Early war air power

Gary Grigsby's strategic level wargame covering the entire War in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945 or beyond.

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ChezDaJez
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RE: Early war air power

Post by ChezDaJez »

These are all straw man arguments as you well knew when you wrote them. Tactical surprise is different from whether or not one is at war. If it is your claim that instances of tactical surprise reflect pilot capabilities, then it would be as well to knock 20 points off of the EXP of all Japanese naval pilots because they were indeed surprised by RAF tactical bombers in the Indian Ocean (which bombers simply missed) and again at Midway, and when the Japanese lost light carriers in both the Coral Sea and Eastern Solomons engagements.

You had asked for examples of when surprise was not a factor. I gave them.
And I never claimed that tactical surprise reflected pilot capabilities though in no small part it is part of the equation. A good pilot will try to gain an advantage without being spotted. A good leader will plan for achieving surprise whenever possible. And let's not forget, sometimes just plain luck (call it fortunate circumstance if the word luck isn't to your liking) presents a golden opportunity to achieve surprise. But achieving surprise, whether one likes it or not, is an intricate part of the art of war.

The problem with the "shock and awe" and "learning curve" claims is that they are illogical. Thach & Flatley certainly had no shock or awe and no learning curve to overcome, since they'd already solved the Wildcat vs Zero problem before the war even started. There were plenty of people in the USN VF units that had heard of their work in 1941, and even rookies could be taught the tactic literally on the fly (as at Midway). So at the least, the ZB if hardcoded not to apply to the AVG should likewise never apply when the Allied opfor consists of US carrier planes. Not even in Dec 1941.

Let's talk a little bit about the Thatch Weave... specificially when was it developed and when was it first used... Lundstrom (Vol 1) goes into great detail about how and when it was developed. In a nutshell, here are the facts.

Thach's unit re-equipped with F4F-3s in July of 41 so his main focus during this period was on learning the new aircraft vice developing tactics against a fighter he hadn't even heard of yet. Thach did begin work on developing tactics during the fall of 41 however the tactic that became known as the Thach Weave wasn't thought of until very late in 1941. The US had just adopted the 6-plane formation consisting of 3 pairs of fighters (over Halsey's initial objections) and Thach initially worked hard to make it work. He even tried the British weave system of having 2 aircraft remain above and behind the rest of the formation as a type of early warning tactic. He could not make it work. The FATU report became available to him sometime late in 1941. It was originally published in Sep 41 and probably didn't filter down to him until Oct 41. (If you've ever been in the military, you know how long it takes for data to filter through the system, even in this day of "instant" communications- especially when it is a report that the fleet admirals dispute).

Thach finally hit on his solution sometime after that report. He tested it with Butch O'Hare and sent it up the chain for approval. Halsey turned it down with the caveat that VF-3 could continue to work on it. (So much for every VF unit being aware of this new tactic). By then war had broke out. Thach did not have an opportunity to use the new tactic until Midway and even then only a small part of VF-3 knew how to use it due to the incorporation of replacement pilots from VF-42 and flight school. These replacements had only the briefest of training on the tactic prior to Midway. Thach spent most of his time drilling them in live gunnery exercises.

At Midway, Thach was able to use it on several occasions and found that it was successful. Upon returning to Oahu, Thath received permission from Halsey to disseminate to the fleet. He first attempted to convince Flatley of the value of it but Flatley believed his 6-palne formation was superior. Thach had O'Hare "school" Flatley on its use and Flatley immediately adopted it. In fact, Flatley was the man who named it the Thach Weave during the Guadalcanal campaign.

Now if you have other sources that dispute that, please list them along with their page numbers so we can be on the same "page."

You are using the Zero bonus as your own strawman argument (you like that word- strawman) to cite critical flaws in the game. What about all the mods where the Zero bonus isn't part of the equation? Of course, you wouldn't have any experience with those mods. I keep forgetting you don't have the game.

And you still have not answered my question... why do you care so much about a game you don't have, don't play and go to great length to denigrate? Why is this so important to you?

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RE: Early war air power

Post by niceguy2005 »

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

"P39s/P40s are being described as great fighters because they were the best US designs available when WWII exploded in the PTO."


While the P-40 was generally liked by those who flew it for it's toughness, I don't think you'll find many people who claimed the P-39 was a "great fighter". Most pilots issued them couldn't wait to get out of them. Not because it wasn't good at what it could do (ground support and shooting up shipping), but because they wanted a "fighter"..., and with no supercharging the P-39 just couldn't "cut the mustard" in that regard.

In retrospect, I doubt many even considered the P-40 to be "great" either. It was rugged, dependable, well-armed and available --- and "held the line" until better A/C came along.
I think this is pretty accurate from the accounts I have read. The P-39 was not well liked by USAAF pilots in general...although ALL pilots LOVE their plane, but only until a better one comes along.

I think the characterization of the P-40 is dead on as well. USAAF pilots recognized that it was an adequate fighter. Interestingly there was some discussion among the RAF and the AVG whether the better front line fighter would be the F-2 or the P-40. There was even a mock dogfight between the RAF and AVG to settle the dispute. The P-40 quickly bested the Buff of course.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by Apollo11 »

Hi all,
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Sqn., where Marseille shot down six Tomahawks


Isn't that the Luftwaffe "confirmed kill" estimate? In general, the only records of any value for these sorts of analyses are records of losses based on the losing units documents.

I don't remember reading that historians (on all sides) ever questioned Marseille's kill records!

He was one of the few very very rare aces - perhaps his only "match" was exceptionally good Me-110 night fighter 3 man crew lead by H. Schnaufer that shoot down 120 British bombers - they most certainly proved that even inferior Me-110 can be extremely dangerous in expert hands...


Leo "Apollo11"
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RE: Early war air power

Post by niceguy2005 »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Actually the learning curve is quite logical as every army in the world has always had to learn to adapt to its opponents tactics. Hearing of tactics and implementing them under fire are two totally different things. The average man under fire falls back on the training that and behaviors that he has repeated time and time again.

Sure but is this something that warrants modeling in a game of this scale and if it is someone needs to rationalize the model. It does not seem rationalized to any real world data, and it seems illogically applied if the only side needing to learn is the Allies.
I would say something that had this large a historical impact is worth modeling, yes.

Your assertion that the impact is not "rationalized to any real world data" seems to be a view not shared by any historians and the majority of people on this forum. As always you are invited to share the data which you say refutes most historians.
I disagree. There is no up front reason for putting in the ZB at all. Indeed, there is more compelling argument for putting in an Allied bonus around April 1942 and increasing that bonus as the Allies introduce new types.

And there is no reason to assume the ZB would apply against USN pilots as they had substantially studied the problem in 1941. Many of them had, anyhow. The USN pilots had better a priori intel on Zero capabilities than the IJN pilots had on F4F capabilities, which is why the .50 came on the Japanese as a rude shock.
But for the overwhelming data and opinion of historical experts I would agree with you.

As to the USN pilots, that is a very BIG what if scenario, but since it is theoritically possible in WitP, why not address it. None of the early war engagements (few though they were) that pitted Wildcats against Zeros reinforces your assertion that the navy pilots had matered the Zero. The USN struggled through Coral Sea to combat the Zero.

I would agree with the other posters that if anything rather than doing away with the Zero bonus it should be expanded to include the Oscar, which had similar manueverability characteristics.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

None of the early war engagements (few though they were) that pitted Wildcats against Zeros reinforces your assertion that the navy pilots had matered the Zero. The USN struggled through Coral Sea to combat the Zero.


That claim is simply factually incorrect to the degree that it implies that F4Fs had to struggle to deal with zeroes any more than zeros had to struggle to deal with F4Fs.
But for the overwhelming data and opinion of historical experts I would agree with you.

There is no data to support the contention that the Zero had any particular advantages over the F4F or P-40 either because of the planes capabilities or the pilots that flew them. I'll concede that historians, some of em anyhow, (Bergerud & possibly Shores) have written books that promote the myth of early war Japanese aircraft supremacy.

20 years ago, even 5 years ago, people would (in the GGPW forum DID) casually dismiss anyone who suggested that the USN victory at Midway was a consequence of anything other than sheer, improbably good USN luck. That claim is now deader than dead. Given time, the myth of zero supremacy will dissipate under the weight of evidence against it.
I would agree with the other posters that if anything rather than doing away with the Zero bonus it should be expanded to include the Oscar, which had similar manueverability characteristics.


And to do so would be manifestly illogical.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

The air combats we're talking about are far more complex than the Yay Japan club here will admit. Just for chucks I think I'll run all the data down by mission type, loss, & circumstances of engagement. I've done this twice now for the Guadalcanal campaign and pretty much crushed the myth of allies being behind the learning curve in that campaign, but I've never tried to narrow down variation by mission type.

I'll hand the results over to Matrix when I'm done. Figure a substantial inroad on the analysis can be made by the end of the year, although some data is needed from 5th Air Force, 36th Fighter Group &c.

Does anyone know of a good English translation of Japanese air unit histories from the Rabaul/New Guinea area?
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mikemike »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

If one goes to the illogical extreme as to suggesting that the Tony warrants some sort of bonus, then the only reasonable suggestion is that each time a new model is introduced the player bringing it to the combat gets a "bonus."

I think you've understood the principle! Congratulations! It should be extremely obvious that the tactics that worked against the Oscar would not work against the Tony, so the Allied fighter pilots would have had to adapt their tactics, and they could do so effectively only after the Tony's characteristics were sufficiently explored. This doesn't happen in a few days. I think that effect should warrant a temporary "bonus". The same would of course also be valid for the period the Japanese took to adapt to the P-38. P-47 etc. (if they ever did). What's illogical about that? I'm not saying the Zero Bonus is correct as to its extent and length, but some such effect is irrefutable. Just look at how long it took Fighter Command to counter the FW190 - they had to develop a new Spit variant and capture a FW190 to do it.

BTW, in Pacwar, the experience of air units took a hit when they changed to a different type. I would like to see something like it in WitP, too - it stands to reason pilots would need some time to switch from the, say, P-40 to the P-47 and regain full combat efficiency. The extent of the effect would of course be dependent upon the degree of dissimilarity of the respective aircraft. Switching from a flying boat to a fighter should cost a pilot maybe 30-40 experience points, switching from a P-40 to a P-47 3-10v points, depending on absolute experience.
DON´T PANIC - IT´S ALL JUST ONES AND ZEROES!
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

Logically this will imply that the Japanese player will also suffer a penalty (or the Allied player gain a bonus) when sufficiently different versions of Allied aircraft are introduced.

For example, I anticipate that the P-39Q variants deployed to the PTO will have something like a 10-15% bonus, quite apart from their improved stats, since according to the theory advanced by the Yay Japan club here, the Japanese will have learned that a plane of that appearance (the P-39) is slow, vulnerable, has a limited ceiling, and climbs poorly. They will of course employ tactics learned in New Guinea, only to discover that the P-39Q has a turbosupercharger.

There should also be significant "Allied Bonuses," on the order of say a year or two (given how relatively slowly Japanese units adapted to new circumstances) for units that engage with an F4F-4 rather than an F4F-3, an SBD-5 rather than an SBD-3, on introduction of the P-40E, B-17E variant over earlier models, advent of the P-38E, and again with the J-model, the P-51, the P-47, and in the late war, the FM2 variant of the F4F.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by jwilkerson »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Yay Japan club


Could you explain this new terminology in more detail? I'm getting confused. Thanks!
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

"Yay Japan Club" -- advocates for a preferential treatment of a Japanese unit or a.c. based on spurious grounds or embracing a logical hypocrasy. For example, the contention that only the Allies should suffer a penalty when combating heretofore unfamiliar (because they have not been seen in combat) Japanese a.c. types owing to absence of knowledge on how to defeat that type of plane.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by jwilkerson »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

"Yay Japan Club" -- advocates for a preferential treatment of a Japanese unit or a.c. based on spurious grounds or embracing a logical hypocrasy. For example, the contention that only the Allies should suffer a penalty when combating heretofore unfamiliar (because they have not been seen in combat) Japanese a.c. types owing to absence of knowledge on how to defeat that type of plane.

Are there any such people? How can we be sure? Haven't we really been talking about one or both of:

(a) The history of fighter/air combat in the early (Pacific) War (i.e. 1941-2)

(b) The WITP Game

Or are we categorizing various individuals into various groupings with various labels? This would seem to be a different activity. Hence my confusion!
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

Are there any such people? How can we be sure?

If you wanted to know, you could ask 'em whether or not unfamiliarity with enemy a.c. types was a factor that only adversely affected the allies.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by jwilkerson »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Are there any such people? How can we be sure?

If you wanted to know, you could ask 'em whether or not unfamiliarity with enemy a.c. types was a factor that only adversely affected the allies.

My assumption is that there are no such people - hence neither of us would be able to ask them this (or any other) question.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

And for the sake of charity I will agree with your assumption. For now.

I'm gonna enjoy assembling the research & doing it. With respect to Nikademus I think his argument is incorrect and moreover that we've had the discussion before, but for the moment I'm willing to table objections to his claims about CS until I've had a time to reacquire Lundstrom 1&2 and go through them yet again.

If yer interested in discussing the research design (what factors I've not thought of that might be interesting to track), PM me. I extend that invitation to Nikademus (since he's been reliable dissenter over the years), Big B ('cause I know he's done something like this too vis a vis the game) and you Jwilkerson because, well, just because.



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RE: Early war air power

Post by jwilkerson »

Well Lundstrom's pretty easy to acquire - in paperback. If you want hardbacks of both "First Team" volumes - perhaps try Abe's Books - I eventually got decent priced hardbacks for both there.

Shores is a bit tougher to acquire - but you can get occasional decent priced hits on Abe's for those as well.

===

Sure, an organized presentation of this data would be very useful!

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RE: Early war air power

Post by niceguy2005 »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The air combats we're talking about are far more complex than the Yay Japan club here will admit. Just for chucks I think I'll run all the data down by mission type, loss, & circumstances of engagement. I've done this twice now for the Guadalcanal campaign and pretty much crushed the myth of allies being behind the learning curve in that campaign, but I've never tried to narrow down variation by mission type.

I'll hand the results over to Matrix when I'm done. Figure a substantial inroad on the analysis can be made by the end of the year, although some data is needed from 5th Air Force, 36th Fighter Group &c.

Does anyone know of a good English translation of Japanese air unit histories from the Rabaul/New Guinea area?
Actually to support an argument against the zero bonus you would need data prior to Guadalcanal. I think data from the PI invasion would be much more appropriate. By the time Guadalcanal happened the zero bonus would have expired, modeling the fact that the USAAF/USN had learned how to fight the Zero.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by ChezDaJez »

That claim is simply factually incorrect to the degree that it implies that F4Fs had to struggle to deal with zeroes any more than zeros had to struggle to deal with F4Fs.

Care to list your sources that back up your point. As you yourself pointed out, it was the F4F pilots that needed to develop tactics during the early war to deal with the Zero, not the other way around.
There is no data to support the contention that the Zero had any particular advantages over the F4F or P-40 either because of the planes capabilities or the pilots that flew them. I'll concede that historians, some of em anyhow, (Bergerud & possibly Shores) have written books that promote the myth of early war Japanese aircraft supremacy.

There is plenty of data, most of it written in blood, allied blood. The only allied unit that was successful against the Japanese during the first 5 months of the war was the AVG and the vast majority of their kills were bombers. Don't believe me... check out the individual AVG pilot claims.

I didn't know that Bergerud promoted the myth of Zero invincibility. Gee, seems to me that he (Fire in the Sky, page 240-247) goes to great lengths to state that the P-40 could hold its own if the right tactics were used. He says that for it to be successful, the pilot had to maintain speed above 275 knots, had to avoid tight turns (it really bled off speed in a turn) and it had to avoid combat above 15000 ft (the Allison had no supercharger). He offers many pilot anecdotes from Joel Paris, Sammy Pierce, and Robert DeHavento (all of the 49th FG).

When engaged by more modern fighters (i.e the Oscar), the AVG's kill ratio wasn't spectacular. Only against Nates did it rack up an impressive kill ratio. The P-40 did not fare well in other areas, notably the PI. It was roughly handled there though I'm sure you will say that superiority of numbers and surprise (even with radar) accounted for the difference however that type argument apples to any battle where one side had more than the other. The main difference in the PI was the higher combat experience levels of the Japanese and the USAAF pilots attempted to dogfight with them.

USAAF pilot training was not as good as USN pilot training and USN pilot training was only comparable, maybe slightly below that of the IJN pilots. Certainly the average number of pilot hours in fighters favored the Japanese and when coupled with combat experience, its pretty easy for open-minded people to see that the Japanese pilots were better overall than their counterparts during the early months. Couple that with a fighter that was one of the best dogfighters in the world and throw in an unprepared force that attempted to fight the Japanese in a manner that suited the strengths of the Zero... what else could you expect?

Of course combat has a steep learning curve to it... you seldom get a second chance if you make a mistake. The pilots who survive the initial onslaughts learned and learned quickly. They passed this knowledge as best they could up the chain of command. But it takes time to incorporate these lessons learned. Many of these survivors became flight instructors (just one of the many things that made for improved training).

You seem to have this perception that people believe the Zero was a superweapon piloted by supermen when they say it was better than the Wildcat or P-40. It most certainly was not but it was the best aircraft for the job during the early time period and it was successful. It got the job done... the allied fighters did not.

The bottom line is that if, during the first 5 months of the war, you fought the Zero on its terms, you died. If you could force it to fight on your terms, you had a much greater chance at survival to come back another day and later wipe it from the sky.

You still haven't answered the question... why are you here talking about a feature of a game that you don't have, don't play and denigrate at every turn? Are you really that obsessed with this topic that you feel this unsatiable need to educate us poor, dumb ba$tards?

Chez

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RE: Early war air power

Post by niceguy2005 »

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

"Yay Japan Club" -- advocates for a preferential treatment of a Japanese unit or a.c. based on spurious grounds or embracing a logical hypocrasy. For example, the contention that only the Allies should suffer a penalty when combating heretofore unfamiliar (because they have not been seen in combat) Japanese a.c. types owing to absence of knowledge on how to defeat that type of plane.
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RE: Early war air power

Post by ChezDaJez »

The air combats we're talking about are far more complex than the Yay Japan club here will admit. Just for chucks I think I'll run all the data down by mission type, loss, & circumstances of engagement. I've done this twice now for the Guadalcanal campaign and pretty much crushed the myth of allies being behind the learning curve in that campaign, but I've never tried to narrow down variation by mission type.

I'll hand the results over to Matrix when I'm done. Figure a substantial inroad on the analysis can be made by the end of the year, although some data is needed from 5th Air Force, 36th Fighter Group &c.

Does anyone know of a good English translation of Japanese air unit histories from the Rabaul/New Guinea area?

I thought we were discussing whether the Zero bonus was warranted during the first five months of the war as aplied by the game. Of course, if your intention is use an a priori analysis from a later period and apply it to this early war period, why not go for the gusto and use the late war data (1945) and apply it?
pretty much crushed the myth of allies being behind the learning curve in that campaign

You did? What myth is that? When? I certainly have never stated that the Japanese were superior in the Guadalcanal campaign. If anything, I've stated that the Americans were fully applying the lessons learned during the first half of the year and the Japanese paid dearly to the likes of Butch O'Hare and many othe notables at Guadalcanal who had learned how to combat the Zero.

Chez
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
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RE: Early war air power

Post by mdiehl »

Actually to support an argument against the zero bonus you would need data prior to Guadalcanal.

Agreed. But as I noted before my explanation for this has more to do with strategic isolation, logistics, & circumstances of combat. The latter not only includes information like insufficient early warning (or for that matter, sufficiency of same), and numbers, but also missions. One of the oddities of the Guadalcanal campaign was that the Japanese worst day occurred on a mission in which they feinted with a large bombing raid and moved in with a large number of fighters to engage.

I have often had a nagging feeling that there are intangibles out there like "complexity of mission." If a fighter was ordered to be tied to its escorted bombers by a short leash or whatever the pilot might feel compelled by orders to not pursue enemy a.c. if such pursuit would leave the escorted vulnerable. Likewise, if a defender felt compelled to try to push through enemy fighters to get at escorted bombers, the defender might be more vulnerable to enemy escorts than, say, a pilot whose orders (or attitude) were something like "Screw this, I'll fight whatever is of most immediate concern to my health" or something.

So there will be dates, numbers of a.c. engaged, numbers of a.c. *actually lost* as reported by the sides that lost them, cause of loss (where available), mission type, tactical considerations like surprise, qualitative assessments of fatigue, aircraft servicability, duration of the air combat and so forth.

And yeah. That means incorporating Shores books into the study. I'm still looking for *reliable* data for the N.Australia and early circum Coral Sea area. I know there is a history of 5th AF but it is really expensive and not locally available from a library. So doing all this is gonna take time.
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