Japanese Armor Divisions and Brigades

[el cid again]

New data in the Niihorster database identifies three Tank Groups when the Pacific War
began - numbered 1 to 3 - these are de facto brigades. [Col. Tsuji, chief of operations
for 25th Army, actually uses the name brigade in his order of battle, found in Japan's
Greatest Victory, Britains Worst Defeat]. These tank groups are not uniform in composition.
We can see Yamashita's influence in the third - it has four tank regiments and a motorized
engineering regiment - a precursor of the idea of supporting tanks with other arms that in the
tank divisions.

Three tank divisions form (on 24 June, 1942, all in Manchukuo). All are formed from existing units,
although one tank regiment (17th) just formed earlier in the year. Yamashita's Third Tank Group
(from 25th Army) becomes the heart of the 2nd Tank Division, but it splits into the 5th and 6th
Tank Brigades. First Tank Group splits into 1st and 2nd Tank Brigades - adding First Tank Regiment
to do so. [Note 1st Tank Regiment had been in 2nd Tank Group, so 11th Tank Regiment had to replace it.
Most things Japanese are complicated]. The former 2nd Tank Group becomes the 5th Tank Brigade of the
Third Tank Division. 13th and 17th Tank Regiments form 6th Tank Brigade to round out the Third Tank
Division.

Never mind we have two series of de facto tank brigades already duplicating the use of numbers 1 to 3,
in 1945 a different series of Independent Tank Brigades forms, triplicating that use of 1 to 3!
These brigades are somewhat different - and include a de facto tank support battalion in the organization.
These have small supporting elements. As well, by then, most tank regiments have picked up companies of
"gun tanks" - a peculiar Japanese idea combining tank chassis with NON turreted but heavier guns. The
First and 9th Independent Tank Brigades form and remain in Manchukuo. All the rest form in the Home
Islands for counter invasion duty.

If this isn't complicated enough already, a 4th Tank Division is formed in 1944. It has a different organization.
All the tank divisions reform on this new pattern, with only one brigade of three tank regiments vice two brigades
of two regiments. The divisions lose their recon regiment and their AA regiments as well. The recon regiments
of the original three tank division become new tank regiments.

To that add that a new Second Tank Division is formed after the first one is wiped out in 1945! Originally
a training unit, it ends up under command of a Prince as part of counter invasion defenses.

[TulliusDetritus]

The day you cite serious, modern operations vs modern foes like the genuine ones conducted by the Wehrmacht (France '40, Barbarossa, Case Blau) and the Red Army Tank Armies (Stalingrad, Kursk, stuffed Germans in Ukraine in '44, Bagration, Vistule and Oder Operations and er Berlin) I will believe the Japanese had armored forces worth that name.

Until that day: this...

[el cid again]

What matters in a battle is not what you have in some abstract, universal scale of things.
Instead, as the SAS teach international clients, "there is no magic weapons you can buy that
guarantee victory - it is how you use what you have in the specific circumstances you are in
which wins."

Japanese tanks were not created in, and did not operate in, a vacuum. They were based mainly on
British and French designs, and were improvements of them. During the 1930s, it was IJA that led
the world in the application of diesel engines to motor vehicles in general, and to tanks in particular.
And these were designed to operate in the cold climate of Siberia. It was an important innovation.
Today, most tanks in the world use diesel engines (other than the worlds most fuel inefficient tank,
the US Abrams, which has less than half the range of almost every other MBT). I guess "specified by
by US DoD" is no guarantee of a superior weapons system.

Japanese tanks were intended for operations in Asia. Even in the late 20th century, PRC was designing
and fielding important tanks in great numbers constrained by the very same factor preventing Japan
from fielding heavy tanks: local bridges. A typical bridge built before WW2 has 10t inscribed on its
cement - indicating a 10 short ton load. It is impractical to use such bridges with 30-40 ton tanks in
numbers - it is much more time efficient to use vehicles under 15 tons at road speed.

Remember, colonial policy and the poor purchasing power of the few independent Asian nations (China, Thailand)
meant the local standard for tanks was very low. The Chinese only had the Soviet T-26 in numbers - and that
before they were expended before what we enter the war. Thailand may have a "tank division" - but it is entirely
composed of machine gun tanks and tankettes. It does not take much of a tank to compete with the local opposition.
Japanese armor WAS quite effective. According to historians like Bergerud, one or two light tanks regularly decided
battles (or were major factors to be overcome if they didn't decide them) in the SW Pacific/New Guinea area.

For examples of European like tank operations, you must confine yourself to places with European like road systems.
Early war operations of this sort occurred in Malaya and in Java. In Malaya, Japan was outnumbered in every class
of arms - including tanks. But Japan achieved tactical victory in every important confrontation. Their tanks
were so dreaded that many roadblocks abandoned their position at hearing what they wrongly thought were Japanese
tanks (against which they had no effective weapons). [In fact, the bicycle infantry was riding on the rims of its
wheels, the tires having failed. The noise of the steel rims on the paved roads seemed to be tanks.] But those
imaginary tanks caused dread because of what reports said happened when you faced the real ones!

It is fashionable for US arm chair generals who have no clue what conditions were like in WW2 to bad mouth Japanese
armor. I assure you, when Allied officers formed an emergency mobile task force on Western Java in 1942, they were
anything but sanguine about their prospects for success against what was considered to be "superior" Japanese armor.

I learned the hard way that hubris is a poor thinking habit. An electronics technician radar, I saw nothing wrong
with the plan to engage convoys of junks at night using radar controlled guns from "modern" US Navy destroyers. They
ran EIGHT TIMES as much tonnage every night as came down the Ho Chih Ming Trail - crossing from Malaya to Cambodia
in large numbers. We only tried it once - and were forbidden to try again - so that SLOC remained operational
for four more years - until the US Army "incursion into Cambodia" severed it by land. It seems that the junks
did NOT fight by Western rules, and did NOT scatter as we would if a convoy is faced by superior naval power. They
sailed right through our line (possibly the last line of battle in history), and got most of their cargo inshore where
we lost them among islands, rivers and streams. They armed the junks with 122 mm and 152 mm guns, deadly to
unarmored warships, and engaging in numbers, it was decided the risk of serious damage was too great to run
ever again. In spite of what might be called a tactical victory - we sank many junks - we suffered a strategic
defeat - the SLOC was not cut - because none of us saw the flaw in assuming our superior weapons and tactics
must guarantee victory. They did not. If you were in a colonial (or Chinese) force facing Japanese armor, you
would not feel it was not a problem.

[TulliusDetritus]

re the roads

The place that saw massive tank battles, deployments (the USSR) had in fact atrocious roads (even ignoring the rasputitsa = time with no roads). Excellent rail lines but they stopped at the frontline, and if you advanced they were obviously destroyed (it took time to repair them).

This primitive road network did not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing duting the summer of '41. And yes they had motorised and armored units, but the mass of the infantry marched and there were horses, no trucks. A WW1 army.

Later, when the Red Army was on the move, that's when the lend and lease US trucks gave them more mobility. And the atrocious roads did not stop them, that's for sure.

So the lack of good roads argument, I'd take it with a pinch of salt. In Europe or NE Asia.

The point is that if you want to take over the world and cross your sword with dangerous foes, you pay attention to the doctrine, technology they are using. And I can't see anywhere these armored forces.

Even the French got it. Their tanks were superior, more numerous, but incorrectly used and thus beaten in '40.

[TulliusDetritus]

Suffice to say that possibly the boldest move ever in WW2 was the attack through the Ardennes in '40. Unpassable, impossible, according to the allies.

So say something cannot be done at your own peril. Until someone does it and voilà, you're gloriously caught pants down in the WC.

[m10bob]

A number of years ago I became acquainted with Matrixgames when they offered free copies of the old Steel Panthers wargame.
Soon, I became friends with a nice fellow gamer from Japan named Taki who also had a website dedicated to the Japanese aspects of that great game.
I did re-locate his website, and another as well.

http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/
.

http://axisafvs.blogspot.com/2015/03/ja ... -wwii.html

[btd64]

Thanks Bob....GP

[spence]

The day you cite serious, modern operations vs modern foes like the genuine ones conducted by the Wehrmacht (France '40, Barbarossa, Case Blau) and the Red Army Tank Armies (Stalingrad, Kursk, stuffed Germans in Ukraine in '44, Bagration, Vistule and Oder Operations and er Berlin) I will believe the Japanese had armored forces worth that name.

Until that day: this...

Actually there was a confrontation of the IJA (some tanks) and a modern enemy: the Soviet Union. Although the IJA had some success the principal Japanese force got its head handed to it by the Soviet armor (BT-5s, BT-7s and T-26s). Both the IJA and the Soviets were pulling their punches to a certain extent having other things to keep them occupied (war in Europe, war in China).

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: spence

The day you cite serious, modern operations vs modern foes like the genuine ones conducted by the Wehrmacht (France '40, Barbarossa, Case Blau) and the Red Army Tank Armies (Stalingrad, Kursk, stuffed Germans in Ukraine in '44, Bagration, Vistule and Oder Operations and er Berlin) I will believe the Japanese had armored forces worth that name.

Until that day: this...

Actually there was a confrontation of the IJA (some tanks) and a modern enemy: the Soviet Union. Although the IJA had some success the principal Japanese force got its head handed to it by the Soviet armor (BT-5s, BT-7s and T-26s). Both the IJA and the Soviets were pulling their punches to a certain extent having other things to keep them occupied (war in Europe, war in China).

This was Khalkin Gol, at the time the largest tank battle in history!

[el cid again]

If you are trying to say "how you use what you have matters" - then I agree.

But what are you trying to say about roads? Whatever one says, the vast area of our
map system makes generalization dangerous or wrong. There were superb roads in Malaya,
on Java, and on Ceylon. There are many special cases on our map - and FICTIONAL roads
in stock AE maps (possibly deliberately I suppose, for the sake of logistics). In
much of Soviet Eastern Siberia, roads are fine when the ground is frozen (much of the
year), but tend to develop truck swallowing sink holes in summer. Because RHS permits
different pwhexe.dat files in different seasons, we deal with this by turning secondary
roads into trails. Farther South, jungle trails disappear altogether in Monsoon.
In winter, in high mountains of SW Asia, some trails get blocked by snow. And the
Allied campaign in Burma is only practical if one permits building of the Ledo Road in
my view. Still - my generalization remains true: Asia is not suitable for heavy vehicles.
The US DID field a heavy tank - but decided not to send ANY to fight in the Pacific. Yet
they could have been sent, and roads and bridges could have been built to support them.
What is possible may not be the same as what is practical and economic. Further, even
uneconomic policy may still win a campaign. The beauty of simulations is one is not limited
to historical choices.

Japan had only one armor oriented senior general officer. His ideas were in my view quite
valid in the context of the opposition and infrastructure. Japanese leaders initially demurred
building a "tank corps" with any priority, but later decided it was a war winning weapon after
all. The organizations evolve over time - as did most wartime technologies. And Japanese
conditions were different from US conditions: few Japanese knew how to drive. They addressed
that in two different ways: the gave priority to selecting troops who already could drive, and
they created training for those who had no experience. There was nothing like the US network
of fuel ('gas') stations, which were also repair shops, in most of Asia. So Japanese tank units
had more organic maintenance assets than corresponding Western ones did. They could not draw
parts or mechanics from regular IJA (or IJN) depots, so they tried to carry more of what they might
need, and also to start with spare vehicles as part of the unit TO&E. This caused the cost of
a tank unit to be greater than if we fielded a similar sized one. But it permitted them to be able
to support operations in the context of the logistical desert for motorized operations which much
of the theater was. Japanese military operations DID widely use tank and motorized formations and
WERE successful - according to Stephen Zaloga - who wrote a book about them because, he believed,
this was not generally understood. I studied at the National Diet Library (with a JSDF captain assigned
to assist me with translation), and at the Mitsubishi Tank Museum, when I was stationed in country.
I gained the impression the Japanese had invested much effort in mastering foreign concepts, and often
improved on them. Much writing has double standards: Japanese vehicles which are actually better than
the imports they were based on are often ridiculed (say for thin armor). Why are not BRITISH carriers
similarly ridiculed? Some wartime designs look very good to my eyes - and I tested armor at the General
Motors Proving Grounds in Milford Michigan. I saw a photograph of the tank part of the reconstituted
Second Tank Division on Kyushu in 1945. Row upon row of medium tanks and SP guns - uniformly armed with
fine 75 mm guns. We might have more respect for them if Operation Olympic had jumped off.

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

re the roads

The place that saw massive tank battles, deployments (the USSR) had in fact atrocious roads (even ignoring the rasputitsa = time with no roads). Excellent rail lines but they stopped at the frontline, and if you advanced they were obviously destroyed (it took time to repair them).

This primitive road network did not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing duting the summer of '41. And yes they had motorised and armored units, but the mass of the infantry marched and there were horses, no trucks. A WW1 army.

Later, when the Red Army was on the move, that's when the lend and lease US trucks gave them more mobility. And the atrocious roads did not stop them, that's for sure.

So the lack of good roads argument, I'd take it with a pinch of salt. In Europe or NE Asia.

The point is that if you want to take over the world and cross your sword with dangerous foes, you pay attention to the doctrine, technology they are using. And I can't see anywhere these armored forces.

Even the French got it. Their tanks were superior, more numerous, but incorrectly used and thus beaten in '40.

[el cid again]

I am that sort of fellow - I love to do "the impossible" - so I admire your spirit. But the real story of
the campaign in 1940 in France is a bit more complicated. The thrust that mattered was NOT authorized!

Halder then went through an "astonishing change of opinion", accepting that the Schwerpunkt should be at Sedan. He, however, had no intention of allowing an independent strategic penetration by the seven Panzer divisions of Army Group A. Much to the dismay of Guderian, this element was absent from the new plan, Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb, issued on 24 February.[31] Halder was criticised in the same way he had attacked Manstein, when he first proposed his attack plan. The bulk of the German officer corps was appalled and called Halder the "gravedigger of the Panzer force". Even when adapted to more conventional methods, the new plan provoked a storm of protest from the majority of German generals. They thought it utterly irresponsible to create a concentration of forces in a position impossible adequately to supply, along routes that could be cut easily by the French. If the Allies did not react as expected, the German offensive could end in catastrophe.

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

Suffice to say that possibly the boldest move ever in WW2 was the attack through the Ardennes in '40. Unpassable, impossible, according to the allies.

So say something cannot be done at your own peril. Until someone does it and voilà, you're gloriously caught pants down in the WC.

Half a century ago, I came across a tale that the actual thrust involved a deliberate disobedience of orders:
Only a "reconnaissance in force" was authorized. Guderian told Rommel "YOU are my reconnaissance in force.
Use your entire division. I am attaching mine to yours as a reinforcement." I am not sure German strategists
ought to be considered so brilliant - OKW had opposed many written proposals and never did authorize what
was done by field commanders!

Note - however - that the Ardennes was not jungle or swamp terrain. The hexes marked mangrove on our maps are
properly classified as unsuitable to land ANY sort of troops, never mind vehicle mounted troops. Hyperbole does not
trump physical reality.

[el cid again]

There were actually TWO such fights. And Spence is right - neither side wanted a general war.
IJA was quite impressed. The Ki-48 was inspired by the SB-2. The 47 mm tank rifle and anti-tank
gun was a literal copy of the Soviet 45 mm - but used existing tooling in 47 mm formerly used for
a naval gun. Japan applied this weapon to both tanks and AT guns. Late in WW2, it developed a
higher energy weapon in the same caliber - something I just discovered today (and have not yet
modeled). Ultimately, Japan decided to do what most major powers did - use 75 mm AA guns and
even larger caliber weapons.

I grew up in Detroit and knew many in the automotive industry. I was taught that Japan failed to convert
auto-plants to make airplanes. Turns out, they did that TOO MUCH - and ultimately decided it had been a mistake.
They build too many planes, but could not train enough pilots for them! It isn't that there wasn't a proposal -
Yamashita wrote one after witnessing combat on the German Eastern Front. It was not immediately adopted.

ORIGINAL: spence

The day you cite serious, modern operations vs modern foes like the genuine ones conducted by the Wehrmacht (France '40, Barbarossa, Case Blau) and the Red Army Tank Armies (Stalingrad, Kursk, stuffed Germans in Ukraine in '44, Bagration, Vistule and Oder Operations and er Berlin) I will believe the Japanese had armored forces worth that name.

Until that day: this...

Actually there was a confrontation of the IJA (some tanks) and a modern enemy: the Soviet Union. Although the IJA had some success the principal Japanese force got its head handed to it by the Soviet armor (BT-5s, BT-7s and T-26s). Both the IJA and the Soviets were pulling their punches to a certain extent having other things to keep them occupied (war in Europe, war in China).

[Hrafnagud]

The Japanese Army grasped the importance of armour from what they had heard had happened in World War One. A real, although modest, attempt was made to incorporate these new weapons into their force. During the early 1920s they purchased a few dozen tanks, mostly French Renault FTs, along with some British Mk A Whippets. Two tank companies were activated in 1925 - the 1st at Kurume (the 12th Division's depot), and the 2nd at Chiba's Infantry School.

A platoon of Renault tanks was sent to Manchuria in 1931 and, along with the Kwantung Army's Armored Car Platoon, created a new provisional armoured company. Additional Renaults and personnel allowed a full tank company to be created in 1932. This tank company participated in the Jehol campaign and performed well.

The Army liked what they saw and pressed ahead with plans to expand the tank arm further. By 1933 there were enough available and proposed tanks to allow the conversion of the 1st Tank Company at Kurume as the 1st Tank Battalion, while the 2nd Tank Company at Chiba was reorganised as the 2nd Tank Battalion. A brand-new 3rd Tank Battalion was raised in Manchuria.

The Japanese Army Staff, however, regarded tanks as infantry support devices, but in Manchuria the Kwantung Army had vast open steppes to operate in. A more independent role for tanks was considered there, culminating in the forming of an experimental combined arms force in 1934, the Kungchuling Mechanised Mixed Brigade.

The Kungchuling Brigade was composed of the new 4th Tank Battalion (light tanks), a motorised infantry regiment, a field artillery battalion, engineer company, and some smaller support elements. The 4th Tank Battalion was built around three companies, each with 15 light tanks, and a headquarters with five more light tanks (plus two field cars and five trucks) and a depot. The depot held a further ten tanks as reserves, and had a trains element with a further 30 trucks to aid resupply. The depot also had a small maintenance section with four recovery vehicles.

The motorised infantry regiment was basically a tankette company and three infantry battalions carried in trucks. Each infantry battalion had a headquarters, three companies (each of 150 men in fifteen trucks), and a battalion gun company with a further ten trucks, towing four 37mm infantry guns. The artillery battalion was a wheeled formation with twelve 75mm Type 90 field guns. The engineer company had twelve trucks and was reinforced by five engineer assault tanks.

Also at Kungchuling but not an organic part of that brigade was the 3rd Tank Battalion. This consisted of two companies of Type 89 medium tanks and a depot. Some of these medium tanks were routinely attached to the Kunchuling Mixed Brigade for evaluation purposes.

The mechanised mixed brigade was not a roaring success. The wheeled vehicles could not keep up with the tanks in the Asian steppes, particularly in winter. The equipment was ill-suited to the extreme colds experienced in that theatre and the engineer unit, configured in an infantry assault role, did not prove helpful. Elements of the mechanised mixed brigade, along with the 3rd Tank Battalion, fought in north China in 1937 but did not distinguish itself.

The 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions, formerly at Kurume and Chiba, were sent to China in September 1937, where they participated in operations until mid-1938. These two battalions were both a mix of Type 89 mediums and Type 94 tankettes in three companies. The 5th Tank Battalion was activated in July 1937 for use in Shanghai, but was soon brought back home and deactivated.

The command staff of these tank battalions became overwhelmed in combat and in 1938 additional staff officers and support staff were added; with this basic adjustment the battalions were redesignated as Tank Regiments. The 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions in China became the 7th and 8th Tank Regiments in 1938, and the 3rd and 4th Tank Battalions in Manchuria became the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments.

A new 5th Tank Regiment was raised by the Kwantung Army at Mutanchiang in 1938, using the new Type 97 medium tanks. With increased combat, more tank regiments were raised in China - the 9th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Tank Regiments were all activated in China during 1939. However, the 12th, 13th and 14th Tank Regiments were basically equipped with tankettes only until actual tanks became available (e.g., the 13th Tank Regiment was created from the merging of the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 9th Tankette Companies into a regiment of three light companies).

After the Nomonhan Incident started, it looked like the Kwantung Army had no intention of using tanks there, considering it to be a job purely for the infantry of the 23rd Division. However, as the Soviets ramped up their response and committed armoured forces there, the Kwantung Army ordered its tank forces west to supplement the infantry efforts. The 3rd Tank Regiment arrived at Nomonhan with a strength of 376 officers and men, four Type 97 and 26 Type 89 medium tanks, and five Type 97 and ten Type 94 tankettes.

The 4th Tank Regiment had a strength of 565 men with 35 Type 95 light tanks, eight Type 89 medium tanks, and two (some say three) Type 94 tankettes. These two regiments were merged into the "Yasuoka Detachment", which was envisaged to also contain motorised infantry, wheeled artillery, and engineers. However, it proved impossible to coordinate the various elements and in reality the two tank regiments ended up fighting exposed and on their own. They suffered horrendous losses at the hands of the Soviets and accomplished little. The regimental commanders faced considerable criticism after the debacle, but in reality little could have been done as the wheeled elements were utterly incapable of keeping up with the tanks for even the shortest maneuvers. It is likely that the experience at Nomonhan contributed to the decision to disband the Mechanised Brigade in 1940. In its place, two new tank formations were activated: the 1st Tank Group at Tungning, and the 2nd at Tungan. These Tank Groups were given the responsibility of infantry support and each consisted of three tank regiments.

[Hrafnagud]

The IJA mobilisation plan for 1941 attempted to standardise the tank formations by providing set Tables of Organisation and Equipment for the Tank Group HQ, group maintenance company, group ammunition trains, and regular and light tank regiments.

The Tank Group HQ had an allowance of 60 officers and men, two light tanks, two medium tanks, three field cars and four trucks. The tank group maintenance company had an allowance of 162 officers and men, 4 light tanks, 6 medium tanks, three field cars, eleven trucks, and four repair vehicles. The tank group ammunition trains had an allowance of 176 officers and men, with three field cars and 55 trucks (that mostly carried ammunition for the tanks).

The medium tank company consisted of three platoons, each with three medium tanks, and a company HQ with one medium and two light tanks, a small field car, a motorcycle, and a truck. The company trains had a further eight trucks. It is clear from the company ammunition load that its primary role was infantry support - 107 HE and 53 AP rounds for each medium tank, and 80 HE and 80 AP rounds for each light tank. There were only four radios - one in the medium tank in the company HQ, and one for each platoon leader's tank.

A medium tank regiment had three medium tank companies and a light tank company, together with a regimental HQ and trains element. The light tank company was simply three light tank platoons (each three light tanks), a company HQ with a light tank and two small field cars, and a trains element with six trucks. The ammunition basic load was the same as for the light tanks in the medium company - 80 HE and 80 AP rounds per tank.

The regimental trains carried a further load of ammunition, equating to 148 HE and 148 AP rounds for each of the 20 light tanks, and 200 HE and 99 AP rounds for each of the 37 medium tanks. The regimental trains also included a small maintenance detachment with three light repair trucks, as well as three light and five medium tanks as reserve replacement vehicles.

The Tank Group, then, had a TO&E that allowed a total of 2,345 officers and men, 119 medium tanks, 66 light tanks, 54 field cars, 286 trucks, and 12 repair vehicles.

Under the Mobilisation Plan, however, the 4th Tank Regiment remained a light tank regiment, with three light tank companies identical to the ones found in a medium tank regiment. A significant change was the ammunition loadout; without medium tanks and their short-barrel low-velocity 57mm guns for infantry support, the 4th Regiment was forced to use its 37mm guns for this purpose, and the company ammunition load was altered to 107 HE and 53 AP rounds per tank, while the regimental ammunition trains carried 214 HE and 106 AP rounds per tank.

Japanese tank production took a while to catch up with the demand created by the activation of new tank regiments. However, by December 1941 the tank regiments were all relatively built out. The 1st, 3rd and 11th Tank Regiments were fully equipped with Type 97 medium and Type 95 light tanks. The 5th and 6th Tank Regiments also used the new Type 97s, but appear to have been slightly below strength. The 7th, 8th, and 9th Tank Regiments were all up to full strength, but with older Type 89 mediums. The 4th Tank Regiment was a light tank regiment; the 14th Tank Regiment consisted of Type 95 light tanks until enough medium tanks arrived (eventually in 1943). The 13th Tank Regiment - a medium regiment in name - was still largely equipped with light tanks.

The 1st Tank Group in Manchuria controlled the 3rd, 5th and 9th Tank Regiments, while the 2nd Tank Group controlled the 2nd, 4th, and 11th Tank Regiments. Although the tank group HQs had been formed in early 1941, IGHQ only sanctioned the mobilisation of the group maintenance companies and ammunition trains on 1 August 1941.

The tank group HQs were small affairs that were hard-pressed to conduct tactical operations; the only radios were found in the two medium and two light tanks assigned to it. The group ammunition trains used its 55 trucks to carry 5,400 rounds of HE and 3,700 rounds of AP for the medium tanks' 57mm guns but, surprisingly, none for the 37mm guns.

Once the decision was made to invade to the south, Japanese tank assets were rapidly reshuffled. In November 1941 the 3rd Tank Group HQ was formed, along with maintenance and trains elements. The 1st Tank Regiment (from Japan) and the 6th and 14th Tank Regiments (from China) were attached to this new HQ which was itself made subordinate to the 25th Army due to invade Malaya. At the same time, the 4th Tank Regiment was taken from Manchuria and the 7th Tank Regiment from China to be allocated to the 14th Army (for use in the Philippines).

A novel step taken with the 3rd Tank Group was the assignment of an organic engineer unit with a motorised bridging company (with six Type 99 pontoon bridge sets) and two regular engineer companies. The bridging element allowed the tanks of the 3rd Tank Group to operate extremely well in Malaya.

The tank elements in the southern invasion forces performed well and contributed to the spectacular initial advances. One problem that was noted in after-action reports regarding operations in the Malayan jungle was the one-man turret on the Type 95 light tank; this severely hampered operations as it required the tank commander (and sometimes unit leader) to also serve as gunner and loader.

After the fall of Singapore and the commencement of the siege of Bataan, the tanks used in the Centrifugal Offneisve were free for reassignment. The 3rd Tank Group's HQ and the 6th Tank Regiment were sent back to Manchuria. The 1st and 14th Tank Regiments were sent to Burma as part of the 15th Army in March 1942, where the 14th Tank Regiment served out the rest of the war, eventually being equipped with medium tanks in 1943. The 1st Tank Regiment was reassigned to the Kwantung Army in July 1942.

The 4th Tank Regiment was moved from the Philippines to the 16th Army for the invasion of Java in January 1942, while the 7th Tank Regiment remained in Luzon until May 1942, when it was reassigned to the Kwantung Army. The 4th Tank Regiment carried out garrison duty on Timor for the rest of the war.

So, by mid-1942, only two tank regiments - both of them with light tanks - were left in Japan's new conquests. The rest were mostly concentrated under the Kwantung Army, which kept its eyes firmly on the Soviet Union.

[Hrafnagud]

As indicated earlier, the Kwantung Army had experimented with combined arms during the mid-1930s. Reports of the success of massed German panzers reached Japanese commanders in Manchuria and would have impressed them greatly.

On 4 July 1942, the Mechanised Army was officially created by IGHQ order. The units assigned to it were the 1st and 2nd Tank Groups (with their subordinate three tank regiments each), the 6th and 7th Tank Regiments, four independent anti-tank companies, an independent field artillery regiment (less a battery), three independent field AA companies, two field machine-cannon companies, an independent engineer regiment (less a company), the 3rd Tank Group's engineer unit (less a company), and the 3rd Heavy River Crossing Engineer Company.

However, the IGHQ plan for the Mechanised Army was short-lived, as the two tank groups and other units mentioned in the July order had been disbanded a month earlier by the Kwantung Army in order to create two new tank divisions!

[Hrafnagud]

The Kwantung Army was able to form two tank divisions, each with four tank regiments. From 24 June 1942 the 1st Tank Division consisted of the 1st Tank Brigade (1st and 5th Tank Regiments) and the 2nd Tank Brigade (3rd and 9th Tank Regiments); the 2nd Tank Division consisted of the 3rd Tank Brigade (6th and 7th Tank Regiments) and 4th Tank Brigade (10th and 11th Tank Regiments).

The tank regiments themselves were also substantially enlarged with effect from 24 June 1942. Regimental strength went from 649 men to 1,017. The regiment's medical detachment did not include any privates, so an additional 24 medical and 30 general-duty privates were authorised for all regiments, bringing total authorised strength up to 1,071 men. Each of these tank regiments now had a headquarters, a light tank company, three medium tank companies, a gun tank company and a maintenance company. A light tank company had 10 light tanks and a maintenance platoon. A medium tank company contained three light tanks and eleven medium tanks, along with a maintenance platoon. The gun tank company was new; basically, this was brought about by the development of the high-velocity Type 1 47mm anti-tank gun, which had been designed specifically to counter Soviet armour. During the Nomonhan Incident, the Japanese had realised that the Soviet 45mm tank guns had completely outranged the low-velocity 57mm tank guns mounted on their medium tanks. The new Type 1 47mm anti-tank gun had double the penetration of the older 57mm guns at 1,000 metres. The Type 97-Kai or ShinHoTo Chi-Ha ("new turret Chi-Ha") mounted this new gun.

The gun tank company was identical to the medium tank company but featured these Type 97-Kai's. The regiment HQ had four light tanks for liaison and two medium tanks for command duties; the maintenance company also carried out supply duties with 30 trucks along with a reserve pool of 10 replacement tanks. The newly reorganised tank regiments had significantly more firepower (26 light tanks and 46 medium tanks, excluding the reserve pool), but slightly less logistical support; however, they were no longer earmarked to operate independently and could rely upon divisional elements for support.

The reorganisation was based on what the Kwantung Army wanted, not necessarily what it had. The plans were slowly implemented; production of the Type 97-Kai's increased stocks so that by mid-1944 most of the regiments were actually made up of a light tank company, three Type 97-Kai companies, and one medium company with the unimproved Type 97. By this point the older 57mm-equipped tanks became designated the Gun Tank Company for the regiment.

The tank division, apart from the four tank regiments, also included a motorised infantry regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank battalion, a field artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion, an engineer battalion, a maintenance battalion and a transport regiment. This resulted in the tank division having an authorised strength of 635 officers and 13,186 other ranks.

The lessons of Khalkhin Gol had been hard learnt, and the new Japanese tank divisions emphasised anti-tank protection. Each of the nine motorised rifle companies included a 47mm anti-tank gun; the anti-tank battalion had eighteen 47mm anti-tank guns; and 37mm Type 94 AT guns were allocated to other units making up the division.

The engineer unit was also armoured. It was made up of six companies, each of which consisted of two armoured engineer platoons carried in APCs and one assault platoon with four SS-Ki armoured engineer vehicles. In addition to the Type 96 pontoon bridge sets, the engineers also had 62 APCs, 44 soft-skinned half-track trucks, 29 trucks, 3 workshop trucks and a passenger car.

Divisional recce consisted of two light tank companies, a rifle company, a gun tank company and a maintenance company. The light tank companies were identical to those in a tank regiment, while the gun tank company had eight Type 97-Kai's and two basic Type 97s.

The motorised infantry regiment had three battalions along with infantry gun, maintenance, and medical companies. Each battalion had three rifle companies, each of three platoons, each of four sections. One of these sections was an anti-tank section, with a 47mm Type 1 AT gun and 70 rounds of ammunition. The other three sections were infantry, either with a light machine gun, a grenade discharger, and 11 rifles each; or two sections with LMGs and one with GDs, depending on the commander's preference. It appears the intention was to equip the motorised infantry regiments with the full-track Type 1 APC, but they never became available in sufficient numbers so the infantry instead relied upon Type 94 6x4 trucks. Despite being a brand-new formation, all rifles in the tank division were older 6.5mm Type 38 Arisakas.

The artillery regiment had twelve 75mm Type 90 field guns and 24 105mm Type 91 howitzers, all towed by Type 98 4-ton tractors. The anti-aircraft regiment had eight 75mm Type 88 guns and 24 20mm Type 98 autocannons.

The maintenance unit consisted of four maintenance companies and a parts company. Each maintenance company had three maintenance platoons and a recovery platoon. A maintenance platoon had one heavy repair section, two light repair sections, an ordinance/radio repair section and a spare parts section. The spare parts company had fifteen half-track trucks, fifteen 6x4 trucks, and fifteen other trucks for the trains. The transport regiment had six motor transport companies and a maintenance company.

These new tank divisions provided for a total of 124 light tanks and 194 medium tanks, with a further 40 tanks in the regimental reserve pools.

Shortly after the raising of the 1st and 2nd Tank Divisions, the 3rd Tank Division was formed in China. This was created around the 5th Tank Brigade (8th and 12th Tank Regiments), the 6th Tank Brigade (13th and 17th Tank Regiments) and a selection of infantry, artillery and support units. Most of the constituent elements were formed through the conversion of elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.

The raising of these three tank divisions during 1942 did not involve creating any additional tank regiments. In fact, no further tank regiments were formed until early 1944, nor were the tank divisions made part of the permanent army force structure by the Army Staff in Tokyo. In part, this was due to Japanese tank production having reached a peak in early 1942, which went into a terminal decline that lasted right up until the Japanese surrender. By 1943 the priority was on shipping and aircraft and tank factories were being converted to aircraft assemblies. During the whole of 1945, before the surrender - eight months - Japan only managed to produce 127 tanks. The tanks that were being produced were mainly the Type 97-Kai and the similar Type 1, which were used to replace older models in existing tank regiments. The tanks freed by this effort - mainly light tanks - were then used to form the organic tank elements that were earmarked for the ocean divisions.

[Hrafnagud]

In November 1943, the Mechanised Army was finally formally disbanded by the IGHQ, with the 1st Tank Division reassigned to the 3rd Army and the 2nd Tank Division reassigned to the 5th Army. In early 1944, the organisation of the tank divisions was changed, moving from a "square" (two brigades of two regiments each) to a "triangular" (three tank regiments). As a result, the 9th Tank Regiment was removed from the 1st Tank Division, with the 11th Tank Regiment being removed from the 2nd Tank Division. The 3rd Tank Division in China had already lost its 8th Tank Regiment to service on Rabaul, and was therefore unaffected. Simultaneously, and for no real good reason, the divisional AA units were also removed from the divisions, although they continued using their old designations (for example, 2nd Tank Division AA Unit). By early 1944 most of the divisional tank regiments looked very different, with 31 light tanks and 50 medium tanks. Internal organisation differed widely from division to division, based on command preference and available equipment.

The 1st Tank Division then lost its 3rd Tank Regiment in April 1944, when that unit was moved to China. This left the 1st Tank Division with only two tank regiments. However, the division's other constituent elements remained in place, even by the time it was moved to Japan in March 1945, when the 1st Tank Division had an actual strength of 10,033 men.

However, with the move back to the Japanese homeland, large numbers of trucks were removed from the 1st Tank Division. The tank regiments were left with only three cars and eight trucks. The mechanised infantry regiment became a non-motorised infantry regiment with only 39 APCs, eight cars and 21 trucks. The transport unit only retained 61 trucks.

At the time of the Japanese surrender, each of the 1st Tank Division's remaining two tank regiments had 30 Type 95 light tanks, 35 Type 97 medium tanks, and 12 Type 97-Kai medium tanks. The infantry regiment held 39 fully-tracked APCs and 15 tankettes.

The 2nd Tank Division, in contrast, was shipped to the Philippines for combat. To conserve valuable shipping space, IGHQ issued drastically reduced strengths for the division's constituent elements on 21 July 1944, which saw the division having to cut manpower from around 12,000 to just over 7,000 men. Given only general directives to reduce the number of men in the division, the 2nd Tank Division saw some rather flexible organisation. Each of the three tank regiments had a nominal strength of 22 light tanks, 38 Type 97-Kai's, and 16 basic Type 97s. However, in the case of the 10th Tank Regiment, its gun tank company lost all its 57mm Type 97s to submarine attack on the way to the Philippines; tanks from other companies were distributed to it.

The infantry regiment left behind almost all its vehicles, including the few APCs it had, and deployed as normal foot infantry in the Philippines. The mobile artillery regiment had twenty-four 105mm Type 91 howitzers, eight 75mm Type 90 field guns, and four Type 1 Self-Propelled 75mm guns. The single SP battery included four APCs for ammunition and had two armoured observation vehicles. In theory, each towed battery should have included a Type 98 4-ton tractor for each gun, along with two armoured observation vehicles for each battery HQ. However, battery composition apparently different considerably.

The 2nd Tank Division's AT battalion had 18 47mm Type 1 AT guns. However, in February 1945 the guns were abandoned during a retreat and the unit was issued with machine guns instead. The engineer regiment took its SS-Ki engineer assault tanks to the Philippines, but no other armoured vehicles. The transport regiment was reduced to 400 men with 132 trucks.

The 2nd Tank Division shipped from Fusan, Chosen [Pusan, Korea] in mid-September 1944. Upon its arrival on Luzon, it was broken up into different elements which were assigned to different commands. The division was destroyed piecemeal without ever affecting the battle.

The 3rd Tank Division served the entire war in China as a mobile reserve. It also had a different organisation by mid-1944, with its three tank regiments each consisting of around 900 men with 31 light tanks and 48 medium tanks. Given the lack of Chinese armour, all of the mediums were nominally older Type 97s, although by May 1944 there were 90 Type 97-Kai's in the 3rd Tank Division. The AT unit was supposed to have 18 47mm AT guns, but in fact only had six, while in the mechanised infantry regiment the three rifle companies only had two 47mm guns instead of three. The artillery regiment had its full quota of sixteen 105mm howitzers, but only nine of the twelve 75mm Type 90 guns authorised.

[Hrafnagud]

In July 1944 IGHQ ordered the raising of the 4th Tank Division in Japan. However, the new division only started taking shape with the arrival of the 30th Tank Regiment to supplement the earlier 28th and 29th Tank Regiments. The 4th Tank Division was not organised on a similar scale to the earlier 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tank Divisions, resembling a reinforced tank brigade rather than a tank division.

The new 28th, 29th and 30th Tank Regiments had a new TO&E of 966 men when activated on 16 July 1944. On 6 April 1945, they were reorganised onto a new 1,198 man TO&E, which was then supplemented a month later by the addition of two more technicians. The tank regiments of the 4th Tank Division were an entirely new organisation that included a large infantry/pioneer company in the battalion. However, the transport problems that had plagued Japanese tank units were not remedied. In addition to its 56 tanks, these regiments had only 12 APCs, a field car and 11 trucks.

The 28-30 Tank Regiment series included a regiment HQ, two medium tank companies, two gun tank companies, a SP gun company, an infantry/pioneer company and a maintenance company. The regiment had a total of 11 light tanks, 25 Type 97-Kai medium tanks, and twenty Type 3 medium tanks (gun tanks armed with the Type 3 75mm gun). The SP gun company had six SP guns, either 75mm Type 1s or 105mm Ho-Ni II howitzers. The battery was also provided with four half-track APCs. The infantry/pioneer company consisted of three rifle platoons and a pioneer platoon with 368 men, 10 LMGs, 10 grenade dischargers, one light tank and and eight tracked APCs. The maintenance company had 129 men and was provided with one light and two medium tanks as reserves and eleven trucks.

There was very little logistical support for the 4th Tank Division's tank regiments. Each had a nominal "maintenance" company, but had to make do with only a single light repair truck, and ten supply trucks to cater for the logistical needs of the entire regiment. For comparison, the 1st Tank Division's regiments - after their move to Japan proper - had three light repair trucks, but only eight cargo trucks.

There was no way that ten cargo trucks were going to be able to transport the 750-odd men of the regiment who were not tank crews or could not fit into the 15-man APCs. It is unlikely they could even carry enough fuel, ammunition and spare parts for the regiment. The division's transport unit (160 trucks) could assist, but only at the expense of general carriage for the division. However, the 4th Tank Division was much better off in this regard than the 1st Tank Division, which by this time only had 61 cargo trucks in its transport unit, in addition to the eight trucks in each of its two tank regiments.

In addition to the three tank regiments, the 4th Tank Division included a 135-man HQ, a 686-man machine cannon unit, a 189-man signal company, a 524-man maintenance unit, and a 766-man transport unit. The machine cannon unit had twenty 20mm autocannons, five cars and 35 trucks, while the HQ had a car, two trucks and a light repair truck. The divisional maintenance unit had two companies, each of which held six medium tanks as reserve vehicles, along with three tracked tank recovery vehicles, four light and two heavy repair trucks and ten cargo trucks.

The 4th Tank Division therefore had an authorised strength by May 1945 of 5,900 men, with 33 light tanks, 75 Type 97-Kai medium tanks, 60 Type 3 medium tanks, and a further 12 medium tanks in reserve. Other vehicles included 18 SP guns, 36 APCs, 12 light repair trucks, four heavy repair trucks, six tracked tank recovery vehicles, six cars, and 237 trucks.