Army Service Merchant Ships vs. WITP Merchant Ships

[eMonticello]

I compiled the chart below to demonstrate how badly the game may distort the number of transports available compared to what was historically available to move supplies in the Pacific. These numbers represent the total number of ships allocated to the Army Services by the War Shipping Administration in the Pacific Ocean. Although the ship breakout between trans-oceanic and within-theater does not exist before Nov 1943. I would guess it's between 3:1 to 2:1 (within-theater means local use ... greater chance for the ship to be destroyed). I don't have the data on US Navy-contracted ships, but I would guess that, since the Army handled their own logistics, the total number of Army Services and Navy ships allocated by the War Shipping Adminstration wouldn't be 10% above these numbers.

In the game, you need to lose 35% of your transports every quarter until early-44 to match real-life, then about 15% thereafter. So... a player would need to lose about 125 US AKs during the game... something that I doubt many will do.

So what's the solution?

Actual Army Service Ships vs. WITP US AK Transports

Quarter …… ArmySvc .. WITP …… Variance

1941Q4 …… 87 …………. 178 ……….. 104.6%
1942Q1 …… 185 ……….. 275 ……….. 48.6%
1942Q2 …… 200 ……….. 291 ……….. 45.5%
1942Q3 …… 193 ……….. 326 ……….. 68.9%
1942Q4 …… 195 ……….. 385 ……….. 97.4%
1943Q1 …… 184 ……….. 470 ……….. 155.4%
1943Q2 …… 254 ……….. 537 ……….. 111.4%
1943Q3 …… 368 ……….. 622 ……….. 69.0%
1943Q4 …… 437 ……….. 700 ……….. 60.2%
1944Q1 …… 503 ……….. 795 ……….. 58.1%
1944Q2 …… 603 ……….. 880 ……….. 45.9%
1944Q3 …… 684 ……….. 936 ……….. 36.8%
1944Q4 …… 828 ……….. 1,016 …….. 22.7%
1945Q1 …… 714 ……….. 1,133 …….. 58.7%
1945Q2 …… 1,045 ……… 1,241 …….. 18.8%
1945Q3 …… 1,161 ……… 1,267 …….. 9.1%
1945Q4 …… 1,161 ……… 1,294 …….. 11.5%

Source: Appendix G: Ships in Army Service, Statistical Review of WW2, 1946
WITP 7-Dec-41 to Mar-46 Scenario (15 I believe)

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: eMonticello

I compiled the chart below to demonstrate how badly the game may distort the number of transports available compared to what was historically available to move supplies in the Pacific. These numbers represent the total number of ships allocated to the Army Services by the War Shipping Administration in the Pacific Ocean. Although the ship breakout between trans-oceanic and within-theater does not exist before Nov 1943. I would guess it's between 3:1 to 2:1 (within-theater means local use ... greater chance for the ship to be destroyed). I don't have the data on US Navy-contracted ships, but I would guess that, since the Army handled their own logistics, the total number of Army Services and Navy ships allocated by the War Shipping Adminstration wouldn't be 10% above these numbers.

In the game, you need to lose 35% of your transports every quarter until early-44 to match real-life, then about 15% thereafter. So... a player would need to lose about 125 US AKs during the game... something that I doubt many will do.

So what's the solution?

Actual Army Service Ships vs. WITP US AK Transports

Quarter …… ArmySvc .. WITP …… Variance

1941Q4 …… 87 …………. 178 ……….. 104.6%
1942Q1 …… 185 ……….. 275 ……….. 48.6%
1942Q2 …… 200 ……….. 291 ……….. 45.5%
1942Q3 …… 193 ……….. 326 ……….. 68.9%
1942Q4 …… 195 ……….. 385 ……….. 97.4%
1943Q1 …… 184 ……….. 470 ……….. 155.4%
1943Q2 …… 254 ……….. 537 ……….. 111.4%
1943Q3 …… 368 ……….. 622 ……….. 69.0%
1943Q4 …… 437 ……….. 700 ……….. 60.2%
1944Q1 …… 503 ……….. 795 ……….. 58.1%
1944Q2 …… 603 ……….. 880 ……….. 45.9%
1944Q3 …… 684 ……….. 936 ……….. 36.8%
1944Q4 …… 828 ……….. 1,016 …….. 22.7%
1945Q1 …… 714 ……….. 1,133 …….. 58.7%
1945Q2 …… 1,045 ……… 1,241 …….. 18.8%
1945Q3 …… 1,161 ……… 1,267 …….. 9.1%
1945Q4 …… 1,161 ……… 1,294 …….. 11.5%

Source: Appendix G: Ships in Army Service, Statistical Review of WW2, 1946
WITP 7-Dec-41 to Mar-46 Scenario (15 I believe)

We've been discussing various ways to tie in merchants with offmap supply. Eventually we will have a system which has supply availability directly related to merchant commitment. This would take care of the excess merchants quite nicely. After all, this is why many merchants were in the Pacific in the first place.

[bstarr]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

We've been discussing various ways to tie in merchants with offmap supply. Eventually we will have a system which has supply availability directly related to merchant commitment. This would take care of the excess merchants quite nicely.

Cool idea. How would it work? a "Panama Canal" port that produces supplies and mercships have to relay them to the main playing area?

[Don Bowen]

ORIGINAL: eMonticello

I compiled the chart below to demonstrate how badly the game may distort the number of transports available compared to what was historically available to move supplies in the Pacific. These numbers represent the total number of ships allocated to the Army Services by the War Shipping Administration in the Pacific Ocean. Although the ship breakout between trans-oceanic and within-theater does not exist before Nov 1943. I would guess it's between 3:1 to 2:1 (within-theater means local use ... greater chance for the ship to be destroyed). I don't have the data on US Navy-contracted ships, but I would guess that, since the Army handled their own logistics, the total number of Army Services and Navy ships allocated by the War Shipping Adminstration wouldn't be 10% above these numbers.

In the game, you need to lose 35% of your transports every quarter until early-44 to match real-life, then about 15% thereafter. So... a player would need to lose about 125 US AKs during the game... something that I doubt many will do.

So what's the solution?

Actual Army Service Ships vs. WITP US AK Transports

Quarter …… ArmySvc .. WITP …… Variance

1941Q4 …… 87 …………. 178 ……….. 104.6%
1942Q1 …… 185 ……….. 275 ……….. 48.6%
1942Q2 …… 200 ……….. 291 ……….. 45.5%
1942Q3 …… 193 ……….. 326 ……….. 68.9%
1942Q4 …… 195 ……….. 385 ……….. 97.4%
1943Q1 …… 184 ……….. 470 ……….. 155.4%
1943Q2 …… 254 ……….. 537 ……….. 111.4%
1943Q3 …… 368 ……….. 622 ……….. 69.0%
1943Q4 …… 437 ……….. 700 ……….. 60.2%
1944Q1 …… 503 ……….. 795 ……….. 58.1%
1944Q2 …… 603 ……….. 880 ……….. 45.9%
1944Q3 …… 684 ……….. 936 ……….. 36.8%
1944Q4 …… 828 ……….. 1,016 …….. 22.7%
1945Q1 …… 714 ……….. 1,133 …….. 58.7%
1945Q2 …… 1,045 ……… 1,241 …….. 18.8%
1945Q3 …… 1,161 ……… 1,267 …….. 9.1%
1945Q4 …… 1,161 ……… 1,294 …….. 11.5%

Source: Appendix G: Ships in Army Service, Statistical Review of WW2, 1946
WITP 7-Dec-41 to Mar-46 Scenario (15 I believe)

I'm not sure how to relate to this figures.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army operated a total of 31 transports World Wide. The War Shipping Administration did not come into existence until February, 1942, when it was created as a spin-off of the U.S. Maritime Commission. There would be no allocations prior to this date - only vessels owned or directly chartered by the army. Therefore I assume that the numbers above represent all ships carrying cargos for the U.S. Army. Even so I am at a loss to explain 87 vessels under army control in the Pacific in 1941.

WSA allocations were primarily new construction during the war - over 1000 of them were Liberty or Victory Ships - or else existing allied tonnage that was made available. Approximately three-fourths of the ocean-going vessels operated by the Army were allocated. The remainder were army owned (which carried the designation US Army Transport) or directly chartered. The effective difference was that allocated ships generally carried cargos for the army while owned/chartered vessels were directly operated by the army.

Army vessels, allocated, owned, or chartered, are only a portion of the US merchant fleet. Approximately 2700 Liberty ships were constructed. Slightly less than 1000 were allocated to US Army service (968 ships as of July 31, 1945).

There was also the Navy cargo fleet. Cargo ship hull numbers ran into the low 200s, plus another 150 or so attack cargo ships (not all completed and some duplicated by conversion). Transport hull numbers went to about 150 plus attack transports to just over 200. Also a few special-purpose ships that are considered AK by WITP - such as AF and some AG. All in all at least 600 hulls.

The US had a lot of merchant shipping and only a portion of it was under Army control. A calculation based on army shipping alone would not appear to support a conclusion that allied shipping is overstated in WITP.

[eMonticello]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

I'm not sure how to relate to this figures.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor the U.S. Army operated a total of 31 transports World Wide.
The War Shipping Administration did not come into existence until February, 1942, when it was created as a spin-off of the U.S. Maritime Commission. There would be no allocations prior to this date - only vessels owned or directly chartered by the army. Therefore I assume that the numbers above represent all ships carrying cargos for the U.S. Army. Even so I am at a loss to explain 87 vessels under army control in the Pacific in 1941.

I haven't cross-checked the ASF numbers with anything else yet. According to ASF, there were actually 139 ships in Army Service in both Atlantic and Pacific. Note that this number includes both AK and AP.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/cgi-bin/us ... docnum=347

WSA allocations were primarily new construction during the war - over 1000 of them were Liberty or Victory Ships - or else existing allied tonnage that was made available. Approximately three-fourths of the ocean-going vessels operated by the Army were allocated. The remainder were army owned (which carried the designation US Army Transport) or directly chartered. The effective difference was that allocated ships generally carried cargos for the army while owned/chartered vessels were directly operated by the army.

Army vessels, allocated, owned, or chartered, are only a portion of the US merchant fleet. Approximately 2700 Liberty ships were constructed. Slightly less than 1000 were allocated to US Army service (968 ships as of July 31, 1945).

Although the Army did own or "bareboat-charted" some shipping, they drew most shipping from the WSA pool by mid-April 1942 (Statistical Review, p.37).

There was also the Navy cargo fleet. Cargo ship hull numbers ran into the low 200s, plus another 150 or so attack cargo ships (not all completed and some duplicated by conversion). Transport hull numbers went to about 150 plus attack transports to just over 200. Also a few special-purpose ships that are considered AK by WITP - such as AF and some AG. All in all at least 600 hulls.

The US had a lot of merchant shipping and only a portion of it was under Army control. A calculation based on army shipping alone would not appear to support a conclusion that allied shipping is overstated in WITP.

I excluded all US Navy-designated AK, AP, AKA, and APA ships from the scenario file when determining the number of transports available to the Army. If the game's data is correct, the combination of monthly losses and Navy's monthly allocation of ships in the Pacific would be nearly equal to the Army's monthly allocation ... which seems to be a tad high.

Ideally, I would like to cross-reference the ships in WITP with their respective Ship Movement Report Cards at the National Archives to determine the ships sailed trans-Pacific routes within the war period. This would be the definitive source. However, lacking this source I would either need to find a secondary source that contained this information or work with the summarized data and fill in the holes. I'm still in the middle of research and plan to visit the Boston Public Library next week to gather more information.

Anecdotally, when the Statistical Review states that "at no time during the war did the United Nations have enough ships to fulfill their commitments," it's hard to imagine this reality with the stock WITP.

[Don Bowen]

I was going to put my conclusions at the bottom but I moved them up here so everyone would not have to dig through all the raw data to get to them:

Now, having gone through all that – I think you may well be right in your assertion that there is too much shipping available in WITP (and me just finished with a major expansion of the merchant OOB). You are not the first one to raise this concern and I have looked at it in some detail. The basic point that players are not usually constrained by lack of shipping is very troubling.

Simply put, WITP does not account for a number of factors:

• Non-military cargos (civilian items)
• Partial or inefficient cargo loading
• Lengthy delays in loading/unloading due to port facilities, etc
• Withdrawal of shipping to the Atlantic – if a transport (for instance) carried troops to Australia in 1942 it is in our OOB. If it was historically then transferred to the Atlantic, it is still in our OOB.

If we include an historically accurate merchant OOB we are effectively overstating the portion of their cargo capacity that is available for player use in WITP. There are two possible ways to adjust for this within WITP:

• Omit some portion of the actual shipping to account for withdrawals
• Reduce cargo capacity to account for bulky cargo, partial or combat loading, or to try and bring total cargo capacity into line with that needed by WITP

Our scenario is currently approaching “alpha” release. Based on recommendations from initial testers we may well do one or the other (or some of each). I would like to state that I personally am particularly attached to an accurate early-war OOB.

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My primary data source is US Army Ships and Watercraft of World War II by David H. Grover – Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0-87021-766-6. Since this is a distillation of data from various sources I assume the data is somewhat less precise but very much easier to access.

The introduction to the book includes a number of large data tables, which I have summarized:

Ships over 1000 Gross Tons (totals for entire war):

• Troopships, owned/bareboat chartered – 80
• Troopships, allocated – 114
• Troopships, foreign flag, allocated – 18
• Cargo ships, owned/bareboat chartered – 83
• Cargo ships, time or voyage chartered – 32
• Cargo ships, non-Maritime Commission type, allocated – 195
• Cargo ships, Maritime Commission type, allocated – 102
• Cargo ships/Troopships, Victory ships, allocated – 107
• Cargo ships/Troopships, Liberty ships, allocated – 748
• Cargo ships, unclassifiable, allocated – 3
• Cargo ships, South West Pacific Area and Philippines – 75
  (sub total – 1557)
• Other ships over 1000 tons (Hospital, dredges, repair, etc) –108
• Vessels under 1000 tons – 12,379
• Barges and non self-propelled craft – 25,383
• Amphibious Assault Craft – 88,366

Total Army Ships and Watercraft – 127,793

The author indicates that authoritative sources differ on the exact number of ships and gives a second table using data from the Vessel Operations Analysis Branch, Water Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation. This is the “most liberal” ship-counting system for “Army” ships, and is broken down by type of control:

• Owned by Army – 57
• Bareboat Chartered – 93
• Time Chartered – 2
• Voyage Chartered – 2
• Owned by Navy – 24
• Chartered by Navy – 28
• Loaned to Navy by WSA – 17
• Loaned to Army by WSA – 1,264
• British Control – 21
• US Commercial – 113

A third table, which I summarized in my original post, lists Maritime Commission types:

• Liberty – 822
• Liberty, passenger – 12
• Liberty, special purpose – 20
• Liberty, hospital – 6
• Liberty, enlarged – 79
• Liberty, tank transport – 8
• Liberty, boxed aircraft transport – 21
• Victory, troopship –19
• Victory, cargo ship – 95
• Victory, enlarged – 27
• C1 – 108
• C2 – 81
• C3 – 46
• C4 – 35
• P2 – 15
• S4 – 11
• N3 – 24
• R2 – 4

And a few pertinent quotes:

“Early in 1941 the general Army Transport Fleet consisted of 26 ships, of which 24 were owned and two chartered”

“Shortly after Pearl Harbor the Army was operating 31 transports, 16 of which were troopships and 15 of which were cargo vessels”

Though not specifically stated, I ASSUME these totals were for ocean-going vessels over 1000 tons and did not include the small ships (had to type that three times before it would come out “small SHIPS”). I also ASSUME that these are owned/chartered only. As the WSA did not exist until February, 1942, formal WSA allocations could not have existed prior to then. However, there may well have been some other, perhaps less-formal method by which merchant ships not under direct army control were carrying army cargos at the direction of the army, and that might account for the quoted number of 139 ships in service.

[eMonticello]

There are a few sources that I plan to check at BPL of which Grover's book is one:

- Jordan, Roger W. The World's Merchant Fleets, 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
- Grover, David H. US Army Ships and Watercraft of World War II . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
- Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun : The American War With Japan . New York: Vintage, 1985.
- Other government documents (generally GPO books)

I'll collect data on as many merchant ships as I can that are in the WITP database so that a reasonable ship pool model can be developed. I'm working on an MS Access tally sheet that includes ship name, shipping line, type of ship (trans-oceanic or intercoastal), theaters served and timeframe of that service, and ship's fate. If anyone can think more useful information or additional resources, let me know.

[Don Bowen]

ORIGINAL: eMonticello

There are a few sources that I plan to check at BPL of which Grover's book is one:

- Jordan, Roger W. The World's Merchant Fleets, 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
- Grover, David H. US Army Ships and Watercraft of World War II . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
- Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun : The American War With Japan . New York: Vintage, 1985.
- Other government documents (generally GPO books)

I'll collect data on as many merchant ships as I can that are in the WITP database so that a reasonable ship pool model can be developed. I'm working on an MS Access tally sheet that includes ship name, shipping line, type of ship (trans-oceanic or intercoastal), theaters served and timeframe of that service, and ship's fate. If anyone can think more useful information or additional resources, let me know.

All of these sources are (or were) in my library and I'm afraid the individual ship data is minimal. I also have US Merchant Vessel War Casualties of World War II by Robert M Browning, the Australian Official Histories and, of course, History of US Naval Operations in World War II. Eagle Against the Sun I have sold as I have limited shelf space and many books competing for it.

Some interesting data for specific ships is included in picture-captions in Merchant Fleets and Army Ships and Watercraft but usually individual ships are mentioned only when they come into action or are lost.

I would be very interested in any data you are able to collect from these or other sources. Please post and/or send me a copy.

[pry]

Nm I'll finish this later when I get more time..

[Ron Saueracker]

I'm looking forward to Pry's take on this. I believe he also thinks there is a massive discrepancy with regard to merchants. Allies are supposed to be suffering from a severe shipping shortage but they don't even early in the game. APs may be tight according to some but AKs are like leaves in a forest or cameras on an Air Nippon flight. Loads of them.

Japan does not have a shortage of shipping either. The generic supply model has alleviated the shipping shortage. Perhaps Pry has a solution other than simply gutting the OOBs...which is inadequate as this would skew the submarine war etc.

We were thinking about tying in merchants to offmap supply by either adding supply centre bases such as Panama, South Africa, Red Sea, and placing the auto daily supply at these bases (and reducing the amount available at San Francisco) and making the player use ships to move them to actual bases.

Perhaps adding a merchant pool feature for San Francisco and Karachi in lieu of these bases and have player place merchants in the pool. The merchant load value present in the pool each day dictates how much supply is added to the respective bases.

I was also thinking that supply being offloaded at friendly bases should be subject to a civilian needs penalty...perhaps 50%. With 50% of cargo being lost at destination ports, the shipping shortage might actually start to be felt. Reason why I go for the civvy penalty vs reducing load capacity of ships is twofold. One, we need a way to differentiate between mixed loads and combat loads for amphibious ops...don't want to penalize the AKs and APs which would not be carrying civilian goods onto the sands of Iwo Jima. Second, with virtually endless supply levels at main supply ports, reducing the load values of merchants would simply perpetuate the supply abundance.

[pry]

As everyone knows (Right Ron [:D]) I am one of the folks who have long felt that the Allies (and Japanese to a much lesser extent) had to much shipping available allowing them unhistorical early abilities to move way to much of everything. The Allies were hard pressed to move anything over a regiment in size until enough shipping could be begged borrowed and stole to launch the Guadalcanal operation. It was nearly all transferred to the Atlantic right afterwards for Torch so the shortage actually existed until well into 43.

Considering that no good sources exist (and I have been looking for years) on the number of merchant vessels available in the Pacific early war for cargo duties and the problems associated with the lack of a withdrawal for shipping to other war areas I have instead focused my efforts away from trying to reduce ships and moved on to "Other means" of addressing the issue.

After doing allot of time consuming research I have come to the conclusion that the way to address the issue is to change the load cost of the items carried by some means. The numbers are under represented by as much as 60%... It took about 50K DWT to move a single division's equipment plus further transport to move the troops themselves.

As things go now you can move an average division with about 18,500 load points (AP) when in reality based on my research the load cost should be around 40 - 50,000 load points.

The roadblock here is that the equipment load values are hard coded by ship type (see table in section 6.1.19) You could change the load cost of the individual items to make less fit on each ship but that would skew other aspects of the game like fast transport and air transport so the only effective way to address the over abundance would be to reduce the cargo capacity of all vessels with cargo capacity by 50% (Thus doubling the number of vessels necessary to move things) This is the approach I have taken in the new scenario I am working on and in my alpha tests it really does slow everything down to close enough to what I feel is a more realistic.

You all are of course free to deal with this issue as you see fit but I am going the reduced cargo capacity route in my next scenario for both sides to address this.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: pry

As everyone knows (Right Ron [:D]) I am one of the folks who have long felt that the Allies (and Japanese to a much lesser extent) had to much shipping available allowing them unhistorical early abilities to move way to much of everything. The Allies were hard pressed to move anything over a regiment in size until enough shipping could be begged borrowed and stole to launch the Guadalcanal operation. It was nearly all transferred to the Atlantic right afterwards for Torch so the shortage actually existed until well into 43.

Considering that no good sources exist (and I have been looking for years) on the number of merchant vessels available in the Pacific early war for cargo duties and the problems associated with the lack of a withdrawal for shipping to other war areas I have instead focused my efforts away from trying to reduce ships and moved on to "Other means" of addressing the issue.

After doing allot of time consuming research I have come to the conclusion that the way to address the issue is to change the load cost of the items carried by some means. The numbers are under represented by as much as 60%... It took about 50K DWT to move a single division's equipment plus further transport to move the troops themselves.

As things go now you can move an average division with about 18,500 load points (AP) when in reality based on my research the load cost should be around 40 - 50,000 load points.

The roadblock here is that the equipment load values are hard coded by ship type (see table in section 6.1.19) You could change the load cost of the individual items to make less fit on each ship but that would skew other aspects of the game like fast transport and air transport so the only effective way to address the over abundance would be to reduce the cargo capacity of all vessels with cargo capacity by 50% (Thus doubling the number of vessels necessary to move things) This is the approach I have taken in the new scenario I am working on and in my alpha tests it really does slow everything down to close enough to what I feel is a more realistic.

You all are of course free to deal with this issue as you see fit but I am going the reduced cargo capacity route in my next scenario for both sides to address this.

Actually Pry, I think you may be on to something by increasing load costs of individual items. In conjunction with reducing ship capacities to deal with the overabundance of supply. Fast transport and air transport presently can pull off some amazing feats of movement. I for one don't think that FT missions should be able to move more than men and supplies, but right now they can lift heavy equipment...dumping artillery off a DDs decks so they float onto the beach or loading same from the beach was basically impossible but can be done in the game. Air transport missions should not be able to move tanks for the most part but I've had Stuarts lifted from Manila on PBYs! I don't think these missions would be skewed.

Setting daily operations maximums for ports would help immensely as well. Plug, plug...[;)]

[Don Bowen]

ORIGINAL: pry

As everyone knows (Right Ron [:D])

Right!, we know

I am one of the folks who have long felt that the Allies (and Japanese to a much lesser extent) had to much shipping available allowing them unhistorical early abilities to move way to much of everything. The Allies were hard pressed to move anything over a regiment in size until enough shipping could be begged borrowed and stole to launch the Guadalcanal operation. It was nearly all transferred to the Atlantic right afterwards for Torch so the shortage actually existed until well into 43.

Considering that no good sources exist (and I have been looking for years) on the number of merchant vessels available in the Pacific early war for cargo duties and the problems associated with the lack of a withdrawal for shipping to other war areas I have instead focused my efforts away from trying to reduce ships and moved on to "Other means" of addressing the issue.

After doing allot of time consuming research I have come to the conclusion that the way to address the issue is to change the load cost of the items carried by some means. The numbers are under represented by as much as 60%... It took about 50K DWT to move a single division's equipment plus further transport to move the troops themselves.

As things go now you can move an average division with about 18,500 load points (AP) when in reality based on my research the load cost should be around 40 - 50,000 load points.

The roadblock here is that the equipment load values are hard coded by ship type (see table in section 6.1.19) You could change the load cost of the individual items to make less fit on each ship but that would skew other aspects of the game like fast transport and air transport so the only effective way to address the over abundance would be to reduce the cargo capacity of all vessels with cargo capacity by 50% (Thus doubling the number of vessels necessary to move things) This is the approach I have taken in the new scenario I am working on and in my alpha tests it really does slow everything down to close enough to what I feel is a more realistic.

You all are of course free to deal with this issue as you see fit but I am going the reduced cargo capacity route in my next scenario for both sides to address this.

I too am growing fond of reduced capacity. I am emotionally attached to a complete and accurate OOB and reduced carry capacity seems the best answer. I must admit I was not thinking 50%!

In our scenario we have set capacity of our new classes of AKs to 90% of GRT, with an additional reduction for AKA to simulate combat loading. I was thinking along the lines of setting it to 75% of GRT and also reducing the matrix "standard" L. AK and S. AK by 75% (don't know their GRT). I have rough-calculated that this would translate into about a 20% reduction from total "Scenario 15" capacity. In addition, I was considering slowing down the pace of new AK arrival - at least during 1942. I suspect there is quite a lot of estimation in the arrival times and I would be perfectly happy to estimate a month or two later.

I've not really dug into AP but your numbers on load points are compelling. A flat 50% cut across the board is worth considering.

Opinions anyone??

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
Opinions anyone??

My uninformed opinion is - I very much hope that Pry and the combined scenario authors can reach a consensus on what the correct reduction should be for the sake of consistency.

Andrew

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: pry

As everyone knows (Right Ron [:D]) I am one of the folks who have long felt that the Allies (and Japanese to a much lesser extent) had to much shipping available allowing them unhistorical early abilities to move way to much of everything. The Allies were hard pressed to move anything over a regiment in size until enough shipping could be begged borrowed and stole to launch the Guadalcanal operation. It was nearly all transferred to the Atlantic right afterwards for Torch so the shortage actually existed until well into 43.

Considering that no good sources exist (and I have been looking for years) on the number of merchant vessels available in the Pacific early war for cargo duties and the problems associated with the lack of a withdrawal for shipping to other war areas I have instead focused my efforts away from trying to reduce ships and moved on to "Other means" of addressing the issue.

After doing allot of time consuming research I have come to the conclusion that the way to address the issue is to change the load cost of the items carried by some means. The numbers are under represented by as much as 60%... It took about 50K DWT to move a single division's equipment plus further transport to move the troops themselves.

As things go now you can move an average division with about 18,500 load points (AP) when in reality based on my research the load cost should be around 40 - 50,000 load points.

The roadblock here is that the equipment load values are hard coded by ship type (see table in section 6.1.19) You could change the load cost of the individual items to make less fit on each ship but that would skew other aspects of the game like fast transport and air transport so the only effective way to address the over abundance would be to reduce the cargo capacity of all vessels with cargo capacity by 50% (Thus doubling the number of vessels necessary to move things) This is the approach I have taken in the new scenario I am working on and in my alpha tests it really does slow everything down to close enough to what I feel is a more realistic.

You all are of course free to deal with this issue as you see fit but I am going the reduced cargo capacity route in my next scenario for both sides to address this.

Actually Pry, I think you may be on to something by increasing load costs of individual items. In conjunction with reducing ship capacities to deal with the overabundance of supply. Fast transport and air transport presently can pull off some amazing feats of movement. I for one don't think that FT missions should be able to move more than men and supplies, but right now they can lift heavy equipment...dumping artillery off a DDs decks so they float onto the beach or loading same from the beach was basically impossible but can be done in the game. Air transport missions should not be able to move tanks for the most part but I've had Stuarts lifted from Manila on PBYs! I don't think these missions would be skewed.

Setting daily operations maximums for ports would help immensely as well. Plug, plug...[;)]

FT and Air Transport missions, if they are incapable of moving certain items, simply leave them at the embarkation point, fragmenting the unit correct? This is optimal in my opinion. Heavy and bulky equipment should actually BE heavy and bulky, and therefore only transportable by the proper means (AKs, APs).

[Don Bowen]

Got a few minutes and decided to figure out how much shipping we have added to out scenario (the "Combined Histerical Scenario"). Wow - I did not know it was that much! Anyway, the fastest and easiest method of reducing total capacity is to reduce capacity (no, really!). This would allow us to simply change the capacity values in the class database and not have to mess with the oob.

The 25% and 50% reduction columns are based on the value in our scenario. Let me know what you think.

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
the "Combined Histerical Scenario"

Almost as funny as the "hysterical monument."

[Don Bowen]

Here the other cargo/personnel carrying ships. The reduction in allied APD and LST is due to duplicates or mis-classing. Note that additional US APDs can be converted from DDs

[Lemurs!]

In game, as it stands now, Japan between June '42 and December '43
will ship about 750,000 tons out and 600,000 tons in per month.
According to war sources the average turn around was 1 month per pair of voyages (Inward/Outward). That includes several days for refit.

This does not include and men or weapons.

Mike

[33Vyper]

Very interesting discussion. One question though....if you lower the cargo capacity of AKs is this going to effect the ability to covert some of these vessels? Right now I believe you have to have an AK of 7000 Capacity to convert to MLE, AV etc...