Where are the long lances?

[Wilhammer]

The fact of the matter is that Japanese night battle action REQUIRED starting an attack with Torpedoes. So, they developed the best methods, techniques, equipment and doctrine for it.

This was designed to counter the American preference for gunnery. The Japanes felt they would ultimately loose a straight up gun fight, so they decided on the torpedo to even the odds.


Every Japanes surface engagement began with the Japanese expected to use Torpedoes as soon as the enmy was spotted, and in fact this happened almost everytime.

It should happen in UV as well.

[Capt Cliff]

Has the INJ better night optical capability been modelled into the game? The advantage was only overcome by the USN's use of radar targeting. This is a big plus for INJ targeting and should be in the game.

If this has been previously mentioned sorry. Hard to speed read 40 threads!

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

As far as I know the German WWII "Schnellboots" were much
much biger that US PT boats depicted in UV....


Leo "Apollo11"


P.S.
Last weekend there was one great old John Ford movie on TV
here. It was "They Were Expendable" with John Wayne and
about US PT boats in Philipines at the start of war in the Pacific...

[Drongo]

Posted by mdiehl

Drongo. We'll just both be stubborn I guess. I do not see any evidence in gunnery hit rates or spotting success that all the night training gave IJN an edge. IMO that has long been a simple and convenient explanation *because* clearly the IJN spent more time training at night and had the best torp. Looking at the engagements, however, in detail, the critical element seems always to have been something *else*.. both for IJN victories and defeats in 1942. And IJN torp and gunfire accuracy varied so greatly that it is not apparent that all that night training made them necessarily more accurate at night. Same applies to observation. IJN night optical spotting binocs were the best, but that seems not to have regularly given them an advantage.

Both us be stubborn??? Impossible.

Mate,

Who said anything about night training making Japanese gunnery and torpedo hit rates better??? Are we getting a bit paranoid? (or have I just missed what was said in an earlier post?). Every topic related post so far in this thread discussed IJN night training/experience in terms of bringing firepower to bear as effectively as possible, not making the firing of weapons more accurate.

I would have thought the USN may even have had a slight edge in gunnery at night once targets were revealed, fire directors kicked in and the guns started. Capt Cliff mentioned IJN optics for targeting but I've only ever heard about their low light (wide lens) binocs for lookouts being outstanding.

You've made your rationale for it clear in other posts but I really think you might be going a bit overboard in your attempts to down play the impact of Japanese night fighting capabilities. Lundstrom may have argued the case for US pilots/fighters but I've yet to see any historian argue that the USN were the equals of the IJN at night in the last 6 months of '42.

Name the book that does, I'd be interested in reading it as all the ones I've read (including recent ones) credit the IJN with having a superiority at night over the USN in '42 primarily due to their intense ship and formation training. Add to that superb lookouts, excellent visual aids, reliable starshells, good and numerous searchlights, ships that carried large numbers of the most effective and reliable torpedo used in WWII and crews and leaders who had the willingness to use them at every available opportunity. What you should end up with in that equation is a force that will always have some chance of inflicting a heavy defeat on the USN at night (doing it twice historically was enough to convince me).

I'll repeat what I said earlier. All we were discussing was how the Japanese player in UV could be given the same chance, if the circumstances permitted, to attempt to repeat the historical Savo or Tassafaronga. In both battles, the USN virtually handed the opportunity to the Japanese to gain a clear, major victory (measured in ships sunk/damaged/whatever). The Japanese training and weaponry did the rest. When the Japanese handed the USN the opportunity, they failed to do it (Cape Esperance included). The conditions that gave the IJN the opportunity (command, surprise, confusion) are in UV in the form of commanders and a night experience ratings. The ability to use the Japanese training and weaponry to obtain the historical results is not in the game. That's it. No one was saying the Japanese should always win battles or that they were more accurate with their guns or torpedoes due to training.

If you really want a full on debate over the various battles and the results and the meaning of those results etc., go open another thread (with an obvious title) and I'll be happy to join in (as would others, I'm sure).

[Capt Cliff]

Drongo,

Good defence! But your missing the point. First the USN didn't allow them selves to be defeated in two surface action to "gain the enevible triumph"! No commander does this! The game does not reflect the fact that the Japanese intensely trained for night action with their cruisers and destroyers, while the USN did not! We, the USN, had to learn the hard way and got the edge when we had radar and they didn't. Even as late as the Batle of the Philippine Sea Admiral Lee was reluctant to enage the INJ in a night surface action due to the low level of night surface training his fast BB's had.

The game need's to model this.

[Drongo]

Posted by Capt Cliff

Good defence! But your missing the point. First the USN didn't allow them selves to be defeated in two surface action to "gain the enevible triumph"! No commander does this! The game does not reflect the fact that the Japanese intensely trained for night action with their cruisers and destroyers, while the USN did not! We, the USN, had to learn the hard way and got the edge when we had radar and they didn't. Even as late as the Batle of the Philippine Sea Admiral Lee was reluctant to enage the INJ in a night surface action due to the low level of night surface training his fast BB's had.

Capt Cliff,

Are you referring to the following.

In both battles, the USN virtually handed the opportunity to the Japanese to gain a clear, major victory (measured in ships sunk/damaged/whatever). The Japanese training and weaponry did the rest.

If you are, I did not mean it literally. When I said the USN virtually handed the IJN a victory, I meant that in both battles the USN unintentionally left themselves vulnerable to the IJN. At Savo, the allies dispersed their ships in small, non supportable groups (as well as had no plan, were unsure what was going on etc). At Tassafaronga, they held their course for too long and also didn't give their DD's sufficient freedom. The point I was making that the IJN's ability at night was good enough to turn the opportunity given by allied errors into a heavy defeat for the USN.

Mdiehl had indicated that he did not think the IJN training gave them any real advantage. I was simply pointing out that the IJN training/experience allowed them to react successfully to the combat situation in both battles whereas, for example, the USN at Tassafaronga (despite knowing the IJN was coming and tracking them on radar) was unable to deliver a defeat of the same magnitude to the IJN when it had its opportunities. Giving the USN DD's insufficient time to deliver their torpedo attack and holding the cruisers on the same course for too long was a command error. However, the chaos that ensued when the first IJN torpedos struck (ships going in all directions, own vessels being fired at, etc) was a result of lack of training/experience at night. I was using this example to show how the differences in the level of training/experience between the two sides contributed heavily to the outcome.

[Capt Cliff]

Drongo,

Didn't mean to poke you in the eye!:rolleyes:


If the USN lacked night experience, night tactics and a good torpedo, remember the US torpedo's had a depth setting problem and a exploder problem, then these need to be modeled into the game. Getting back to the main topic of this thread.

The way the game is now you have to change tactics as the INJ and not challenge the USN in Iron Bottom Sound!

Maybe Surface TF's need a button that say's "night action only". Just a thought. Then again I don't think there were and day actions in the Pacific, not like the River Platte.

I ran an experiment; Tanaka moves from the Shortland to Lunga with 6 CA's, 2 CL's and 4 DD's vs 2 USN TF's with 3 CA's and 4 DD's each. Scott commanded one of the TF's. Well the INJ force got Whooped and badly. No ships directly sunk but 3 CA's and 3 DD's that were not going to make even to the Shotlands! The USN TF with an average commander did lose a CA, but Scott's force got only minor hits! I think this kind of result is what started this thread.

[mdiehl]

(or have I just missed what was said in an earlier post?).

Drongo, I meant it as an observation on what the intensive night training histroically produced with respect to combat results. If the intensive night training gave the IJN a real edge, then one would expect to see it in superior optically directed hit rates at night. One can look at various engagements and see truly astonishingly horrid IJN shooting, *despite* all that night training (Sunda Strait both with shellfire and torps, 2nd Gcanal with torps, Cape Esperence). Which leads to the question, what did all the night training get the IJN *other than* a better torpedo *doctrine?* (since they may indeed not have been any better a night *shooting* using torps or guns?)

It's important not to overread my argument. I'm not contesting that USN DD commodores subordinate to CA skippers were not allowed to fight according to DD doctrine. What I'm saying is that if the US player decides to form a DD-only TF, one can reasonably presume that they'd attempt to deliver the classic torpedo-first attack, *as they did in January 1942 in, IIRC, Desron 25* and *as the USN DD's pointedly attempted to get permission to do at Tassafaronga.*

Thus, if one were going to have some kind of "torpedo doctrine task check" one would expect a USN DD-only group to have as much of a chance of conducting such an attack as an IJN group. That would be a different (and greater) likelihood from the case where the USN Desron commodore was subordinate to a CA gun-line. That's *all* I'm claiming about how the difference betweeen the USN and IJN should be modeled with respect to night torpedo attacks.

Next question, would the RN/RAN likely have fared differently? Did their doctrine emphasize the CA gun-line despite the fact that some RN CAs were torpedo-armed or, alternatively, would one expect and RN CA-DD line to attempt a torpedo doctrine attack *first* before opening up with guns?

[Drongo]

Capt Cliff,

If the USN lacked night experience, night tactics and a good torpedo, remember the US torpedo's had a depth setting problem and a exploder problem, then these need to be modeled into the game. Getting back to the main topic of this thread.

As far as I know, USN torpedoes are represented correctly in the game (as are IJN torps).

The way the game is now you have to change tactics as the INJ and not challenge the USN in Iron Bottom Sound!

Thats exactly what I'd said earlier. The point is, you shouldn't have to. Thats why we were discussing (earlier in the thread) how to bring in a simple way of giving the IJN a chance of fighting as it did. The assumption is that the surface combat routines in UV will probably not change much in the near future so we were hoping to come up with a solution that used factors already in the game. This might then have a chance of Matrix considering it.

I ran an experiment; Tanaka moves from the Shortland to Lunga with 6 CA's, 2 CL's and 4 DD's vs 2 USN TF's with 3 CA's and 4 DD's each. Scott commanded one of the TF's. Well the INJ force got Whooped and badly. No ships directly sunk but 3 CA's and 3 DD's that were not going to make even to the Shotlands! The USN TF with an average commander did lose a CA, but Scott's force got only minor hits! I think this kind of result is what started this thread.

You don't need to convince me, go read the earlier posts. We are all agreeing about the same thing.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

Drongo, I meant it as an observation on what the intensive night training histroically produced with respect to combat results. If the intensive night training gave the IJN a real edge, then one would expect to see it in superior optically directed hit rates at night. One can look at various engagements and see truly astonishingly horrid IJN shooting, *despite* all that night training (Sunda Strait both with shellfire and torps, 2nd Gcanal with torps, Cape Esperence). Which leads to the question, what did all the night training get the IJN *other than* a better torpedo *doctrine?* (since they may indeed not have been any better a night *shooting* using torps or guns?)

Mate,

We're obviously at loggerheads here. You're saying that extensive night training will only be an advantage if it makes gunfire and torpedo aiming more accurate at night. I'm arguing that the true value of night training is seen in a force's ability to cope with the conditions and confusion of night combat while still fighting effectively as a coherent force.

Without that, the IJN would probably never have had the ability to strike back at Tassafaronga while undergoing such a heavy surprise attack by the USN cruisers. The same could be said for Savo when the IJN ran into 2 seperate forces, one after the other. Their high level of night training contributed heavily to the victory. Excellent coordination with search planes, a formation that was able to stay together and operate effectively through the two seperate engagements, all ships knew their job despite having no real plan until they approached the area, excellent fire discipline (no one fired early and gave the game away). All this only came about through years of drills and training at night. I'd call that the real advantage.

Thus, if one were going to have some kind of "torpedo doctrine task check" one would expect a USN DD-only group to have as much of a chance of conducting such an attack as an IJN group. That would be a different (and greater) likelihood from the case where the USN Desron commodore was subordinate to a CA gun-line. That's *all* I'm claiming about how the difference betweeen the USN and IJN should be modeled with respect to night torpedo attacks.

IMO, not (the same chance) for the USN in mid-late '42. Yes, if a DD only TF were used, it should have a chance but not the same as the IJN light forces at this time ('42). The USN DD's still lacked the training/exp of the IJN to have the same chance of delivering an effective, coordinated strike at night. Remember, we're talking about how well they would do it in the confusion of a night battle, NOT whether they would do it.

I almost get the impression that you do not actually play UV. If you did, you wouldn't be confusing discussions on game mechanics as an attack on the abilities of the USN. The whole discussion was about how the IJN in UV has no ability to repeat the results of Savo/Tassafaronga (fact) and how it could be rectified in the simplest way (to allow Matrix to consider it).

Next question, would the RN/RAN likely have fared differently? Did their doctrine emphasize the CA gun-line despite the fact that some RN CAs were torpedo-armed or, alternatively, would one expect and RN CA-DD line to attempt a torpedo doctrine attack *first* before opening up with guns?

As far as I know, the RN/RAN cruisers would tend to operate as gun ships when operating in numbers and jack of all trades when supporting convoys (ie Arctic convoys). There were not a lot of head to head battles involving them to draw any conclusions. Maybe someone else can give you a better answer.

[TIMJOT]

Im not saying that the following excerpt proves anything, but its a interesting narrative of a DD on DD encounter in August 1942


Excerpt: "Tin Cans" by; Theodore Roscoe.

"August 22nd 1942; USN DDs Blue and Henley were patrolling Ironbottom Sound . When the DDs near center of Savo Sound, Blues radar and sonar registered contact with an unidentified target. In the moonless dark nothing was seen; at 0346 the DDs slowed to 10 knots and patrolled at the cautious pace, the lookouts tense and watchful.

Another suspicious radar and sonar contact was picked up by Blue at 0355. Her electronic detection gear indicated the target as 5000 yards distant on the starboard beam - a high speed vessel of some sort, doing anywhere from 20 to 50 knots. Henley aslo made radar contact with this target, and off across the water a creamy wake was sighted. Was the vessel foe or friend?

Neither DD took a positive or offensive action. Continueing on her course at unchnaged speed, Blue brought her guns and torpedo tubes to bear, but she held her fire. Henley, too, held fire. The range closed to 3200 yds. as the high speed stranger approached. The stranger was a Jap DD.

At 0359, shocked lookouts on board Blue suddenly saw a spread of phosphorescent wakes reaching through the water toward their destroyer. Compliments of Jap DD Kamikaze.

"TORPEDO!"

The cry was drowned out by the roar of exploding war heads."



The Blue later sank and the Kamikaze escaped into the darkness before either DD could get even a single shot off.

Again one example doesnt prove much, but it at least demonstrates the IJN DD without radar was able to sight, react, get off a torpedo attack and retire before the USN DDs warned by radar could figure out what was going on.

A previous poster had it right. Extensive night training isnt only about fire control and accuracy. Its also about being able to react and perform efficiently in the difficult night enviroment. The USN, due to bugetary, safety and doctorine issues, simply did not train much at night. That lack of training and experience in night operations has to have had a negative effect in efficencey, comand and control .....ect..

[mdiehl]

We're obviously at loggerheads here. You're saying that extensive night training will only be an advantage if it makes gunfire and torpedo aiming more accurate at night. I'm arguing that the true value of night training is seen in a force's ability to cope with the conditions and confusion of night combat while still fighting effectively as a coherent force.

I don't think we're at loggerheads. W/respect to launching a torp attack I think we agree that the IJN is generally more likely to try it as a matter of doctrine. In the *other* areas, I don't see that night fighting really gave the IJN an edge (that's why I mentinoed their historically varied gunfire performance). As to the coping with the confusion of night combat, there we *are* at loggerheads. For every instance of Japanese keeping their cool and US confustion, you probably find almost as many instances of just the opposite. That's one of the reasons why Bppn is so interesting to me. Not only did the USN DDs of Dsn 25 (IIRC) launch a *textbook* torp doctrine attack, but also the IJN reacted in a panicked fashion, completely failing to observe the USN DDs that were about 3000 yards distant. It's not easily explained given that the IJN had manifestly better spotting binoculars and all that night training. All one can do is assume that the confusion got them so focused on Dutch SSs that they failed to maintain a proper watch for surface vessels. Likewise, the IJN were mighty confused at 2nd G'canal, and again at Cape Esperence.

Tim -- the Savo Island debacle does not say anything about USN DD torp doctrine. The two DDs in question were pickets. By nature, pickets aren't supposed to shoot until they've confirmed what they're shooting at. Savo is appropriately described as a series of command errors, leading to scattered disposition of USN forces and a general laxity throughout the TF there. Of *course* the IJN were going to launch the first attack -- they knew where there targets would be and knew that anything in front of their line of approach would be hostile.

All you need for a radically altered Savo island is for someone to have decrypted the aerial recon report in time for the Allies to have formed a battle line and gone hunting. Then it might have been anyone's battle to win or lose.

[Possum]

Hello all
Two points..
1) Have you considered the effects of Teamwork, and the cofusion to be found, when a taskforce is simply thrown together, without any time taken to allow the various commanders to farmiliarize themselves with each other?
I would point out that it was the side that was generally the best prepared, that usually "won" a naval engagement.

2) the RN/RAN, as far as I know, did not have a "Doctorine" that they planned to follow. The RAN, at least, always tried to fight it's ships in the most efficent manner possibe, and that was determind by the cirumstances that they found themselves in. Usually this meant haulling off to medium-long rang and using the RN/RAN's superior gunlaying ability to simply pound the foe with gunfire. But there are examples of RN/RAN cruisers instead racing into point blank range as if they where Destroyers, in order to conduct a close range torpedo attack. (Battle of North Cape being the most spectacular example of this, with RN heavy cruisers charging the German BC's Sharnhorst and Genisenau, to drive the Germans away from the convoy.)

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

Likewise, the IJN were mighty confused at 2nd G'canal, and again at Cape Esperence.

I'm not sure where you got that from.
Your going to have to explain in what ways the IJN were "mighty confused".

At Esperence, the initial low readiness of the IJN combined with USN intel, radar and position gave the USN a chance of a stunning victory. They didn't get it because they suffered from confusion, not the IJN. Goto did assume that the USN would not be encountered that far west and thought that it might have been Joshima's force. This has nothing to do with my point on training/experience. DD Fubuki also made that mistake (and paid for it) but once battle was joined, there was no confusion in the way the IJN ships conducted themselves (which is my point). After the initial USN surprise attack, the IJN outperformed the USN in the confusion.

2nd G'canal - I've already discussed this in detail earlier. IMO, the IJN performance showed no real signs of confusion (in fact the opposite) of the type relevant to my point about their trn/exp advantage. Their light forces handled the chaos of the night engagement superbly (their torps not hitting the S/Dok was nothing to do with confusion - they still executed the mult ship launch). I do know that the USN BB's were reported as cruisers (understandable) and Kondo chose to commit his capital ships to the engagement (command mistake - they still had HE shells loaded) rather than let the light forces (after reloading their torps) handle the attack on the 2 now unescorted BB's (which was what he initially intended).

Do us a favour mate,
when you come back with your answers, start a new thread in the War room (I'll find it) as this ones getting more into a historical arguement than a game discussion. Might be easier for other people to notice/join in too (if they wish).

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl


I don't think we're at loggerheads. W/respect to launching a torp attack I think we agree that the IJN is generally more likely to try it as a matter of doctrine. In the *other* areas, I don't see that night fighting really gave the IJN an edge (that's why I mentinoed their historically varied gunfire performance). As to the coping with the confusion of night combat, there we *are* at loggerheads. For every instance of Japanese keeping their cool and US confustion, you probably find almost as many instances of just the opposite. That's one of the reasons why Bppn is so interesting to me. Not only did the USN DDs of Dsn 25 (IIRC) launch a *textbook* torp doctrine attack, but also the IJN reacted in a panicked fashion, completely failing to observe the USN DDs that were about 3000 yards distant. It's not easily explained given that the IJN had manifestly better spotting binoculars and all that night training. All one can do is assume that the confusion got them so focused on Dutch SSs that they failed to maintain a proper watch for surface vessels. Likewise, the IJN were mighty confused at 2nd G'canal, and again at Cape Esperence.

Tim -- the Savo Island debacle does not say anything about USN DD torp doctrine. The two DDs in question were pickets. By nature, pickets aren't supposed to shoot until they've confirmed what they're shooting at. Savo is appropriately described as a series of command errors, leading to scattered disposition of USN forces and a general laxity throughout the TF there. Of *course* the IJN were going to launch the first attack -- they knew where there targets would be and knew that anything in front of their line of approach would be hostile.

All you need for a radically altered Savo island is for someone to have decrypted the aerial recon report in time for the Allies to have formed a battle line and gone hunting. Then it might have been anyone's battle to win or lose.

Mdiehl

First, that encounter wasnt the battle of Savo. Savo was on Aug 9. The Blue was sunk on Aug 22.

Second, The DDs were not on Picket duty. (Quote) "Admiral Turner directed the Blue and Henley to leave the convoy and race ahead to Savo Sound where they were to *intercept* enemy naval forces bearing down on Lunga point."

Again I didnt say it proved anything, but you are going to hard pressed to find any other DD on DD engagement until 1943.


RE: Balikapan, I dont see why you are so facinated with Balikapan. It was hardly textbook. They made there first pass at too hight rate of speed and each DD fired there salvos independently instead of in concert. The result was not a single torp hit on the first pass.

The IJN failure to observe the the US DDs at Balikapan is easily explaind.

Quote: "U.S. Destroyer Operations in WWII" (Roscoe)

"So chance , capricious as always, provided DesDiv 59 with a break at Balikapan. It was a destroyerman's set-up; the anchored transports; the smoke smudge wich screened the attacking DDs; the fiery shoreline which just silhouetted the targets."

Now try a simple expirement. Hold up a sheet of plain white paper to a brite light. Stick your finger behind it. What do you see?

Next, turn around so that your back faces the light and the light shines on the front of the paper. Stick your finger behind behind it. What do you see?

[Wilhammer]

"All you need for a radically altered Savo island is for someone to have decrypted the aerial recon report in time for the Allies to have formed a battle line and gone hunting. Then it might have been anyone's battle to win or lose."

Not really.

The Japanese approached in a tight line ahead formation with a plan setup in advance: locate enemy, SLOW DOWN (to supress wakes), get in close, and fire torpedoes. That is what happened.

Then the Allied force noticed the Japs bearing down just as the first torps hit home.

The Allied disposition was criminal.

1. All ships were widely spread out in NON mutually supporting positions.

2. None of the Allied ships ever served together before.

3. None of the forces had but minimal training at night.

4. The Allied commander was missing and failed to report it to the fleet near Savo.

The Allies learned after this, but still failed to EVER match the Japs at night surface combat, even with radar.

American doctrine did not get much better. It took until 1944 to form cohesive DesDivs, before that they were nearly always ad-hoc scraped together forces.

[mdiehl]

Source for all on Savo that follows: Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal.

The Allied disposition at Savo was neither criminal nor negligent. The Allies were deployed in two groups with separate DD pickets, spaced 10-15 miles apart, to cover two invasion groups (Tulagi and opposite Henderson), roughly 12 miles apart, with transports still unloading cargo and men at both locations.

The first two USN DDs to oberve the IJN ships launched torpedoes without opening up with guns. These were pickets, and their attack was entirely consistent with torpedo doctrine. The initial IJN attack was semi-torp doctrine: the initial Type 93 salvo was launched, but the IJN opened up with batteries before the first torps struck. Understandable, given that by *that* time it was clear to the IJN vessels that they'd been spotted. The IJN attack on the northern group was entirely gun-doctrine, despite the availability of half salvos of Type 93s in most of the IJN ships (IIRC, one of them had lost their torp mount to shellfire).

What went wrong at Savo is well known. It had nothing to do with night training or Allied gun doctrine. It had everything to do with your point #4. Crutchley was absent at the start fo the engagement without informing Turner or Riefkohl. Crutchley also failed to provide copies of the northern Allied groups patrol plan and disposition to the southern group, and of the southern group's to teh northern group. As a result, there was considerable confusion, initially, about the identity of the strange vessels. To make matters worse, the northern group was screened from the southern group by a heavy squall and did not observe gun flashes. They heard the some torp detonations, which they presumed to be the southern group engaging subs. (Shades of the IJN at Balikpapan there. At Bppn, the IJN CL/DD group failed to observe the Allies after the IJN group cleared the harbor. That had nothing to do with smoke, and everything to do with ASW fixation leading to, IMO, lax visual observation for surface vessels.)

Balikpapan:

Your response to my observation about Bppn is non-sequitur. I brought it up because it shows that USN DDs had a very good torp doctrine when not attached to a CA gun-line, which is basically where this discussion started (how to provide a "Tassafaronga" engine to UV). Whether or not the attempt succeeded to your standards is another question entirely. The fact remains that the USN DDs at Bpp worked as a cohesive group and launched a textbook torpedo doctrine attack.

That said:

Say what you want. The USN hit rate was 12% that night. Comparable to the IJN's better night actions, but not their two best. (One a statistical outlier in 1943, 4 torps fired at extreme range with 1 hit. The other: Tassafaronga, IIRC, about 16%). At Savo, one IJN CA launched a full volley of torps range 13K yards at the flare-illuminated, completely visible, parked transport group near Tulagi. Guess what: no hits. The explanation for the USN DDs initial misses at Bppn and the parting IJN shots at Savo/Tulagi is the same. It is not especially easy to hit ships with torps even with textbook firing conditions.

Now try a simple experiment. Riding a bicycle on undulating sand, hit two trash cans with two rocks each in no more than three passes at a distance of sixty feet. The trash cans will be intermittantly obscured by smoke, and there are deflectors positioned such that there are limited angles from which the trash cans may be hit. You may presume to have sixty seconds to accomplish the job, after which the trash cans may start hurling lids at you at 50 mph.

You have drawn the conclusion from Bppn that the Allies were inferior based on your assessment that 12% isn't good enough. By that standard, one would conclude (erroneously) likewise that the IJN was inferior with torps, since 12% is about their hit rate for Savo/Tulagi (despite Allied laxity, personnel exhaustion, background illumination, and complete tactical surprise -- i.e. a textbook firing condition), and since by *your* standards the IJN miss at Tulagi implies they could not hit a barn door from inside the barn (if we evaluate IJN performance by the same standards that you set for evaluating the USN performance).

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Source for all on Savo that follows: Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal.

The Allied disposition at Savo was neither criminal nor negligent. The Allies were deployed in two groups with separate DD pickets, spaced 10-15 miles apart, to cover two invasion groups (Tulagi and opposite Henderson), roughly 12 miles apart, with transports still unloading cargo and men at both locations.

The first two USN DDs to oberve the IJN ships launched torpedoes without opening up with guns. These were pickets, and their attack was entirely consistent with torpedo doctrine. The initial IJN attack was semi-torp doctrine: the initial Type 93 salvo was launched, but the IJN opened up with batteries before the first torps struck. Understandable, given that by *that* time it was clear to the IJN vessels that they'd been spotted. The IJN attack on the northern group was entirely gun-doctrine, despite the availability of half salvos of Type 93s in most of the IJN ships (IIRC, one of them had lost their torp mount to shellfire).

What went wrong at Savo is well known. It had nothing to do with night training or Allied gun doctrine. It had everything to do with your point #4. Crutchley was absent at the start fo the engagement without informing Turner or Riefkohl. Crutchley also failed to provide copies of the northern Allied groups patrol plan and disposition to the southern group, and of the southern group's to teh northern group. As a result, there was considerable confusion, initially, about the identity of the strange vessels. To make matters worse, the northern group was screened from the southern group by a heavy squall and did not observe gun flashes. They heard the some torp detonations, which they presumed to be the southern group engaging subs. (Shades of the IJN at Balikpapan there. At Bppn, the IJN CL/DD group failed to observe the Allies after the IJN group cleared the harbor. That had nothing to do with smoke, and everything to do with ASW fixation leading to, IMO, lax visual observation for surface vessels.)

Balikpapan:

Your response to my observation about Bppn is non-sequitur. I brought it up because it shows that USN DDs had a very good torp doctrine when not attached to a CA gun-line, which is basically where this discussion started (how to provide a "Tassafaronga" engine to UV). Whether or not the attempt succeeded to your standards is another question entirely. The fact remains that the USN DDs at Bpp worked as a cohesive group and launched a textbook torpedo doctrine attack.

That said:

Say what you want. The USN hit rate was 12% that night. Comparable to the IJN's better night actions, but not their two best. (One a statistical outlier in 1943, 4 torps fired at extreme range with 1 hit. The other: Tassafaronga, IIRC, about 16%). At Savo, one IJN CA launched a full volley of torps range 13K yards at the flare-illuminated, completely visible, parked transport group near Tulagi. Guess what: no hits. The explanation for the USN DDs initial misses at Bppn and the parting IJN shots at Savo/Tulagi is the same. It is not especially easy to hit ships with torps even with textbook firing conditions.

Now try a simple experiment. Riding a bicycle on undulating sand, hit two trash cans with two rocks each in no more than three passes at a distance of sixty feet. The trash cans will be intermittantly obscured by smoke, and there are deflectors positioned such that there are limited angles from which the trash cans may be hit. You may presume to have sixty seconds to accomplish the job, after which the trash cans may start hurling lids at you at 50 mph.

You have drawn the conclusion from Bppn that the Allies were inferior based on your assessment that 12% isn't good enough. By that standard, one would conclude (erroneously) likewise that the IJN was inferior with torps, since 12% is about their hit rate for Savo/Tulagi (despite Allied laxity, personnel exhaustion, background illumination, and complete tactical surprise -- i.e. a textbook firing condition), and since by *your* standards the IJN miss at Tulagi implies they could not hit a barn door from inside the barn (if we evaluate IJN performance by the same standards that you set for evaluating the USN performance).

Mdiehl

I dont think anyone on this thread has said that US DDs lack a good torpedo doctorine. If you mean by good doctorine that a USN DD only force would attempt to launch a torp attack before a gun attack. My point on Balikapan is that you claimed it was text book. My point was the execution was not textbook. Texbook would have been makeing the run at a proper speed to allow for accurate aiming. Text book would have been if the 4 DDs launched there salvos in concerted effective spreads.

Cant say that I know of the IJN CA vs Tuligi transports thing, but 13,000 yrds is a far cry from 1000yrds and a Furataka class CA full spread was only for torps.

My expirement simply explains how obects that are backlite can be seen through an opaque screen. While objects backed by darkness remain unseen behind the same opaque screen. Its a perfectly legitimate explanation to your query on how did the IJN miss the US DDs.

Regarding your expirement. I say my chances were pretty good if I practiced throwing rocks at cans over and over again; year after year. I say my chances would not be so good if I only practiced throwing rocks a couple times a year and when I did; I usually didnt actually throw rocks, but instead just went through the arm motion.

Just curious though. Why the deflectors? I wasnt aware of any intervening land masses, reefs, torps nets at Balikapan. Can you enlighten me?

[mdiehl]

Tim

I agree that the range was different and that can also be a factor. Just checking the i-net now I could not determine which torp the Clemson class used at Bppn. Maybe Mark IXs. Decent max range but 25% slower than the IJN Type 93. I wonder how the actual times to target played out in both cases? That and currents would seem to be important factors in shooting at stationary ships.

The deflectors. I'm guessing (thinking it's a dim IIRC) that Bppn harbor was narrower at the entrance than in-harbor because of breakwaters or something, so there'd be a constrained firing position from which any given AP/MCS could be targeted. Anyhow, with extensive practice your chances *would* be pretty good. Maybe even as high as 12%. Of course, if the trash can was the size of a Dexter Dumpster, I'd expect you to do much better, which is where the 2nd Guadalcanal engagement applies.

I think it *was* someone's contention that the IJN should have an inherently higher chance of conducting a coordinated torp attack than the USN, regardless of the composition of the USN attacking force. That's why I've made the distinction between a combined USN DD-CA force and a USN DD-only force.

The "opaque screen" thing does not explain why the IJN missed the USN DDs. It suggests, perhaps, that the USN ought to have hit more targets than they did at Bppn. But the distance between the sortieing IJN force and the USN DDs was *considerably* shorter than the distances in other engagements in which the IJN observed hostiles visually. Since the IJN spent more time training for night combat, and had a better visual observation instrument in their binocs, there are logically three possible conclusions: (1) The IJN was inherently bad at night spotting and Bppn was typical despite their trainig efforts and instrumentation (not a reasonable conclusion, IMO), (2) exigencies in the initial conditions of a battle with respect to variation in visibility conditions exist than many are willing to recognize (possible, as I've argued elsewhere I think unusual initial conditions played a bigger role than doctrine or training in most 1942 night engagements), or (3) the IJN TF was, er, fixated on the possibility of underwater targets and thereby distracted from their usual effort to observe surface targets. The latter would fall under the category of a command error, not a problem of doctrine training or experience. The same kinds of phenom affected the Allies at Savo and again at Tassafaronga (in the latter the USN DDs were simply denied permission to conduct the attack that they knew they ought to make).

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Tim

I agree that the range was different and that can also be a factor. Just checking the i-net now I could not determine which torp the Clemson class used at Bppn. Maybe Mark IXs. Decent max range but 25% slower than the IJN Type 93. I wonder how the actual times to target played out in both cases? That and currents would seem to be important factors in shooting at stationary ships.

The deflectors. I'm guessing (thinking it's a dim IIRC) that Bppn harbor was narrower at the entrance than in-harbor because of breakwaters or something, so there'd be a constrained firing position from which any given AP/MCS could be targeted. Anyhow, with extensive practice your chances *would* be pretty good. Maybe even as high as 12%. Of course, if the trash can was the size of a Dexter Dumpster, I'd expect you to do much better, which is where the 2nd Guadalcanal engagement applies.

I think it *was* someone's contention that the IJN should have an inherently higher chance of conducting a coordinated torp attack than the USN, regardless of the composition of the USN attacking force. That's why I've made the distinction between a combined USN DD-CA force and a USN DD-only force.

The "opaque screen" thing does not explain why the IJN missed the USN DDs. It suggests, perhaps, that the USN ought to have hit more targets than they did at Bppn. But the distance between the sortieing IJN force and the USN DDs was *considerably* shorter than the distances in other engagements in which the IJN observed hostiles visually. Since the IJN spent more time training for night combat, and had a better visual observation instrument in their binocs, there are logically three possible conclusions: (1) The IJN was inherently bad at night spotting and Bppn was typical despite their trainig efforts and instrumentation (not a reasonable conclusion, IMO), (2) exigencies in the initial conditions of a battle with respect to variation in visibility conditions exist than many are willing to recognize (possible, as I've argued elsewhere I think unusual initial conditions played a bigger role than doctrine or training in most 1942 night engagements), or (3) the IJN TF was, er, fixated on the possibility of underwater targets and thereby distracted from their usual effort to observe surface targets. The latter would fall under the category of a command error, not a problem of doctrine training or experience. The same kinds of phenom affected the Allies at Savo and again at Tassafaronga (in the latter the USN DDs were simply denied permission to conduct the attack that they knew they ought to make).

I respectively submit to you that while the Japanese optics were good, they couldnt see vessels through a heavy smoke screen back by darkness on a moonless night. Granted Nishimuras assuming it was a sub attack contributed. In his defence though he had been attacked several times early by subs and had no reason to suspect a surface force was in the area. Regardless without the smoke I dont think the US DDs could have gone unobserved.

A lot of the command and control issues that you site as reasons for Allied defeats can be directly attributed to the lack of expirence fighting in the unfamiliar enviroment of night and the overall lack of confidence it engendered.

Example; Adm. Crutchly at Savo; stated reason for not rejoining the southern force was becuase he did not consider night manuvers "wise". The man he left in charge Capt Bode in the Chicago decided not to take the lead position ahead of Canberra becuase he too was unwilling to risk the night time manuver.