Japanese ASW warfare

[RCHarmon]

Still learning the game.

As Japan in the ASW fight I am figuring PBs are okay SC are good? What destroyers are best at ASW? The ones with the most endurance I use with my long range task forces.

As far as planes, I am guessing, a Betty can be used to drop depth charges?

[jdsrae]

I’ve been working on this recently, with some great feedback from the forum at this link:
tm.asp?m=4585575

I use PB and E ships in oil/fuel/resource convoys for local protection, old DD to support strategic troop convoy movements and amhipb ops, new DD with battle force / Kido Butai. SC in dedicated ASW task forces. SC-Ch classes eventually get decent depth charges. SC-CHa ships keep the little depth charges which are best used in coastal hexes only.

Floatplane groups (Jake etc) along convoy routes conducting day and night naval search /ASW patrols.
Land based navy bombers (Nell, Betty, frances, Kates etc) from navy air base locations conducting night and day naval search.

Some players even use army light bombers in ASW roles (but my Generals still need some convincing on that idea!)

[Barb]

Surprisingly I had discovered (from the receiving end) that Akizuki-Class (the ones with 4x2x100mm primary guns) are quite effective in ASW warfare in my PBEM in DBB scenario (I am on the receiving end). They do look really big and scary (cruiser like!) on the ASW screen and managed to send about 7 subs to the dockyard in less than month (with other ships on ASW its more like 1-3 per month)

However my overall sub losses up to 1943 are really low compared to reality so far.

[xj900uk]

IN RL the IJN never gave that much throught or backing to ASW until it was far too late. THey have the very good SC's with '10' ASW but these are only for coastal work around the home island s and don@t have the range as convoy escorts.
In practice they converted a few small freigthers into Patrol Boats with some depth charges and ASDIC, but in practice they didn@t do this very often - however yes they do make good convoy escorts.
#E~ boats sound good in theory and do have a nice range for a long distance convoy escort, but their ASW capability is very poor until late in the game '1' is the norm b efore refits

Here is a very good book on RL Japanese ASW during WWII, I found it very useful :
https://www.amazon.com/Japanese-Anti-Su ... 8365281392

For a nation that never rated ASW highly (the maverick Inoue aside, who was recalled to the General staff in late '44), they were the only nation in WWII that ever designed and operated a purpose built ASW aircraft, the 'flying eye' from a few shore bases.

IN RL the best ASW plane on the Allied side was, ironically, the old Stringbag. It flew so slowly it could drop bombs and depth charges on U-Boats with uneering accuracy.
It was only the aircraft that could hover on one spot (given a strong Atlantic westerly breeze) and w as the first to deploy a sonar boy on the water towed by a cable like a helicopter. The Swordfish tended to operate 'Scarrecrow' patrols flying in pairs, one with the buoy and the other with the bombs and depth charges - they communicated with hand signals or signal lamps (as radio would give their presence away) and also depth charges settings were set by hand by the poor gunner who sometimes had to climb out on the wing to do it!)

[sPzAbt. 502]

Tomozuru-class is your best at start, ASW value 2 with better DCs, decent range and good maneuverability, it is still not good.

But you should go for "soft-kills" anyways, start training you ASW assets, naval and air, from the first day so they will be good enough when you really need them.

[rustysi]

best at ASW?

Anything with high experience/skill levels.

[sPzAbt. 502]

Maybe the torpedo problems that USN suffered from in the start made the Japanese issues even worse in the long term as the first leasson where missed.

[sPzAbt. 502]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

best at ASW?

Anything with high experience/skill levels.

True, forgot to mentions this, that makes all the old DDs valuable even with their Type 95 DCs.

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

Maybe the torpedo problems that USN suffered from in the start made the Japanese issues even worse in the long term as the first leasson where missed.

Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

[sPzAbt. 502]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

Maybe the torpedo problems that USN suffered from in the start made the Japanese issues even worse in the long term as the first leasson where missed.

Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

But they had the Battle of the Atlantic to observe before the war so there is no good excuse for the strategic oversight.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

Maybe the torpedo problems that USN suffered from in the start made the Japanese issues even worse in the long term as the first leasson where missed.

Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

But they had the Battle of the Atlantic to observe before the war so there is no good excuse for the strategic oversight.

The same can be said for the US navy. Admiral King was totally unprepared for the U-boat offensive in 1942.

[sPzAbt. 502]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

ORIGINAL: rustysi




Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

But they had the Battle of the Atlantic to observe before the war so there is no good excuse for the strategic oversight.

The same can be said for the US navy. Admiral King was totally unprepared for the U-boat offensive in 1942.

Good point.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

best at ASW?

Anything with high experience/skill levels.

+1

same is applicable to the Allies... which is why the British DDs/ corvettes are so good early on

[Macclan5]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

ORIGINAL: rustysi

best at ASW?

Anything with high experience/skill levels.

+1

same is applicable to the Allies... which is why the British DDs/ corvettes are so good early on

Further according to Ian Toll's Pacific Trilogy - and other books I have read over the years IIRC - it also "somewhat" has to do with "sub doctrine" and "Albert Thayer Mahanism".

That is the primary role of the Submarine - prewar - was to act as a scout for the "inevitable" Big Gun Battleship that 'always' settled any war where Naval forces played a role. Sub and sub missions were not a strategic weapon in and of themselves in conventional wisdom of the day.

German thinking on Uboat deployment - wolf packs - and SLOC interdiction / blockade - is actually rather unique among the Naval Powers of the era.

In fact one might argue (and as I have read it) that Germany being a primarily continental power and not a traditional coastal sea power- was further forced to adopt this stance. They knew of their unintentional successes in WW1 - and despite a ship building program under the Nazi; the ship building designs were at best a pale imitation of the Royal Navy. Surface raiders, Pocket Battleships, even their large capital ships were influenced by the goal of strangling Great Britain via Blockade as opposed to squaring off in the great battleship duel of Mahan.

USN strategic success may largely due to the fact that Nimitz himself was a 'dolphin' and recognized / deployed against conventional wisdom.

I am not sure I agree 100% with this line of argument as other factors come into play... strategic genius 'on the fly', personalities, shipbuilding capacity, etc etc.

But it does partially answer why the Japanese failed to 'convoy' their merchant marine till far too late. Japanese Naval thinking and doctrine was likely far more conservative than most other nations.

[geofflambert]

Japanese ASW totally blows bubbles, and that is historically consistent. In deep water Japanese surface ASW is a complete waste of time. For the Japanese player, you begin with intensive air ASW and then see if surface units can assist at all. However, having escorts that have some ASW capacity is far better, when facing enemy subs, than not having any at all.

[Lowpe]

Once you hit 1944 sometime (June?) Japanese ASW ships get downright deadly!.

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

Maybe the torpedo problems that USN suffered from in the start made the Japanese issues even worse in the long term as the first leasson where missed.

Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

But they had the Battle of the Atlantic to observe before the war so there is no good excuse for the strategic oversight.

Eh. Japan's view was that the size of the Pacific would mitigate a similar war.

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: Zorch

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt. 502

ORIGINAL: rustysi




Could have added to Japan's complacency. She didn't believe the U.S. subs would be a problem, and the results in '42 seemed to show this was true. In '43 as improved torps, new boats, and better/more experienced commanders became more prevalent things started to change.

By the time Japan noticed the change it was too late for her.

But they had the Battle of the Atlantic to observe before the war so there is no good excuse for the strategic oversight.

The same can be said for the US navy. Admiral King was totally unprepared for the U-boat offensive in 1942.

To some degree, but it was also due to a lack/concentration of assets. As far as King went, well like many such leaders he had his faults/issues.

[rustysi]

That is the primary role of the Submarine - prewar - was to act as a scout for the "inevitable" Big Gun Battleship that 'always' settled any war where Naval forces played a role. Sub and sub missions were not a strategic weapon in and of themselves in conventional wisdom of the day.

German thinking on Uboat deployment - wolf packs - and SLOC interdiction / blockade - is actually rather unique among the Naval Powers of the era.

In fact one might argue (and as I have read it) that Germany being a primarily continental power and not a traditional coastal sea power- was further forced to adopt this stance. They knew of their unintentional successes in WW1 - and despite a ship building program under the Nazi; the ship building designs were at best a pale imitation of the Royal Navy. Surface raiders, Pocket Battleships, even their large capital ships were influenced by the goal of strangling Great Britain via Blockade as opposed to squaring off in the great battleship duel of Mahan.

Good points.

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

Once you hit 1944 sometime (June?) Japanese ASW ships get downright deadly!.

IIRC this has been toned down. I don't recall what you need to load to get the effect.