for me.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
Mike

Pardon me if I respectifully disagree.

For your information WPO3 was OFFICIALLY recinded in Oct.41, by presidential order and with complete agreement of the Army Chief of staff (Marshall); in favor of the defend the beaches plan. He did not "ARBITRARILY" can it. So you might as well blame FDR and Marshall for the defeat, becuase he was simply carrying out the official strategy. WPO3 was a plan which the only outcome could be enivatable defeat. Which by definition is "DEFEATEST". What self respecting commander wouldnt prefer to fight to win instead of fight to loose? You are correct that pre-stockpiling of might have eleviated some suffering early on. But then what? They would have eventually run out of food and suffered anyway. Unless you think they could have held out ontil Oct 1944?:rolleyes:

MacArthur announced when he was re-activated in the American
Army in July of 1941 that he totally rejected the concepts of
WPO3, and that he dissagreed with the Europe-First strategy
of "Rainbow 5". He was well into the process of "gutting" WPO3
long before it was officially recinded in favor of the "Germany First"
Rainbow Plan. As a Field Marshal in the Philippines Army he had
been fighting to enact his own ideas of a Swiss-style Militia for
the Philippines since 1936. His total refusal to see that the
Philippines had neither the money nor the economic base to
support his Militia, and lacked the time to create one in any case,
squandered most of the few resources available.

I didn't say that WPO3 offered a chance to hold out or to be
victorious. What it did offer was the best use of the resources
and manpower available in "soaking up" Japanese assets in
a war situation. Which in the realities of 1941 was all that
could be hoped for or expected. MacArthur's "plan" was
politically popular with the Philippino Government (though not
to the extent MacArthur believed)---but WPO3 was much more militarily useful to the United States. MacArthur a seemed to
forget "who was working for who."

IMO, the defend the beaches plan was a viable one that had a chance to succeed; particularly if USAFFE had recieved everything promised; but even with his meager resources at hand in Dec 41. He might have succeeded in repulsing the initial landings if he commited his best troops, but that is hindsite and MacArthur had some legitamate reasons for holding those troops in reserve.

Given the length of beach to be defended just at Lingayen Gulf,
and the fact that the Japanese landed up the side of the Gulf
instead of at it's base where he expected them, I don't think
your argument that "defending the beaches" was viable holds
up.

If you ask me it was FDR "arbitrarily" initiating the oil embargo when he did, that doomed the Philipines not MacArthur.

No argument that this was a short-sighted political move by FDR.
Problem was mainly that neither side understood the other. The
U.S. looked at a potential war in economic terms; and thought
that Japan, with less than 10% of our resources and industrial
might, must be bluffing about going to war. The Japanese lived
in their own little delusion of superior moral will, and thought the
Americans "too soft" to pay the price in blood of a war. After all, their soldiers were willing to die for the Emperor. What they
totally missed was that American economic power would enable
us to kill them all for their Emperor. And FDR couldn't see that
the Japanese were not willing to be shoved back into the ranks
of Third-Rate Powers while they still had an Army and a Fleet.
Lots of stupidity on both sides.

I do agree about Malaya though that was a royal screw up.

[Leahi]

This seems to me a tough issue for historical strategy game designers. A game by definition should allow the possibility for any player to win, if he's capable enough. On the other hand, in this case history must be respected, if only to satisfy the interests of the players who choose to play such a game.

But these programmers are not in it merely for the fun, as we are. Nor do they pay us to play; rather, we pay them to give us a good game to play at our expense in money and time as well as emotional expenditure (and broken marriages, loss of sleep, gray hairs, etc [probably the creators of the game share these problems]). So hopefully the WITP designers will find a way to allow for either side to win, while recreating historical parameters for us to work with. If not, we'll just have to shop elsewhere for the kind of games we like to play, if we can find them....

[Admiral DadMan]

Ron,

You double posted. Click the "edit" button on one of them. When you get to the edit page, click the "delete" check box at the top. Then click the "Delete Now" button to the right of it.

[Leahi]

Thank you DadMan. Your attention to detail is Admiral -- uh, admirable.

[Hoplosternum]

Hi Timjot,

I understand what you are saying and agree in part. I don't want the initial conquests to be a complete cakewalk for the Japanese. However this is a game and needs to be reasonably challenging. I don't see too much of a problem in single player as long as the AI can plan attacks well. Playing as the allies you can always pull back / not try to hard initially if you like.

But I worry about the effect on PBEM. Everyone knows that the allies are going to come out on top eventually but the Japanese player should have at least a few months on top. Unfortunately the Allies had an advantage in troop numbers in both the Philipines and Malaya, nor are they short of planes and can probably do a much better job with their smaller number of naval assets than they historically did while the IJN is supporting the landings. It is also quite hard to attack compared to being the defenders who can sit and dig in (and don't think any human player or even the AI is going to be quite so unprepared in either theatre as was historically the case after the war begins). To even enable the Japanese to take these two areas the designers are going to have to give the Japanese some advantages in fighting skill. But at the risk of envoking mdhiel do we really want the Zero to be portrayed as far better than it was or the Japanese troops as having some mystical advantage over all others? These effects will last far longer than the initial Japanese expansion phase.

When Mike Scholl (thanks for the kind words ) raised the prospect of changing the early war allied leaders (certainly a good idea - especially in the British commander Percival's case!) I thought this might be a way of helping to mirror the poor early allied performance. I am not sure exactly how the HQ commanders influence the troops but if your planes are less likely to fly and your troops either take longer to dig in or perform worse when badly led then this would quite neatly reproduce the early periods poor performance without artificially doing down theallied equipment. Those same planes and troops can perform badly where they did but if evacuated out can put in a more historical performance once well led. Obviously this solution is lost if the first move of the allied commander is to appoint his best people to Singapore and Luzon in December '41!

I also disagree about the purpose of the allies. I for one prefer to play them. That is not in my case because I want an easy game but because I feel more an affinity for them. Sure I want to do better than the historical position but by that I mean sweeping back to Japan in '44 not doing so by mid '42. I want the Japanese to be able to hammer me early on not be able to hold every base. I don't believe I am alone in this. Look at the UV board there are lots of posts from Coral Sea Newbie players. The vast bulk went straight for the Allies even though that is not the 'stronger' side there. When I asked for Japanese opponents in scenario #17 I only got players who would play the allies....

Still I take some of your points. I don't want the allies to be constantly forced to repeat the same mistakes they made historically but think the Japanese have to have a fair chance to gain their initial conquests. That should pretty much be the average in say an AI vs AI game not a result of exemplory Japanese play. As a player I can think of far more things I could do as the Allies to slow down or stop this advance than I can to speed it up or make it less costly as the Japanese.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Hoplosternum
Hi Timjot,

I understand what you are saying and agree in part. I don't want the initial conquests to be a complete cakewalk for the Japanese. However this is a game and needs to be reasonably challenging. I don't see too much of a problem in single player as long as the AI can plan attacks well. Playing as the allies you can always pull back / not try to hard initially if you like.

But I worry about the effect on PBEM. Everyone knows that the allies are going to come out on top eventually but the Japanese player should have at least a few months on top. Unfortunately the Allies had an advantage in troop numbers in both the Philipines and Malaya, nor are they short of planes and can probably do a much better job with their smaller number of naval assets than they historically did while the IJN is supporting the landings. It is also quite hard to attack compared to being the defenders who can sit and dig in (and don't think any human player or even the AI is going to be quite so unprepared in either theatre as was historically the case after the war begins). To even enable the Japanese to take these two areas the designers are going to have to give the Japanese some advantages in fighting skill. But at the risk of envoking mdhiel do we really want the Zero to be portrayed as far better than it was or the Japanese troops as having some mystical advantage over all others? These effects will last far longer than the initial Japanese expansion phase.

When Mike Scholl (thanks for the kind words ) raised the prospect of changing the early war allied leaders (certainly a good idea - especially in the British commander Percival's case!) I thought this might be a way of helping to mirror the poor early allied performance. I am not sure exactly how the HQ commanders influence the troops but if your planes are less likely to fly and your troops either take longer to dig in or perform worse when badly led then this would quite neatly reproduce the early periods poor performance without artificially doing down theallied equipment. Those same planes and troops can perform badly where they did but if evacuated out can put in a more historical performance once well led. Obviously this solution is lost if the first move of the allied commander is to appoint his best people to Singapore and Luzon in December '41!

I also disagree about the purpose of the allies. I for one prefer to play them. That is not in my case because I want an easy game but because I feel more an affinity for them. Sure I want to do better than the historical position but by that I mean sweeping back to Japan in '44 not doing so by mid '42. I want the Japanese to be able to hammer me early on not be able to hold every base. I don't believe I am alone in this. Look at the UV board there are lots of posts from Coral Sea Newbie players. The vast bulk went straight for the Allies even though that is not the 'stronger' side there. When I asked for Japanese opponents in scenario #17 I only got players who would play the allies....

Still I take some of your points. I don't want the allies to be constantly forced to repeat the same mistakes they made historically but think the Japanese have to have a fair chance to gain their initial conquests. That should pretty much be the average in say an AI vs AI game not a result of exemplory Japanese play. As a player I can think of far more things I could do as the Allies to slow down or stop this advance than I can to speed it up or make it less costly as the Japanese.

Hopelstrum,

I understand you point. In places like Malaya (historical 1:1 odds) and PI (historical 1:3 odds?) its going to be very hard to repeat the Japanese performance. Unless the Japanese player can deploy vastly more troops than was logistically possible historically. I doubt anybody wants that. Perhaps substantially downgradeing moral and expirence factors in the initail oob would do the trick ( the rath of Mdheil not withstanding). Since these factors are not permenant it would not have detrimental effects later on. I also think that if careful attention to the initial oob would also go a long way in keeping things historically balanced. For example the Indian troops in Malaya not only should have very low moral, but also have very little in the way of AT guns and heavy artillary. The Austalian Div. should be high moral but only 2/3rds strength. The Philipino divisions should only regimental in size with very low moral, NO expirence, No arty to speak of, very little MGs ect...

[mdiehl]

But I worry about the effect on PBEM. Everyone knows that the allies are going to come out on top eventually but the Japanese player should have at least a few months on top. Unfortunately the Allies had an advantage in troop numbers in both the Philipines and Malaya, nor are they short of planes and can probably do a much better job with their smaller number of naval assets than they historically did while the IJN is supporting the landings. It is also quite hard to attack compared to being the defenders who can sit and dig in (and don't think any human player or even the AI is going to be quite so unprepared in either theatre as was historically the case after the war begins). To even enable the Japanese to take these two areas the designers are going to have to give the Japanese some advantages in fighting skill. But at the risk of envoking mdhiel do we really want the Zero to be portrayed as far better than it was or the Japanese troops as having some mystical advantage over all others? These effects will last far longer than the initial Japanese expansion phase.

I think you have to become really well-informed about the reasons why the PI and Malaya were overcome easily. The reasons in the two cases are not necessarily the same. I do not know the Malaya camopaign well enough to say.

In the PI:
With respect to a/c, there's no basis to assume that Japanese pilots were superior to Allied ones. What the Japanese did quite well was to concentrate vastly superior numbers of a/c against a set of logistically isolated, understrength air units that lacked much early-warning capability. In those circumstances, attrition worked in favor of the Japanese in rapidly gaining air supremacy over the combat area.

With respect to ground troops, the Allies outnumbered the Japanese but much of the nominal strength was badly trained, under-equipped PNI units. One would not expect them to have great morale. Moreover, although regular units such as the P.scouts would have very high morale, one would expect morale to deteriorate through lack of supply, attrition, and isolation.

To do as Timjot suggested (or seems to have suggested) -- assume as a fundamental characteristic of units -- that Japanese army units were either better trained or better equipped (person per person capable of inflicting more casualties on the enemy), would be an error if this assumption was used to set the quality/strength/combat-worthiness of US army units in, for example, Hawaii or any other non-isolated location. Likewise, to assume that Japanese pilots were inherently better would be an undocumented claim (comparing them with USAAF pilots) and a manifestly false one (as a matter of documented facts) with respect to USN/USMC pilots.

The alternative is to simply make the Japan player do his job. In that event the Japanese player can only expect to have qualitatively superior performance, over the duration of a campaign if he isolates the positions that he wishes to attack and causes substantial deterioration in Allied unit quality through attrition, lack of supply, and air supremacy gained by concentrating overwhelmingly superior numbers.

[Admiral DadMan]

I offer 2 words to this discussion: Surprise and Experience. Japan had both early on.

[mdiehl]

I'm not convinced that Japanese experience gave them an edge in the PI. They were stalemated by the US forces there, and were only able to take the initiative after the sustained wasting effects of isolation on USAFFE. Some of the Japanese units there (IIRC elements of the 65th regiment) made a very inept job of it. And that's leaving aside the bungled recons in force (or whatever the rear area landings were supposed to be) that were wiped out -- largely by PNI units.

The biggest Japanese advantage was strategic isolation. *That* was something that was quickly attained by the successful surprise attack on Clark A/F on 8 December. After that the Japanese could recon the waters in and around the PI, provide air-ground support, land new forces & in general enjoy complete freedom of movement in theater.

Since, however, the logistical pipeline to the PI was very narrow *anyhow* I expect the Japanese would have taken the PI as quickly, even if USAAFFE had not been caught on the gronud on 8 December. It's just that in the process the Japanese would have lost more a/c, and they might have lost some ships.

If the game is any good, what the Allied player should expect to *maybe* (if he's talented and his opponent is not, or his opponent has bad luck), is resist long enough in the PI and cause a high enough attrition rate on Japanese forces that the Borneo/Indonesia conquests occur less quickly, and that some Japanese formations (11th Air Fleet) would lose much of their edge/elan.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl

To do as Timjot suggested (or seems to have suggested) -- assume as a fundamental characteristic of units -- that Japanese army units were either better trained or better equipped (person per person capable of inflicting more casualties on the enemy), would be an error if this assumption was used to set the quality/strength/combat-worthiness of US army units in, for example, Hawaii or any other non-isolated location. Likewise, to assume that Japanese pilots were inherently better would be an undocumented claim (comparing them with USAAF pilots) and a manifestly false one (as a matter of documented facts) with respect to USN/USMC pilots.

Mdiehl

I think you just created that mythical strawman, to coin your favorite phrase:D Actually Im argueing against the use of super zeros or super IJA troops for the sake of mimicking Japanese intitial success. Im simply argueing for accurately modeled oob to put the initial situation into historical balance. It was pointed out that on paper there was 1:1 odds in Malaya, maybe 1:3 in the PI. If the game uses generic universal unit strengths, moral, and expirence.Then it will be next to impossible to recreate the initial Japanese success. I dont think you are against the allied oob reflecting their historical shortage of AA, AT, Mgs, Art ect...are you? Or that the Indian, Philipino troops should suffer from low moral and expirence. Or that the PA Divisions were basically irregulars and were effectively regimental in strength. Or that the Aussie Div in Malaya was only 2/3rds strength. In short my point is that as long as the historical obb is correctly modeled there should be no need for gimicks or tricks. It should be possible, but difficult for a good Japanese player to duplicate the historic outcomes. As it should be possible but difficult for a allied player to stop or at least delay the initial Japanese advance.

I know you main beef is the whole "EXPIRENCE" debate. Mainly regarding pilots if I understand your position. That point is debatable and has been hashed and rehashed. I think in game terms that, and I am using UV as the model, the expirence level of air units also have to reflect the lack of command and control, coordination and general unpreparedness on part of the allies intially. that was the main reason why the US were caught with their pants down. Where as many of the US air units were new to the theater the IJN units had been practicing and training for there specific missions for months. Shouldnt this be reflected by intitial expirence levels?

Regards

[mdiehl]

I think you just created that mythical strawman

My apologies, then. It was not completely clear to me hence my "TIMJOT... seems to have suggested."

I'm simply argueing for accurately modeled oob to put the initial situation into historical balance. It was pointed out that on paper there was 1:1 odds in Malaya, maybe 1:3 in the PI. If the game uses generic universal unit strengths, moral, and expirence.Then it will be next to impossible to recreate the initial Japanese success. I dont think you are against the allied oob reflecting their historical shortage of AA, AT, Mgs, Art ect...are you?
Or that the Indian, Philipino troops should suffer from low moral and expirence. Or that the PA Divisions were basically irregulars and were effectively regimental in strength. Or that the Aussie Div in Malaya was only 2/3rds strength.

No sweat... I'm with you. And I agree. I somehow thought you were arguing away from unit specific characteristics to some generic level. My mistake.

I think in game terms that, and I am using UV as the model, the expirence level of air units also have to reflect the lack of command and control, coordination and general unpreparedness on part of the allies intially.

I do not think that's how experience is used by the designers, however, based on what I've read in UV. I think they think it's supposed to have something to do with pilot skill or training or something. But I agree that poor initial US preparedness (in PW was this not a general dearth of PP?) ought to have an effect.

That was the main reason why the US were caught with their pants down.

Err. USAAFFE were on the deck because they were refueling and taking a break after a false alarm. Murphy's Law then took over. But if the false alarm had not occurred, or if the initial raid alert had not been a false alarm, then, IMO, the Japanese would have suffered significant initial combat losses to 11th AF and the US losses at Clark would have been lower -- at least in the first couple of days/engagements. In the end, 11th AF would have won, because there was nothing logistics-wise to keep the US flying in the PI, and because performance probably degrades in a non 1-1 fashion (log or something like that). It would have taken a couple of weeks, probably, rather than a couple of hours. That's why I think the Jpns might have taken some shipping losses invading the PI or had their timetable set back further if the US player somehow manages to do tolerably well with USAAFFE.

Where as many of the US air units were new to the theater the IJN units had been practicing and training for there specific missions for months. Shouldnt this be reflected by intitial expirence levels?

I'm not sure. Flying CAP, local air superiority and ground support, and local anti-shipping missions does not require alot of in-theater prep, from what I've read. Bombing Takao is another can of worms entirely.