Yamamoto's Plan in action

[Nikademus]

not to mention all the incompatibilities between the two fleets logistically, assuming there's much of anything intact to work on. If Japan came close to succeeding in an invasion its not out of bounds to postulate that the US would block the harbor themselves to prevent it even being used as a safe anchorage from the elements. There's the oil of course but its highly likely those reserves would be torched before they'd be allowed to fall into enemy hands.

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: spence

The Japanese were not the ones to learn from though. Their Khota Bharu landing put a division ashore in the face of a battalion of enemy stretched over 20 miles of coast.

Take another look. It isn't battalions that start at Kota - it is brigades - plural. You have to be reading something very narrow to allege a battalion stretched over 20 miles of coast. Further - they had more than light infantry weapons - because they were able to set ships afire at night. There was artillery in effective support.

Sid,

There was only 1 Bde at Kota Bharu and they were on extended fronts.

The Indian 8 Bde held the beaches at Kota Bharu, it had 2 Bns on the beaches covering about 30 miles, 3/17 Dogras held the beaches in front of KB on about a 10 mile font, 2/10 Baluch on about a 20 mile front to the south. they were defending 6 beaches each with about a 5 mile front plus a river frontage of about 10 miles. While there where concrete pillboxes, they were around 1000 yards apart.
Defending the airfilds at KB, Kedah & Machang were 1st Hyderabad & 1st Mysore State Infantry, both Indian States Forces Bns.
1/13 Frontier Force Rifles was in reserve at Peringat, about 10 miles inland.
2/12 Frontier Force Rifles & 73 Field Battery were in further reserve at Chongdong, about 30 miles inland
21 Mountain Btty was also there.
Other units such as 4/19 Hyderabad were added later.

Which other Brigades do you have involved in the defense of KB.

As for burning ships, the RAF & RAAF Blenheims and Hudsons had been attacking since the early hours of 8 December and had struck a small number of ships.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
The loss of Hawaii is not going to change the US attitude, it will in fact strengthen it because of the loss of home soil. If we can get bent out of shape from losing two insignfigant pieces of real estate up north, than the theoretical loss of Hawaii would cause an even stronger reaction.

Indeed. In fact, I would guess that if there was a Japanese attempt to invade Hawaii in December 1941, successful or not, then the USA would probably not agreed to the "Germany first" strategy. So a "what if" scenario such as this one should also, in my opinion, include very large increases in US air and ground reinforcements (say, increase the amount of each by at least 50% for the duration of the scenario), plus an advance in US ship arrivals by a few months across the board. On the other hand, some British reinforcements, and all US reinforcements arriving from the ETO in 1945, would not appear, on the assumption that the European war would not be over yet.

Ironically, I suspect the only benificiary of such a strategy by Japan would be Germany.

The rationale for Germany first is "it is the more dangerous enemy because it is bigger economically and more advanced technically." I do not see how that would be changed. Anyway - the Germany first strategy was not exactly as advertised - nominally only 15% of assets were to go to PTO - but in many categories it was never that low. We lack the ability to calculate what might happen along these lines: if we assume something we lack the ability to predict the impact on the war in other areas - and how that might ultimately impact PTO resources. WITP is pretty much an isolated case that has to assume the rest of the war went as it did - or we don't know what to send to the Allies? If the US sends significantly less to ETO - the Axis probably does not lose as fast - and might not lose at all. In which case - that would impact out year things entering PTO. How could we reasonably figure that out - even if we could agree on a change in % sent to PTO?

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The rationale for Germany first is "it is the more dangerous enemy because it is bigger economically and more advanced technically." I do not see how that would be changed.

I do. Its one thing to sit down and discuss with another power how one is going to conduct a future war....its quite another when you find your turf being invaded. King would never have stood for it and I doubt he'd have gotten alot of resistance from Arnold and the other Chief's of staff. An invasion of Hawaii could easily have led to a temporary suspension of the Germany first strategy under those circumstances.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

REPLY: It was meant as a polite contradiction of the proposition no one got along with him - or at least the implication from the examples cited. Not to say that those examples are untrue - but that they should not stand alone to represent a complete picture of the man.

Thats nice, except I never stated noone got along with him. I said that some front line commander's found him intrusive. i.e. meddling, and he could be aggressive enough about it to the point of rudeness.

REPLY: WHAT book retraction?

See Nomonhan by Alvin Coxx for details regarding his confrontation with 26th Infantry regiment commander Sumi. As mentioned, Tsuji's point of view and relating of past battle accounts was not treated as gold by all within the IJA. I find it puzzeling that you keep suggesting his every word should be treated as factual.

I have Nomanhan - and I noticed nothing like a retraction of anyting in a book by Tsuji. Got a specific page in mind?

Two comments on your comment: (1) Whatever Tsuji says IS a fact for us: it is a raw datum in the collection of things we know about the era - valuable because it is from a professional directly involved. (2) I do not mean to suggest that one point of view should be adopted as gospel, difinitive, complete, or anything of the sort. Rather - I mean to say loud and clear that one may not do a proper professional forinsic examination of the matters at hand if one is dismissive of what Tsuji says on the basis he was a fanatic, an enemy, or in particular a liar. While the first two are clearly the case, the latter is probably not the case - at least in general. One needs to be open minded - and to assume first of all the eyewitnesses are telling the truth - from their own point of view - unless and until compelling evidence shows otherwise. Disregarding eyewitness reports of the enemy was number one on the list SLAM taught me back when I was a baby in military history.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again


I quite agree that KB is not able to sustain air operations. I mean explicitly that land based Japanese air is the instrumentality for reducing Oahu. Take temporary control of the area, land on the outer islands and put those fields in service, and use them to sustain presence - keeping reinforcement out and reducing the defenses. Further - it isn't the beach defenses I am talking about - but the giant guns of Fort Ruger. There are only two of these - and both are on open wholly exposed mounts that can not be relocated (it takes many months to mount them). You don't go in until they go down - and it won't be hard to tell (but it might be possible to decive).

I have serious doubts about the IJA/N's ability to sustain a land based air offensive so far from their base of operations. Not impossible. I'm not of the group that says that Hawaii is strictly a fantasy operation, but i forsee huge difficulties with consequences for other front line areas that need Japan's attention. It is true however that in WitP, its very easily acomplished due to abstractions in supply and laser pinpoint transfer options for aircraft, ready to go and conduct ops at a moment's notice.

Avoiding the CD guns entirely is Japan's best bet. Land, consolidate and overland march.

The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

One other "little problem" with invading Hawaii at the War's start. Winter is "Big Surf Season" in Hawaii, especially on the North Shore. So even if the CD coverage wasn't as strong on this side, landings were going to be quite difficult on "good days", and suicidal on the "not so good days". And the conditions can change at rather short and unpredictible intervals..., so scheduling would be totally "hit or miss".

I agree with you - and this is one reason I don't favor North side landings. But US officers are unanimoous - they see no other possibility - and essentially nothing else was seriously planned for. Which would make any other option probably look even better.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The rationale for Germany first is "it is the more dangerous enemy because it is bigger economically and more advanced technically." I do not see how that would be changed.

I do. Its one thing to sit down and discuss with another power how one is going to conduct a future war....its quite another when you find your turf being invaded. King would never have stood for it and I doubt he'd have gotten alot of resistance from Arnold and the other Chief's of staff. An invasion of Hawaii could easily have led to a temporary suspension of the Germany first strategy under those circumstances.

Then the US would be losing the war - by its own strategic lights - and we have to figure out what that means for later year impacts on what the US could not send when it really did send it?

However - living in Alaska - one gets a different sense of the willingness of the US not to defend its territory. Hawaii was not taken over by US policy - it was an accident - and the US was not the most likely player to end up with it. It might have remained independent. It might have ended up Japanese, Russian or even British. This was not US territory in the usual sense - although propaganda could be made no doubt. But I don't think we can reasonably say "send half the bombers to ETO the Germans do this much better - impacting ETO out year operations by a, b and c in terms of PTO availability." That would be daunting to figure out. Easier at least to assume no change.

Note however that this attitude - which may be representative of US thinking - indicates how wise the campaign would be. The US would NOT consider other adventures - period. It would be focused on fighting a battle Japan does not need to win. How long it takes is merely a matter of detail - the things sent to fight it are things not hurting Japan where it counts - and maybe not Germany either. That is my kind of strategy: a win win situation. I love to fight over what I don't need, and I love it when the enemy psychology/political situation does not permit him to avoid my attack - and hit me on some unexpected and perhaps vital flank. Give me predictable every time. Give me predictable over a place I do not need - please.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I have Nomanhan - and I noticed nothing like a retraction of anyting in a book by Tsuji. Got a specific page in mind?

<shrug> Take another look. Its in Chapter 20. Tsuji partially backed down from his earlier written statement after Sumi challenged him postwar.

Two comments on your comment: (1) Whatever Tsuji says IS a fact for us: it is a raw datum in the collection of things we know about the era - valuable because it is from a professional directly involved.

Horsehockey. Tsuji was a Staff Officer in the Imperial Japanese Army. That does not come with a seal of absolute truth. Thats like saying MacArthur was 100% correct about everything he wrote.

(2) I do not mean to suggest that one point of view should be adopted as gospel, difinitive, complete, or anything of the sort.

You wanna reread what you just wrote in comment one and your past posts?

I mean to say loud and clear that one may not do a proper professional forinsic examination of the matters at hand if one is dismissive of what Tsuji says on the basis he was a fanatic, an enemy, or in particular a liar.

[/quote]

And i've told you, several times now, that I am neither completely dismissive of what he writes nor have I labeled him a "liar" as an all encompassing statement. I said that his writings needed to be taken with a grain of salt and that he was a man fully capable of recounting information altered to suit his purposes. Sumi called out him out for a lie or if you prefer, a malicious slander and Tsuji's words/opinions were not held with the same weight you have been attempting to attach to him by other elements within the IJA. Even Sumi admitted that some of Tsuji's input at times was useful but he'd never label him as completely accurate even before reading Tsuji's Nomanhan account.

His being a "fanatic" or the "enemy" never played into my opinion of him. I did mention him being a "Hawk" which he was and he himself admitted. Thats useful info to have when judging his viewpoints.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again


The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Can you show me information documenting how these limited numbers of CD's cover every inch of the Island?

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

[Then the US would be losing the war - by its own strategic lights - and we have to figure out what that means for later year impacts on what the US could not send when it really did send it?

Actually, no...we don't, nor do I think the US would be losing the war. Europe might end up fully under the Soviet boot heel, but the US isn't losing the war.

However - living in Alaska - one gets a different sense of the willingness of the US not to defend its territory.

I seriously doubt that.

Note however that this attitude - which may be representative of US thinking - indicates how wise the campaign would be. The US would NOT consider other adventures - period. It would be focused on fighting a battle Japan does not need to win. How long it takes is merely a matter of detail - the things sent to fight it are things not hurting Japan where it counts - and maybe not Germany either.

Japan does need to win it, otherwise she has shortened her own clock. She cannot afford to burn supplies and fuel, nor lose substantial amounts of equipment where the result is either a draw or worse, a bogged down campaign in Oahu. You claim the details don't matter. I find that viewpoint ridiculous if not insane. Loss or severe damage to Japan's fleet and Army without even securing the objective (who's value is in question to begin with) would be paramount to disaster.

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again


The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Can you show me information documenting how these limited numbers of CD's cover every inch of the Island?

If they were fitted on a BB they could cover half each[8D]

At 71km x 48km, with some 4,000ft mountains, maybe atop Mt Ka'ala ??

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: JeffK
Can you show me information documenting how these limited numbers of CD's cover every inch of the Island?

They were mounted near Pearl Harbor..., it's the almost 50,000 yard range and the island's integrated fire control that allowed them to fire out to sea on all sides of Oahu (which isn't that big a place)

[ChezDaJez]

Take another look. It isn't battalions that start at Kota - it is brigades - plural. You have to be reading something very narrow to allege a battalion stretched over 20 miles of coast. Further - they had more than light infantry weapons - because they were able to set ships afire at night. There was artillery in effective support.

It is brigade... singular... the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 9th British-Indian Infantry Division that was the primary defender at Kota Bharu. In support, they had the 21st Mountain Battery consisting of four 3.7in howitzers.

However, they were not on the beaches. Their job was to defend the airfield and to act as a reserve force for the primary beach defender... the 3/17th Dogras in battalion strength who had responsibility for a ten mile stretch of beach. In support, they also had the 73rd Field Battery of the 5th Field Regiment located at adjacent to the airfield.

For a good description of the forces involved and the battle fought, see this link: Landings at Kota Bharu

It's written by Dr. LEO NIEHORSTER in cooperation with several others.

Chez

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Not as easy as one might think. The CD guns around Manilla Bay were exposed to Land-based air attack for more than 4 months, and only one battery was put out of action permanently. And remember too that in real life Kido Butai was a "wasting asset". Even with the total suprise of 12/07/41 the CV's lost 08% of their air group in 4 hours. As the only air support available for a month of landings in the islands aircraft and pilots would be running short rather quickly.

[ChezDaJez]

They were mounted near Pearl Harbor..., it's the almost 50,000 yard range and the island's integrated fire control that allowed them to fire out to sea on all sides of Oahu (which isn't that big a place)

Well, 50,000 yards is only 25nm so I doubt that they would have been much use against landings on the northern shores of Oahu plus the southeastern shore would have been at maximum range (and having to fire over Diamond Head). And with only 2, it wouldn't take much to take them out.

Chez

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Well, 50,000 yards is only 25nm so I doubt that they would have been much use against landings on the northern shores of Oahu plus the southeastern shore would have been at maximum range (and having to fire over Diamond Head). And with only 2, it wouldn't take much to take them out.
Chez

Right! I'm sure that's what the Japanese thought about the Manilla Bay Batteries...., before they actually tried to destroy them and failed miserably for 4 months... The one that was permanently destroyed was taken out by their siege artillery when it was finally emplaced.

And you are right that the 16" guns couldn't engage targets very far out to sea on the North Shore..., but as I mentioned earlier, the surf would do a pretty effective job of that in the Winter months. Everything worth attacking on Oahu is on the South shore..., along with the only practical invasion sites in the time frame envisioned.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

LoL, i had occasion to witness that for myself back in 05. Having no fins I was prohibited by the life guards from entering the massive swells, but even had I had some, I probably would have been too chicken to dare the waters. Impressive doesn't do those waves justice compared to the calm Touristy waters of Waikiki.

When I was doing a math PhD at UCSD back in the late 60s, I learned to surf one winter. Not a good time for a beach landing!

[el cid again]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Amphibious operations were and remain the most complex of operations to undertake. Pessimism is well warrented. The chance for error, setback and outright failure are compounded by the sheer distance involved. Japan has no nearby support net to repair the damaged ships you cite nor replace equipment that is damaged/lost. [quote]

As both an amphib sailor, a member of landing / boarding parties (and graduate of Landing Party School),
and a student of naval history - I completely agree with you that amphibious operations are the most complex of all military operations. Further - the US had been working on defenses for Oahu for a generation - and it had in place a body of troops who had exercised in many aspects of its defense. This isn't a Normandy scale operation - nor even a lot of smaller operations one might name - but it is right at the limit of something Japan might attempt with a reasonable expectation of success.

But you have not yet come to an understanding of the Japanese operational concept. It specifically DID involve forward bases. Staging out of Kwajelien, Eneweitok and Saipan, all of them given extra "infrastructure" in the form of repair ships, they planned to sieze Midway, Johnston, and one or two of the lower islands in the first phase. Moving assets forward to these, they would occupy the rest of the lower islands and the islands Northeast of Oahu in phase two. They would sieze good ports and airfields and put support assets onto them. By the end of stage three - when air and support units were moved in strength onto the lower islands - the land based air (an entire Air Brigade) would be able to dominate the skies even in the absence of the KB - which is then free to leave - or divide - as appropriate due to battle damage or other requirements - or the need to rebuild air groups. There is no particular time limit on this phase either - they can pound for days - weeks - months - as required - until intel on the ground - and photographs - indicate landing is feasible. Japan started with outstanding intel on Oahu and this was an important key to its successful offensives everywhere: Malaya, the Philippines, the NEI, the attack on Oahu itself.

You also do not seem to understand that an operation of this sort is inherantly managable: you push as long as you can, and when and if the cost becomes excessive - you can stop pushing. Then you can either push again later - after a phase of repair / build up - or you can make a partial withdrawall - and contest the area as you see fit. Because you do NOT need the area - you have lots of options. It is great to take it all - greater still to keep it - and possibly the best war ending chip for the table. IF Hawaii falls, and IF an attempt to retake it (or worse more than one such attempt) also fails - and they might because of the absence of nearby Allied land bases - offering to neutralize Hawaii (say as an independent state) might be a way to end the war. Fall back position: Offer to return it - for an end to hostilities. But that is not the goal - it is the gravy. The goal is to get the US to focus on the Eastern/Central Pacific - and leave Japan free in the Western Pacific. Also to delay - probably until 1944 or later - any offensive into the Western Pacific. And that is worth much more than the likely cost - however well or poorly the op goes.

Finally - you seem to grossly overestimate the capability of US forces - if you believe their state of readiness and quantity could inflict major harm on a naval force of this size. With the single exception of ships in range of the heavy coast defense guns before they are knocked out - they lacked the means to do that. Really. Please read Bloody Shambles to get a handle on how things were going in the early phase of the air war.

[ChezDaJez]

And you are right that the 16" guns couldn't engage targets very far out to sea on the North Shore..., but as I mentioned earlier, the surf would do a pretty effective job of that in the Winter months. Everything worth attacking on Oahu is on the South shore..., along with the only practical invasion sites in the time frame envisioned.

Well according to a study entitled "Guarding the United States and Its Outposts" and conducted for the Center for Military History, U.S. Army, the northwestern shore was the most likely place for a landing.

"The principal Army unit was the Hawaiian Division, activated in 1921; and its station at Schofield covered the Pearl Harbor base against an enemy landing on the northwest coast. It was only along this coast that the Army believed a hostile landing in force even remotely feasible."

Here's a link to the entire article (which discusses peacetime and wartime defensive preparations): Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

Note: This does not mean I believe that an invasion of hawaii was feasible nor likely regardless of what happened at Midway. But many of the defenses on Hawaii were simply check marks on paper. From the above article:

With the strength available, Army antiaircraft on Oahu had the ability when deployed to give some protection against high-flying horizontal bombing planes along the south coast (from Diamond Head to west of Pearl Harbor) and around Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field. The 37-mm. guns had been in Hawaii for almost ten months before ammunition for them arrived on 5 December 1941, and there had been very little for the antiaircraft machine guns, so that firing practice for even the small number of guns available for defense against dive or torpedo bombers or other low-flying planes had been more or less out of the question. About half the mobile 3-inch guns were assigned action stations on private property, and in practice sessions during the months before the Japanese attack the gun crews kept to nearby roads and carefully refrained from trespassing. Except during practice sessions the guns and the regiments that manned them were concentrated in three areas some distance from their battle stations, and at all times after May 1941 ammunition for the guns remained in the Ordnance depot. Only the fixed 3-inch guns, with ammunition boxed but close at hand, were ready for near immediate action. The rest depended on getting several hours' advance warning of an impending attack.

Chez