Road Network in COTA maps

[PyrosLambert]

I have already sent an email to your "Panther games" email address concerning the road network in COCA maps.

cheers,
Pyros

p.s in case you don't receive it, you may contact me at Pyros@myway.com
or post in this thread.

[sterckxe]

ORIGINAL: PyrosLambert

I have already sent an email to your "Panther games" email address concerning a serious map issue.

cheers,
Pyros

p.s in case you don't receive it, you may contact me at Pyros@myway.com
or post in this thread.

Eh, we're a curious bunch - well, I am [:)] - could you post it here as well ?

Greetz,

Eddy Sterckx

[Arjuna]

From Pyros:

Hi,

I just saw few of your maps and I located several mistakes. You are using modern maps and not historical maps. In those maps the terrain has changed, expanded toward the sea, most of the marshes are not present and the most serious mistake of all is that use use MODERN ROADS !!! This is a BIG mistake because the historical road network was a MAJOR parameter of this conflict (For the Germans and the Allies).
There are others mistakes as well.
The road network of Greece was primitive at WW2 times...

cheers,
Pyros

My reply:

Thanks for your email.

Actually our mapping is based on historical maps from the period, not modern ones. We used 1:50,000 mainly British Army maps from 1940/1/2. We have not used modern road overlays at all. We do realise that the road network at the time was very primitive.

Which COTA maps are you referring to?

[PyrosLambert]

First of all, I wish to say that the maps of COTA are very good! [:)]
My only concern is about the quality and quantity of roads, because the road network is a crucial factor in the battle of Greece.

Anyway here are some pics of the Platamon Castle:








Here is a part of the "Conquest Of The Aegean"'s Platamon map (I added the position of the castle and the views A, B, C).



Here is a photo of the castle, on top of the hill, which is not present in the map...



Here is view (LOS) A (area in front of the castle) :



Here is view B (side of the castle ) :



Here is the view C (the area behind of the castle) :





cheers,
Pyros

[PyrosLambert]

Here is the type of roads in Greece by that time:
1. Very few one-way paved roads



2. Several dirt roads



3. The Allies and Axis preferred to use the rail tracks for vehicle movement




More on the road network...

Here is typical dirt road (most of the roads were like this one) :



Here is the view of another road, Thermopylae road :



And here are some maps of the Greek road network - 1941 (most of the roads are dirt roads) :

[Arjuna]

Pyros,

First off, thank you for the terrific pictures. Very nice.

As I said in my email to you, you should avoid jumping the gun here and rushing to conclusions based on the screen dumps provided here. You really to have the game before you can accurately comment on the veracity and accuracy of our maps.

For instance the Platamon map that we use does have the castle. It's just that at the zoomed out level portrayed in the screen dump it's not highlighted. However, once you zoom in, it's there alright.

[JeF]

Wow ! Talk about a teaser !
Thanks about it Pyros. [8D]

Now, please, stop distracted Arjuna, he has bugs to hammer and a manual to finish. Thanks again.

JeF.

[Arjuna]

Also re the road quality and road network, tracks as shown by dotted lines only provide a benefit to foot units - motorised units cannot gain a benefit from them and are governed by the underlying terrain. Check out the Mot rate in this screen dump of the terrain popup.

[Arjuna]

The other remaining roads in this map are all "minor". Motorised units only move at 39% of their normal rate, compared to 100% for a highway. Now maybe that's a tad high and we could debate this for a long time. But as I said in my email, you need to see the effect in the game to make a good judgement.

[Error in 0]

Sorry for stressing you out, Arjuna, but can you give us some loose approximate release time? Are we talking April or August (then Ill buy Galactic Civ2 to fill my gaming void)? 2006 or 2007? [X(]


JT

PS. Great pictures here. I would be nice to have a seperate thread for pictures from the campaign.

[MarkShot]

One other quick comment on tracks: Even though it looks like a road on first glance of the map, I don't believe they facilitate resupply as compared to roads.

[PyrosLambert]

ORIGINAL: Arjuna

The other remaining roads in this map are all "minor". Motorised units only move at 39% of their normal rate, compared to 100% for a highway. Now maybe that's a tad high and we could debate this for a long time. But as I said in my email, you need to see the effect in the game to make a good judgement.

Dave,

I consider myself as a very scholastic and demanding scenario designer concerning historical and map accuracy, so Dave, please receive the following statement as a compliment:

Your maps are very detailed and certainly are the best that I have seen during my career as scenario designer.

My comments are directed to the direction of helping you reach, an even higher, level of accuracy.

Since we started this chat, concerning the Platamon scenario, here are some more comments:

From a quick analysis on the road connecting the Platamon area with Panteleemon you may conclude two things:

1. It is crossing vertically the elevation curves.
2. It starts from sea level and it reaches the height of 550 meters in an interval of 2 Km (aprox). This gives a climbing gradient of 20-25%.

From the above, you may easily conclude that this kind of road can't be anything else than a mule trail. Normally a light tank Pz II, in such a mule trail, can't move at all.
If you wish to assign a group of engineers along the movement of a tank group (in such a road type) then you may hardly accept that this group may be able to move at the 5-10% of its normal speed.

Just to give you a quick reference for the above read the following from the official NZ archives (concerning the Platamon engagement) :

Major Le Lievre's B Company area forward of Point 266 was rather more difficult. Dense scrub covered the terrain and the field of fire was limited. Ridges and ravines ran in all directions and mule tracks apparently began and ended at random. Lieutenant Rose,6 with 10 Platoon, held the right flank, Lieutenant Yeoman and Second-Lieutenant Finlayson,7 with 11 and 12 Platoons, were situated on opposite sides of a ravine that also covered the saddle track forward and to the west of 10 Platoon. Company Headquarters was near the junction of the saddle track and another track winding down from Pandeleimon village. If it had needed a name, ‘Monastery Corner’ would have been a good description, for there were ruins there, probably the remains of a Greek monastery.

A more detailed reconnaissance decided Colonel Macky to widen his front. Westward from Point 266 the ridge rose sharply and about a mile inland the village of Pandeleimon clung to the hillside, 1500 feet above sea level and a few chains below the snow line. Pandeleimon was the junction of several tracks connecting with other villages among the hills and on the plains to the north.

One of these tracks wandered in a south-westerly direction to Rapsane, thence to Gonnos on the Larissa end of the Peneios Gorge; another, more substantial than the average, connected Pandeleimon with Platamon station; yet another twisted down behind B Company and joined the saddle track. If the Germans came down the coast and Pandeleimon was not held, it would be a simple matter to cut the battalion's line of retreat at Platamon station, where the railway runs along the foot of a ridge skirting the beach. It was decided, therefore, to put Captain Tongue, with C Company, to hold Pandeleimon. Even then it was only a matter of how large the opposing force was before the open left flank was turned. The battalion's first assignment was a tough one.

C Company was disposed with 14 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant Smith8) and 15 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant Mason9) covering the mule trails to the coast, and 13 Platoon (Lieutenant O'Neill10) in reserve near Company Headquarters on the path to the saddle track. Pandeleimon was still inhabited by the Greeks.

D Company dug in on the reverse slope of Castle Hill with 17 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant Aickin11) forward on the right, 16 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant Phillips12) rear right near the southern exit of the tunnel, and 18 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant Flavell13) rear left.

The above text is very clear concerning th road conditions between Platamon and Panteleemon.

In order to give a better example of the road conditions of the Greece theatre of Operations, I present you the total number of men, guns and mules of the Greek Army in the Albanian front (13th November 1940)

Greek forces in ToO : Pindus (Albanian Theatre of Operations)

Men : 232,000
Guns: 556
Mules (and horses) : 100,000

From the above, you may understand that in Greece the supply and deployment of artillery units required a very big number of mules due to the road conditions.

For example read how the 21 Bn (at Platamon, decided that they needed to acquire mules for building up their defences, I guess in the region of Panteleemon,... this also means that they couldn't use their carriers in order to reach Panteleemon) :

Carrying ammunition, wire, and stores up the hillsides was slow and exhausting work, and some form of transport was badly needed. Colonel Macky had no authority to requisition pack animals, but the inhabitants were friendly and the battalion needed transport. The solution was to purchase some mules, but finance was something of a hurdle. This was finally overcome by platoon commanders taking the hat around and collecting what cash had escaped the Athenian taverns. Receipts were given for every donation to the transport fund, but there is no evidence that they were ever redeemed. Army Pay Office would probably have been very difficult if they had been presented for payment.

With the finance position under control Lieutenant McKay19 was appointed mule purchasing officer, although his knowledge of the Greek language was no greater than that of the rest of the unit, being confined to the challenge Alt tis E? (Halt, who goes there?) used on guard duty at Athens. In spite of the language difficulty, a mixed team of 24 mules and donkeys was acquired, a corral was erected near Platamon station, and private Jim Collingwood,20 a hunting farmer from Tirau, was appointed ‘OC Mule Corral’. Several small boys also attached themselves as mule attendants. It is a melancholy coincidence that both McKay and Collingwood were killed in the battalion's first action.

Concerning the events that took place during the 2 days engagement between the NZ Maori 21st Bn and the German force, the only thing that I can say is that the Maori, didn't expect to face an armor attack (100 tanks) and didn't have any Anti-Tank weapons to face such an attack. The few things that saved them from annihilation were the absence of roads, bad terrain, partially destroyed tunnel and the small minefield in front of the castle ridge (all of these had as a result, the reduction of the operational tanks from 100 to 25-30 in just one day).

Here are some of the events during that battle (when the main German assault began) :

The 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion from 2 Panzer Division, reinforced with engineer, artillery and machine-gun detachments, was leading the way, and by the evening of 14 April had reached the north-east slopes of Mount Olympus. Reconnaissance elements pushed on towards Pandeleimon and had not gone far when they saw soldiers lounging in pits on the forward slopes of a flat-topped ridge. A ruined castle dominated the ridge where it ended abruptly at the sea. Judging by the casual attitude of the soldiers the patrol believed that its advance had not been observed, but soon guns opened up from behind the castle and prevented any movement. Then the guns, evidently attracted by the rest of 2 Motor Cycle Battalion moving up behind the patrol, increased their range and the patrol reported back.

The reconnaissance report, combined with the sound of demolitions that began at dusk and seemed to get farther and farther away, led to the conclusion that the British were occupying only the ridge near the castle and not the hills about it. The commander of 2 Motor Cycle Battalion decided to attack at first light next morning. Meanwhile General Veiel4 of 2 Panzer Division, still mostly to the north of Katerini, had formed two groups to carry out his task. One group, the main body of the division, was to force the Olympus Pass, while the other, the reinforced Motor Cycle Battalion, was to be joined by ⅓ Panzer Regiment (100 tanks), 11/304 Infantry Regiment (one battalion—not to go forward immediately), and two batteries of artillery. The coastal group was to be commanded by Colonel Balck, 3 Panzer Regiment, a hard, strong-willed man who later commanded an Army Group.

During the night of 14-15 April 2 Motor Cycle Battalion formed up to attack the castle, concentrating behind a ridge with the object of attacking the inland flank. Shelling from behind the castle, an irritated diarist says, ‘plagued us, front and rear, right and left… things were damned sour with us for a while’. In the morning, after a brief artillery bombardment, the battalion moved forward, making good progress until it reached the forward slopes of the castle ridge. Here a ‘murderous fire’ broke out, and the leading company suffered heavy casualties, including the company commander. The companies on the west flank found unexpected opposition, and a reconnaissance patrol was sent out to determine 21 Battalion's left flank. This patrol brought back the disconcerting information that the ridge was held as far inland as the village of Pandeleimon.

Colonel Balck arrived to take command at two o'clock in the afternoon. He found that the Motor Cycle Battalion had gone to ground in the tangled undergrowth, boulders and scrub on the forward slopes of castle ridge. Balck gave instructions for the battalion to be withdrawn and reformed. It was then to move out in a wide encircling movement to attack 21 Battalion from above Pandeleimon, while ⅓ Panzer Regiment attacked frontally at the coast. This regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Decker,5 had been ordered up from north of Katerini that morning. The roads were crammed with traffic, but the tank battalion rushed up, ‘disregarding all obstacles in its path… a few other vehicles learnt by experience that their mud guards and radiators are not so hard as tanks’. The tanks reached Katerini at two-thirty in the afternoon and Platamon just before six o'clock.

Balck ordered the tanks to attack immediately. The whole of ⅓ Panzer Regiment pushed to within 1200 metres of the castle and deployed to support the unit's light platoon of five Mark II tanks. These advanced on the castle by a narrow cart track, the only means of approach. A terrific fire from rifles, machine guns, and mortars met the tanks, but it was evident that no anti-tank guns protected the castle. The rough country prevented the tanks from closing in, although one tank almost reached a weapon pit. All five of the Mark IIs shed their tracks on boulders and were abandoned under cover of darkness. The regiment suffered no casualties during this attack.

Meanwhile, 2 Motor Cycle Battalion had been attacking C Company 21 Battalion at Pandeleimon. Three of the four companies attacked, as the fourth company had been pinned down in front of the castle until after dark when trying to disengage earlier in the afternoon. One company swung well round over country that was ‘terribly difficult, mountainous and pathless, with slopes of 700 metres to surmount’, and reached Skotina. By some error the two companies attacking frontally made contact before the outflanking company had got into place, and although some positions were siezed at great cost, they were all lost during a sharp counter-attack. The Motor Cycle Battalion called the attack off until dawn next morning, but remained in position close to Pandeleimon. Colonel Balck, after the failure of both tank and infantry attacks, reported to 2 Panzer Division:

The fight for the castle began at nightfall. End not yet in sight. Very fierce resistance, and terrible country.

In the meantime General Boehme had issued a Corps order stating that 2 Panzer Division's main effort was now to be between Olympus and the sea, with Larisa as its objective. The 6th Mountain Division was to assist by capturing the northern foothills of Olympus west of Pandeleimon, and should 2 Panzer Division be further delayed at Platamon, was to move through the mountains to Gonnos to attack the Platamon and Pinios positions from the rear. A special patrol from 6 Mountain Division was to climb Mount Olympus with the German flag—the swastika would pay homage to Zeus.

Elements from 8/800 Brandenburg Regiment, a special unit largely recruited from Germans familiar with foreign countries to undertake intelligence or sabotage tasks, were to outflank the Platamon position by sea in one motor boat and three assault boats. The force was to sail up the Pinios to capture the traffic bridge.6

That night, 15-16 April, 2 Panzer Division sent up reinforcements—1/304 Infantry Regiment and more engineers and artillery. The Germans now had 100 tanks, one battalion of infantry (1026 men), the reinforced Motor Cycle Battalion (more than 1050 men), 1/74 Artillery Regiment (twelve 105-millimetre and four 150-millimetre guns), and other artillery and specialist units. These opposed 21 Battalion, one troop of 25-pounders and one section of engineers, a total of little more than 700 men. So effective had been the fire from the four 25-pounders that 2 Panzer Division estimated that from two to three troops (8-12 guns) were in support of the castle position.

Balck decided to attack again from front and flank. The 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion was to re-attack Pandeleimon, supported this time by 1/304 Infantry Regiment; ⅓ Panzer Regiment, with one company of infantry under command, was to attack frontally; the artillery was to fire a preliminary bombardment and would then give close support. To Balck's annoyance contact was lost during the night between tanks, infantry and motor cyclists, and it was not possible to synchronise the attack. At nine o'clock in the morning of the 16th, following a deception attack at first light, the bombardment started against the castle and surrounding field positions. On the flank the Motor Cycle Battalion attacked with one company moving up behind Pandeleimon, the other three on front and flank. After a very bitter struggle with little success the appearance of 1/304 Infantry Regiment coming up to give support turned the tide, and Pandeleimon was captured with all field positions in the area. Success gave the opportunity to move down the ridge along a good track to roll up the rest of 21 Battalion.

The tanks had been accompanied by engineers to help force a passage, and their story is well told by a participant:

The right-hand company of tanks forced its way forward through scrub and over rocks, and in spite of the steepness of the hillsides got to the top of the ridge. The country was a mass of wire obstacles and swarming with the enemy. In the thick scrub visibility was scarcely a yard from the tanks, and hardly a trace was to be seen of the enemy except an occasional infantryman running back. The tanks pressed forward along a narrow mule path. Many of them shed their tracks on the boulders, or split their track assemblies, and finally the leading troop ran on to mines … and completely blocked the path. A detour was attempted. Two more tanks stuck in a swamp and another was blown up on a mine….

Colonel Macky withdrew his battalion a few minutes before ten o'clock, and Balck signalled to 2 Panzer Division that the castle had been captured at five past ten; he said that his forward units had suffered 25 per cent casualties. The 21st Battalion got clean away, crossed the Pinios River, and by nightfall reached the village of Tempe at the western end of the gorge; its casualties had been light—36 killed, wounded and missing.

The Germans tried to press the pursuit, but immediate advance was impossible as the tanks could not get down the castle ridge. The infantry, badly mauled, needed reorganising. The tunnel through which the railway passed the castle ridge almost at the edge of the sea had been so thoroughly blown that the engineers estimated it would take five days to clear. Actually temporary repairs were effected sooner, but as late as 20 April engineers reported that the tunnel kept falling in and no set time could be given for repairs. One company of tanks tried to get forward along the edge of the sea but found this impossible. In the end the tanks were towed over the ridge, such a slow process that only 25-30 tanks had been got across by eleven o'clock next day.

David, for one more time, I wish to express you my compliments for all your hard work.

cheers,
Pyros

[PyrosLambert]

ORIGINAL: MarkShot

One other quick comment on tracks: Even though it looks like a road on first glance of the map, I don't believe they facilitate resupply as compared to roads.

MarkShot,

The roads have played a very significant role (at least) during the Italian Invasion on 28th October 1940 at the Albanian front.

When the Italian invasion began, the Greeks were unprepared, outnumbered and outgunned... but soon, the spirit of the Greek warrior changed the balance.
But, the Greek army also depended on the heroic local population (women of Pindus), which contributed enormously to the cause, by carrying in their backs all the needed ammunition and supplies. [&o]

Most of the Italian units, thought that they would walk easily by the Pindus mountain and they only took with them food and supply rations for 3 days.

Soon, they discovered that the reality was different and they found themselves fighting in very harsh conditions without appropriate supplies.

The elite formation Julia (for example) found itself in a desperate position deep inside the Greek sector, without food and supplies, and began a desperate retreat (still it was destroyed).

If the road network of Pindus mountain was better than the existent three one-way narrow paved roads... then the Italians would had probably bypassed the Pindus front.

cheers,
Pyros

[PyrosLambert]

Here is a decent topo of Platamon region.

What is important, is to understand how the displayed road network is related with the real road conditions.

For instance, on this map the dashed lines (- - -) represent the "cart tracks", while the dotted lines (....) represent the "mule tracks".

[Tactics]

I dont see any frakkin mules!

[PyrosLambert]

ORIGINAL: Tactics

I dont see any frakkin mules!

Then perhaps you should read the official AARs

Balck ordered the tanks to attack immediately. The whole of ⅓ Panzer Regiment pushed to within 1200 metres of the castle and deployed to support the unit's light platoon of five Mark II tanks. These advanced on the castle by a narrow cart track, the only means of approach.

Balck decided to attack again from front and flank. The 2nd Motor Cycle Battalion was to re-attack Pandeleimon, supported this time by 1/304 Infantry Regiment; ¨÷ Panzer Regiment, with one company of infantry under command, was to attack frontally;

The tanks had been accompanied by engineers to help force a passage, and their story is well told by a participant:

The right-hand company of tanks forced its way forward through scrub and over rocks, and in spite of the steepness of the hillsides got to the top of the ridge. The country was a mass of wire obstacles and swarming with the enemy. In the thick scrub visibility was scarcely a yard from the tanks, and hardly a trace was to be seen of the enemy except an occasional infantryman running back. The tanks pressed forward along a narrow mule path. Many of them shed their tracks on the boulders, or split their track assemblies, and finally the leading troop ran on to mines ¡¦ and completely blocked the path. A detour was attempted. Two more tanks stuck in a swamp and another was blown up on a mine¡¦.

[Brady]

WoW, That was a great read![:)]

Awsome picks BTW thanks for posting them, I am facinated by the theater this game will endevor to cover.

[MarkShot]

Hmm ... maybe PG should start a new promotion where each customer for a game is entered into a drawing. The grand prize is a trip to visit the battlefield upon which the game is based.

Actually, one of the beta testers, Coralsaw, was in Greece when we started COTA, but I think he dropped out.

And there was Eddy and Grouchy, beta testers, from the low countries while HTTR was being developed.

[Arjuna]

I'm sure David Heath would love to fund such a promotion. [;)]

Of course, we'd need a guide for them. Someone knowledgeable, whose been over the ground and can point out all the interesting bits. Now who do we know with those qualifications?[;)]

[PyrosLambert]

ORIGINAL: MarkShot

Hmm ... maybe PG should start a new promotion where each customer for a game is entered into a drawing. The grand prize is a trip to visit the battlefield upon which the game is based.

Actually, one of the beta testers, Coralsaw, was in Greece when we started COTA, but I think he dropped out.

And there was Eddy and Grouchy, beta testers, from the low countries while HTTR was being developed.

Not only I live in Greece,
But I travelled several times to all these places,
I even walked in the snowed mountains of Pindus...
and I know how hard was this battle for both opponents.

Here is the place outside of MOLOS, near Thermopylae.
In these slopes the ANZAC forces make their stand against the advancing Germans.



The following picture shows is a typical Pindus "Cart Track" !!!! [:D]
These were the exact conditions, at the moment of the Italian attack.
All movements suffer a great penalty, (it took me approx ONE (1) hour to walk / climb almost 1 km in this modern Pindus "cart track" (snow height = 0,80 m - 1,5 m).