What WW2 Scenario Would We Like?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: a white rabbit

..oh pls, Sedan without Dinant was an isolated thrust,

An "isolated thrust" that contained the vast majority of the German mechanised force. Dinant was two panzer and one motorised divisions, as I recall.

Sedan was the biggie. The French, in any case, were unable to react. What does it matter if the German spearhead is vulnerable to being cut off if the French make no attempt to do so? It was vulnerable as it was. Nothing happened.

** a B class div, under TOE and under trained...

Great excuse. Funny that the 3. and 4. Wave German divisions didn't do as badly.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k

Works for me. I also tend to differ somewhat on a lot of the imponderable value judgements.

The trouble with intangible factors is that they can be very important. As humans we don't like them and would rather deal in concrete facts (hence the popular misconception of the awesomely powerful German panzer force). But this often conceals the truth.

[a white rabbit]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: a white rabbit

..oh pls, Sedan without Dinant was an isolated thrust,

An "isolated thrust" that contained the vast majority of the German mechanised force. Dinant was two panzer and one motorised divisions, as I recall.

Sedan was the biggie. The French, in any case, were unable to react. What does it matter if the German spearhead is vulnerable to being cut off if the French make no attempt to do so? It was vulnerable as it was. Nothing happened.

** a B class div, under TOE and under trained...

Great excuse. Funny that the 3. and 4. Wave German divisions didn't do as badly.

..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it, but then what, or rather "where" ? taking it was only flank protection and part of the isolation, then destruction of the Allies in Belgium ( that you would destroy etc- iGo maxim [:)])..


..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division...

..B class french-style, expected and designed to hold already entrenched positions on quiet sections of the front, ..err that they were even worse than that is part of the rot in the french military of the period..

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: a white rabbit

..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it,

That's nonsense. The reason the panzer divisions were mostly committed to Sedan was because that was where the Schwerepunkt was to be delivered. If heavy resistance was expected they would have bypassed the spot.

..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division...

It of course adds weight to the German offensive. Of course in light of events we know the French were too paralysed to do anything regardless of whether the German flank was north or south of Dinant.

[a white rabbit]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: a white rabbit

..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it,

That's nonsense. The reason the panzer divisions were mostly committed to Sedan was because that was where the Schwerepunkt was to be delivered. If heavy resistance was expected they would have bypassed the spot.

..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division...

It of course adds weight to the German offensive. Of course in light of events we know the French were too paralysed to do anything regardless of whether the German flank was north or south of Dinant.

..Sedan..come on, it was a fortress, in theory anyway, and also a major bridging point, bypassing was not an option if only cos of a lack of bridges elsewhere, it had to be taken and held. The proof is that it was Rommel from Dinant that did the dash to the Channel, not the forces at Sedan..

..as to French paralysis, sorry, you can't generalise, some mobile divs did well, others lousy, the armoured div (3rd ?)coming from the south did it in unrealistic but just justifiable stages so arrived too late at Sedan to change things, a few days earlier and those German tanks would have been wiped from the map by the Char bis1s of a very good div.

..pls forgive the technical errors, i gave my personal library to my commune before i leaving Europe, now they have possibly one of the best Indochine reference sections in France..sighhh*

..* s'ok, the next one , basically on the military history of Mindanao is already under construction, a white man's burden, educating the natives, right.....

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: a white rabbit

..Sedan..come on, it was a fortress, in theory anyway,

It was a fortress in 1870. In 1940 it was not.

The proof is that it was Rommel from Dinant that did the dash to the Channel, not the forces at Sedan..

You're wrong;

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/ ... p%2012.htm

See where it says "Rommel"? See how it's not moving toward the Channel?

..as to French paralysis, sorry, you can't generalise, some mobile divs did well, others lousy,

Well that's just it; there was no organisation. Very little was done- and what was, only on a small scale.

a few days earlier and those German tanks would have been wiped from the map by the Char bis1s of a very good div.

Well, leaving aside that the Germans would have pulled their tanks back and drawn the B1s onto their anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns (as was done to great effect at Arras), 3ieme DCR was NOT "a very good div". From "France 1940something";

Units lacking in cohesion, divisional staff untried, 42e BCC only two companies strong, no divisional AT battery, no engineer company, no supply or recovery tractors, 50% shortfall of infantry fighting vehicles, large shortfall of radios.

[Graymane]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Graymane

Maybe you two could summarize your positions

Well here's the main argument;

I believe French doctrine, which was to a large extent a consequence of the French nation's experience of the First World War, led to their inability to cope with a mobile battle, and that this would have been their downfall even if the initial German blow had been less devastating.

jtownend2k puts more emphasis on a failure of dispositions and plans.

It's not a radical disagreement. We just disagree of the relative importance of factors.

Thank you =) I agree with your assessment. France winning WWI and the losses they took doing it instilled a deep desire to never repeat it again. Everything from planned battles, to the Maginot line, to using armor to support infantry to concentration on doctrines of defense all contribute to a siege mentality. Even the desire to overload the left wing and take the fight into Belgium is simply a desire to not fight on French soil. I tend to think that the failures attributed to dispositions and plans are simply a part of the problems described above. Something along the lines of proximate versus ultimate causes. Analyzing the troops, equipment, dispositions and other aspects of the purely technical side of the campaign shows that the French fighting forces themselves weren't really all that bad. But divorcing that analysis from the fact that the higher and mid-level commands were suffering from a siege mentality and victor's disease can lead one to believe that simply changing the dispositions and a few commanders here and there would change the outcome.

I also note that the English suffered from victor's disease as did everyone else pretty much. I think it is manifested in the old boy network of the high command between the wars. I think it is also manifested in the German High Command for good and ill. We all know that it was the younger generation commanders that were so keen on a new kind of warfare and the extent of the fights that people like Manstein and Guderian had to fight to get their ideas modestly accepted. People talk about what France could have done if the dispositions were different? I like to think, what could Germany have done if their higher command had believed in their new kind of warfare more than they did? There were numerous times in the French campaign when higher commands froze the spearheads (and other units as well). It is highly likely and quite possible it would have been all over in the same timeframe as Poland with the loss of the BEF if the Germans wouldn't have put the breaks on the campaign at certain critical times.

I think that outside of manstein, guderian and a few others, the rapid success of the germans in France was just as big of a shock to the germans. They just adjusted to it more quickly.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Graymane

Even the desire to overload the left wing and take the fight into Belgium is simply a desire to not fight on French soil.

Yeah. It was even overtly expressed by some politicians as a reason for holding on the frontiers. People are reluctant to admit to visceral motivations. When they do, it means they're pretty strong.

I also note that the English suffered from victor's disease as did everyone else pretty much.

Yeah. We were certainly expecting a fairly static war. Hence all these 12" guns we brought over with the BEF. Hence Churchill busying himself with a design for a machine to assault trench systems with ("Cultivator No. 6"). However the psychological effect of the First World War on Britain had been less catastrophic than in France, largely because the proportionate dead must have been only about 60% of what France suffered.

I think it is manifested in the old boy network of the high command between the wars. I think it is also manifested in the German High Command for good and ill.

Well, both armies were dominated by the aristocracy in 1914. One can't expect an overnight transition. Hence the Wehrmacht still had plenty of 'von's even when it was controlled by a socialist dictator.

I like to think, what could Germany have done if their higher command had believed in their new kind of warfare more than they did? There were numerous times in the French campaign when higher commands froze the spearheads (and other units as well). It is highly likely and quite possible it would have been all over in the same timeframe as Poland with the loss of the BEF if the Germans wouldn't have put the breaks on the campaign at certain critical times.

I doubt the French could have been defeated any more quickly, since it really was necessary to bring stuff forward to the Somme before attacking the new line. However the BEF could certainly have been harried if not actually destroyed.

Quite what the ultimate impact of this is not quite clear. Would Britain have come to terms without the nine divisions saved at Dunkirk? I'm not convinced. Certainly no Sealion could be attempted; the Germans still cannot protect their forces sufficiently during the crossing. Perhaps General Student's scheme for an airborne descent in June could have been attempted. This would have been dicey, however; whilst ill-equipped and under-trained, there were still nearly twenty divisions in Britain, including five which would have been combat ready at this time (1st and 2nd Armoured, 43rd Wessex, 52nd Lowland and 1st Canadian).

[a white rabbit]

..thanks for the info/sources..

..no worries, Ben, it's what we're here for...so we can undertand why/how/what..

..personaly i still think the bad man (+Devil)+ had a hand in it, just too many f*k ups in the early war, but i may be just have taken too many mind -altering substances....

[Graymane]

I really believe Sealion is at most a pipe dream. I really don't see Hitler ever allowing it to come off given his own understanding, beliefs and feelings about the English in an abstract sense (yes, he did bombing and rockets till the end of the war). Also given his strategic aims, I don't believe he ever thought of the west as anything more than a distraction as his eyes lay always on the east, the decisive theatre.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Graymane

I really believe Sealion is at most a pipe dream. I really don't see Hitler ever allowing it to come off given his own understanding, beliefs and feelings about the English in an abstract sense (yes, he did bombing and rockets till the end of the war). Also given his strategic aims, I don't believe he ever thought of the west as anything more than a distraction as his eyes lay always on the east, the decisive theatre.

Yeah. The interesting hypothetical is one where Hitler really has it in for the English. Then stuff starts getting set aside as early as May.

This is the basis for Colin Wright's Seelowe. One of the finest scenarios I've ever played. Getting towards completion, too.

[Graymane]

Hmmm...I might have to try that one. v. Manstein certainly thought it was possible.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Graymane

Hmmm...I might have to try that one. v. Manstein certainly thought it was possible.

Well Manstein was wrong- as things stood. But in the hypothetical, matters have changed.

[KoenigMKII]

For Sealowe, does anyone know if the Germans considered making the evening of S-1 a day when there is maximium moonlight.
 
If it is a crystal clear night (fine weather) its more dangerous for a Royal Navy pre-emptive raid on french ports stacked with invasion barges.
 
Was there even such a night falling in the possible launch window when at least the basic sealowe preparations have been done? The tides have to be taken into account of course - but the Germans did have a small number of tanks converted to "snorkel." Frankly, a P-III could do quite a bit of damage if it made it ashore.
 
I am not at all sure a small force of destroyers and light cruisers could have eliminated the whole Invasion threat. A single large HE bomb hit from a stuka can criple a WWII destroyer, and Me110 cannon shells would have been a threat to the secondary gun crews. Also, the Germans planned to sow mines on the outside of the invasion corridor(s) - that automatically introduces an element of luck into the battle.
 
The biggest problem for the Luftwaffe, short fighter range, could be reduced by rebasing some of the squadrons closer to the invasion ports. 
 
I honestly think if the first lighter ship attack was stopped short, then even the Battleships would have been committed, even though the book says it is dangerous.
 
If the invasion beaches are in range of Luftwaffe fighters, there is a danger of successfull invasion. The problem for the British army is that if the Germans gain local air superiority over a small beachhead it could grow. It also pins the RAF to trying to fight over a fixed location in Luftwaffe Fighter range. In crete, the decisive moment occured when an airstrip was captured, what if the first target of a para drop in sealowe is a fixed airfield? With local German air superiority over a beachhead, can the British army counter attack?
 
Manstein probably had similar ideas. But the Rhine barges really are a terrible idea for invasion transport if the weather is not perfect in open sea in the channel. A stuka HE bomb won't stop a battleship, torpedos and mines are another matter. The number of U-Boats was painfully small, but again, there is that element of random luck involved.
 
The British plan for a light weight attack on the invasion is logical, if you assume it has the cover of darkness. But the Germans read moonlight tables as well as we do. As soon as they attempt sealowe all previous bets are off. In perfectly calm weather is it possible to fire an 88 from an invasion barge? Difficult at best I would say, but just a small force of destroyers and light Cruisers to stop sealowe? Thats asking for it.

[Telumar]

Maybe you go to http://www.tdg.nu and ask there - there is an expert on Seelöwe, Colin Wright is his name.. [:)] He also has done a Seelöwe scenario that is said to be soon released.

[ColinWright]

I think that the thing about Seelowe is that while one can plausibly rearrange history to give it a fair chance of success, it remains a hair-raisingly risky proposition from the German point of view almost no matter how one stacks the deck.

This was in fact more or less Hitler's take on it. It would be an operation to be undertaken if Germany was in a desperate situation, and Germany was not in a desperate situation. That was the gist of what he had to say on the subject.

Rationally, the thing to do upon the fall of France was not to attempt Seelowe, but to methodically isolate England and render her position untenable. Bring Spain in, eliminate Gibraltar, and use Ferrol to increase the threat to her sea routes. Make concessions to the French to gain the use of Dakar and Syria. Encourage Japan to attack her holdings in the Far East. All these powers were quite willing to cooperate with Germany in the early summer of 1940 -- Hitler all but ignored them. The most extreme example would be his reply to Japan's overtures along these lines: 'harvest help not needed.'

Hitler didn't need or even want to conquer Britain -- just to force her to acquiesce in his plans. I think a solid case can be made that all the steps I have mentioned above were eminently achievable -- and I think the pressure on Britain could have been racheted up to the point where it would have been unbearable. Moreover, note that the actual resources Germany needs to commit to follow the above course are minimal.

However, Hitler didn't even do this much. Rather, he halted in puzzlement when Britain failed to agree he had won the war, hemmed and hawed, tried to scare her with the threat of invasion, and then turned to the more congenial task of plotting the destruction of Russia. Largely, he thereafter simply ignored Britain as much as possible -- never pursued a coherent policy with regards to her at all.

Of course, none of this means Seelowe is an operation that never could have happened. Hitler was not famously rational, and given a different attitude on his part towards Britain, simply invading her would have been very appealling. After all, if successful, an invasion would certainly deliver quick results, and there'd be no nonsense about negotiating a settlement. Moreover, after the fall of France, German morale and self-confidence was sky-high. They might have had a go.

[Karri]

ORIGINAL: KoenigMKII
The tides have to be taken into account of course - but the Germans did have a small number of tanks converted to "snorkel." Frankly, a P-III could do quite a bit of damage if it made it ashore.

Dunno how that would have worked, quite a few of the allied tanks during d-day sank before they reached the beaches.

I am not at all sure a small force of destroyers and light cruisers could have eliminated the whole Invasion threat. A single large HE bomb hit from a stuka can criple a WWII destroyer, and Me110 cannon shells would have been a threat to the secondary gun crews. Also, the Germans planned to sow mines on the outside of the invasion corridor(s) - that automatically introduces an element of luck into the battle.

If a bomb can cripple a destroyer, then what could the RAF do to unarmed and unprotected targets? Furhtermore, if the germans sow mines thus making a corridor, what stops the british from sealing off this corridor with their mines.

Also that would make supplying the forces impossible.

[nelmsm1]

I'd like to see a hypothetical where by some miracle the Germans achieve their goals during the Bulge and the Americans/Brits/French sign a separate peace agreement and the Germans redeploy most of their forces to face the Russians alone.

[Silvanski]

ORIGINAL: nelmsm

I'd like to see a hypothetical where by some miracle the Germans achieve their goals during the Bulge and the Americans/Brits/French sign a separate peace agreement and the Germans redeploy most of their forces to face the Russians alone.

The "Gotterdammerung" scenario comes to mind... it could be revised for this what-if? situation... a lot of work but not impossible...

If the Germans could have been able to redeploy their forces used for Wacht Am Rhein to the East it might have prolongued the war against the Soviets.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Karri

ORIGINAL: KoenigMKII
The tides have to be taken into account of course - but the Germans did have a small number of tanks converted to "snorkel." Frankly, a P-III could do quite a bit of damage if it made it ashore.

Dunno how that would have worked, quite a few of the allied tanks during d-day sank before they reached the beaches...

Yeah, I thought about that. However, the German systems (there were two) seem to have worked quite well. Only one tank was lost in trials, and the next Spring the same tanks were used to cross the river Bug at the opening of Barbarossa -- as far as I know they worked just fine.

As far as the play of the scenario goes, what's of at least equal concern is that these four amphibious tank battalions not only assist in the initial assault, but continue to form a fairly significant component of the German forces ashore. This is somewhat questionable, as tanks don't just run forever: they need fuel, ammo, and maintenance. While a full-fledged panzer division has all the components to meet these needs, it's questionable if four independent battalions wandering around in the logistical chaos that would have existed in a German beachhead in the aftermath of a successful landing would have access to the same sort of support.