Yamamoto's Plan in action

[Buck Beach]

One must continually ask themselves why you obsessively find it necessary to injected your attacking B.S. in every debate Sid enters into. Did he, in this or a previous life, run away with your wife?

You should be in the "Matrix Legion of Dis-Honor" for your Forum conduct!

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
While I know deep down "the company" wants to "extract" my labor as efficiently as possible...

No, they don't. They want to do it as slowly and painfully as possible. [:(]

[Ol_Dog]

There is a little green button below his name - click on it and it will turn red.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Ol_Dog

There is a little green button below his name - click on it and it will turn red.

Is that the ignore button?

[Ol_Dog]

Yes - it works.

It shows that there was a post, but no message.

[witpqs]

Thanks. I suffered through some others because I really want to see what people have to say, but I think it's time to use it.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates).

I think that should be barrels, not tons, for the reserve figure.

Mike - out of interest, where did you get the figure of 30,000,000 [presumably barrels, not tons] used by the IJN in the first year of the war? Is that for ships only? Or all uses by the Navy? That is information I have been looking for recently...

Thanks,
Andrew

You are correct about it being barrels. And the actual Japanese Naval usage during the first year of the war is shown as 30,520,000---a figure 60% larger than the Navy's "estimated" use by the "Navy and Planning Agencies". It seems to reflect all Naval use, but might well not include that used by the Civilian Shipping the IJN "borrowed" at war's start. Comes from Willmott's EMPIRES IN THE BALANCE, page 70-71.

The real point was that the Japanese used 98.2 % of their entire "Strategic Oil Reserve" in the first year of the conflict, and from that time forward were literally fighting "hand to mouth". This was without implementing "the Prolonged Hawaiian Adventure" which would haved sucked down oil by the millions of barrels.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
While I know deep down "the company" wants to "extract" my labor as efficiently as possible...

No, they don't. They want to do it as slowly and painfully as possible. [:(]

Ah..., another veteran of the "business wars".

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Dutch can wait - but Midway and Johnson are essential - they are the approaches and provide vital land air bases and refueling points for ships. The logistic keystone is Kwajalien - already a major base complex - with nearby supporting bases.

There is no need to divert divisions from other operations in the South - the IJA was very large and there are plenty of formations in the North.

I think you are oversimplifying here Cid. The Dutch can't wait very long,

Misunderstanding here: it meant "Dutch Harbor can wait" - referring to his statement that Midway, Johnston and Dutch Harbor had to be taken first. I think he wantes it for recon - but it is too far North for that to be the case.

Alaska has a dialect. So does the US Navy. In both "Dutch" means "Dutch Harbor." As distinct from "the Dutch" - which might imply something quite different - as there are no Dutch at Dutch - if you follow my meaning?

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


[quote]ORIGINAL: The Dutch can't wait very long, because they are the source of the oil that is going to refill Japan's shrinking reserves. And (IRL) the Japanese know that there really isn't any reason they and the Brits can't totally destroy those oil fields starting on 12/08/41. Only "the game" prevents that---and the Japanese weren't playing "the game".

REPLY: The British and Dutch grossly underestimated the Japanese - although that would change if they got word of what was happening somewhere else. I don't think they will start destroying oilfields on day one - but they might a few days later. But aside from that - you and I agree - and I do not change ANY of the Southern Area invasion tables. Instead I added additional operations to them - to speed things up.

Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates). An large, extended operation in Hawaiian waters could easily double that usage, without even considering the demands of industry and civilian usage. And unless the Japanese are suffering from a huge pineapple and sugar deficiency I've never heard about, Hawaii solves none of the "stragic resource needs" that drove them to war.

REPLY: Something wrong with that number - perhaps it is barrols? For good numbers see USSBS - or Parillo's Japanese Merchant Marine and World War II. Still - oil isn't the problem. There is as much oil on Oahu as the Japanese strategic reserves - and it won't be feasible to destroy it all. Oddly the big logistic problem is FOOD - and unless Japan depopulates the place that is going to be a problem for a long time. [One US officer studying the matter said Japan should let people go to the US - via Canada or Mexico - on US bottoms - if they wanted to.] The operation as planned would inded have taken many months - and it does require several weeks - but unless they do a Midway thing (and fail to achieve concentration of force for example) - it turns out to be a very efficient way to kill enemy forces of all kinds - more efficient than any other option could ever be. The US has no islands to hop from - or support from - or to pump out flooded hulls at - between the West Coast and Pearl. This turns out to be critical. It effectively pins US forces - and other ops go far better than they otherwise can - and net Japan is way ahead to do it.

[spence]

According to "Shattered Sword" the Midway/Aleutian operation used 1/3rd of the fuel that the IJN planned to use in 1942...that was only 3 weeks or so and that only used enough merchant shipping for two reinforced battalions to assault the island plus a base force...not exactly an impressive demonstration of long distance sealift capability.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: The Dutch can't wait very long, because they are the source of the oil that is going to refill Japan's shrinking reserves. And (IRL) the Japanese know that there really isn't any reason they and the Brits can't totally destroy those oil fields starting on 12/08/41. Only "the game" prevents that---and the Japanese weren't playing "the game".

REPLY: The British and Dutch grossly underestimated the Japanese - although that would change if they got word of what was happening somewhere else. I don't think they will start destroying oilfields on day one - but they might a few days later. But aside from that - you and I agree - and I do not change ANY of the Southern Area invasion tables. Instead I added additional operations to them - to speed things up.

And pulled the additional resources to accomplish it from...? This would have been the largest effort the Japanese Navy made by far logistically..., and would have called for dragging the IJA even farther from it's own goals and thinking than ever. On paper, looking back, you might be able to find the shipping and the troops (of course, the Japanese Economy would collapse in early 1942 from lack of materials and worker starvation). But in reality? There isn't enough shipping, and there isn't enough oil, and the Imperial Army was most unlikely to offer up enough troops.

Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates). An large, extended operation in Hawaiian waters could easily double that usage, without even considering the demands of industry and civilian usage. And unless the Japanese are suffering from a huge pineapple and sugar deficiency I've never heard about, Hawaii solves none of the "stragic resource needs" that drove them to war.

REPLY: Something wrong with that number - perhaps it is barrols? For good numbers see USSBS - or Parillo's Japanese Merchant Marine and World War II. Still - oil isn't the problem. There is as much oil on Oahu as the Japanese strategic reserves - and it won't be feasible to destroy it all. Oddly the big logistic problem is FOOD - and unless Japan depopulates the place that is going to be a problem for a long time. [One US officer studying the matter said Japan should let people go to the US - via Canada or Mexico - on US bottoms - if they wanted to.] The operation as planned would inded have taken many months - and it does require several weeks - but unless they do a Midway thing (and fail to achieve concentration of force for example) - it turns out to be a very efficient way to kill enemy forces of all kinds - more efficient than any other option could ever be. The US has no islands to hop from - or support from - or to pump out flooded hulls at - between the West Coast and Pearl. This turns out to be critical. It effectively pins US forces - and other ops go far better than they otherwise can - and net Japan is way ahead to do it.

Yes, as I explained to Andy above, I meant barrels rather than tons. But read that farther and you will see. "The real point was that the Japanese used 98.2 % of their entire "Strategic Oil Reserve" in the first year of the conflict, and from that time forward were literally fighting "hand to mouth". This was without implementing "the Prolonged Hawaiian Adventure" which would haved sucked down oil by the millions of barrels." We're talking about the real world here..., the one in which the Japanese Battleships rarely left home waters because they burned too much oil. In real life, the Midway Operation was pretty much a "raid"...., yet it burned the entire IJN planned allocation of feul oil for the entire year. Turn it into a Campaign of several months duration to conquer Hawaii (more than 1000 miles farther away) and Japan collapses in mid-1942 from lack of oil. It's really that simple. Japan was totally dependent on it's merchant marine for it's economy to function at all. No oil, no merchant marine, no economy. And blythly stating "Oil isn't a problem" doesn't change that. Basing a campaign on the possibility of capturing feul from the other side wasn't a good idea in 1944 for the Germans, and it wasn't a good idea for the Japanese in 1941-42 either. Logistically, you are confusing "the game" with reality when judging logistical potential.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


And you speak airily about "the IJA was large and could have used extra units stationed in the North for the Hawaiian attack". Truth was it was akin to "pulling teeth" to get the IJA to allocate even the limited forces sent to sieze the SRA in reality. All of the ideas in this string of posts are the kind of "pencil and paper" exercises beloved of "armchair strategists"...., the kind that drive the military nuts when political folks try to interfere with their operations. Again, while it's fun to speculate looking back, it's not very realistic from the viewpoint of those who had to plan a war while only being able to "guess" at the future.

Read more carefully and you will find the opposite is the case. I put getting things from the IJA on the short list of reasons Yamamoto could not have organized the attack in this way if he wanted to before the war began. And you are not thinking deeply enough - or reading what I wrote above about how the op must proceed: the Army must not only provide three divisions - something it did ultimately do IRL for this very mission - but it must provide bombers and fighters. Yet after the war IJA officers were bitter that the Navy never leveled with them about what it would mean to fight the USN. What if Adm Yamamoto did that - not in general terms as he really did - but very specifically? What if his threat to resign if Hawaii was not attacked was attached to a different form of attacking Hawaii? And what if the planning group for the Southern Area Offensive was the one such group which IRL in Japan was joint minded? Suppose Tsuji and Yamashita were convinced? Yes - IJA only created ONE REGIMENT for Nanyo operations - in 1941 (five more in 1943, and whole divisions, were authorized after the counterproductive Makin Island raid exposed these almost undefended areas were vulnerable). Support for this concept existed - in the form of two generations of planning - so advocates only had to point at IJA officers own conclusions when they had become informed: you were going to need troops to do this.
My point was not airy at all, but based on the fact that the ONE thing Japan was ALWAYS superior in is troops: it needs to fight an Army type war - whenever it can - and in particular early - when US forces are not fitted with AT weapons - so the light Japanese armor (which also does not overstress the primitive infrastructures of the area) will be effective.
IJA was bigger than the US Army when the war ended, when it began, and every time in between. It is easier to solve its problems of allocation than those of any other Japanese branch.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'm not trying to "attack Cid". I'm simply pushing to inject a large Hypodermic of "reality and common sense" into some of the wilder flights of fancy that players seem willing to engage in on the forumns. Fun's fun..., but there were real world reasons why most of these things were rejected.

IF you are going to inject realities, lets return to the beginning. A major real world player was Adm Yamamoto. He surely knew something of the geography and strategic issues involved. And HE is the one who became convinced this "impossible" operation was the way to go. Not only that Japan should have done it on Dec 8 (Japanese time) 1941, but that Japan STILL should do it - and he got Japan to actually IMPLEMENT that decision. What we call the Battle of Midway is based on misunderstanding and assumption and ignorance: it was a bit like the battle of Kafge - the first step in a larger attack actually standing up. In a very real sense, this operation was not only possible, it was history. It was badly managed: Morison (author of the US Navy official history) claims the Japanese violated every one of the rules of war at Midway - and he then lists them - case by case. But that Japan might try to do this is not easily to effectively debate: on the record they did so. My opinion is that it was feasible when the war began, but not in 1942 or later. The changes in the defense capabilities of the US after even just six months were almost impossible to imagine - even in the US - never mind in Japan.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates).

I think that should be barrels, not tons, for the reserve figure.

Mike - out of interest, where did you get the figure of 30,000,000 [presumably barrels, not tons] used by the IJN in the first year of the war? Is that for ships only? Or all uses by the Navy? That is information I have been looking for recently...

Thanks,
Andrew

As I already noted above, this figure sounds right for bbl. And just for the Navy. Japan had more than one petroleum reserve - and shockingly - the size of the Army one was secret from the Navy- and vice versa! Japan had three different shipping administrations (so did the USA) - civil - military and navy - and the Navy one was actually the smallest of the lot.
There is also the matter of what kind of oil? Some oil - notably that from Borneo - was possible to burn directly - unrefined - while other oil had to be converted to "bunker" or "diesel" - of more than one level. A motor ship (that is, a diesel powered ship) was not tolerant of being fed the wrong grade - but a steamship with oil or mixed boilers could be - in particular if the right burner openings were installed. So understanding this problem is not entirely easy: there are several kinds of reserves, physically; there are several kinds of reserves, politically - for each physical type; there are also several kinds of ship fuel requirements - at least one of them being coal and not oil at all. To this WITP adds the complication that only a fraction of the oil fuel is ship fuel: to the extent oil reserves are required by something other than ships (and it does not matter if it is industry or a military user) - it shows up in the game as "oil" or as "supply points." So whatever we figure the reserves should be - we need to discount that by the amount not intended for ships. IRL the same product could be used more than one way - and to that extent - we must lock in the historical pattern into our data.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Terminus

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'm not trying to "attack Cid".

That's okay... I am...

In case it was not clear before - there is no wiggle room any more. This person - who loves to say I am lieing - lied when he agreed to the terms of use of the board. He has no civilized standard of conduct and no useful purpose in being here. We should all simply lock him out - until Matrix does it for us. IF they have any standards for the board, blatant defiance of the conditions of use surely is something they must act on.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Ol_Dog

There is a little green button below his name - click on it and it will turn red.

Thanks. Never knew how to do that. It works well. He has managed to become the first and only person ever to be blocked by me. I don't mind criticism. But he is unpleasant for its own sake and never has a constructive thing to say.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Logistically, going for Hawaii would have been a much bigger operation than the historical Midway Attack. It would require most of the major units of the Home (Battleship) Fleet plus Kido Butai to spend months "on station" at the end of a very long logistical train. Japan started the war with approximately a 53,000,000 ton oil reserve..., and the IJN alone used over 30,000,000 in the first year (totally exceeding all "professional" estimates).

I think that should be barrels, not tons, for the reserve figure.

Mike - out of interest, where did you get the figure of 30,000,000 [presumably barrels, not tons] used by the IJN in the first year of the war? Is that for ships only? Or all uses by the Navy? That is information I have been looking for recently...

Thanks,
Andrew

You are correct about it being barrels. And the actual Japanese Naval usage during the first year of the war is shown as 30,520,000---a figure 60% larger than the Navy's "estimated" use by the "Navy and Planning Agencies". It seems to reflect all Naval use, but might well not include that used by the Civilian Shipping the IJN "borrowed" at war's start. Comes from Willmott's EMPIRES IN THE BALANCE, page 70-71.

The real point was that the Japanese used 98.2 % of their entire "Strategic Oil Reserve" in the first year of the conflict, and from that time forward were literally fighting "hand to mouth". This was without implementing "the Prolonged Hawaiian Adventure" which would haved sucked down oil by the millions of barrels.

This is both true and false. It omits that Japan had - and used - other oil reserves. It also seems to misunderstand that Japan has ships NOT using Navy fuel stocks. An Army ship will use Army fuel reserves, for example. Japan didn't really run out of fuel in a year. Nor did it manage its fuel reserves in a strategically logical way. Ships didn't run both ways with cargo - or do "triangle" routes. Not enough was done to protect ships. More than enough oil was captured and produced - but most of it was not shipped where it was needed (so eventually ships had to go get the fuel they needed from where it was). By 1945 non-tankers were moving fuel AS IF they were tankers - for other ships to use. The complete fuel pictures involves not just navy stocks - or not even just total stores - but also production. It is not that all ships must feed from navy stores. The POINT of strike south was to capture fuel - there was more than enough - and in the event production was restored ahead of plan. But ships needed that fuel at points it was not in most cases - so things became grim by 1944.


IF to this you add Hawaii - you DOUBLE the petroleum reserves potentially. It won't be that good - because some of that is going to be lost. We spent decades moving the oil to Hawaii - so much that we cannot put it in the database - because it cannot accept such numbers! It would take Japan at least two years to move it IF only 10% were captured - and IF they sent tankers there instead of to the NEI to get it. But they must capture much more than half of it - see US Army studies on the subject - and they would hardly send tankers to a more distant point (meaning less oil shipped per year due to fewer round trips). What you end up is a situation in which the oil in Hawaii fuels any ship that goes there for any reason - say to haul in food - haul out refugees - bring soldiers or munitions.

There is a grave risk of doing what Mike worries about - and I did it once! When I sent six divisions to Hawaii - I not only ate too much fuel - I used too many ships - and things that had to happen didn't happen because of it. IT was not until 1943 this became clear. We should have allocated more troops to the Southern Areas - and to the South Pacific (so US ships do not just divert around Hawaii en route to Australia) - and more ships to support them - and then hauled more resources and oil back to Japan than we did. The trick is to do it with a resonable allocation of resources. BEFORE the official history concluded the Japanese decided 3 divisions was the right size, I independently came to the same conclusion. Which implies to me that possibly the staff planning was competent.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: spence

According to "Shattered Sword" the Midway/Aleutian operation used 1/3rd of the fuel that the IJN planned to use in 1942...that was only 3 weeks or so and that only used enough merchant shipping for two reinforced battalions to assault the island plus a base force...not exactly an impressive demonstration of long distance sealift capability.

Logistically speaking, Midway is much longer than 3 weeks. It took a long time to get into position, and longer still to build up the supplies and fuel reserves at forward points. It involved more than 200 ships - and was virtually the same size as an invasion of Hawaii in 1941 would have been in terms of ship counts.

Now I am a loggie doggie in my strategic heart: I believe "amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics" - and I crafted RHS first of all to be logistically oriented - in a sense WITP was not designed to be. I hated "almost nuclear powered" ships that could go 250% too far on 40% of the fuel required for each 100% of that figure - all this at a higher than economical cruising speed required to get that 100%. I do not mean to say this op will not strain Japanese fuel requirements - and even in our game if tankers are not sent out on the first day - the op will stall. There must be a period during which ships repair and fuel is accumulated - sometime in 1942 - and not late 1942 either. But this operation was really planned for decades, was really believed in by Yamamoto, and it was indeed feasible.

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


[quote]ORIGINAL: el cid again


[quote]ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl