F-35 EW

[orca]

It strikes me as odd that the F-35 has no DECM capability given its otherwise advanced avionics and sensor suite. Essentially all other modern fighters have DECM. There are claims that it's aesa radar has jamming cability (at least against x- band radars). Is this correct or just theoretical?

[Dimitris]

This is correct. Both the F-22 and F-35 lack an integrated DECM suite in favor of VLO.

[AlmightyTallest]

https://www.f35.com/about/capabilities/electronicwarfare

The F-35’s advanced stealth and built-in electronic warfare capabilities enable unprecedented battlefield access without the need for dedicated electronic attack aircraft support.

Advanced electronic warfare capabilities enable the F-35 to locate and track enemy forces, jam radio frequencies and disrupt attacks with unparalleled precision. All three variants of the F-35 carry active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars with sophisticated electronic attack capabilities, including false targets, network attack, advanced jamming and algorithm-packed data streams. This system allows the F-35 to reach well-defended targets and suppress enemy radars that threaten the F-35.

While F-35 is capable of stand-off jamming for other aircraft — providing 10 times the effective radiated power of any legacy fighter — F-35s can also operate in closer proximity to the threat (‘stand-in’) to provide jamming power many multiples that of any legacy fighter.

http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=bae-provide-joint-strike-fighter-transmitter-countermeasures

April 4, 2014

BAE Systems Electronic Solutions, Nashua, N.H., is being awarded a $47,352,248 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity delivery order contract for the manufacture of the transmitter countermeasures T-1687A/ALE-70 (V) in support of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, Mechanicsburg, Pa., is the contracting activity (N00104-14-D-K054).
- See more at: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=bae-pro ... r7qKZ.dpuf

http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system

Over the course of the next 20 years, BAE Systems developed industry-leading countermeasure technology that led to an integrated electronic warfare suite and low observable antenna system for the F-22. On this firm foundation, BAE Systems has continued to build upon its capabilities with the development and delivery of the AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare suite for the F-35 Lightning II.

NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY
The AN/ASQ-239 system protects the F-35 with advanced technology for next generation missions to counter current and emerging threats. Equipped with offensive and defensive electronic warfare options for the pilot and aircraft, the suite provides fully integrated radar warning, targeting support, and self-protection, to detect and defeat surface and airborne threats.

The system provides the pilot with maximum situational awareness, helping to identify, monitor, analyze, and respond to potential threats. Advanced avionics and sensors provide a real-time, 360-degree view of the battlespace, helping to maximize detection ranges and provide the pilot with options to evade, engage, counter or jam threats.

Always active, AN/ASQ-239 provides all-aspect, broadband protection, allowing the F-35 to reach well-defended targets and suppress enemy radars. The system stands alone in its ability to operate in signal-dense environments, providing the aircraft with radio-frequency and infrared countermeasures, and rapid response capabilities. AN/ASQ-239 is a platform-level solution that provides the F-35 with improved reliability and maintainability, helping reduce long term life cycle costs to keep the aircraft fielded now and into the future.

[SASR]

Adding a narrowband OECM capability to the APG-81 would be nice too as per the post above (Plus the DECM he mentioned)

[Dimitris]

ORIGINAL: AlmightyTallest

https://www.f35.com/about/capabilities/electronicwarfare

The F-35’s advanced stealth and built-in electronic warfare capabilities enable unprecedented battlefield access without the need for dedicated electronic attack aircraft support.

Advanced electronic warfare capabilities enable the F-35 to locate and track enemy forces, jam radio frequencies and disrupt attacks with unparalleled precision. All three variants of the F-35 carry active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars with sophisticated electronic attack capabilities, including false targets, network attack, advanced jamming and algorithm-packed data streams. This system allows the F-35 to reach well-defended targets and suppress enemy radars that threaten the F-35.

While F-35 is capable of stand-off jamming for other aircraft — providing 10 times the effective radiated power of any legacy fighter — F-35s can also operate in closer proximity to the threat (‘stand-in’) to provide jamming power many multiples that of any legacy fighter.

All fluff and nothing hard [:D] (loved the "algorithm-packed data streams" BTW - that's so Bruckheimer).

http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=bae-provide-joint-strike-fighter-transmitter-countermeasures

April 4, 2014

BAE Systems Electronic Solutions, Nashua, N.H., is being awarded a $47,352,248 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity delivery order contract for the manufacture of the transmitter countermeasures T-1687A/ALE-70 (V) in support of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support, Mechanicsburg, Pa., is the contracting activity (N00104-14-D-K054).
- See more at: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=bae-pro ... r7qKZ.dpuf

That's a dispenser for expendable countermeasures: http://www.deagel.com/Aircraft-Protecti ... 65001.aspx . Not quite the same as built-in DECM.

http://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system

Over the course of the next 20 years, BAE Systems developed industry-leading countermeasure technology that led to an integrated electronic warfare suite and low observable antenna system for the F-22. On this firm foundation, BAE Systems has continued to build upon its capabilities with the development and delivery of the AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare suite for the F-35 Lightning II.

NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY
The AN/ASQ-239 system protects the F-35 with advanced technology for next generation missions to counter current and emerging threats. Equipped with offensive and defensive electronic warfare options for the pilot and aircraft, the suite provides fully integrated radar warning, targeting support, and self-protection, to detect and defeat surface and airborne threats.

The system provides the pilot with maximum situational awareness, helping to identify, monitor, analyze, and respond to potential threats. Advanced avionics and sensors provide a real-time, 360-degree view of the battlespace, helping to maximize detection ranges and provide the pilot with options to evade, engage, counter or jam threats.

Always active, AN/ASQ-239 provides all-aspect, broadband protection, allowing the F-35 to reach well-defended targets and suppress enemy radars. The system stands alone in its ability to operate in signal-dense environments, providing the aircraft with radio-frequency and infrared countermeasures, and rapid response capabilities. AN/ASQ-239 is a platform-level solution that provides the F-35 with improved reliability and maintainability, helping reduce long term life cycle costs to keep the aircraft fielded now and into the future.

Even LM theselves say that only the APG-81 can perform jamming (by degrading its radar function), only on the front quarter (narrower than that in fact, due to the off-boresight limitations of AESAs) and only on X-band frequencies. They wouldn't be saying this if a separate DECM system was installed.

[Dimitris]

ORIGINAL: SASR
Adding a narrowband OECM capability to the APG-81 would be nice too as per the post above (Plus the DECM he mentioned)

Yes, it would.

[AlmightyTallest]

No problem, the first link is from the company so as with anything we have to figure how much is bluster at this point, nothing concrete with these bleeding edge systems due to the nature of the industry.


just posting some public source info indicating that systems like the F-35 might have some sort of DECM in place, and ALE-70 isn't exactly the same as an ALE-70(V) it could mean there is a modification to the original system. But again finding any good info is going to be hard.

The AN/ASQ-239 is the most interesting one since it's mentioning radio frequency countermeasures, and not necessarily part of the AESA radar.


http://militaryrussia.ru/forum/download/file.php?id=28256

Page 18:

A fighter aircraft intended to enable control of both the air
and of the electromagnetic spectrum, the F-35 Lightning
II was designed from the outset with its own electronic
warfare (EW) system. With BAE Systems at Nashua, New
Hampshire as the team lead, but including the participation
of leading EW specialists worldwide, including Northrop
Grumman, the F-35’s EW system is part of the basic design,
alongside its avionics, communications, navigation and
intelligence; and sensor systems.

While all the aircraft types that the F-35 will replace use EW
systems, some highly capable against current threats, the
F-35’s EW system enables its effective integration with all
the other onboard systems. Each of the F-35’s systems is
able to inform and operate with components of each other.
This F-35 network can also link to larger multi-unit networks,
other aircraft or terrestrial platforms via its built-in MADL
(Multifunction Airborne Data Link), which allows the EW
system to be networked either in attack or defence.
The internally mounted AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda EW system
built by BAE Systems completed its fl ight testing in 2005
and was soon in low-rate initial production, with a unit cost
estimated at $1.7 million. Weighing some 200lb (90kg), it
was developed from the BAE Systems AN/ALR-94 EW suite
fi tted to the F-22 Raptor, using emerging technologies to
produce greater capabilities with a goal of achieving twice
the reliability at a quarter the cost.

The F-35 EW system provides radar warning (enhanced
to provide analysis, identifi cation and tracing of emitting
radars) and multispectral countermeasures for self defence
against both radar and infrared guided threats. In
addition to these capabilities, it is also capable of electronic
surveillance, including geo-location of radars. This allows
the F-35 to evade, jam, or attack them, either autonomously
or as part of a networked effort. The enhanced capabilities
of the ASQ-239 (and integration with the F-35’s other
systems) allow it to perform SIGINT (signals intelligence)
electronic collection. The aircraft’s stealth capabilities
make it possible for an F-35 to undertake passive detection
and SIGINT while operating closer to an emitter with less
vulnerability. For the use of active deception jamming, the
F-35’s stealth design also allows false target generation and
range-gate stealing with less use of power.
The EW system also sends and receives data and status and
warning information from other onboard systems through
the MADL data link.

The ASQ-239 has ten dedicated apertures, six on the wing
leading edge, two on the trailing edge, and two on the
horizontal stabilizer trailing edge. The system also has the
potential to use the F-35’s other apertures, most notably
that associated with its APG-81 AESA (active electronically
scanned array) radar. In addition to functioning with the
radar, this array, transmitting only at high-power, could
function as a stand-off jammer.

When used in receive only mode, the APG-81 provides
enhanced SIGINT capability. The radar could also be used,
following future upgrades, as an electronic attack weapon,
burning out emitters with pure power or injecting hostile
radars or command and control systems with computer
inputs that would provide false targets, misleading
information, or shut down an air defence system.
Combining these capabilities and data links will give F-35s
the potential to do more than defend themselves and jam or
attack enemy emitters they locate.
Groups of F-35s could collect SIGINT from multiple directions,
and then use the information gathered and analyzed to fi re
missiles, start jamming, or launch an electronic attack. Data
links mean that F-35s can provide this information to other
platforms in near real-time and have their actions coordinated
‘off-board’, where there will be more access to fused
intelligence, greater situational awareness, and less chance of
lethal information overload, than in the cockpit of an F-35.
The 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron part of the 53rd
Electronic Warfare Group, formed in 2010 at Eglin AFB,
Florida, is tasked with introducing the F-35’s EW capabilities
at an operational level. A joint squadron with personnel from
all US services, the 513th is co-located with the 33rd Fighter
Wing, the F-35 school house for pilot and crew chiefs.
Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to be used by the
F-35 in electronic combat are being developed by the 513th.
The unit will also provide and update the threat libraries and
systems programming that will keep the F-35’s systems
responsive to changing threats. To do this, the 513th will
operate a new $300 million reprogramming laboratory at
Eglin, scheduled to open in mid-2011. David Isby

Page 19:

The APG-81 has an electronically steered array controlled by a steering computer with
no mechanical motion. Designed as a multi-mode system, the APG-81 has 32 modes
of operation which are common to all three F-35 variants; 12 air-to-air, 12 air-to-ground
(including two maritime modes ship target track and sea search), four electronic
warfare (electronic attack and electronic protection), two navigation, and two weather.
Some of the modes are high resolution and are supported by the sophisticated signal
processing available.

[ComDev]

Thanks, have updated an existing ticket on this.

[Primarchx]

As an aside, the rumor has been that the USMC will be looking at an F-35 airframe for their EA-6B successor, but nothing specific has been put forth yet.

[ckfinite]

The issue with adding an F-35 EW system to the game is that everything about that side of its capabilities is really, really secret. Hardly anything is even known about the much less sensitive AN/ASQ-239, mostly from a single article that was amazingly explicit while being still incredibly (by most other standards) vague, and the AN/APG-81's specific jamming capabilities are unclear to say the least. As a result, I don't think that there's a good way to model the AN/APG-81 for a while yet.

It would be cool for the USMC to do a jammer by attaching an NGJ to a F-35B/C. Instant EW from an amphib is a very cool idea.

[Primarchx]

ORIGINAL: ckfinite

The issue with adding an F-35 EW system to the game is that everything about that side of its capabilities is really, really secret. Hardly anything is even known about the much less sensitive AN/ASQ-239, mostly from a single article that was amazingly explicit while being still incredibly (by most other standards) vague, and the AN/APG-81's specific jamming capabilities are unclear to say the least. As a result, I don't think that there's a good way to model the AN/APG-81 for a while yet.

It would be cool for the USMC to do a jammer by attaching an NGJ to a F-35B/C. Instant EW from an amphib is a very cool idea.

Agreed. I have to wonder how you even do EW from a single-seat fighter, though. Can you pipe that work to off-board operators with enough secure bandwidth?

[AlmightyTallest]

This article might help answer how EW is done on a modern single seat aircraft. It lists the limitations of the EF-111 Raven compared to the EA-6 Prowler, and then shows the advancements to the EW suite on the EF-18G single seater.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/confessions-of-a-us-navy-ea-18g-growler-electronic-warf-1694954599

"I cannot really speak to specific operator procedure due to classification. What I can say is, as a community, we are going from an extremely operator driven process in the EA-6B to an automated and computer automated one in the new EA-18G Growler. That being said, the EA-18G is far more battlespace aware and has to deal with in enormous amount of outside information piped in via data-link. In the Prowler we joked we were deaf, dumb, and blind. We relied purely on what information you could glean from the radios, and a good crew could get a lot, but being "in the link" is a whole other level of information."

"A Growler crew goes about their motions fairly quietly due to task division. A proficient Prowler crew in a complex large strike was poetry in motion. So much in the Prowler was influenced by the side-by-side seating. A lot of times inter-cockpit communication was just a nudge and point, or thumbs up, etc. Effective, silent, crew communication was an art form. Since each crew member was dependent on another to complete a task; one detecting a signal, one jamming that signal, one building the HARM target package, one designating the missile, one shooting it, etc., efficiency was paramount. On the flip side, an inexperienced crew could be an endless fit of frustration."

[Primarchx]

ORIGINAL: AlmightyTallest

This article might help answer how EW is done on a modern single seat aircraft. It lists the limitations of the EF-111 Raven compared to the EA-6 Prowler, and then shows the advancements to the EW suite on the EF-18G single seater.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/confessions-of-a-us-navy-ea-18g-growler-electronic-warf-1694954599

"I cannot really speak to specific operator procedure due to classification. What I can say is, as a community, we are going from an extremely operator driven process in the EA-6B to an automated and computer automated one in the new EA-18G Growler. That being said, the EA-18G is far more battlespace aware and has to deal with in enormous amount of outside information piped in via data-link. In the Prowler we joked we were deaf, dumb, and blind. We relied purely on what information you could glean from the radios, and a good crew could get a lot, but being "in the link" is a whole other level of information."

"A Growler crew goes about their motions fairly quietly due to task division. A proficient Prowler crew in a complex large strike was poetry in motion. So much in the Prowler was influenced by the side-by-side seating. A lot of times inter-cockpit communication was just a nudge and point, or thumbs up, etc. Effective, silent, crew communication was an art form. Since each crew member was dependent on another to complete a task; one detecting a signal, one jamming that signal, one building the HARM target package, one designating the missile, one shooting it, etc., efficiency was paramount. On the flip side, an inexperienced crew could be an endless fit of frustration."

That was a good article. However the Growler is a 2-seater, with the backseater running the EW activities. The pilot still mostly flies the a/c and launch weapons. With just one man in the Lightning, the pilot, how does he/she concentrate on the complex EW environment and fly the aircraft?

[Tailhook]

I imagine it's a highly automated process with the option for more direct management in times of low "flying" workload. As it stands, such a modern aircraft likely requires little actual flying that requires complete concentration.

[Primarchx]

ORIGINAL: Tailhook

I imagine it's a highly automated process with the option for more direct management in times of low "flying" workload. As it stands, such a modern aircraft likely requires little actual flying that requires complete concentration.

I agree that there can be a lot of automation. But I would also say that both being an effective EW officer and being a pilot in a combat area are both full time jobs. That's why I'm wondering if perhaps some of those tasks for onboard jammer gear can be 'offboarded' to remote operators.

[AlmightyTallest]

I think modeling any EW system is tough because it's all a really secretive side of warfare.

Some of you guys mentioned an F-35 with an additional pod, seems someone heard you.

From Janes:

http://www.janes.com/article/50036/f-35-programme-begins-developing-cyber-attack-capability


Plus an updated IRST capability and higher resolution targeting capability. https://www.f35.com/news/detail/lockheed-unveils-new-f-35-electro-optical-targeting-platform-paul-lemmo-com

Video of the EODASS showing cued aerial targets. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5VuCsQJy8Y

The company said Thursday Advanced EOTS contains an infrared marker, new resolution for image detector, high-definition television and short-wave infrared system that work to provide air-to-surface and air-to-air targeting functions for F-35 pilots.

Somewhat related but detailing Cyber attacks to a naval ship and what systems can be affected with such a cyber attack capability.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=91131

"Some examples of the types of shipboard systems that RHIMES is looking to protect include damage control and firefighting, anchoring, climate control, electric power, hydraulics, steering and engine control," explained Craven. "It essentially touches all parts of the ship."

Imagine being able to mess with a ships damage control systems, anchoring, climate control etc.

http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/09/air-force-fighters-will-carry-laser-cannons-cyber-weapons-by-2020/

The Air Force has been looking at ways to conduct cyber attacks against adversaries’ networks from flying aircraft—either from drones or from manned aircraft, injecting attacks into radio and wireless networks that could disable or confuse enemy systems. Those capabilities have already been tested and could soon be fielded.

During a press roundtable, Air Force Major General Burke “Ed” Wilson, the commander of the 24th Air Force (the Air Force’s communications and cyberwarfare force) and of Air Forces Cyber, talked about the ways the Air Force is looking to combine “non-kinetic options into the kinetic fight…bringing together the power of the air, space, cyber, ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] and EW [Electronic Warfare] domains.”

Wilson said that the Air Force has conducted tests “where we asked the question, what if we—instead of jamming a target—put a tool on an aircraft that allowed us to touch a target with cyber? And yes, we can touch a target from an air-enabled network.”

That has been a major part of why the Air Force has tried to tack hard toward cyberwarfare capabilities over the past 10 years, even putting weapons system designations on some of its network capabilities. And over the past few years, the Air Force has integrated cyberwarfare into its annual Red Flag war game, along with planning for space warfare (defending satellite networks and taking out adversaries’ satellite systems).

While Wilson said that cyber had been integrated into Red Flag for several years, Carlisle said that this past year was the first time the Air Force included cyber as a major aspect of Red Flag. “It took us 11 years,” Carlisle noted during his presentation at ASC. “We have to move faster than that—we have got to take advantage of this warfighting domain. Our adversaries have a huge capability here, and we have to be able to root them out in the same way we do in the physical domain.”