But don't let yourself get distracted. My point was that the USN was not adverse to exercising, either in fleet problems, or as individual units, in the North Pacific.
I absolutely agree that US forces were not adverse to operating north of Hawaii. Mike bases his abrupt dismissal of even the possibility of a carrier operating in that region on the weather and on "no logical reason for being there." By who's definition are we defining "logical?" Most admirals I knew didn't seem to know what the word "logical" meant.
First the weather front. It was not a strong weather front and and consisted of mainly low clouds and rain. Winds were no more than 40 knots. The front passed through PH on the 6th. When the Japanese launched on the 7th, their ships were still covered by low clouds but the rain and winds had greatly moderated. The weather over Pearl on the 7th was partly cloudy. These hardly severe enough conditions to prevent any ship from operating in them. Indeed at that time of year, this is pretty much the typical pattern around Hawaii. So weather wouldn't prevent the US from operating ships north of Pearl.
I would submit that there is any number of logical reasons for a fleet to be operating there. Considering the numerous war warnings, it is quite possible and logical that a US carrier force (or other warships) could have been assigned to patrol the northern approaches to Hawaii for early warning, just for training purposes or in transit to Alaskan waters. It could have been the perfect ambush position in which to strike the Japanese fleet during the attack had they been located.
I doubt Mike has ever been in the Navy. In all my years of service, only once have I ever seen a training exercise cancelled due to weather and that was due to the remmanants of a typhoon east of Japan. I have no reason to believe that the Navy of the thirties and forties was any more likely to cancel.
Chez
