The concept of leader ratings

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Light4bettor
Posts: 172
Joined: Fri Jan 03, 2020 1:45 am

The concept of leader ratings

Post by Light4bettor »

I understand that leader ratings are integral and built into the mechanics of this game- I just wanted to point out some aspects of it that I find off and off-putting.

The first example will be from a game that is a distant cousin of WITE2, but I think its illustrative of part of the problem in general- though not necessarily this specific case. A few years ago- in the game Hearts of Iron 3- I remember seeing von Paulus' (German 6th Army's leader at Stalingrad) defense rating as above average.
I thought to myself, hmmmm- ok what could justify this above average defense rating, and what do I know about F. von Paulus before he took over 6th Army:

1) he was a staff officer with not much combat experience (if any)

2) he helped plan Barbarossa- and had significant face to face/ personal interaction with Hitler during that several months long process (gained some familiarity/relationship points with Herr Adolph).

3) It's said he was a good organizer, but that is not necessarily a plus or minus towards combat/warrior leadership ability.

4) Just because Paulus did not ever show a propensity for combat command does not mean he would of not been a great commander/ but it also doesn't show that he would of been a good commander.

5) When Paulus' predecessor Gen Reichenau died- It was probably this prior familiarity with Hitler that got Paulus the job (I base this on the strength of the supposition that although Paulus was Reichenau's Chief of Staff at the time of Reichenau's death- there were plenty of other people who would've been more qualified/ capable for that posting).

So I come to the conclusion that the people deciding Hearts of Iron ratings for generals- said to themselves that- "well, Stalingrad held out for 3 months or so- so that means Paulus had something to do with it and therefore that merits a high "defensive" rating for Paulus. But a closer look at the history shows that Stalingrad held out for many reasons- Paulus' defensive tactical ability was not foremost (if a factor at all) among the reasons for it holding out as long as it did. (lackluster soviet pressure at times- and fear of Soviet captivity among the German defenders were some of the more salient factors). Admittedly, since I am not familiar with Paulus' 6th Army command performance during the Russian Spring offensives in early 42 Voronezh area- I may be overlooking that.

Now the above example was specifically my experience from Hearts of Iron 3.

For the following, I'm probably going to sacrifice a few cows that are sacred to some- but bear with me as these are only my views.

Another example not directly related to WITE2, but still applicable, is Albert Speer (another whose position as Armaments minister was achieved by his relationship with Hitler- not because he was particularly suited for the job). While conventional wisdom and popular memory has him firmly placed as the architect (excuse the pun) of Germany's production miracle- I think Adam Tooze (author of "Wages of Destruction") say's it best when he says that when you look at the trajectories of all the war participants production capabilities (in other words the projected growth of armaments industries in different countries during a wartime situation and given their starting points)- the growth of Germany's war production capabilities would of probably been the same (given its wartime trajectory) pretty much no matter who was in charge. Now Speer was noted for his organizational capabilities, but his personal ability probably only contributed marginally to Germany's increase in production. (This is to say, that even the most talented Armaments minister -whoever that could be- would only have a very limited influence on just how productive the German armaments industry could become- given the situation inherited and time allotted).

Someone like Rommel has over the years undergone some revision. No doubt, as a young junior infantry officer he was tactically gifted, would seize/exercise the initiative, and had a killer instinct-- and as a small unit leader in WW1 those talents served him well, as his pre-war book "infantry attack's" and the "pour le merit" award he received attest. However, once WW2 hits and he gets divisional level command for the first time (and again-like others- he gets command of the 7th Panzer Division in 1940 because of his personal connection with Herr Adolph)- cracks start to appear. Sure, against an enemy unprepared for this new style of warfare- he can run all over them in France- but tellingly he has a close call (Arras)- where he personally needs to step in and organize an ad-hoc defense to avert a disaster. A potential disaster that he had some hand in creating the conditions for because of his judgement and decision making at the divisional level (and this itself is already a red-flag and raises questions as to even his divisional level competency).

In my opinion, in Africa, he could initially do more with less- but once Allied material superiority began to tell- he was powerless (and based on his actions throughout his tenure, how much he could appreciate this reality and factor it into his strategy is suspect). Summary- although an exceptional small unit level tactical leader- Rommel lacked the judgement/ vision/ ability to balance his tactical action inclinations (as brilliant as they could be at times) with the current operational/strategic reality on the ground. While this is not necessarily a handicap when commanding at the squad,platoon,company, battalion level- it can prove a liability at the divisional and higher level of command. (ideally, given his temperament/ability he was probably not suitable for Korp level command or above). -see also how he played his cards with the resistance movement against Hitler-he put himself in a bad position that ultimately led to his forced suicide-(this is not to argue the merits of the opposition to Hitler- only to question Rommel's decision making in high stake scenarios- Arguably taking a more neutral/non-committal tone with the July plotters would've been a better play at least for he and his family's post-war sake).

Guderian- another- sure he had vision- he also wrote a book before the war- Sure he has initiative, and can roll up the enemy. But again, this is a guy- who once the enemy is no longer on the backfoot- and he himself is on the backfoot- the cracks start to show. Sure, the unauthorized withdrawls from the Tula area and beyond in Dec 41 were probably necessary to avert disaster for Second Panzer Army-- but rather than find a way to establish a working relationship/common ground with Kluge, he instead seems to maneuver to intentionally get himself fired - (never to hold another field command mind you - and if his leader ratings are that high- this makes no sense). I mean, it really looks childish and like questionable leadership (i.e.,a true leader woud suck it up and drive on,trying to find a way even when the chips are down.) Summary- gifted visionary- who doesn't want to play anymore when the "fun" part is over.

Just to add a Soviet- one, how brilliant was Zhukov really? Competent, yes. Self-confident and could navigate a relationship with Stalin yes, - did not mind sending tens of thousands into a meat grinder-yes.-- but he also came up with (or at least gave the green-light to) half-baked stuff like using searchlights during the initial assault on Seelowe heights - which was much the opposite of a force multipler in that case.

And yet despite the evidence, the game rates these guys super highly.

This is all to say that I feel the leadership ratings system needs to be revised (or reconceptualized) and looked at again. This system looks to be dated and is based on old tropes/cliches (partly based on allied/german war and post-war propaganda/ commercialization/hero worship -see for example their glorification on Avalon Hill/SPI game boxcovers from the 70s and 80s and beyond) and does not take into account new scholarship and revision. Having said that, this game does contain much that agrees with modern scholarship and has evolved to be a better game because of it. In fact, this game is a premier tool that is very helpful in analyzing why the war took the course it did.

To be clear, I'm not arguing for lower/higher ratings for some- I'm saying that whole concept of how we rate leaders (and how those ratings are integrated into the game mechanics) should be reevaluated. It feels that (aside from the necessarily arbitrary nature of the whole rating level/scheme), at least in some cases, ratings are based on more on popular culture's perceptions rather than critical analysis- and given the current state of WITE2 (and by this I mean that it does a phenomenal job in portraying this wars reality), that is last thing I would expect from this franchise.
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