Yamamoto's Plan in action

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

[

The instruments available to the US were not then capable of such damage.

I disagree.

But no single disaster of that sort is going to be decisive in itself for a force of this size. That they might not keep on attacking is the reason the cost of the campaign would not be excessive - the strategic mission is to pin the US - and it virtually must succeed - no matter the details of its execution - wether or not Oahu is taken. Instead of starting from conclusions, you might want to actually study the matter. It is a very sound concept.

I suggest you study the matter yourself. Start with Galipolli, and move on to Lunga. And the strategic mission is not pinning the US, its taking the island in full to deny it's use to the US and hold it as a bargaining chip. Pinning the US fleet achieves nothing for Japan if it pins her own fleet and resources in the process as well and any attack on Hawaii will draw a major response from the US making the securing of the island essential.

The Japanese do not need the KB to conduct the offensive in the SRA initially - witness history. The range of the Zero freed it to be a mobile force. Nor is the KB needed to stay in the Central Pacific. I doubt it could do so. Aside from possible battle damage to one or more ships, small carrier air groups are fragile, and cannot sustain operations more than a matter of days - and even when withdrawn - they can only do repeat operations for a matter of weeks. USN finds that after about six weeks warships need significant support to remain effective - and Japan surely is no bettter. Entering the Central Pacific in force, siezing lightly defended island bases, moving forward to those bases supplies, support and air units, and using that as a basis to control the area is a sound strategy. KB only covers the initial moves. This is nothign like Galipolli - and it is only a little like Lunga. There is a lot more infrastructure (and even supplies) to sieze in Hawaii than in the Solomans. The very point is that the Japanese fleet is NOT pinned - while the US fleet is substantially expended - unless wiser heads than were present got it to withdraw pending a build up/come back. Can you really imagine Halsey NOT attacking an enemy fleet in the immediate area? If he did - and if you imagine Enterprise would have survived - you are engaged in unrealistic thinking - and you haven't gamed it in any system at all. The US could not have challenged the KB with the carriers then in the Central Pacific - and they probably - on day one of the war - would not imagine this might be the case. Nor did they know about Long Lance torpedoes - or the problems inherant in surface action - and very likely the US battlefleet would have sorteed - rather than ran - which at least might work to preserve it for use when significant air cover would let it be useful.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Dili

Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?

It depends on what you mean. But AFTER a successful invasion, you do have a significant repair shipyard - with a substantially ethnic Japanese workforce - at Pearl Harbor. IJN also had moblile repair units - and these could even build/complete ships - and did at Hong Kong, Soerabaja, and other places. After some period of repair and reorganization - the real question is "how much repair capacity would Japan want to have at Oahu?" rather than how much was possible? Because surely the inherant capacity of the place exceeded anything they would have attempted to fully exploit. Useful - surely.

But BEFORE a "successful invasion" - and even if there NEVER was one - Japan would still have significant repair facilities and capabilities forward. These begin at established bases - in particular at Kwajalein and Saipan - and also at unestablished bases (Eneweitok, captured Midway and Johnston) - which could achieve minimal capability by moving in repair ships and "mobile repairs sections." On the islands themselves, there are three good ports, one moderate port, and a number of very minor ports. Moving in repairs ships and or repairs sections would be useful - as a ship damaged off Oahu would not need long to reach them. The ships then hop - in good weather - first to Johnston - then Kwajalein - then Eneweitok - than Saipan - finally Japan itself - until they reach truly major shipyards - if required.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Dili

Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?

Probably very little..., check out the repair and reclaimation projects the Allies faced when capturing harbors from the Germans. In fact, simply sinking one large vessel in the entrance would neutralize PH (which was what the Captain of the Nevada was worried about, and why she was beached on the point.

This is basically confusion. First - it is ignoring all the ports other than Pearl Harbor itself. Second - it is ignoring that "sinking one large vessel in the entrance" - which I ASSUME WOULD happen - either naturally in battle or deliberately if it had not otherwise occurred - is only a temporary obsticle. You refloat the hulk and tow it out of the way. And that is only an issue IF you want to use the anchorage inside the harbor at all - you don't have to for any purpose other than access to the shipyard. Since I ALSO assume it would be damaged - wether or not you wanted to use it would depend on wether or not you decided to repair (part) of the yard? In no case do I see Japan trying to restore it to full capacity. It is way too far forward - and why risk ships being laid up there? Better to rig temporary patches and send them to Japan for long term work. And you then don't have to risk so many experts in a forward area likely to be attacked and/or invaded either. And logistic costs of supplying ANYTHING mid Pacific are not attractive to Japan - compared to similar heavy work in Japan itself. They might move shipyard workers out of Hawaii - you don't have to move food for them that way - to Japan - rather than try to do really large scale work in Pearl.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

not to mention all the incompatibilities between the two fleets logistically, assuming there's much of anything intact to work on. If Japan came close to succeeding in an invasion its not out of bounds to postulate that the US would block the harbor themselves to prevent it even being used as a safe anchorage from the elements. There's the oil of course but its highly likely those reserves would be torched before they'd be allowed to fall into enemy hands.

I agree we would block the Harbor in any competent defense. I agree there are problems of compatibility of some sorts - but these never stopped Japan from commissioning captured warships of US, British or Dutch (or other) origin. They would raise some hulks, repair some damaged or captured vessels - and they might well convert them in place - not that we could do that in the game. But IRL that is what Japan did - and would surely do. Somehow the fact the harbor is blocked is not a fact of nature has eluded some: the blockship can be removed - and it almost certainly would be. It is a TEMPORARY denial of the facilities. And it isn't critical - there are other ports - even at Honolulu itself - and on Oahu - and Lahaina was a true fleet anchorage in its own right.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I have Nomanhan - and I noticed nothing like a retraction of anyting in a book by Tsuji. Got a specific page in mind?

<shrug> Take another look. Its in Chapter 20. Tsuji partially backed down from his earlier written statement after Sumi challenged him postwar.

That does not sound like a retraction of both his books. I will look at it in due course. I keep a file on T - and once started to write a book about him - which I am astonished to say never has been done - in any language.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus



Two comments on your comment: (1) Whatever Tsuji says IS a fact for us: it is a raw datum in the collection of things we know about the era - valuable because it is from a professional directly involved.

Horsehockey. Tsuji was a Staff Officer in the Imperial Japanese Army. That does not come with a seal of absolute truth. Thats like saying MacArthur was 100% correct about everything he wrote.

[Ignoring the explative] This is a basic principle. Evidence is evidence. Testimony is an important category of evidence. While Tsuji mostly was a staff officer - he was a very unusual one - at the front in landings in Thailand - with the point advancing into Malaya - personally flying recon in a Ki-46 before the war - and even a commander on Guadalcanal.
He is a direct participant. What he says is a fact in the primary data sense of the term. I speak and think technically and you are not listening technically. NOTHING I have said implies Tsuji - Mac - or anyone else is 100% correct about anything. It is rather the opposite: we may not safely assume something a person with direct knowledge says is 100% false - it requires compelling evidence on a case by case basis to reach that conclusion. There is an attitude out there - very popular in the US in particular - to wholly discount Tsuji as a source. Saying that is wrong is not to say he was 100% right. For one thing, he might be telling the truth and still be wrong. For another, it is quite normal for "truth" to be incomplete - the teller does not know it all - he only tells us what he does know - not what he does not know. Lots of nuances here. But stop turning on its head what I am saying: I am not saying Tsuji is gospel - I am saying he is a primary source that must be considered ALONG WITH other primary and derived source material.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I mean to say loud and clear that one may not do a proper professional forinsic examination of the matters at hand if one is dismissive of what Tsuji says on the basis he was a fanatic, an enemy, or in particular a liar.

And i've told you, several times now, that I am neither completely dismissive of what he writes nor have I labeled him a "liar" as an all encompassing statement. I said that his writings needed to be taken with a grain of salt and that he was a man fully capable of recounting information altered to suit his purposes. [/quote]

I am acknowledging your point(s) here. I am not as far from your view as it may at times have seemed. I am not sure this is yet clear to you? But - OK - you are not "completely dismissive" nor calling him a liar. I think you are probably more dismissive than I am - and you certainly have a stronger view of his remarkable candor than I do - but I doubt you read his second book - which might modify your view (if only because it is so hard to get - I cannot buy a copy in the US or Japan at any price - not even four figure money).

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again


The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Can you show me information documenting how these limited numbers of CD's cover every inch of the Island?

There is just about no material on them that does not mention it. The newest is an Osprey book on The Defenses of Pearl Harbor and Oahu 1902-1950. It is in Seacoast Fortifications of the United States. The curator of the Army Museum on Oahu - Burl Burlinggame - can confirm it and can tell you where they were sited - although there is a subdivision there now (according to him). Burl wrote Advance Force Pearl Harbor - and I think he mentions it there too. He also has a spreadsheet showing every battery - and he emailed it to me - and I printed it - so I have a copy with some of his comment notes from many years research.

In general, most CD guns cover only a certain sector. But some of the guns ranged the islands - and diagrams of this are in the Osprey book. Regretfully - many of them are post 1941 batteries - the heavy ex battleship turrets only came almost on line when the war ended (one fired proof shots, the other didn't, and neither was ever operational). But the M1919s were able to range the island BEFORE the war began - decades before.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again

[Then the US would be losing the war - by its own strategic lights - and we have to figure out what that means for later year impacts on what the US could not send when it really did send it?

Actually, no...we don't, nor do I think the US would be losing the war. Europe might end up fully under the Soviet boot heel, but the US isn't losing the war.

However - living in Alaska - one gets a different sense of the willingness of the US not to defend its territory.

I seriously doubt that.

You seem to seriously doubt anything and everything I say. Why don't you read the Alaska Statehood Act - which is unique. Eisenhauer refused to accept statehood for Alaska without PEACETIME Presidential authority NOT to defend the vast majority of it. It is a strategic fact of life. We have 75% of US coastline - but not one navy base (an ex Navy base serves USCG at Kodiak, and another at Adak was turned over to Aleuts who have not figured out what to do with it).
We have had as one brigade nominally stationed here - on 20% of US territory - and while now there are nominally two - it is SOP to have 2/3 deployed operationally - and the other 1/3 not fit for operations. We are the only state that mobilizes not only elements of the NG but the State Defense Force every year - and we have as many fires, floods, volcanic eruptions, and sometimes other disasters (e.g. oil spills) as the rest of the country combined - but almost no infrastructure to deal with them (not enough for a single 747 crash unless we mobilize). We dare not run our airport police too many hours - we fly our food in - so we have to be creative about what to do in a problem situation.

Historically - when the commander, Alaska Command, called for reinforcements - the Canadians sent more than the US did - and sometimes the US sent nothing at all! See The Thousand Mile War for details.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus


[

Note however that this attitude - which may be representative of US thinking - indicates how wise the campaign would be. The US would NOT consider other adventures - period. It would be focused on fighting a battle Japan does not need to win. How long it takes is merely a matter of detail - the things sent to fight it are things not hurting Japan where it counts - and maybe not Germany either.

Japan does need to win it, otherwise she has shortened her own clock. She cannot afford to burn supplies and fuel, nor lose substantial amounts of equipment where the result is either a draw or worse, a bogged down campaign in Oahu. You claim the details don't matter. I find that viewpoint ridiculous if not insane. Loss or severe damage to Japan's fleet and Army without even securing the objective (who's value is in question to begin with) would be paramount to disaster. Versingetorex knew he was surrendering to Ceasar - and he knew he would pay with his life - but he felt compelled to surrender anyway - in spite of having the Romans in a very bad situation (they in turn were sourrounded and starving). No modern US general is going to lose tens of thousands of civilians to starvation.

What is tripping you up is a difference in assumptions. You are assuming casualties are possible which, bluntly, were not short of the Japanese pulling their own seacocks. You are missing the operational point - ANY unit that is significantly damaged need not press on - and most of them will be saved if withdrawn. BECAUSE you don't have to take Oahu - just threaten it - to win - to establish CONTROL over the central Pacific area - you are NEVER required to risk truly heavy losses. You wait until those big guns are out - and if they never go out - you don't really have to go. Taking out two guns ought to be possible - and probably a list of secondary things as well. I am assuming competent leadership would NOT risk severe losses - period - and that isolating Oahu serves almost as well as occupation does. Ultimately - time is not on the side of the defense: like Versingetorex at Alecia Short likely will surrender - to save the women and children from starvation - if things are not resolved by military events sooner than that becomes a necessity.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: JeffK

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: el cid again


The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Can you show me information documenting how these limited numbers of CD's cover every inch of the Island?

If they were fitted on a BB they could cover half each[8D]

At 71km x 48km, with some 4,000ft mountains, maybe atop Mt Ka'ala ??

Fort Ruger was West of the entrance of Pearl Harbor. The guns were on flat circle concrete mountings - and perfectly balanced - a technical achievement equal to the casting of the mirror of Mount Polomar's reflector telescope - and never achieved anywhere else (except at two other M1919 sites - Panama and San Francisco I think). This if flat land - and some distance from the mountains. The practical range is about 54,000 yards - due to sighting limitations - and the actual maximum range was never determined. The coast defense guns at Oahu were able to hit a moving target on the first round - and in order to practice MORE than one round - they had to aim to miss the target sled! Coast defenses have some significant advantages: they know exactly where the observation posts are - they know exactly where the guns are - and they can measure where the target is with greater precision than a battleship can do. They were so good at hitting moving targets the AAA units were given to the Coast Defense branch - because it was a similar problem.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The problem is - you cannot avoid the M1919s. You have to take them out - or you will get hurt landing. Now you don't have to take em out by air - and one US officer thinks a raid is a better way to go - but you have to take em out. They range the entire island. The only good news is there are only two - and they have no concealment from air observation or attack.

Not as easy as one might think. The CD guns around Manilla Bay were exposed to Land-based air attack for more than 4 months, and only one battery was put out of action permanently. And remember too that in real life Kido Butai was a "wasting asset". Even with the total suprise of 12/07/41 the CV's lost 08% of their air group in 4 hours. As the only air support available for a month of landings in the islands aircraft and pilots would be running short rather quickly.

To start at the end - you are right. KB is ONLY cover for the initial op - and to take down the airfields on the first day. It is not the thing that wins this battle - land based air is. It is the thing that insures land based air is always enough - a trump to be used when/as required.

To back up - see the new Osprey book on The Defenses of Manila Bay. The US took considerable losses and had various casualties to various coast defenses - but not always due to enemy air. The IJA was "artillery happy" - we faced it only once - at Manila Bay - and it broke our defense line in only 20 minutes. It is likely there would be some artillery attached to the Army tasked with the operation. If a landing on Oahu was judged feasible, it would go in with some armor and artillery support - and we were not going to do very well against a combined arms team in that time frame. On the plus side, the terrain is at places quite formidable - and we knew some of it well. But under sustained enemy air power, things would be pretty grim trying to contain an attack supported by heavy weapons. The vast majority of the systems on Ohau were obsolescent - and virtually none of them concealed from air or high ground observation. The chances the enemy would not have observers on Oahu are vanishingly small - Filipinos believe they did at Linguyan Gulf - and we have material indicating more information than required in Malaya - including real time radio data by an RAF officer! We tend to "know" such things "can't happen" - but they could and did - and Japan has an ancient intel service that never discloses its successes.

[DuckofTindalos]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Thats like saying MacArthur was 100% correct about everything he wrote.

You mean he WASN'T??? Gasp of horror![:D]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Well, 50,000 yards is only 25nm so I doubt that they would have been much use against landings on the northern shores of Oahu plus the southeastern shore would have been at maximum range (and having to fire over Diamond Head). And with only 2, it wouldn't take much to take them out.
Chez

Right! I'm sure that's what the Japanese thought about the Manilla Bay Batteries...., before they actually tried to destroy them and failed miserably for 4 months... The one that was permanently destroyed was taken out by their siege artillery when it was finally emplaced.

And you are right that the 16" guns couldn't engage targets very far out to sea on the North Shore..., but as I mentioned earlier, the surf would do a pretty effective job of that in the Winter months. Everything worth attacking on Oahu is on the South shore..., along with the only practical invasion sites in the time frame envisioned.

This isn't correct. Most of the open positions were taken out. The shining exception was Fort Drum. 26 feet of concrete (!!!) was planed off by bombs or shells - but EVERY system was operational when it surrendered (and disabled the lot). They considered refusing to surrender - but they were out of food. FOOD ALONE would have closed Manila Bay for ships for a long time - perhaps upwards of a year. See The Concrete Battlehship where this was first disclosed.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Dili

Supposing a succefull invasion what were the facilities in Pearl Harbour that could support KidoButai instead of having it return to mainland?

It depends on what you mean. But AFTER a successful invasion, you do have a significant repair shipyard - with a substantially ethnic Japanese workforce - at Pearl Harbor. IJN also had moblile repair units - and these could even build/complete ships - and did at Hong Kong, Soerabaja, and other places. After some period of repair and reorganization - the real question is "how much repair capacity would Japan want to have at Oahu?" rather than how much was possible? Because surely the inherant capacity of the place exceeded anything they would have attempted to fully exploit. Useful - surely.

But BEFORE a "successful invasion" - and even if there NEVER was one - Japan would still have significant repair facilities and capabilities forward. These begin at established bases - in particular at Kwajalein and Saipan - and also at unestablished bases (Eneweitok, captured Midway and Johnston) - which could achieve minimal capability by moving in repair ships and "mobile repairs sections." On the islands themselves, there are three good ports, one moderate port, and a number of very minor ports. Moving in repairs ships and or repairs sections would be useful - as a ship damaged off Oahu would not need long to reach them. The ships then hop - in good weather - first to Johnston - then Kwajalein - then Eneweitok - than Saipan - finally Japan itself - until they reach truly major shipyards - if required.

Kwajalein

Largest atoll in the world. Roi was covered by an airfield (4300, 2x2700 feet), while Namur was brush-covered. One significant pier, about 450 feet long. Kwaj itself was about 2.5x0.5 miles. Two 300-foot wharves at the air stripe and a 1500 foot long pier on the north (naval base) side. 5000-foot air strip in the island's central area. Ebeye had a seaplane ramp. HQ for the eastern mandates.

Eniwetok

Anchorage for up to 2000 ships. No military facilities prewar.

Midway

Coral sand islands. Lagoon is mostly foul ground. Sand Island is 11400x6000 feet. Seaplane base and submarine base. Naval air station on Eastern Island (6600x3900 feet, triangular). Three runways (3250, 4500, 5300 feet). Garrison in June 1942 was two battalions, a USMC air group, and a provisional USAF bombing force (crammed in there). Eventually the runways were increased by about 50% in length and a major submarine base was built.

Johnston

3000x600 feet, coral topped with guano. No anchorage. Used as a seaplane base, with a single 4000 foot runway added later. One USMC company garrisoned it.

Battle damage had to get back to the mandates for temporary repair.

[Andrew Brown]

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The rationale for Germany first is "it is the more dangerous enemy because it is bigger economically and more advanced technically." I do not see how that would be changed.

My assumption is that the more successful Japan is, or the bigger a threat it poses to the USA, the more likely that the USA would be willing to increase the proportion of its effort to fighting in the Pacific, even to the point of suspending "Germany First" if the threat from Japan is serious enough.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

But you have not yet come to an understanding of the Japanese operational concept. It specifically DID involve forward bases. Staging out of Kwajelien, Eneweitok and Saipan, all of them given extra "infrastructure" in the form of repair ships, they planned to sieze Midway, Johnston, and one or two of the lower islands in the first phase. Moving assets forward to these, they would occupy the rest of the lower islands and the islands Northeast of Oahu in phase two. They would sieze good ports and airfields and put support assets onto them. By the end of stage three - when air and support units were moved in strength onto the lower islands - the land based air (an entire Air Brigade) would be able to dominate the skies even in the absence of the KB - which is then free to leave - or divide - as appropriate due to battle damage or other requirements - or the need to rebuild air groups. There is no particular time limit on this phase either - they can pound for days - weeks - months - as required - until intel on the ground - and photographs - indicate landing is feasible. Japan started with outstanding intel on Oahu and this was an important key to its successful offensives everywhere: Malaya, the Philippines, the NEI, the attack on Oahu itself.

I think my understanding of Japanese operational capabilities is sufficient enough to know that the forward bases you allude too are not capable of sustaining the level of operations required for the fleet to operate continuously near Oahu. The Japanese had no equivilent of later war fleet and logistical train that allowed the USN to operate effectively hundreds, even thousands of miles from long established logistical hubs. The swift capture of minor bases like Midway or Johnston are not going to fill the bill and "repair" ships can only do so much. They would provide way points for Japanese Datais to transfer to Hawaii however. I still have my doubts about how effectively the Japanese are going to establish their land based airpower on the chain.

You also do not seem to understand that an operation of this sort is inherantly managable: you push as long as you can, and when and if the cost becomes excessive - you can stop pushing. Then you can either push again later - after a phase of repair / build up - or you can make a partial withdrawall - and contest the area as you see fit. Because you do NOT need the area - you have lots of options.

The goal is to get the US to focus on the Eastern/Central Pacific - and leave Japan free in the Western Pacific. Also to delay - probably until 1944 or later - any offensive into the Western Pacific. And that is worth much more than the likely cost - however well or poorly the op goes.

<shurg> You don't seem to understand how inherantly unmanageable this type of operation can be. If it was that managable then the Allies would have conducted Overlord in 42 instead of 44. Japan can't afford to push, then "push later" as you allude. Time is against them and the Imperial fleet cannot operate in Hawaiian waters indefinately, nor can they base operations out of fringe bases for long either. They don't "need" the area.......yes....they need to capture Oahu and they need to do it reletively quickly.

How is Japan "Free" in the Western Pacific if the bulk of her assets are pursuing this host of options you keep alluding too? Japan isn't delaying squat if she gets bogged down or thwarted. The opposite in fact. Only if they win quickly might there be such a delay and they must win completely and then fortify their position (if they can) The focusing of US efforts along a single track might serve to accelerate their advance across the Pacific anyway. Again you claim how well the op goes doesn't matter. Yet it mattered in all the other operations and it mattered in Japanese thinking. Japan's strength was finite and couldn't be frittered away in costly operations without a substantial return for the investment. Hence the obsession with the Decisive Battle.

Finally - you seem to grossly overestimate the capability of US forces - if you believe their state of readiness and quantity could inflict major harm on a naval force of this size. With the single exception of ships in range of the heavy coast defense guns before they are knocked out - they lacked the means to do that. Really. Please read Bloody Shambles to get a handle on how things were going in the early phase of the air war.

You grossly underestimate US capabilities to the point of being a non-factor. I've always given the IJN the edge for the most part in the early part of the conflict in certain key areas and in general readiness but i've never claimed that the USN was incapable of inficting harm, particularily when closer to their home base of operations while the enemy is stretched.

[DuckofTindalos]

I still don't understand what the rationale behind a Japanese invasion of Hawai'i would be, Sid. It would serve no useful purpose for the Japanese and would run counter to their war aims of capturing the SRA and ensuring economic resources, which was, after all, what they went to war for in the first place.

Even a successful invasion wouldn't have any effect beyond what the Pearl Harbor strike did in real life, and the Japanese would set themselves up for a HUGE defeat very quickly. Any garrison troops would be stranded hundreds and hundreds of miles away at the end of a supply line that could be cut with a few submarines. And the Japs would have to ship in EVERYTHING, including what they'd need to clear up and repair every demolished facility, port and airfield.

Face it, Sid. You just haven't thought this one through either... Drop it.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The Japanese do not need the KB to conduct the offensive in the SRA initially - witness history.

Correct, they need the troops that were delegated to take and secure it and they need the airpower and merchants to support it. A Hawaiian adventure would deny a substantial portion of those assets to the SRA ops.

Entering the Central Pacific in force, siezing lightly defended island bases, moving forward to those bases supplies, support and air units, and using that as a basis to control the area is a sound strategy.

Of course it is....basic stuff. However in this particular cases the bases will be widely seperated and won't be mutually supporting, and the sheer distances involved will strain logistics, tax equipment and impose long delays greatly hindering coordination and timing. The smooth pace of the SRA ops didn't occur simply because of the presence of a "sound strategy"

KB only covers the initial moves. This is nothign like Galipolli - and it is only a little like Lunga. There is a lot more infrastructure (and even supplies) to sieze in Hawaii than in the Solomans.

Ok so we're back to Ye Olde "we'll capture what we need to sustain/reward our efforts" philosophy. That of itself is a recipe for potential disaster. The Japanese cannot afford to count on such sloppy planning. They need to assume they'll have to bring it themselves otherwise they are gambling with their entire future. This is like Galipolli and most other amphib operations in that they show just how badly things can go awry. Must have been those "little details" again....the details that you say don't matter.

The very point is that the Japanese fleet is NOT pinned - while the US fleet is substantially expended - unless wiser heads than were present got it to withdraw pending a build up/come back. Can you really imagine Halsey NOT attacking an enemy fleet in the immediate area? If he did - and if you imagine Enterprise would have survived - you are engaged in unrealistic thinking - and you haven't gamed it in any system at all. The US could not have challenged the KB with the carriers then in the Central Pacific - and they probably - on day one of the war - would not imagine this might be the case. Nor did they know about Long Lance torpedoes - or the problems inherant in surface action - and very likely the US battlefleet would have sorteed - rather than ran - which at least might work to preserve it for use when significant air cover would let it be useful.

The Japanese fleet "is" pinned to the general area if they are going to support the landings. Or are you suggesting that they will just drop five divisions on the island and then go off hunting for the Decisive Battle? If it becomes apparant that the entire Japanese fleet is massing off Oahu with the intent to invade, no I don't expect even Halsey to charge blindly where Angels fear to Tread. This is not unrealistic thinking. Unrealistic thinking since you mention it, is assuming such a difficult operation must inherantly succeed and that the "details" don't matter. Please make up your mind too. In one post you say KB doesn't have to stay, probably can't and then turn around and say the USN can't match KB. Double jeperdy. The USN doesn't have to challenge KB directly to throw a spanner in the works. Lots of targets and a long exposed supply line to snipe at. What US battlefleet is going to sortie? The bulk is bottled up at Pearl and assumed damaged since a RL Pearl Harbor is a requirement of this operation. The disablement and damage to the fleet will warrent automatic caution allowing cooler heads to prevail and access the situation. Thats where the time factor comes in. Japan needs to strike quickly if the op is to have a chance to succeed.



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[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I agree we would block the Harbor in any competent defense. I agree there are problems of compatibility of some sorts - but these never stopped Japan from commissioning captured warships of US, British or Dutch (or other) origin. They would raise some hulks, repair some damaged or captured vessels - and they might well convert them in place - not that we could do that in the game. But IRL that is what Japan did - and would surely do. Somehow the fact the harbor is blocked is not a fact of nature has eluded some: the blockship can be removed - and it almost certainly would be. It is a TEMPORARY denial of the facilities. And it isn't critical - there are other ports - even at Honolulu itself - and on Oahu - and Lahaina was a true fleet anchorage in its own right.

There are problems of compatability of many sorts. There is a huge difference between salvaging a handful of small warships and refurbishing them in Japanese shipyards and attempting to service and repair a major fleet using the damaged and completely foreign shipyard of another. I don't seem to recall any such thing being acomplished in the 20th Century much less contemplated. The invading or advancing power had to use their own shipyards and bring forward their own logstical base.

Blockships can be removed...how quickly depends on the circumstances. In some cases they were not able to be removed. Other ports? So Japan in addition to a major assault on Oahu is going to capture the rest of the chain too? Honolulu and Lahaina have major shipyards and oil reserve storage facilities?