ORIGINAL: wdolson
Coming out of the SBS at dawn would not have favored Lee's forces. As you said, they would have been silluetted against the rising sun. Lee would have been able to at least partially negate that by setting up in a crossed T formation. Kurita would have been hampered at the start by his ships needing to navigate a confined space before turning broadside, while Lee would have been prepared and waiting.
ORIGINAL: irrelevant
According to Morison, Kurita had transited SBS by 0034 on Oct 25. Halsey/Lee would not have been able to be anywhere near there in full strength by then. Even the partial strength force you mention (4BBs) was only just beginning to form up at this time some 60-80 miles NE of SBS.
I thought Kurita came through the SBS later than that. Passing through at 0 dark 30, Lee would have been better able to set up an Olendorf style ambush.
There is some confusion here about TF 34. Halsey first talked about forming TF 34 on the afternoon of the 24th
before he sent the 3rd fleet north. He told Lee to draw up a list of ships for TF 34 drawn from 2 of the carrier task groups. The force Lee drew up had 4 BBs, including both Iowas available at the time.
That force was never formed. Early in the morning of the 25th, way off to the north, Halsey finally formed TF 34 with 6 BBs and sent them on ahead of the carriers.
If the original TF 34 been formed and placed at the exit to SBS as Halsey proposed on the 24th, it would have been in position by early evening on the 24th and would have had ample time to get ready for Kurita.
Bill
To talk about when the engagement might have taken place, one must examine what ships would have comprised TF 34, and where they were at what time.
Most of TF 34's heavy hitters would have been drawn from the screen of Sherman's TG 38.3. Sherman's screen included BB's Washington (Lee's flag), Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Alabama, Du Bose's cruisers Santa Fe and Mobile, and Desron 50 (4 Fletcher class DDs). Sherman spent the 24th well to the north of SBS, off Luzon, striking airfields and absorbing airstrikes--during which CVL Princeton was sunk and Birmingham seriously damaged. As late as 2000 Sherman was still more than 150 miles north of SBS, at least 6 hours steaming even at a relatively high speed of 25kts.
Halsey might certainly have started these ships south sooner, but the fact was that he did not do so when Kurita was still steaming eastward in the Sibuyan Sea as late as 1400. As Sherman, having already lost one carrier--the first since Hornet more than two years earlier--was at that time still operating under constant threat of air attack and in fact had fought off 4 seperate attacks by 1400, it is hard to imagine that even someone as non-risk-averse as Halsey would have stripped his screen from him during mid afternoon. In addition, all three TGs were still operating under orders issued the previous evening. Orders for the night and following day were being developed through late afternoon and evening and were issued at 2022. No responsible commander would have wanted to issue orders on the fly, without proper consideration by staff. No, Lee was stuck with Sherman off Luzon, for good or for ill, until after 2030.
What would have been available at 0000 on Oct 25 at the north end of SBS was Halsey with Iowa and New Jersey, 2 CAs, 3 CLs and 3 Desrons (12 Fletchers). A formidible force, but not one with overwhelming superiority like 7th fleet enjoyed at the north end of Surigao Strait the same evening. Also, important to note is that Halsey, not Lee, would be OTC. Not that Halsey is automatically a bad thing, but Lee had been with the BBs for years, and he was the only US admiral present with actual experience in night surface combat.
A further consideration is that Halsey was an aviator. He wanted to fight a carrier battle. He was looking north, not southwest. He would have loathed a deployment that put his flagship New Jersey anyplace other than with the fast carriers looking for a fight with Ozawa.
If you want to argue that Halsey might have deployed differently on the 24th, that is, that he and his staff might have analysed the situation that existed at sundown on the 23rd, reached different conclusions and issued different orders for the next day, you might as well argue that Spruance, not Halsey, might have been in command. [;)]
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