Admiral Yamaguchi?

[spence]

I've not played as the IJN Player. I am not familiar with the statistics of IJN ships.
Do Hiryu and Soryu have substantially less endurance than the other IJN carriers.

I read something recently pertaining to the Adm which states that he protested an original version of the PH raid plan which would have left Soryu and Hiryu out of the operation because of their shorter legs. His protest included a proposal to abandon and presumably scuttle Soryu and Hiryu in the vicinity of Hawaii after their a/c participated in the raid on PH. Apparently Combined Fleet found an alternative solution so that they could bring them along but it does make one wonder a little bit about the Admiral.

[kumano]

Do Hiryu and Soryu have substantially less endurance than the other IJN carriers.

cruising distance ,Akagi(8200),Kaga(10000),Soryu(7,680),Hiryu(7,670),Zuikaku(9700),Syokaku(9700)sea mile
(Japanese Air Craft Story. write [Shizuo Fukui])excerpt

The solution installed and overcame the fuel in the flying deck(The replenishment ship contains it).

Admiral Yamaguchi=[Ni-Ko-Sen(2nd Ship Group?)(organizational affiliation CV.(Hiryu).(Souryu)] was chosen because it was experienced.

[spence]

Thanks for the info.

I know that the IJN found a better solution to the shorter legs of Hiryu and Soryu than what Adm Yamaguchi apparently suggested. I just found the fact that an officer of such high rank would make such a suggestion as intriguing.

[jwilkerson]

The Admiral in question certainly has a reputation in history of being agressive, assertive, etc. but this proposal sounds a bit beyond those traits ( and I hadn't heard it btw ) but it is possible that it is taken out of context - and that would be my assumption - on the German side Guderian has a similar overall reputation and sometimes he might "lecture" people by "talking down to them" ... perhaps Yamaguchi was quoted while being in a situation of having to explain something to idiots and had to resort to extremes to make his point ... we will never know ... but I would not assume that the comment was made as an absolute cold 100% logical reply either.

[tsimmonds]

...although the fact that he shortly thereafter went 1-on-3 vs. the Enterprise class with Hiryu does not speak well of his judgement....

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

...although the fact that he shortly thereafter went 1-on-3 vs. the Enterprise class with Hiryu does not speak well of his judgement....

Well whoa thar ... what did he know at the time ?

We can't question a decision based on what WE know - only based on what HE knew ... I think he knew there was one CV for sure from reports .. but could guess more than one ... due to the attacks .. but not sure we can know that he knew there were 3 ... and hey even still ... he got off 2 strikes both of which inflicted useful damage .. had they been against 2 different carriers ... which was certainly possible ... the out come could have in theory been changed .. then he for a short time .. is one against one ... is that a loooooooooong shot ... absolutely .. but it is probablity greater than zero .. well absolutely ...

If it comes down to 2 guys standing in the street .. both with a pistol .. the one who shoots first wins .. not the one that turns and runs !

[spence]

Actually his judgement is questionable at Midway. Hiryu's torpedo squadron was really beat up by the raid on Midway. His second strike of 10 Kates/6 Zeros included one refugee from Kaga...half of Hiryu's own torpedo squadron was dead or unserviceable. He planned on launching a third strike that day but I think all that Hiryu could put in the air was 5 Vals and 4 Kates or something like that and those flyers had already flown no less than 2 missions that day. Hiryu's offensive bolt was shot yet he kept following Nagumo, who after the disaster was closing the US CV(s) attempting to engage in a surface action.
Also Yamaguchi's "I think we should attack now with whatever's ready" message to Nagumo during the morning would have necessarily meant that the entire Midway strike package would have had to ditch. Considering that the US CVs had by that time already put 150 attack aircraft into the air enroute KB it is hard to see any great advantage to throwing away half of KBs offensive potential. Like I mentioned in another thread the disaster that befell the KB on the morning of 4 June, 1942 looks more and more like the logical conclusion to the story.

[Mike Scholl]

About all we know for sure about Admiral Yamaguchi was that he was quite aggressive...., which put him at odds with Adm. Nagumo on a number of occasions. He was also very traditional and went down with his ship at Midway..., which avoided the possibility of his being placed in a position for us to actually find out if he was any good. So the best anyone can say is that he was an aggressive SUBORDINATE commander.

[Alikchi2]

At least he was decisive. Nagumo had a lot of room for improvement as we well know ..

IMHO it would have been interesting if command of the KB fell to one of the more forward-thinking IJN admirals, like Kondo.

[spence]

Actually I think that the detailed record of what was really known, what was surmised, and what was ordered by higher authority might temper your harsh judgement of Nagumo some.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence

Actually I think that the detailed record of what was really known, what was surmised, and what was ordered by higher authority might temper your harsh judgement of Nagumo some.

Nagumo was possibly, in retrospect, not the best choice for his position. He seems to have been overwhelmed by the responsibilities of his command. But he WAS the one Yamamoto put in command. And speculation over what someone else would have done in his position at PH or Midway can only be speculation. It's like saying PH wouldn't have happened if somebody other than Short and Kimmel had been in command. Fun to talk about, but impossible to judge realistically

[spence]

Nagumo got his job as CO of the First Air Fleet because he was the senior man. Yamamoto would have made too many enemies within the IJN if he had chosen anybody else (and the fact that such a decision could have FATAL consequences was not lost on him). Though not well experienced directing carrier operation Nagumo was nonetheless well aware that his command was the single most important command within the IJN. With an eye to the preservation of that force he acted accordingly. Any decision he might have made at Midway had a serious downside. He trusted doctrine. BIG TIME OOPS.

[John 3rd]

This discussion is useful but also a little out of context.

Yamaguchi Tamon was exceptionally aggressive. Yamamoto knew him to be a better choice for the First Air Fleet but couldn't buck seniority. Unlike Nagumo, Yamaguchi was steeped in knowledge and full appreciation for the Aircraft Carrier. Nagumo was a Destroyer--Torpedo man. There was talk that Yamaguchi might be the next C-in-C of Combined Fleet after Yamamoto's. This infomation comes from Kaigun and several other sources.

Midway: Any talk about Yamaguchi being foolish fighting Hiryu alone versus 3 US carriers isn't appropriate. The Japanese were already IN THE FIGHT when this happened. How could he turn Hiryu west and run away? He didn't know immediately that there were 3 CVs. It was only after the first strike on Yorktown that he got full information from Soryu's scout plane. He fought with all he had available.

The comment about launching his DB against the American CVs and causing the Midway strike to fall into the sea isn't accurate either. Had the Japanese showed some flexiblity, it could have been done; however, Nagumo would have none of it. Remember that those DB would have taken off with hardly ANY Zeros for protection. Those Vals would have fallen like the American Devastators did.

As for Nagumo being the wrong commander, he definately could have done better but he was surrounded by brilliant subordinates who provided extraordinary advice. Kusaka, Genda, and Fuchida were among the best of the best!

The new accounting of Midway--Shattered Sword--REALLY provides new insight into this discussion and debate. PLEASE read it! It puts the Japanese side of the battle into a completely new light.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

...although the fact that he shortly thereafter went 1-on-3 vs. the Enterprise class with Hiryu does not speak well of his judgement....

Well whoa thar ... what did he know at the time ?

We can't question a decision based on what WE know - only based on what HE knew ... I think he knew there was one CV for sure from reports .. but could guess more than one ... due to the attacks .. but not sure we can know that he knew there were 3 ... and hey even still ... he got off 2 strikes both of which inflicted useful damage .. had they been against 2 different carriers ... which was certainly possible ... the out come could have in theory been changed .. then he for a short time .. is one against one ... is that a loooooooooong shot ... absolutely .. but it is probablity greater than zero .. well absolutely ...

If it comes down to 2 guys standing in the street .. both with a pistol .. the one who shoots first wins .. not the one that turns and runs !

And given his uber CAP, he should have been able to gut each successive uncoordinated raid by the Americans. Oh yeah, real life.[:D]

[spence]

Midway: Any talk about Yamaguchi being foolish fighting Hiryu alone versus 3 US carriers isn't appropriate. The Japanese were already IN THE FIGHT when this happened. How could he turn Hiryu west and run away? He didn't know immediately that there were 3 CVs. It was only after the first strike on Yorktown that he got full information from Soryu's scout plane. He fought with all he had available.

Given the number of American a/c which had attacked KB Yamaguchi had to be all but certain that there were several US carriers but he didn't know where they were exactly. A blind charge TOWARDS an enemy whose strength and disposition is unknown is hardly recommended tactically, especially when considering the generally longer legs IJN carrier a/c enjoyed. I do think questions about Yamaguchi's tactical acumen are in order.

Just to be clear I question moving Hiryu closer to the enemy. Launching a/c counterstrikes is not being questioned.