SOPAC and SWPAC

[Luskan]

I would like to know how WITP intends to model the seperate pacific commands.

All the historians I have read on the pacific campaign - about 8 or 9, all say that the US needlessly divided its own forces in the pacific by dividing things up between MacArthur and Nimitz. They all go on to state that as a result, a smaller, weaker IJN force could threaten and even manage naval parity with their USN opponents simply because assets were not shared between the two commands.

If WITP is going to simulate things like production, and doctrinal problems (ie. Japanese pilot training program - lack thereof) - it should also have to model the heirachy problems suffered by the allies due to having no unified commander for the pacific area.

Perhaps ships arriving as reinforcements can be assigned to one or the other upon arrival - and are thereafter not allowed to leave the arbitrary operational boundary that the allies drew between the two theatres?

This is what happened in real life. halsey's gamble in the raids on Rabaul wouldn't have had to have been a gamble if he'd had cruisers to protect his CVs from the IJN cruisers sitting in Rabaul's bay! etc. etc. [insert dozen other historical examples here].

So I pose this question to the betas and Matrix - how is this modelled, and if it hasn't been considered - how are you going to incorporate the sort of handicap the allies had by having no supreme CiC pacific for several years?

[Mike Scholl]

LUSKIN I don't know who the "they" are you refer to, but
"they" need to check their facts. The main Carrier Force and
all it's supporting BB's, CA's, etch served with both CENTPAC
and SWOPAC---It was Task Force 38 with MacArthur, and Task
Force 58 with Nimitz. Same ships, different designation and
Admirals. Halsey was TF 38, and Spruance TF 58---that way one
staff could be planning it's next move while the other was using
the fleet.

There was some division of effort, but not as much as you
seem to think---US forces in the Pacific were large enough by
the end of 1943 (when the Central Pacific Operations started
in the Gilberts) That they almost needed the extra "frontage"
just to bring it all to bear on the Japanese.

[mdiehl]

The interservice and cruddy command hierarchy doctrinal problems in the Allied armed forces paled in comparison to the flaws in the Imperial Japanese command structure.

[Luskan]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
LUSKaN I don't know who the "they" are you refer to, but
"they" need to check their facts.
---------------------------------------------

Every book I've ever read on the pacific war (about 8 or 9 pacific war books, old and new, good and bad) constitutes "they".

----------------------------------------------
There was some division of effort, but not as much as you
seem to think---US forces in the Pacific were large enough by
the end of 1943 (when the Central Pacific Operations started
in the Gilberts) That they almost needed the extra "frontage"
just to bring it all to bear on the Japanese.

--------------------------------------------------

All of these books make it a MAJOR theme to drum out how much faster the war in the pacific would have progressed with a: unitary command, and b: no division of forces. Ships, troops, planes, and orders for planes (the B29) were fought over between the two theatres, each commander wanting to implement his plan that basically represented the ancillary hostility between the Navy and Army. Most of them use Halsey's CV battle at Lunga as an example of an admiral taking a gamble to sink IJN cruisers before they could threaten him that night - because there were no US surface forces to protect him.

Sure - the big CVs never got split up between theatres as far as I know - there just weren't enough of them to do so before the end of 1943. The point is (as is made best by Spector I think, but van der vat makes it pretty clear too) that the US could have had the sort of plethora of force you describe before 6/1944, but they didn't.

Look at it this way: every commander, operation and theatre were rivals for the same resources. The Liberator tug of war between plugging the Atlantic U-boat gap and ops in the pacific, the tug of war between Torch and the pacific for landing craft - the repeated disagreements between King and Marshall, Nimitz and MacArthur. The Central drive or the Phillipines? Hell we'll do both!

How about "Whoever gets there first gets to command the rest of the op?" [not an exact quote obviously].

Mdiehl: I don't suppose you could shed some light on what the IJ command structure's problems were? I could have thought the Junta would have pretty much had their way "in the name of the emperor" etc. They only required his permission for "big" things (withdrawing from Guadalcanal maybe?).

[mogami]

Hi, I think the game will produce a division of labor naturally.
Trying to send resource to protect a multitude of bases will produce the mixed command problem. The Allied player will need to

Protect Australia (Command A)
Protect CenPac (Command B)
Protect the route between A and B (Command C)
Protect the Indian Ocean (Command D)

It will occur without any artificial rules. The only advantage the player has is the command of his choice will always win the request for material.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Luskan
--------------------------------------------------

Mdiehl: I don't suppose you could shed some light on what the IJ command structure's problems were? I could have thought the Junta would have pretty much had their way "in the name of the emperor" etc. They only required his permission for "big" things (withdrawing from Guadalcanal maybe?).

I think he means that the IJN and IJA hated each others guts and thus rarely cooperated unless deemed to their mutual strategic self interest. That being said, they were capable of doing so from time to time, when push came to shove.

[mdiehl]

I mean that the IJA and the IJN hated each other's guts and almost never cooperated, even when a gun was held to each other's heads. They operated separate merchant fleets and hoarded these for their own operations. Their divergent opinions about strategic planning made the Nimitz-MacArthur divergence seem like the negotiations between two Lutherans dividing the last block of fruit-cocktail-jello. When army officers and navy officers HAD to cooperate on campaigns because of directives from Imperial GHQ, they often did not, often to the point of disregarding orders from nominally superior officers (as the IJN ground units did in the Philippines in Manila).

[Yamamoto]

Originally posted by mdiehl
They operated separate merchant fleets and hoarded these for their own operations.

The army distrusted the navy so much they (the army) even operated a couple of their own (really pathetic) aircraft carriers. I forget the names now but they only held 16-22 planes (CVE). I wonder if they ate planes the way Long Island does.

Yamamoto

[Raverdave]

Yup there were two laid down and only one was completed before the end of the war, they were the Yamashio Maru (sunk by planes in Yokohama bay 17/2/45) and the Chigusa Maru, (launched 29/12/44 and completed as a cargo ship in March '49).

They were only able to operate 8 (EIGHT:eek: ) aircraft.

[showboat1]

So what would their designator be? His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Army's Navy's Ship? HIJMANS?

The Army never got over the fact that there plan for a drive into Siberia and East Soviet Union got overturned in favor of the Navy's plan.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
The main Carrier Force and
all it's supporting BB's, CA's, etch served with both CENTPAC
and SWOPAC---It was Task Force 38 with MacArthur, and Task
Force 58 with Nimitz. Same ships, different designation and
Admirals. Halsey was TF 38, and Spruance TF 58---that way one
staff could be planning it's next move while the other was using
the fleet.

Mike, the command structure of the PTO was a little different. Soon after PH it was divided between Army (SW Pacific Area-MacArthur and CBI-Stilwell) and Navy (Pacific Fleet-Nimitz). The latter was subdivided into North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area and South Pacific Area. All Areas had their own Naval Force, organized in Task Forces.
The Allied Naval Force Southwest Pacific under VAdm. Leary and later (September 42) VAdm. Carpender - better known as 'MacArthur's Navy' - consisted of the remnants of the ABDA Fleet and a few reinforcements (in September 1942 Carpender comanded just five 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 20 submarines and 7 small craft).
The South Pacific Naval Force under Ghormley and later Halsey played the major role after Midway in the struggle for Guadalcanal.
The Central Pacific Command under Nimitz remained rather inactive after Midway, most ships being sent to the South Pacific instead. It became the main theater again with the Central Pacific Offensive starting in November 43.
The North Pacific Area Force under RAdm. Theobald (relieved by Kinkaid in Jan 43) saw comparatively little action except the recapture of Attu and Kiska in May-July 1943.

On March 15, 1943 a major reorganization took place, with the Central Pacific Force being renamed 5th Fleet under Spruance, the South Pacific Force now being known as 3rd Fleet under Halsey and MacArtur's Navy now being called 7th Fleet (Carpender was relieved by ViceAdm. Kinkaid in November 1943). I must admit I don't know what happened to the North Pacific Force .
Initially most capital ships went to 5th Fleet, only a few carriers were lent to 3rd Fleet. When Halsey's job in the South Pacific was done with the isolation of Rabaul in early 1944, 3rd Fleet found new employment in the Central Pacific offensive, and thus the alternating command structure of 3rd/5th Fleet and TF 38/58 respectively was born.
Because the Navy didn't trust the Army's ability to make best use of major naval assets, the Navy never agreed to MacArthur's request to assign fleet carriers to 7th Fleet. MacArthur's Navy remained a 'shallow waters fleet' predominantly made up of amphibious shipping with a few crusiers and destroyers as covering and bombardment forces. Only in 1944 would 7th Fleet receive CVEs and old battleships to beef up landing operations. For MacArthur's 'Return to the Philippines' 7th Fleet received most of the amphib assets of Nimitz, but 5th Fleet retained all fleet carriers and new battleships. This divided command structure of 7th Fleet = landing operations and 5th Fleet = Fleet action contributed to the well-known near-disaster at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. So much for that, see Morison for the details.

Originally posted by Yamamoto
The army distrusted the navy so much they (the army) even operated a couple of their own (really pathetic) aircraft carriers. I forget the names now but they only held 16-22 planes (CVE).

According to Dunnigan/Nofi the IJA converted seven merchant ships to serve as aircraft transports in order to ferry around fully assembled planes. This was cheaper and more efficient than moving crated planes, which required a long time as well as skilled mechanics to reassemble at the destination. These vessels looked like aircraft carriers, but their flight decks only served for parking the planes. The vessels could carry between 8 and 35 planes. The Army had to built its own 'carriers' because the Navy refused to provide the rival with the necessary transportation services.

[Raverdave]

Originally posted by showboat1
So what would their designator be? His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Army's Navy's Ship? HIJMANS?

The Army never got over the fact that there plan for a drive into Siberia and East Soviet Union got overturned in favor of the Navy's plan.

Which was a good thing! As it was the Units released from the "Siberian Front" that helped in the Soviet counter attack against the Germans near Moscow.


As for the designator of the ships, technically they were only chartered by the army and so were still known as "Chigusa Maru" & "Yamashio Maru".

In addition to the above two ships, the Army also commandereered the "Akitsu Maru", "Nigitsu Maru" and the "Kummano Maru" and converted them into army merchant carriers, complete with flight decks. The plan was that these ships would be used an aircraft transports with the deck being long enought to allow take offs but too short to allow safe landing. The Akitsu and Nigitsu could carry a total of 30 fighters each, while the Kumano was capable of carrying 37. For some reason the Army never took the next step to full convert them to merchant aircraft carriers like they did with the Chigusa and Yamashio.

[Mike Scholl]

Originally posted by LargeSlowTarget
Mike, the command structure of the PTO was a little different. Soon after PH it was divided between Army (SW Pacific Area-MacArthur and CBI-Stilwell) and Navy (Pacific Fleet-Nimitz). The latter was subdivided into North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area and South Pacific Area. All Areas had their own Naval Force, organized in Task Forces.
The Allied Naval Force Southwest Pacific under VAdm. Leary and later (September 42) VAdm. Carpender - better known as 'MacArthur's Navy' - consisted of the remnants of the ABDA Fleet and a few reinforcements (in September 1942 Carpender comanded just five 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 20 submarines and 7 small craft).
The South Pacific Naval Force under Ghormley and later Halsey played the major role after Midway in the struggle for Guadalcanal.
The Central Pacific Command under Nimitz remained rather inactive after Midway, most ships being sent to the South Pacific instead. It became the main theater again with the Central Pacific Offensive starting in November 43.
The North Pacific Area Force under RAdm. Theobald (relieved by Kinkaid in Jan 43) saw comparatively little action except the recapture of Attu and Kiska in May-July 1943.

On March 15, 1943 a major reorganization took place, with the Central Pacific Force being renamed 5th Fleet under Spruance, the South Pacific Force now being known as 3rd Fleet under Halsey and MacArtur's Navy now being called 7th Fleet (Carpender was relieved by ViceAdm. Kinkaid in November 1943). I must admit I don't know what happened to the North Pacific Force .
Initially most capital ships went to 5th Fleet, only a few carriers were lent to 3rd Fleet. When Halsey's job in the South Pacific was done with the isolation of Rabaul in early 1944, 3rd Fleet found new employment in the Central Pacific offensive, and thus the alternating command structure of 3rd/5th Fleet and TF 38/58 respectively was born.
Because the Navy didn't trust the Army's ability to make best use of major naval assets, the Navy never agreed to MacArthur's request to assign fleet carriers to 7th Fleet. MacArthur's Navy remained a 'shallow waters fleet' predominantly made up of amphibious shipping with a few crusiers and destroyers as covering and bombardment forces. Only in 1944 would 7th Fleet receive CVEs and old battleships to beef up landing operations. For MacArthur's 'Return to the Philippines' 7th Fleet received most of the amphib assets of Nimitz, but 5th Fleet retained all fleet carriers and new battleships. This divided command structure of 7th Fleet = landing operations and 5th Fleet = Fleet action contributed to the well-known near-disaster at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. So much for that, see Morison for the details.

I know all this, and really it has nothing to do with my point.
Until the Tarawa Operation at the tail end of 1943, the US had
only one ongoing Campaign in the Pacific.., Operation "Cartwheel"
Yes, it was split between two commands (Halsey and MacArthur)
so that the Navy could keep Macarthur from having control over
any more of it's forces---But as UV shows, it was all basically one
therate of operation. And the Navy wasn't shy about borrowing
Army Divisions and Aircraft for the move up the Solomans either.
The "divergence of operations" is really a 1944-45 phenomonon,
and by then the "Fast Carriers" were operated as I explained.
When supporting SWPAC they were under Halsey, and when
when with CENTPAC under Spruance. The 7th was SWPAC's
Amphibious and logistical support train; while the North Pacific
was pretty much abandoned to the weather once US pride had
been redeemed re-taking the Aluetians in the summer of '43.
My point was that US efforts had not been as diverse as the
original poster made out. It's real offensive punch (the Fast Carrier Groups) were almost continually in use under one fleet designation or another.

[LargeSlowTarget]

I don't disagree that the 'real offensive punch' was continously in use under one designation or the other, but in your posts you've stated that the fast carrier TFs (quote) "served with both CENTPAC and SWOPAC---It was Task Force 38 with MacArthur, and Task Force 58 with Nimitz" - which isn't quite true. The fast carriers always served with Nimitz, regardless of their designation or whether Spruance or Hasley were in command. They did support MacArthur during the Hollandia operation (as TF 58 under Spruance, btw) and during the 'Return to the Philippines (AFAIK the only case were TF 38 supported MacA.), but they always remained part of Nimitz' command.
And exactly this divided command structure created problems, of which the Leyte near-desaster is only the most prominent case (Biak comes to mind as another). Luskan has asked to model the hierarchy problems and rivalry that did exist in the Allied camp. I agree, but also wonder myself how this could be implemented in WITP - with borrowing from PTO2 perhaps, LOL!