Here's the Thing About Long Campaigns

[KG Erwin]

As much as I admire the Germans and their cool toys, I just can't get wrapped up in playing a six-year campaign, KNOWING that I'll still lose the war.

Now, the Russians are another story. With Enhanced, they could be fun to play as. With the default points they are given, you can create a HUGE core force easily. The problem, at least for me, is what to put in a Combined Arms Group. With the Russkies, even in June 1939 there's a lot to choose from. I've fooled around a bit with some ideas, but haven't come up with a magic formula for them -- yet.

BTW, here's a cool site that has a lot of Russian TOE info : http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/index.htm

[FlashfyreSP]

Why worry about a "magic formula" at all? Try something and see if it works. 

[KG Erwin]

ORIGINAL: FlashfyreSP

Why worry about a "magic formula" at all? Try something and see if it works. 

Well, what I'm finding out is that I'm constantly in "experimentation" mode. I haven't settled down and played through a campaign in years. You know what that feels like.

I got my Marines down to a science. Same for those damn Germans. I'm looking for some other country to delve into and establish an "evolution path" for them.

[Goblin]

I just can't get wrapped up in playing a six-year campaign, KNOWING that I'll still lose the war.

 
By the same reasoning, why play the Marines for the whole war KNOWING you have already won? I would forget the winning/losing of the war and enjoy the ride to the end of it, whichever country you chose.
 
 
Goblin

[Mark Ezra]

I LOVED SP1's Long Campaign. With such a small core force I could name them all and give them a pixal personality...  I play about the same with SPWAW.  My core force (US Army) consist of an infantry Company and a couple of scout teams.  For armor: a mixed Company of tanks, light tanks  and TD's. For support I a get a battery of 81mm mortars and an AT (t) sect.  I buy a bunch of light trucks for transport and AA or SP's or what have you.  The size is very manageable for the Long Campaign and I can get into a pretty nice pixal relationship with my guys....What can I say...I'm just a sucker for a guy in uniform.... 

[DROregon]

Playing the Germans is fine.  Even if they lose the war, it better not be because of my leadership.  Same for Marines.  If I can't contribute to the cause, it's a hollow victory.

[Riun T]

I'm not wanting this to come across as a bash Gunny reply, but I think and feel that I've chatted with you long enough on many other topics to call your trump so to speak on this "down to a sience" comment, now u just admitted that the time you've taken to {ironout} your task forces OOB's and loadouts to historically accurate but pleasurable to GUNNY, requirements of tactic and gameplay....... you haven't had time to play this hypathetical "ERWIN FORCE" to anything more than a few generated battles to run a few sucessful tests of playablity.
You've seen some of my canadians screen shots of campaign scores and final maps on these very forums buddy, SO's nows the time to play them all the way threw and show me beyond statistically what YOUR SCIENCE and tactics, and setup, and upgrade sceme, and most of ALL,,,,,, CAMPAIGN TOTAL SCORE with list of battles fought and resulting DV's MV's and DRAWS.
I'm most interested to see if U as a non-realmilitary critic or proponant,have worked on any better strategy than the line abrest infantry infront of tanks{ broadfield } line of advance dispersion i've seen in some of those posts you e-mailed me or with the TBT japanese debackle ?? PLAY THEM THREW, FOREST gump and get back to all us yoakles [:'(] JUST got to add in the other poke I have on u GUNNY,, they'le never get anywhere with the mines button off [:D] RT

[KG Erwin]

OK, Riun, I see your point.  I have NOT tested my so-called "perfect" battalion landing team thru an entire campaign.   
 
I'm still reading thru campaign studies, and I just got a great book describing the use of tanks by the Marines.  
 
I won't bore you with a dissertation, but it seemed that the development of proper  tank-infantry coordination for these unique missions was designed by nothing more than trial and error.  Little to no training was conducted in tank -infantry coordination prior to the landing on Guadalcanal. Hell, the tankers were more concerned about being landed safely on the beach. 
 
As for my "broad -front advances", man, that's the way the USMC did it back then.   The limited fields of observation in a jungle environment meant that gaps had to be covered, to prevent Japanese infiltration.    There wasn't much chance for clever maneuvering.  
 
Now, some attempts were made to outflank the enemy, but communications were not good, so companies or battalions ended up getting misdirected, and proper coordination of a multi-battalion attack was a  nightmare.
 
As for in-depth minefields, the Japanese never used them.    They scattered them here and there, but nothing like what we encountered in Europe.   However, they WERE masters at using terrain to construct interlocking fields of fire  -- the object was not to obstruct the advancing enemy, but to lure him into a killing field.   Sneaky bastards, indeed. 
 
Finally, an amphibious assault was thought to be a suicidal venture prior to WWII. The example of Gallipoli was ever-present.  
 
In the second phase of the Pacific War, there is no room for subtlety, except maybe  on a limited tactical level.   Every landing was nothing more than a direct frontal assault, with victory being achieved by massive application of firepower delivered by direct fire and close assault.    
 
Now, my friend, if you've come up with a better way to use finesse in these situations, please let me know. 

[Riun T]

Just tryin to remember how to get this UO screenshot thingy to work right with conflicting GIMP2 and microsoft paint but I think I got it! my last battle March of 45 and will add core

[Riun T]

This is whom and what got me threw a marine LONG Gunny and you should get a laugh outta how many regular Army grunts fought just as well. Because of positioning and versitility of support , and probably some raw firepower in there TOO

[Riun T]

Try and guess my order of transport and combat {taskforce breakdown } with these??

[Riun T]

Notice all my units are mobile and I didn't stick to any more of a compositional structure than capitalizing on this mobility giving me first grab of the better tactical ground. What general said "before guatalcanal they attacked at their leisure and after they retreated at ours" ?? Based my whole upgrade system on the Marvelous .50 cal. and keeped it moving,then the bigger units to the indespenceable flamethrower,and keeped it moving

[Riun T]

not going with the notion of the 3 infantry companies to 1 tank combat group  and knowing how the japs love to use tanks with recce ontop, thought high mobility with good FO coverage to each platoon was an effort to undercut this concept. I only ran a squad in the real infantry, but the principle and doctrine fore any force size is the same.
Ya got your sniffers/lookers, ya got your smashers and slammers, and ya got your holders and keepers.
Then don't bother to try and compare hypathetical meassures of weapons or statistical preformance,just look at the WAY !!!! your given assets don't have to fullfill the method your enemy WOULD prefer you deploy or utilize them.
WHOM besides an overly nervious commander says the tanks always follow the infantry, and the artillary is always in the rear??? In deathtraps by belton cooper he describes what the allies came up with as the bocage country assault solution, of a US army or engineer A&P squad flanked by .30cal.MMGs and a sherman with the rhino attachment, and the M-12 I think 155mmSP taking up the rear.
The assault squad ran up to the hedge behind the sherman,which breached the bocage and retreated to 50yrds or so to let the assault team recci threw the first portion of the other side while the MMG's tookup the corners of the hole and edge of the hedge to give quartering angle coverfire, the M112 would advance into the mouth of the hedge and give maximum forepower to closerange threats . Great example of improvised doctrine outside of normal application.

[Riun T]

more core and support

[Riun T]

Sorry on repost having shaw problems stinking intreenet[8|] connections

[Riun T]

again

[Riun T]

one more after this

[Riun T]

so wadda ya think Gunny?? [:D]

[Riun T]

ORIGINAL: KG Erwin

OK, Riun, I see your point.  I have NOT tested my so-called "perfect" battalion landing team thru an entire campaign.   

I'm still reading thru campaign studies, and I just got a great book describing the use of tanks by the Marines.  

I won't bore you with a dissertation, but it seemed that the development of proper  tank-infantry coordination for these unique missions was designed by nothing more than trial and error.  Little to no training was conducted in tank -infantry coordination prior to the landing on Guadalcanal. Hell, the tankers were more concerned about being landed safely on the beach. 

As for my "broad -front advances", man, that's the way the USMC did it back then.   The limited fields of observation in a jungle environment meant that gaps had to be covered, to prevent Japanese infiltration.    There wasn't much chance for clever maneuvering.  
{Gaps don't have to be covered if you force them to have to look for you,given that the whole reason they infiltrate is cause their looking for u, having a broad front in the limited vis. means that your enemy can assume that if he masses a force in one general ball infront of any particuler point of your wall he'll bounce back against the felt firepower of that section but eventually breach the sector with mass of men.}
Now, some attempts were made to outflank the enemy, but communications were not good, so companies or battalions ended up getting misdirected, and proper coordination of a multi-battalion attack was a  nightmare.

As for in-depth minefields, the Japanese never used them.{ I'll argue this some in the scence that yes your right they never really sewd whole mine fields but as you said earlier they where masters of layered bunker/tunnel/cave interlocking fields of fire and my uncle tony fought in burma and said they always mined beaches but would boobytrap and pungi stick pit in inland travelways, and a stake pit is way worse than mines IMHO}    They scattered them here and there, but nothing like what we encountered in Europe.   However, they WERE masters at using terrain to construct interlocking fields of fire  -- the object was not to obstruct the advancing enemy, but to lure him into a killing field.   Sneaky bastards, indeed. 

Finally, an amphibious assault was thought to be a suicidal venture prior to WWII. The example of Gallipoli was ever-present.  

In the second phase of the Pacific War, there is no room for subtlety, except maybe  on a limited tactical level.   Every landing was nothing more than a direct frontal assault, with victory being achieved by massive application of firepower delivered by direct fire and close assault.    

Now, my friend, if you've come up with a better way to use finesse in these situations, please let me know. WE DEFINATELY GOTTA TALK MORE[:'(]RT

[Twotribes]

If one sends tanks or armored vehicles forward against undetected, unsupressed enemy Infantry, one is going to lose a good part of his tank or armored force.