http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/191029 ... 8930_em_im

Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
ORIGINAL: Skyros
Included are tables of organization and strength reports for the wartime period.
ORIGINAL: DanSez
ORIGINAL: Skyros
Included are tables of organization and strength reports for the wartime period.
Thanks for the review. I am always looking for good reference material.
Curious about the 'strength reports' though because many of the unit commanders were notorious for over reporting number of soldiers for pay purposes and then keeping the salaries of the phantom soldiers.
The Chinese Army of this period was crippled from the rot of a class division between the elites and the 'Old Hundred Names', the cultural/military philosophy that to survive another day was itself a victory and the lack of strong national unity that resulted in factions fighting or sabotaging each other almost as frequently as they they took the field against the Japanese.
Some adjoining units would not assist units on their flanks because they belonged to another faction. CSK withheld his best units to prepare for the final battle with the Communist. Hundreds of Millions of dollars of aid siphoned into the Soong family coffers, seen as a Right of Power.
All of this makes any 'official' reporting to be suspect based on who the unit commander was and where they were based. Hopefully this book could help lift the fog of war on some of that. I will put it on the 'radar' for future purchases.
Thanks
ORIGINAL: Big B
Good points, but if official sources are not considered good enough, we are left with nothing but opinions?
ORIGINAL: DanSez
...
I know at one point the DBB gang and others were working on a further restriction of the map (gnarly roads?) which would also slow down any Japanese Blitzkrieg. I am not sure if that was completed or not.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
For Chinese OB and maps of important campaigns in considerable detail, I recommend the official
ROC history. Although the original is massive - exactly 100 volumes - there is an outstanding
summary volume carefully translated in to English: The History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45.
It is available on the used book market at modest cost (under $20, sometimes under $10).
There is a similar Japanese history - even longer - but unfortunately it is very difficult to read,
even for readers of scholarly Japanese.
Reading either will dispel the myth that China was a pushover. China is Japan's USSR: a problem too
big to solve by conquest. IF Japan had been willing to settle for status quo anti about 1940 it could
have "won" the war - leaving a rump ROC state. But it was not - and its behaviors caused the Chinese
people to refuse to tolerate any compromise. A single battle alone will dispel the myth - if you wish
to limit your reading: look up the Third Battle of Chang Sha - which begins just as the Pacific War re
the US, UK and NEI begins. Chiang, for once, released the heavy artillery (105s and 150s - neither of
which are in the stock OB). Japanese leadership was close to incompetent and Chinese leadership was more
than adequate. It was a disaster. Partly because Japanese forces were too small - the long term pattern
is that Japanese forces cannot hold what they take.
While modeling China is difficult in this game system, we have found ways to model guerilla warfare that
work (we just lack the slots to put them all in play; the 30 day regeneration mechanism of code helps render
that less than critical however). We have found ways to let China have its effective river navy - one that
never lost control of the most important LOC in China - the Yangtze. In theory Japan can take Chunking using
riverine support. Maybe it can in game terms too - but there should be a real fight. To that end we put in
the river forts, the ability to lay mines, the Marines, and other things. When one puts in all 150 corps and
other units, and the logistics needed to feed them - Japan must limit its objectives to realistic ones: the
plains of Eastern China for example. Sian will probably never fall (I have seen it surrounded several times -
but never taken). Chunking is similar - but I have never seen it even approached. Kunming certainly never will
fall and a Japanese offensive out of Western China into Burma (which I read happens in stock) is not possible.
But I have seen Changsha fall - and when it does - the position in central China collapses - very similar to what
really happened in Ichi Go.
The roads thing was an attempt to mitigate some of the game engine’s deficiencies. It works to some extent, with appropriate house/umpire rules, but not as well in an open, everything goes, environment. The problem is that the game system is not capable of modelling continental, theater level, ground operations. “Fixes” are prophylactic at best, but the system can, and will, be gamed into absurdity.ORIGINAL: Big B
I Love the DBB Team and tried out the Gnarly Asian Roads - unfortunately all I found was that it only served to make Chinese Supply tactically and strategically impossible for the Chinese, it just wouldn't move supply.
The Japanese on the other hand still functioned well enough to overrun most of China in 6 months... hardly the effect that was intended.
My opinion
the prerogative to advance or not strategically was always with the Japanese
Yes, to both these statements. They are not inconsistent. A good idea of the nature of the Chinese Theater can be had by a study of the Spanish conflict in the Napoleonic period.ORIGINAL: spenceThis statement is complete fiction. Advances by anyone to anywhere are 99% a function of how well the troops are supplied. Japan supplied a 20th century army (sort of anyway...they needed more ammo for their breech loaders and gasoline for their tanks) with a 16th century supply establishment. In WitP tank units go racing around Western China apparently "living off the land".the prerogative to advance or not strategically was always with the Japanese
For a wagon the hay/oats/other horse fodder take a much greater percentage of the wagon's load than the gasoline needed by a truck for an equivalent distance does. Railroads are needed to sustain an advance and China relatively few and they didn't really go to places to where the Japanese needed to go to conquer China.
Frankly the Chinese OOB and Japanese OOB are not the problem with the China Theater. The problem in WitP is that there is no differentiation between a the logistical support capabilities of gasoline-powered truck and a hay powered horse-cart.
ORIGINAL: m10bob
I had the great pleasure to work with El Cid on the original RHS for WITP and he had the best info on China of anybody I know.
I know his sources for his info were good, (in my youth I was involved in the so-called "cult of intelligence", and had access to interesting sources of my own.)
El Cid was bold enough to be diligent in his researches, even while some forum members here criticized him very uncivilly .
Always keen to see the new things he ponders "aloud" in the forums, or includes to an already fantastic game.
That's not exactly correct. Chiang committed the elite units that he spent years to build up with German aid to Shanghai in 1937 where they bled out. It's a myth that Chiang was holding back his best forces. The elite of the Central Army was destroyed in the fierce battles of 1937-38 and later on Chiang's best units were the ones built up in India. There is a reason why by 1938-39 Chiang had become little more than the head of a warlord alliance instead of a true authoritative leader.ORIGINAL: US87891
Much the same, Chaing had some very well trained, well equiped, and highly motivated units that he kept close to home. He used tham very sparingly, just like the Spanish juntas used their "Royal" cards.