
1) Battle for Krung Thep: On March 9, the Jap 23rd Mixed Brigade crosses the river from Bangkok, taking fairly heavy losses from 23rd Chindit Brigade which has been flown in from Moulmein. The Japs do manage to retain a foothold across the river. On the same day, a very large raid of 106 mixed-type Jap bombers from Hanoi with an escort of 45 Zeroes tangle with the 10 Spitfires flying CAP over Krung Thep and 3 RAAF Boomerangs vectored in from Tavoy. The Spits down twice their own losses in Zeroes but the bombers largely get through and leave the airfield barely operational.
On March 10th, infantry from two Chinese divisions at Tavoy and Moulmein is ordered in by air and 23rd Chindits counterattack but cannot dislodge the enemy. Newly operational Spits just landed at Moulmein are transferred to Krung Thep and a Squadron of P-38's from Tavoy is ordered to fly CAP. The Japs come back hard again at the airfield. This time a serious furball ensues and the Japs loses 25 Zeroes and 25 bombers to the loss of 5 Spits and 2 P-38's. The airfield takes more hits but can still support fighters. A Jap support unit crosses the river, taking heavy losses. The lost fighters are replenished and the garrison is ordered to attack again on the 11th. 23rd Indian is one or two days away. If Krung Thep falls then the Allied position at Rahaeng will be untenable.
2) 255th Indian Armoured Regt. has the task of inhibiting enemy movement West from Bangkok. This is the chief emergency retreat unit from Krung Thep and therefore must be kept clear of Jap units.
The position also prevents encirclement of 26th Indian Div guarding
the road to Tavoy to the West. 255th is ordered to drive off Jap infiltrators on the 11th. The strength of the opposition is unkown.
Jap reinforcements are also arriving by land at Bangkok.
3) 55th Chinese Div has moved South to augment the unprepared defensive position of 26th Indian Div. The lead Jap unit from Bandou has just arrived. Both units are ordered over to the attack to try to defeat the enemy in detail before the main force arrives.
4) Burma Area Army is moving inexorably toward Rahaeng. The main effort of 10th Air Force and RAF Liberators and Wellys at Chandpur and Imphal is the interdiction and attrition of these units but the Burmese weather is not cooperating. There are already 20,000 troops and 500 tanks opposite Rahaeng acrsoss the Salween. Combat engineers are guarding the road to Victoria Point which has been reoccupied by the Japs.
5) 44th and 3rd Indian Divisions are unloading at Moulmein after a safe run in by sea. 44th Indian is already battle-ready and is ordered to cross the Salween and strike the tail of the enemy coming down the rail line. Indian XIV Corps has moved East to provide a tenuous supply route to Rahaeng and a possible escape route if they are forced to retreat.
6) Retreating Jap 2nd line troops at Pagan were driven off. Allied units are at Lashio and Taung Gyi and will attack soon. There are now no Jap supply routes via the rail line to Burma Area Army. There is a tenuous link via trail from Taung Gyi. The Allied supply situation at Mandalay is improved and now 7th Armoured and British 2nd Division will move down the rail line to press the Jap rearguard.
The question is, can they break through to Rahaeng before Burma Corps unites with 12th Army or before the run out of supply?












