World in Flames is the computer version of Australian Design Group classic board game. World In Flames is a highly detailed game covering the both Europe and Pacific Theaters of Operations during World War II. If you want grand strategy this game is for you.
The Germans didn't "seize Norway very easily". That's just rubbish. They came within a hair of losing everything at Narvik, for example, and suffered very heavy casualties overall.
What isn't mentioned here in all this babble is the fact that even though the Bismark and later the tirpitz were on the way, they had taken a heavy toll on a lot of their DD"S and CA's which prompted Hitler to sack Raeder and promote Donitz( a sub adniral) as leader of the German Navy which in agreement to Hitler that the dreams of a large German navy had effectively ended in the battle of Norway, thus the high concentration of the uboat campaign was born.
So, in that way, it was a very heavy toll on the Germans because they wanted a large navy to counter CW. That's also when they scrapped what at the time would have been the most heavilly armed carrier in the war, the Graf Zeppelin.
What intrigues me is why the Swedes shipped iron ore by sea through the Gulf of Bothnia when in real-life (as well as in the game) they had a good rail net reaching all the way to the south of the country. From there it was just a short hop across to Lubeck ... or they could even have continued overland transport through Denmark.
That the Germans were so worried about losing the winter route (Narvik-based coastal shipping) that they invaded the country suggests that the alternative winter route (by rail to the south of Sweden) was not viable. Yet in the game, resources move by rail freely, while taking them overseas is costly (in the sense of needing convoys) and risky.
Perhaps the game exaggerates the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of moving resources by rail in the forties?
What intrigues me is why the Swedes shipped iron ore by sea through the Gulf of Bothnia when in real-life (as well as in the game) they had a good rail net reaching all the way to the south of the country. From there it was just a short hop across to Lubeck ... or they could even have continued overland transport through Denmark.
That the Germans were so worried about losing the winter route (Narvik-based coastal shipping) that they invaded the country suggests that the alternative winter route (by rail to the south of Sweden) was not viable. Yet in the game, resources move by rail freely, while taking them overseas is costly (in the sense of needing convoys) and risky.
Perhaps the game exaggerates the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of moving resources by rail in the forties?
Millions of tons by rail requires a lot of ore cars and is very hard on the rail bed. This is especially true if the rail line is also being used by passenger trains. For such a long haul (from northern to southern Sweden), you also have all the empty ore cars going back, putting further demands on the rail transportation system.
I expect that the rail network in WIF is comparable to ports, in that it serves a dual purpose in the game: military and commercial. Unless you start differentiating between single line rail from double, etc., and throw in a lot of other considerations (e.g., grade/slope, weather effects), the rail lines in WIF are going to be an oversimplification of reality.
Using some rough math, it looks like Sweden supplied appx 50 million tons of ore from 39-44.
Thats alot of ore.
Using the standard WW2 era ore hopper car holding 13-14 tons of ore, thats roughly 1700-1800 cars of ore *per day* for 6 years straight.
Did Sweden even have the capacity to run that much ore on rail networks all the way to south Sweden? The run from the mines to Narvik or Lulea is alot shorter, maximizing the capacity usable and the carloads possible per day. The long run to south Sweden and then offloading to ships there would have tied up the ore cars for a far greater amount of time, since ore trains are very heavy and extremely slooooow.
The sea route was probably the only way to meet the transport needed for such large amounts of tonnage. One ship can carry several hundreds of train cars of ore.
You must also consider the trouble of reloading the ore from the railway carts to the ship.
You need a pier (prefarable 2) with rail that can take the carts all the way out to the ships.
Out on the pier you need some kind equipment to load the ore to the ships. In Luleå they turned the carts so the ore slided into the ships. The 2 piers was 270 meters long and 14 meters high.
You need to adjust the equipment to the different ships.
You need specialized machines for power. In Luleå they used steampower.
A railway depot is also needed.
A storage area for the ore.
During large part of the year the ore froze during the transport so you need some way to thaw it or break it down to small chunks. In Luleå they thawed the ore by taking up to 48 carts into a steam heated warehouse. The thawing lasted 5 to 6 hours.
In Sweden only 2 ports existed that could handle huge amount of ore. Luleå in northern Sweden and Oxelösund in middle. Oxelösund was mainly used for ore from middle Sweden (mostly Bergslagen)
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Have a bit more patience with newbies. Of course some of them act dumb -- they're often students, for heaven's sake. - Terry Pratchett
A government is a body of people; usually, notably, ungoverned. - Quote from Firefly
I worked for a transportation analysis company a long time ago. My boss was always telling us to work harder, saying: "We've got coal to move!". But that was in Pennsylvania, where there's a lot of coal mines.
In retrospective, based on historical hindsight, the German occupation of Norway may seem a bit strange. Plus, the German attack on Norway was a prominent case of Initiating a War of Aggression during the Nuremberg Trials. Its surviving main actors (esp. Raeder) tended to belittle or falsify their role and to make up misleading arguments (Altmark case, British plans). These lies were perpetuated in the vast amount of German post-war historical memoir writing.
It was foremost the Kriegsmarine (KM), which was interested in the occupation of Norway: KM wanted Norwegian Naval bases for a war against Britain’s maritime commerce. This was discussed the first time in a KM Kriegsspiel in Feb. 1939. Surprisingly, until then the KM just didn’t do any explicit operational planning for a war against Britain. Anyway the Feb 1939 Kriegsspiel was based on Hitler’s statement, that he didn’t need KM war-ready before 1943. KM knew it would need naval bases war against Britain’s maritime commerce, not to repeat being trapped in the Deutsche Bucht like in WW1. But for such bases KM preferred the French Atlantic coast to Norway for obvious strategic reasons. On the other side before the Frankreich Feldzug in 1940 it remained totally unclear, wether the french Atlantic coast could be occupied. Thus, for KM the attractivity of Norway rose: With Norwegian bases it seemed possible to enhance KM’s importance in inter-service-rivalries.
Some KM planners pushed their case, by adding popular economical-ethnical “arguments” about extending the Lebensraum northwards to incorporate nordic people and to secure swedish ore. The Swedish ore also played a role in a study of OKW’s economical staff (Apr.39): In case of a common European war between 3,2 and 8,5 mio ts of Swedish ore would be lost for the expansion of the German Army. It was also clear that transports from the North Norwegian ore harbors could not be secured. (Narvik alone handled 4,9 from 9,0 Mio ts of yearly prewar Swedish exports to Germany. Therefore German representatives in Sweden lobbied for an modernization of Swedish infrastructure to make this connection more secure)
Thus KM planners fully acknowlegded, that in case of war economically, Norwegian neutrality would be the best option. But quite symptomatically, KM insisted on the bigger importance of the Naval base argument.
As for the fear of a British intervention in Norway. KM propagated it big style - to get Norwegian naval bases. In Jan 1940 it started to plan the occupation of Norway in detail. After the Cossack/Altmark incident Hitler ordered the preperation of Weserübung in case of a British/French intervention, using all the arguments KM had prepared. Luftwaffe and Heer were quite not happy about this distraction from the planned campaign in France, which was estimated to be the real hard campaign of this war.
After the Finnish-Russian peace treaty even KM and Raeder didn’t believe anymore in a French/British intervention in Norway. But KM forces were prepared and thus unavailable for other glorious operations. Hitler himself was looking for arguments to give the order for the Invasion of Norway. Thus Raeder acted like a spin-doctor and just pushed him over the edge using all the well known arguments. Until 1943/44 the Nazis undertook some efforts to transform Drontheim into a huge naval base, which would be connected by Autobahn with the Reich.
As for the Swedish iron ore: Because of the German occupation of Norway, the Nazis could apply even more pressure on Sweden, to export huge ammounts of ore. Germany enforced a “Swedish Neutralty”: Swedens economical policy now was partly decided in Berlin. Swedish mine workers were exepted from Swedish military service. In 1943/44 for Sweden it became save to change all this and to reduce and finally stop the ore exports to Germany. This was also the time of Speers armament miracle in Germany. Because of this, it was even stated that German armament was far less dependent on Swedish ore, than the Germans themselves had thought before.
Sources:
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol.2, pp. 189-202.
Gerhrd Weinberg, A world in Arms, pp.130-139. (Germ. ed.)
Plan R 4 was the World War II British plan for an invasion of the neutral state of Norway in April 1940 and occupying the Swedish Iron ore fields.
The plan was to get Norwegian and Swedish permission to send an expeditionary force to Finland across northern Norway and Sweden, ostensibly to help the Finns. Once in place they were however to proceed to take control of the harbors and mines, occupying cities such as Gävle and Luleå and shutting down the German access to Swedish ore, presenting Norway and Sweden with a fait accomplice.
Realizing the danger of Allied/German occupation and of the war being waged on their territory, both the Swedes and the Norwegians refused the transit requests.
Meanwhile, the Germans having realized the Allied threat of Plan R 4, were making plans for a possible pre-emptive invasion of Norway in order to protect their strategic supply lines and get naval bases.
The Altmark Incident of February 16, 1940, convinced Hitler that the Allies would not respect the Norwegian neutrality, and he ordered the plans for an invasion hastened.
The Scandinavian reluctance to allow Allied troops on their territory halted the original Allied plan for using aid to Finland as a pretext for moving in troops, but on March 12 the Allies decided to try a "semi-peaceful" invasion nevertheless. Troops were to be landed in Norway, and proceed into Sweden to capture the Swedish mines. However, if serious military resistance was encountered they were not to press the issue. However, Finland sued for peace on March 12, so the revised version of this plan had to be abandoned too.
Unless it serves to facilitate another strategy (Allies attacking via the Baltic; Allies invade Sweden; German Sealion plans) then in my opinion, no, it is not worth it for either side. Even IF you have such plans, it probably still isn't worth it.
The assets required to succeed, and the assets you give away to your opponant are both higher than the gains from conquering and holding Norway. Britain gains little, and Germany gains naval bases that are easily superceded with the conquest of France.
There is a good reason why the Allies didn't try to liberate Norway until after Germany's surrender: It was an unimportant sideshow, and it kept nine German Divisions 'imprisoned' in their northern garrison duty.
ORIGINAL: Norman42
There is a good reason why the Allies didn't try to liberate Norway until after Germany's surrender: It was an unimportant sideshow, and it kept nine German Divisions 'imprisoned' in their northern garrison duty.
And Hitler nearly was obsessed by the possibility of an Allied invasion of Norway from 1943 onwards. Not only and foremost against the allied arctic convoys he orderd bigger parts of the remaining Navy (surface and Uboats) up there as fleet in being, but in order to secure the Northern flank, the Baltic, the Swedish ore, etc.
So at the end of the day, is it worth it for either Germany or the Allies to invade Norway?
Great question. How important will the Murmansk route be? It ends up being a sort of get there before the enemy does; but if they do alter your plans so they feel it's a wasted effort, unless they captialize on your change of plans.
The point is Germany invaded Norway. Sometimes in war you do, or fail to do, something in anticipation of your idea of the enemy's plans. Sucess in a theatre may lead to the enemy changing plans, or never even thinking of certain options. Historically the Allies left Norway out of their attack plans, but who's to say they would not have pursued a "Soft overbelly (?)" plan if Germany had not occupied Norway? How much more supply would have arrived in Murmansk and Archangel?
Now that's interesting to consider. A successful CW invasion (or DoD alignment) of Norway. Would such a thing be necessary though? In WiFFE, doesn't Germany lose all the swedish iron ore resources even if the Allies occupy nothing of Norway but the Narvik hex?
>>Now that's interesting to consider. A successful CW invasion (or DoD alignment) of Norway. Would such a thing be >>necessary though? In WiFFE, doesn't Germany lose all the swedish iron ore resources even if the Allies occupy nothing >>of Norway but the Narvik hex?
Close. The Germans cannot get any of the 3 Swedish resources IF the Allies have occupied (control) Narvik AND it is winter/blizzard in the Arctic zone in the last impulse of the turn. See 8.2.10. This represents that "resources were transported through neutral Norweigan coastal waters during Winter."
In all the games I have played, and we play with Politics, UK usually heaps large amounts of points into Norway to secure the 2 TRS, 20 CP and whatnot. And usually Germany responds with an invation of Norway, to grab the one SS unit and the resource, and maybe try to sink a few points before Norway joins the war on the UK side.
Also, you secure the swedish resources during winter if you hold Narvik, you can base those 15 range navbombers north of Oslo to interrupt Murmansk convois, and there will be no Allied bombers based on the south coast.
Norway, in WIF, is a candellight dinner for two, and the faster you show up the better it tastes.
The Ore was shipped with a narrowtrack rail to Narvik and then along the norwegian coast. The rail to Narvik is really short and its basically just "down the hill" to a good, ice free port.
And the transport along the coast is as secure as if it had been going the other way, through the Baltic, as the Norwegian coastline is a nightmare, even in perfectly good weather.
Norway, in WIF, is a candellight dinner for two, and the faster you show up the better it tastes.
An interesting way of putting it for sure.
The Ore was shipped with a narrowtrack rail to Narvik and then along the norwegian coast. The rail to Narvik is really short and its basically just "down the hill" to a good, ice free port.
And the transport along the coast is as secure as if it had been going the other way, through the Baltic, as the Norwegian coastline is a nightmare, even in perfectly good weather.
Thanks to all the fjords, no doubt, that Slartibartfast got an award for doing. [:D]
What intrigues me is why the Swedes shipped iron ore by sea through the Gulf of Bothnia when in real-life (as well as in the game) they had a good rail net reaching all the way to the south of the country. From there it was just a short hop across to Lubeck ... or they could even have continued overland transport through Denmark.
That the Germans were so worried about losing the winter route (Narvik-based coastal shipping) that they invaded the country suggests that the alternative winter route (by rail to the south of Sweden) was not viable. Yet in the game, resources move by rail freely, while taking them overseas is costly (in the sense of needing convoys) and risky.
Perhaps the game exaggerates the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of moving resources by rail in the forties?
Millions of tons by rail requires a lot of ore cars and is very hard on the rail bed. This is especially true if the rail line is also being used by passenger trains. For such a long haul (from northern to southern Sweden), you also have all the empty ore cars going back, putting further demands on the rail transportation system.
I expect that the rail network in WIF is comparable to ports, in that it serves a dual purpose in the game: military and commercial. Unless you start differentiating between single line rail from double, etc., and throw in a lot of other considerations (e.g., grade/slope, weather effects), the rail lines in WIF are going to be an oversimplification of reality.
There wasnt a landroad from Sweden via Denmark to Germany either. There is today.
Norden
Norden
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Hexagonally challenged
