The Firebrigade (SigUp vs. loki100 DitU)

[SigUp]

[center]The Firebrigade - German Armour in the Ukraine 43-44

A Decision in the Ukraine 43-44 AAR



Settings

All normal with random weather. House rule regarding the bombing of units. No more than two attacks on the same hex and a unit that has been bombed may not be bombed again after a retreat unless it's stacked with another combat unit that hasn't been bombed yet.

Table of Contents

Part 1: The Race to the Dnepr

24 September 1943 - 30 September 1943
1 October 1943 - 14 October 1943

Part 2: The Battle for the Dnepr

15 October 1943 - 9 December 1943
10 December 1943 - 23 December 1943[/center]

[swkuh]

Looking forward to your AAR.

[SigUp]

24 September 1943 - 30 September 1943

When Operation Zitadelle was called off on 16 July 1943 the initiative on the Eastern Front permanently shifted to the Red Army. After a brief period of respite in the sector of Army Group South the Soviet offensive to recapture Belgorod and Kharkov was launched in the first week of August. Belgorod was liberated on 5 August and on 23 August Kharkov fell to the Red Army. With Army Group Centre's 2nd Army retreating in the face of a Soviet offensive the pressure on Army Group South intensified and by early September Erich von Manstein, the commander of Army Group South, became convinced that the front east of the Dnepr river was no longer salvageable. The German divisions were bled dry after months of intense fighting, many of them barely at half-strength. On 15 September 1943 Hitler finally relented and authorised the retreat of Army Group South behind the Dnepr-Melitopol line thus opening the Dnepr phase of the War in the East.

The German forces had not yet completed the retreat behind the Dnepr on 24 September when the Soviets in a bold maneuver managed to seize a bridgehead over the river at Kanev. 14 German divisions were still beyond the Dnepr in the Cherkassy-Kremenchug sector. Another eight divisions held a bridgehead near Dnepropetrovsk while the bridgehead at Zaporozhye contained a further seven divisions.

The Red Army wasted no time in expanding its Dnepr bridgehead at Kanev and moved multiple tank and mechanised corps over the river and easily brushed aside 112th Infantry Division, as well as elements of 57th Infantry Division. By 1 October the Soviets had secured a 20 miles deep and wide bridgehead over the Dnepr.


Situation map Kanev 1 October 1943

Another crisis befell the German forces south of Zaporozhye in the sector of 6th Army. On 25 September the 5th Shock and 2nd Guards Army attacked the 111th Infantry Division holding the front between Fedorovka and Melitopol. Hammered by artillery strikes from over 3000 guns the division quickly folded, creating a rift in the German lines that was quickly exploited by the mobile elements of 2nd Guards Army. The commander of 6th Army Karl-Adolf Hollidt tried to restore the situation by sending in elements of 17th Panzer Division, however, all they achieved was a minor delay as 111th Infantry Division was too weak to hold up the 2nd Guards Mechanised Corps. The Soviet tank corps then turned northwards into the rear of XXIX Corps, threatening to encircle it around Fedorovka.


Situation map Zaporozhye-Melitopol 1 October 1943

The situation of Army Group South on 1 October 1943 was dire. Its infantry divisions were exhausted and barely capable of holding up a determined Soviet assault. Many divisions were still on the wrong side of the Dnepr, among them the elite divisions Grossdeutschland, Das Reich, Totenkopf and Wiking. And the Soviet breakthrough near Melitopol created a 60 miles wide hole that was only held by two infantry divisions. The road to Kherson seemed open and with it the bottling up of 17th Army - the majority of which still stood in the Kuban bridgehead - on the Crimea. The only thing standing between Army Group South and the total collapse of its front were its armoured divisions.


Front of Army Group South 1 October 1943

Attachment: The State of Army Group South's Mobile Forces 1 October 1943

[SigUp]

1 October 1943 - 14 October 1943

When Army Group South successfully reached the Dnepr in late September 1943 the biggest threat remained in form of the Soviet bridgehead at Kanev. On 1 October German intelligence identified eight major formations in that area - two mechanised corps, four tank corps and two rifle corps. Erich von Manstein saw it as the most urgent task to remove this threat before the mud period would solidify the Soviet hold on the southern side of the Dnepr. To that end he instructed 8th Army to free up divisions Grossdeutschland and SS Totenkopf from the right flank of the army in the Kremenchug bridgehead and send them to Otto von Knobelsdorff's XXXXVIII Panzer Corps on the left flank. In addition 7th Panzer Division was to leave its position north of Kiev and join 10th Panzergrenadier Division at Mironovka.

Due to the urgency of the matter von Manstein chose not to wait for the full assembly of the forces and ordered 8th Army to launch the counterattack as soon as possible and on 3 October Walter Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps launched its attack on 9th Mechanised Corps facing Mironovka. Two days later SS Totenkopf arrived near Korsun and immediately went on to assault the positions 8th Guards Tank Corps and 10th Tank Corps south of Kanev. Two days later XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had closed within ten miles of the riverbank when the Soviet 47th Army tried to throw back 112th Infantry Division. Crisis was averted by the timely arrival of Grossdeutschland which halted the counterattack in its tracks. XXIV Panzer Corps meanwhile ran into more trouble as 72nd Infantry Division was stopped by a counterattack courtesy of 3rd Guards Tank Army.


Situation map Kanev 8 October 1943

On 8 October 1943 von Manstein's counteroffensive entered its final phase as both 3rd SS Panzer Division (how Totenkopf was called from hereon) and Grossdeutschland were fully assembled near Korsun. XXXXVIII Panzer Corps - whose commanding general von Knobelsdorff was replaced by Hermann Balck due to health reasons - supported by airstrikes from Luftflotte 4 took Kanev on 10 October and two days later the Soviets had been pushed back across the Dnepr when 3rd SS Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland swung northward into the flank of the enemy opposing XXIV Panzer Corps.


The Battle of Kanev

To handle the crisis on the southern wing of Army Group South near Melitopol von Manstein ordered 6th Army to break the Soviet encirclement attempt and retreat towards lower Dnepr. 1st Panzer Army was to support the breakout by 6th Army with 16th Panzergrenadier Division located in reserve at Zaporozhye. On 3 October the division - supported by the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion with 45 Tiger tanks attacked the Soviet spearhead to the northwest of Fedorovka and threw them back. 6th Army's 13th and 17th Panzer Division completed the breakout two days later when they successfully routed 11th and 19th Tank Corps west of Fedorovka. With the Soviet mobile forces in pursuit 6th Army retreated towards Dnepr and reached the riverbank on 7 October.

6th Army's retreat, however, threatened Army Group A's 17th Army on the Crimea. The commanders of Army Group A and South von Kleist and von Manstein both demanded the immediate evacuation of 17th Army from the Crimea. But Hitler only authorised the pull-out of V Corps with two divisions, stating the need to hold the Crimea to deny the Soviets bases from which they could bomb the oil fields of Ploesti. On 12 October the Soviets reached the Isthmus of Perekop thus sealing 17th Army on the peninsula.


Situation map lower Dnepr/Crimea 15 October 1943

On 15 October heavy rainfall announced the arrival of the mud period bringing both sides a much-needed combat pause. In the three weeks since 24 September the German-Rumanian forces lost 44.000 men while the Soviets suffered nearly twice as many casualties. 159 German AFVs were lost and the Luftwaffe recorded 107 write-offs. The Race to the Dnepr was over but the battle for the riverline was only starting.

Attachment: 3rd SS Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland 8 October 1943

[obssesednuker]

A scenario AAR! How unusual. What prompted this?

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: obssesednuker

A scenario AAR! How unusual. What prompted this?

From my side, lack of time, a desire to play some of the late game scenarios and to test out some ideas. The later scenarios seem to be often ignored which is a pity as they are very different to the situation most PBEM campaigns reach. In this, at the start, my rifle divisions really are around 6,000 men and a strong tank/mech corps is 10-12 cv.

They also lend themselves to playing and swapping sides as the turns are relatively quick.

Hopefully might encourage others to explore the scenarios other than the 1941 grand campaign.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: obssesednuker

A scenario AAR! How unusual. What prompted this?

Basically what loki's already stated. On the one hand I don't have the time for a full-scale grand campaign PBEM, on the other hand I find the late-war scenarios rather intriguing. They are just very different from 1941-42 and also the situation in 1941 campaigns that reach late 1943. Here you are dealing with units on very low TOE and on the German side a severe lack of manpower. The average infantry division is around 60% TOE with 3-4 CV, meaning everything on German side hinges (as it did historically) on the armoured divisions. I've already bottomed out the manpower pool by turn 3 despite setting max TOE to 60%. All this promises a very fluid play (once the Dnepr freezes over in November).

[SigUp]

15 October 1943 - 9 December 1943

With the onset of the rainy season in mid-October 1943 combat in the Ukraine ground to a halt. Both sides used the time to rest and refit their units. Despite their best efforts though, the Germans could not stop the pendulum from further swinging towards the Soviet side. The Wehrmacht was facing severe manpower shortages and replacements were hard to come by. While the number of Soviet men in the south increased from 2.422.495 men on 15 October 1943 to 2.864.802 men on 9 December 1943, the Germans only saw a moderate increase from 1.002.373 to 1.157.445 men. During that timespan the Germans received close to 98.000 men in new units, meaning that the increase in strength of the frontline units only totaled about 58.000 men.

What did improve in these two months though was the equipment of the two army groups in the Ukraine with tanks and AFV(number in parenthesis - 15 October 1943):

Panzer IIIm: 646 (422)
Panzer IVg: 736 (475)
Panzer IVh: 284 (89)
Panther D: 96 (101)
Panther A: 302 (45)
Tiger: 182 (109)
StuG IIIg: 836 (562)
-------------------------
Total: 3082 (1803)

The fighting on the ground resumed with the coming of snow when on 19 November the Soviet 2nd Guards Army launched its attack on 17th Army's XXXXIV Corps on the Isthmus of Perekop. The combined German-Rumanian forces managed to repel the first series of attacks, however, by 23rd November the Soviet forces broke through and two days later advanced elements of 11th Tank Corps crossed the Chatyrlyk river.

With the German-Rumanian positions on the Crimea nearing collapse Hitler reluctantly authorised the fighting withdrawal to Sevastopol from where as many units as possible should be evacuated. A task made complicated by the limited shipping capacity of the Axis in the Black Sea.


Situation map Crimea 3 December 1943

By 3 December the Red Army had forced its way into the open plains of the Crimea, however, stubborn Rumanian resistance frustrated the Red Army's attempts to overtake the retreating German-Rumanian forces. By 9 December 1943 when the German divisions began taking up positions in the hills northeast of Sevastopol the Rumanians still held Sarabuz and the Salagir line, restoring the honour of the Rumanian army that had been crushed at Stalingrad.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

By 3 December the Red Army had forced its way into the open plains of the Crimea, however, stubborn Rumanian resistance frustrated the Red Army's attempts to overtake the retreating German-Rumanian forces. ..

from my point of view that was a deeply annoying and totally unnecessary hold result - I mean Romanian divisions are meant to run away at the mere sound of a T-34s ill maintained engines and exhaust pipes?. Not least I decided to be kind and not bomb then into the ground before the attack as I wanted my planes to be nice and fresh [;)]

[SigUp]

10 December 1943 - 23 December 1943

While the Red Army was already advancing into the Crimea the Dnepr front remained unusually calm. All that changed when the mighty river froze over in the second December week. On 10 December the Soviet 4th Guard Army announced the beginning of the Red Army's winter offensive by hammering the position of 320th Infantry Division in Cherkassy. Unable to cope with the intense bombardment and devoid of reinforcements the Germans abandoned the city two days later. The Soviets quickly expanded the breach in the German lines and pushed back 167th and 282nd Infantry Division to the west and east of Cherkassy. Reserve committments by the German armour proved to be ineffective in stopping the Soviet onslaught. By 16 December forward detachments of 8th Guard Tank Corps liberated Smela 20 miles southwest of Cherkassy and threatened to split the lines of 8th Army.

At the same time the Red Army also launched an attack against LVII Panzer Corps east of Kremenchug. Similarly the weak German infantry was unable to hold-off the Soviet attack. LVII Panzer Corps' reaction force, the 23rd Panzer Division, was committed on 13 December but despite some initial success couldn't restore the corps' positions.


Situation map Cherkassy-Kremenchug 17 December 1943

At his headquarter in Kirovograd Erich von Manstein quickly recognised the threat the Soviet advance posed to the lines of III Panzer Corps and XI Corps around Chigirin which had been flanked from both both sides. On 17 December he gave both corps the order to disengage from the Dnepr and take up defensive positions in the forests southwest of Chigirin and behind the frozen Ingulets. At the same time von Manstein approached Hitler about an evacuation of the Dnepr-bend and Dnepropetrovsk stating that the Soviet breakthrough east of Kremenchug threatened to cut-off the supply lines of the mass of 1st Panzer Army. The Führer accepted the withdrawal from Dnepropetrovsk but insisted on holding onto Nikopol citing its supposed importance for the German war economy. Von Manstein was furious, but postponed engaging Hitler on the issue of giving up Nikopol since the German retreat had yet to reach the city.

To buy the retreating German infantry time von Manstein authorised the release of the fresh 1st Panzer Division at Krivoi Rog to counterattack the Soviet forces near Aleksandriya. By 20 December the division had reached the frontline and began successfully pushing back 1st and 8th Mechanised Corps. While the counterattack stabilised the Ingulets line it did little to deter the Soviets from swinging east towards Pyatikhatki into the flank of the retreating infantry. With no cover around the Soviet mechanised formations sent 304th and 308th Infantry Division reeling towards Krivoi Rog and were only halted ten miles north of the city with the help of 6th Army's 15th LW Feld Division. The retreat of XXX Corps and XXXX Panzer Corps from the Zaporozhye area also encountered difficulties as the Red Army was in hot pursuit and by 24 December 125th and 335th Infantry Division at Nikopol had been flanked by Soviet armoured forces. 1st Panzer Army's situation was precarious as the army had been split in two with the retreat of six infantry divisions in jeopardy.


Situation map Dnepr-bend 24 December 1943

While 1st Panzer Army's situation was dire it was the Cherkassy area that captured Army Group South's attention with German intelligence identifying at least ten major armoured formations. Von Manstein considered it essential for the survival of the army group to prevent a Soviet breakthrough between Korsun and Kirovograd before 1st Panzer Army had cleared the Dnepr bend. To achieve that goal he ordered the committment of the elite 1st SS Panzer Division that recently had returned to the Eastern Front after garrison duties in Northern Italy. On 18 December the division was ready and together with 5th SS Panzer Division spearheaded XXXXVII Panzer Corps' counterattack against the units of 1st Tank Army that formed the vanguard of the Soviet assault south of Cherkassy. In quick succession the SS panzer divisions stopped the advance of three Soviet tank corps and one mechanised corps and regained some of the ground lost in the previous days.

While the SS divisions fought around Cherkassy the Red Army brought in more armoured formations that allowed them to shift 1st Tank Army towards the forest area west of Chigirin and by 23 December the army had pierced the lines of III Panzer Corps, flanking the positions of XXXXVII Panzer Corps from the south. On 24 December 1943 the number of Soviet armoured formations around Cherkassy had grown to 13, making it clear that if 8th Army was to handle this crisis it needed yet another fresh panzer division.


Situation map Cherkassy 24 December 1943

With combat along the Dnepr flaring up losses for both sides escalated. Especially defensive battles to which German armour were commmitted as reserves turned out to be a highly bloody affair. In the two weeks from 10 December to 23 December 1943 the German-Rumanian forces in the Ukraine lost over 28.000 men while the Soviets counted over 50.000 casualties in addition to 860 AFV.

Attachment: 1st SS Panzer Division 10 December 1943