Where are the long lances?

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

The first two USN DDs to oberve the IJN ships launched torpedoes without opening up with guns. These were pickets, and their attack was entirely consistent with torpedo doctrine. The initial IJN attack was semi-torp doctrine: the initial Type 93 salvo was launched, but the IJN opened up with batteries before the first torps struck. Understandable, given that by *that* time it was clear to the IJN vessels that they'd been spotted. The IJN attack on the northern group was entirely gun-doctrine, despite the availability of half salvos of Type 93s in most of the IJN ships (IIRC, one of them had lost their torp mount to shellfire).

Mate,
I haven't read Frank but I have read several other accounts (both by historians (incl Morison) and also the official USN accounts). Adrian Stewart's 1985 "Guadalcanal : WWII's fiercest naval campaign" is what I use as a constant reference as it is short, concise, references most major texts on the subject and does an excellent job of summarising and analysing the battles.

A few observations on your above quote regarding what I've read on Savo (including the official US Naval Intelligence account).

1) USN DD's Ralph Talbot and Blue were the actual destroyers detached for picket duty. Both reported the Jap scout seaplanes but neither saw Mikawa's ships on the way in (but the IJN saw them and correctly held fire). The Ralph Talbot was spotted again and attacked by the Mikawa's force as they were leaving after the battle (where she fired her 5" guns and 4 torps in response). At no point did these DD's "launch torpedoes without opening up with guns."

2) USN DD's Patterson and Bagley were the screen for the allied Southern force (operating 1500 yds off the port and starboard bow (respectively) of the lead cruiser Canberra. Both spotted Mikawa's force only after the IJN ships had already launched their mass torpedo salvo at the Southern Force. Patterson immeadiately opened fire with her 5" guns (she never fired her torpedoes). Bagley does not appear to have fired her guns but did attempt to fire her torpedoes at the approaching ships. She took so long to prepare that she missed out on the firing solution and had to circle around again to fire them (only launching after Mikawa's ships were withdrawing away from the Southern Group).

3) The intial IJN attack was not "semi-torp" doctrine, it was their standard "torp first" attack (that they trained in for use when they could). Under this attack, gunfire would occur either after the torpedoes hit or at a point where the commander felt that the enemy would have no time left to avoid the torpedo spread. Mikawa's force opened fire only after Patterson attacked (as you said, it was clear to the IJN vessels that they'd been spotted).

4) Regarding the "gunfire" attack by Mikawa against the Northern Group. Japanese accounts refer to 2 reasons. First, due to the dispersion of Mikawa's force into 2 distinct groups (that were still in contact) after the engagement with Southern force, the Japanese choose to illuminate Northern force first with searchlights to clearly establish their identity before firing. These circumstances would not allow the standard "torpedo first" attack.
Secondly, as it was only 15 minutes since the engagement with Southern force, several IJN ships had not finished reloading. Once combat was joined, IJN ships fired their torpedoes as circumstances allowed. 3 to 5 Long Lances struck the USN cruisers.

[Drongo]

I think it *was* someone's contention that the IJN should have an inherently higher chance of conducting a coordinated torp attack than the USN, regardless of the composition of the USN attacking force. That's why I've made the distinction between a combined USN DD-CA force and a USN DD-only force.

It was me :p .

Mdiehl, I'd really like to know whether you've ever played UV or you're drawing your arguements from just reading posts on this forum.

Regarding your above quote. Because the game does not differentiate between the abilities of TF's made up of USN CA's/CL's/DD's and those made up of only DD's, argueing for a recognition of the difference between the two is pointless as we are talking about what's in the game not what was historical. The designers have made no allowance for differences in how battles are fought based on TF composition (and probably won't without a major rewrite of the combat model).

What we were trying to do was come up with a solution to better model night combat and which made use of routines already in the game. That is, if one force surprises another, there should be an experience check to see whether the first force can get in a multi ship initial salvo (of torps and maybe even guns). Surprise (advantage) and experience (night) are all we could use in order to have a hope of the designers considering it.

In UV, IJN CA's and CL's, RAN/RN CL's and DD's from both sides can and do fire torps (although always as single ships). Whether a ship fires or not is dependant on its day/night experience (experience dictates it's chance to engage). Whether a torpedo hits home is dependant on it's game range/accuracy (plus possibly firing ship exp and target mnvr/size? - never been sure).

The problem in UV is that it has a very staggered combat resolution (ie one side's ship fires, enemy ship fires, etc). This means battles almost inevitably go blow for blow and are expensive to both sides (hence, no chance of Savo or Tassafarongo). You never get either side ever being able to deliver an initial "knock out blow" with torps against its opponent (whether its IJN in '42 or USN in '43). An attempt to remedy this was what this thread was about.

As to the various chances of the two forces, I'll continue to argue that the IJN demonstrated REGULARLY (given the no of battles) that they were capable of launching multi ship torp salvos. The USN didn't demonstrate this. The fact that they preferred using gun-line forces of CA's/CL's (with DD's as escorts) in '42 to engage the IJN only makes it clearer that they shouldn't have the same torpedo "preference" as the IJN at this time (also combined with the fact that USN DD performances at night did not indicate to me that they should be considered the "equals" of the IJN in this area in '42 - whether operating seperately or together with cruisers).

I do agree with you historically that a USN all DD force could reasonably be expected to attempt a coordinated "torpedo first" attack in '42 but I would not expect them (in '42) to execute it as well as the IJN, as the USN DD's regularly demonstrated that they suffered from the same problems as the rest of the USN at night (which I've outlined before). As a side point, the use of SG radar (to create a clearer picture at night) could go along way to overcoming these difficulties but not many USN DD's were equipped with this until '43 (by which time when the value of routine night training of DD squadrons had also been recognised).

Your turn

[mdiehl]

I'll bite.

Regarding your above quote. Because the game does not differentiate between the abilities of TF's made up of USN CA's/CL's/DD's and those made up of only DD's, argueing for a recognition of the difference between the two is pointless as we are talking about what's in the game not what was historical.

Well, you are advocating modifications to the code. What you are asking for is a subroutine that in effect has a pre-combat combat round executed by one side and conducted using torps only. If you're going to write that much code, then adding an if-then statement (if USN TF is comprised exclusively of DDs then do execute the same subroutine) is a trivial task. Since UV does track TF composition it's easily done.

As to the rest we're still talking past each other. You say that the USN DDs should not have the same chance of launching a torp doctrine attack if not attached to the gun-line. I can't imagine why, given that there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to show that USN DD commodores had the right doctrine, and that they endeavored to launch said attacks. You keep talking about the way DDs were subordinated to the gun-line, and that has *absolutely nothing* to do with my point. If they're not attached to a CA gun-line, there's *nothing* there to inhibit the DDs from doing what they indisputably knew how to do and were indoctrinated to do.

[TIMJOT]

Exactly

As the game is know, A typical IJN Fottilla of one CL and 6 DDs running into an allied TF of say 4 CAs 5 DDs. Will always try to duke it out toe toe with their 5"pop guns while occasionally fireing off a torp or two. There should be at least a chance that they could open up with a torp attack and then quickly retire. Thats not to say that attack should always be successful but simply be a possibility.

Yes. Allied DDs should also be able to make hit and run atttacks, but the historical record indicates that it should have a less chance of success.

[mdiehl]

but the historical record indicates that it should have a less chance of success.

What, exactly, about the historical record, suggests that a USN DD group, operating on its own, in 1942, would be less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack, given that the one instance of a USN DD-only group, operating solely on its own, in January 1942, did conduct exactly such an attack? If we let historical results be our guide, the probability is approximately 100%.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

I'll bite.

Always hungry for debate! You really don't come hear to discuss the actual game, do you?:p

I notice you didn't answer my question on whether you play UV (or do you just like to hang around this forum for a meal).

Well, you are advocating modifications to the code. What you are asking for is a subroutine that in effect has a pre-combat combat round executed by one side and conducted using torps only. If you're going to write that much code, then adding an if-then statement (if USN TF is comprised exclusively of DDs then do execute the same subroutine) is a trivial task. Since UV does track TF composition it's easily done.

Yes, I'm asking for mods to the code but as to whether its "that much code", the programmers would have to decide.

I'd guess that it would revolve around disabling the gun firing "routine" for the attacker and the gun and torpedo "routine" for the defender for the first round. Night experience is already factored in as to who can fire each round - this would give the IJN a far better chance of multi ship salvos than the USN (as it should :p ). Nothing more should be needed (but I couldn't say for sure, of course - its based entirely on what I've seen PLAYING THE GAME). All I'm suggesting is the disabling of existing routines for one round based on the result of the existing advantage routine. This suggestion does not handle any differences between USN DD's on their own or USN DD's with CA's/CL's. I don't actually think its neccessary to do so to fix the current weakness in the game. As I've said, in the period of 1942 that UV covers, there was only one attack by DD's as a group (and they were operating with cruisers - Tassaf - no result). Why bother to differentiate? I only discussed it because you brought it up.

The actual class or ship array values used in the combat routine may not carry anything to say its a type DD (which is neccesary for your suggestion to work). So, you can't say for sure that its just as simple as adding an If-then (maybe buy the game and have a look? You might be able to judge it better).

As to the rest we're still talking past each other. You say that the USN DDs should not have the same chance of launching a torp doctrine attack if not attached to the gun-line. I can't imagine why, given that there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to show that USN DD commodores had the right doctrine, and that they endeavored to launch said attacks. You keep talking about the way DDs were subordinated to the gun-line, and that has *absolutely nothing* to do with my point. If they're not attached to a CA gun-line, there's *nothing* there to inhibit the DDs from doing what they indisputably knew how to do and were indoctrinated to do.

As I said earlier, I only talk about DD's being subordinated to CA's/CL's cause you brought it up. From my first post (way back when), I was describing USN DD night performances in general for the last 6 months of '42 (ie UV).

I've never said that individual DD's did not want to fire torpedos or that DD squadron commanders would not favour a "torpedo first" doctrine. Do you actually read what I say or do you just get so angry at the thought that someone could be giving credit to the IJN over the USN, that you forget I'm reponding to your arguement and only focus on the "offensive" bits? (end trolling).

Yes, USN DD's wanted to attack with torpedos if they could(as any destroyer should). Yes, their commanders would want to deliver a co ordinated "torpedo first" attack (if the TF commander allowed). No, I don't believe they had the same level of general competence at night (in how succesfully they could co ordinate it) to match that of the IJN's ability (therefore, they don't have the same chance of delivering a "torpedo first" attack BUT THEY DO HAVE A CHANCE). In game terms, It would mean that maybe 4-5 IJN CA's/CL's/DD's would launch if they have the advantage while 2-3 USN DD's would launch if the USN had the advantage (I just made that up but it may give you an idea what I'm suggesting.

Back to you, mate :p

[mdiehl]

Drongo, I've no longer any idea what you think the subject is. My original response was to the suggestion that the USN would not be allowed to launch a torp-doctrine attack until 1943, as advocated by poster "Yamamoto" as follows:

I would like to see the long lance salvo work something like this: (For night time battles only). Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check. If he succeeds, then each captain ( or crew ) makes a check. Foe each ship that passes that ship gets a free "before-the-battle" torpedo salvo off. The same system could be applied to Americans starting in 43. Yamamoto

I won't recap the rest of the conversation as it is there for all and sundry to read. I've faithfully stuck to the gist of the thread: what's needed to add a "Tassafaronga" engine to UV and how it ought to work.

Back to you, mate

Thanks, but I'll decline until you edit out the ad hominem stuff.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl


What, exactly, about the historical record, suggests that a USN DD group, operating on its own, in 1942, would be less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack, given that the one instance of a USN DD-only group, operating solely on its own, in January 1942, did conduct exactly such an attack? If we let historical results be our guide, the probability is approximately 100%.

I didnt say that a USN DD group would be less likely to launch a torp doctorine attack. I said it would be less likely to SUCCEED!

The record............


Allied warships sunk/damaged by surfaced fired torpedoes 1942
----------------------

10 Heavy Cruisers
5 Light Cruisers
7 Destroyers
------------------------
22 ships total


IJN warships sunk/damaged by surfaced fired torpedos 1942
----------------------

0 Heavy Cruisers
0 Light Cruisers
0 Destroyers
-----------------------
0 ships total

[Drongo]

Posted by Mdiehl

Drongo, I've no longer any idea what you think the subject is. My original response was to the suggestion that the USN would not be allowed to launch a torp-doctrine attack until 1943, as advocated by poster "Yamamoto" as follows:

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I would like to see the long lance salvo work something like this: (For night time battles only). Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check. If he succeeds, then each captain ( or crew ) makes a check. Foe each ship that passes that ship gets a free "before-the-battle" torpedo salvo off. The same system could be applied to Americans starting in 43. Yamamoto
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I won't recap the rest of the conversation as it is there for all and sundry to read. I've faithfully stuck to the gist of the thread: what's needed to add a "Tassafaronga" engine to UV and how it ought to work.

To Yamamoto's post, you tactfully replied

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japanese task force leader makes a leadership check.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That's a silly idea. Not only did Japanese task forces *not* regularly get the torpedo doctrine drop on their opponents, they also suffered some minor defeats in 1942 at the hands of torpedo-doctrine savvy USN skippers. At most you'd expect a higher chance of Japanese success at a torpedo-doctrine attack if:
(1) The IJN TF was not detected by radar or spotted prior to or at any time during the torpedo run.
(2) The target TF was a USN TF that contained at least one CA or heavier ship.

and after that, the debate (which had centered around various ideas of simple GAME solutions to the problem) became centered on your need to press for our recognition that USN DD's were only restricted by "Gun-line" TF's and we needed to differentiate etc.

You made it obvious to us what you wanted to discuss

Here's the Real Issue (IMO):
Since UV is a wargame with ahistorical flexibility (which is *fine*) one can easily imagine that the USN player might send a CL+DD TF for some of the various skirmishes in 1942 rather than a CA+CL+DD TF. (Just as the IJN player can choose which ships to send where and so forth). *In that event*, one would not as a feature of game design presume that the USN Desron or DD+CL TF would necessarily be any less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack than the IJN. That the DD desrons were trained in this is beyond dispute -- it was used in January 1942 at Balikpapan and USN DD skippers looked for oppotunities to fight in this manner from the start. The problem seems, to me anyhow, to have occurred when DD commodores were attached to CA admirals who would not let them do what they'd been trained to do.

All we've done since is debate with you on the relative merits of USN DD's, USN CA/CL/DD TF's vs USN DD TF's, gunfire accuracy, etc. You set the agenda by refusing to let the original discussion continue unless we accepted your premise that USN DD's have to considered the equals of the IJN at night. Acceptance of your suggestion would just leave us with a game situation where the USN would win as many, or more (radar), major victories in '42 as the IJN. That would not quiet be the solution we were looking for.

I think our expectation was that, until the allies gain night experience, the surface combat phase should produce some chance for the IJN (at present none) of major victories like Savo, at least more than the USN gets. IMO, the presence of radar and the existing UV "staggered" firing routines lead to draw or USN victory as standard. All we can really suggest is a way of getting more "historical" IJN results as simply as possible (as no major changes to UV can probably occur for some time). If you ever play the game, I'd be interested in your opinion on the surface combat routines (no, thats not sarcasm).

Thanks, but I'll decline until you edit out the ad hominem stuff.

If you find my style of posting insulting, it wasn't meant that way. I've debated you in other threads and I have a lot of respect for your views (hence "mate"). The light weight comments and icons are only there because I try to avoid (obviously not working) making my response sound like an angry attack on a poster. Should I just come out and bluntly say your views are "silly"?

Cheers, mate :p

[mdiehl]

Drongo -

It's not the icons. It's the slur on motives. See your p that concludes with "end trolling."

Savo: torpedo doctrine was partly implemented there by the IJN and torp use substantially successful there because of other factors having nothing to do with USN night experience, training or doctrine. Find three torp-doctrine actions at G'canal, if you can, and then look at the initial conditions. The only clear cut drop dead doctrinal failure by the USN is Tassafaronga, and the USN DD commodore was practically begging to be allowed to shoot.

As to the game: It comes down to whether you think it is reasonable to allow players to choose the ships in their TFs. From your POV the USN player should not be allowed in 1942 to create a DD TF without attaching it to a CA gun line. Or else you would want the DD TF to be qualitatively inferior w/respect to torp doctrine, absent a CA gun-line, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. Either choice leaves the Allied player (arbitrarily and without any supporting historical evidence) penalized if for some reason DDs are the *only* units available, as at Bppn.

[Drongo]

Posted by mdiehl

It's not the icons. It's the slur on motives. See your p that concludes with "end trolling."

I think you misunderstood, I was implying I was "trolling" for your response (refer light weight approach).

Savo: torpedo doctrine was partly implemented there by the IJN and torp use substantially successful there because of other factors having nothing to do with USN night experience, training or doctrine.

....and (IMO) a lot to do with high level of IJN training at night. Other conditions set it up but the IJN's competence at night made it work.

Find three torp-doctrine actions at G'canal, if you can, and then look at the initial conditions.

Why 3? Your cramping me a bit given (as you know) there were only 5 major actions.

In my posts to this thread, I have always defined the "torpedo doctrine" of the IJN as being their intent of loosing torps at the earliest opportunity and to try to do so in a co-ordinated, multi ship manner. If your talking a "torpedo first" attack, both Savo and Tassafaronga are your classic examples (both had the IJN firing their torps either without gunfire or using their guns only after they fired torps - the fact that the US were the initiators at Tassafaronga only makes the IJN use of the "doctrine" clearer - they responded to the attack by firing torps). You can also include the action on the night of 21st Aug between the USN Blue and the IJN Kawakaze . If you use my definition of the IJN torpedo doctrine, I'd also include the actions of the IJN light forces that operated ahead of the Kirishima's group at 2nd Guadalcanal.

You can tell me all about the initial conditions, I don't think its relevant to my point as to what set up or initiated the engagement. All I'm concerned with is how well the IJN conducted themselves in the circumstances of the night battle. In every action I've mentioned, superior IJN ability at night enabled them to best the USN when the opportunity was given. Explain to me how the IJN "torpedo doctrine" does not show up in these examples? My point has always been that the IJN had a proven superior ability (training/exp/"doctrine") at night in '42 over that of the USN. This allowed the IJN to regularly (4 out of 6?) carry out their "torpedo doctrine" attacks succesfully. We have no proven evidence that the USN (DD's) were capable of regularly equalling the IJN at this in '42 (show me three :p .)

As to the game: It comes down to whether you think it is reasonable to allow players to choose the ships in their TFs. From your POV the USN player should not be allowed in 1942 to create a DD TF without attaching it to a CA gun line. Or else you would want the DD TF to be qualitatively inferior w/respect to torp doctrine, absent a CA gun-line, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. Either choice leaves the Allied player (arbitrarily and without any supporting historical evidence) penalized if for some reason DDs are the *only* units available, as at Bppn.

No, I've never argued that the USN DD's had to be tied to CA's in UV. You can't do this in UV anyway. Yes, IMO (as stated before) the USN DD's were not as capable as the IJN in operating at night in '42, therefore, they would have less chance than "experienced" IJN forces in UV of delivering a "torpedo doctrine" attack. Where's the "plenty of evidence" to suggest they could deliver the attacks as well as the IJN (show me the three). Remember, we're talking each torpedo equipped ship in UV that has sighted a target checking (rolling) against its experience to see if it fires early. This does not preclude the USN DD's firing, it just means that more IJN ships would be likely to do so than that of the USN.

So tell me, have you ever played UV or not? :p

[mdiehl]

Drongo

Since you want clarification -

Do you actually read what I say or do you just get so angry at the thought that someone could be giving credit to the IJN

That's what offends. It's most definitely a slur on my motives, and has no bearing on the merits of the arguments put forth by either of us.

I can name two actions that show the USN DDs would do it. 1. Bppn. and 2. Tassafaronga, *but for the refusal of the CA commander to grant permission.* There is absolutely no doubt that absent the CA gun line at Tassafaronga, the USN DDs would have launched said torp-doctrine attack, because it is an established fact that they begged permission to launch said attack. Absent a higher officer refusing permission, there'd have been *nothing* to stop them.

I don't count an action between two pickets as a multi-ship-salvo torp doctrine attack but won't bandy about Blue. In ship-v-ship engagements and in larger engagements where the cohesion began to break down, there's plenty of torp shots by both sides. These are not particularly relevant to the suggestion made by poster "Yamamoto" in his recommended UV patch, at least not according to my understanding of his suggested "fix."

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
Drongo -

It's not the icons. It's the slur on motives. See your p that concludes with "end trolling."

Savo: torpedo doctrine was partly implemented there by the IJN and torp use substantially successful there because of other factors having nothing to do with USN night experience, training or doctrine. Find three torp-doctrine actions at G'canal, if you can, and then look at the initial conditions. The only clear cut drop dead doctrinal failure by the USN is Tassafaronga, and the USN DD commodore was practically begging to be allowed to shoot.

As to the game: It comes down to whether you think it is reasonable to allow players to choose the ships in their TFs. From your POV the USN player should not be allowed in 1942 to create a DD TF without attaching it to a CA gun line. Or else you would want the DD TF to be qualitatively inferior w/respect to torp doctrine, absent a CA gun-line, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. Either choice leaves the Allied player (arbitrarily and without any supporting historical evidence) penalized if for some reason DDs are the *only* units available, as at Bppn.

What plenty of evidence? Is there any evidence that the Allies would be able to make a *successful* torp attack in a surface action involving *manuvering warships* in the UV time period?

What historic evidence would lead you to believe that any allied torp attack would have the same chance of being successful?

As I posted the score was 22 to 0 in 1942. It was 30 to 6 if you include 1943.

There is plenty of evidence to the contrary. The following examples are instances when Allied DDs detached from the battleline launched independent torpedo attacks.

Bandoeng Strait: a total 7 allied DDs in two seperate attacks operating ahead of CLs launched two full spreads approx. 40 torps in all against to IJN DDs and a Transport. The result zero hits. IJN sank an Allied DD with torps

Java Sea: 4 USN DDs *splitting off* from the Gun line launched a counter attack with successive torpedo launges; expending all their torpedos and registrering zero hits. IJN scored torp hits on 1 DD and 2 Cls.

Loss of Blue: 2 USN DDs dispatched to intercept a IJN DD. One USN DD sunk by torpedo before either USN DD could launch an attack. IJN DD escapes unharmed.

Cape Esperance: USN DD Duncan, detaching itself from the line and launched a torp attack. Result zero hits and Duncan sunk by gunfire.

1st Guadacanal: 5 USN detached and closed on IJN Battle line. launched torpedo attacks. Result zero hits and 4 out of 5 DDs sunk.

[TIMJOT]

Earth to Mdiehl........

How many times do I have to tell you the Blue and Henley were dispactched to *intercept* and *attack* the IJN DD Kamakaze. They were *NOT* as you continuely state on picket duty.

[mdiehl]

Thanks for adding Badoeng Strait to the growing list of battles in which Allied ships did *launch* said multiple ship torpedo doctrine attack as described by poster "Yamamoto."

Let's look at the battle in detail, boysengirls. Gee, it was a *daylight* action fought at the limit of range of Allied torpedoes. How does zero hits in a daylight action compare with the IJN record? Lookitthat, zero hits happens to be the modal hit rate (also zero) for the IJN in *all* attacks including day and night battles, looking at 26 engagements. At Badoeng Strait, however, Asashio did some exceptionally good shooting for the IJN, hitting the Dutch DD Piet Hein with 1 torp. Of the 8 Type 93s fired by the IJN in the engagement, this was the only hit giving the IJN in that engagement a 12.5% hit rate. In the same battle, IJN DD Michisio was considerably damaged, suffering 96 cas from gunfire.

Let's look at other engagements shall we. How about Java Sea.
IN this stellar performance, IJN ships executed 38 separate launches of a probable 164 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 3 hits which sank the RNN CL De Ruyter, CL Java and DD Kortenaer. The attack was neither a torpedo doctrine attack as described by the fix posited by "Yamamoto" (an initial torp salvo). The stellar IJN shooting yielded them a hit rate of 1.8%.

On to Sunda Strait. Let's let Joseph Czarnecki's analysis speak for itself. "During action the six IJN ships executed 7 launches of a
probable total of 37 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 5 hits which sank USN CA Houston and RAN CL Perth. This is a probably hit rate of 13.5%. This performance is marred by an additional five hits scored on IJN transports and a minesweeper by a misaimed
launch from CA Mogami. This action fits into the Decisive Battle scenario as representative of the chaos of having a small hostile unit slip into the midst of multiple friendly formations. This would cut both ways during the projected night battle."

The costs of this battle? Roughly 17000 displacement tons of Allied hardware, most of which started the battle out of ammo (and Houston with a turret jammed in train from a previous bomb hit), in return for over 27,000 long tons (note to wonks: a MCS capacity in long tons is by definition less than its displacement) of IJN shipping. Notably, these attacks were not delivered as an initial broadside as advocated by "Yamamoto" but rather in a series of attacks. Mitigating circumstances would indicate that the IJN had reason to shoot with guns, given that some IJN vessels were taking fire *immediately* from Perth. In hindsight, given the major self-inflicted gunshot wound inflicted by the IJN, they'd have been better served to let Perth and Houston slip away (Houston would have been laid up until the G'canal campaign anyhow, given her damaged turret and the need for refit, so her short term strategic significance was nil), but it is not in the nature of talented warriors to shirk from their tasks.

We'll skip Savo except to note that attacking a lax, fatigued Allied force divided into two groups with no CIC, and with tactical surprise, the IJN had a hit rate of 12%. I'm talked out on Savo.

Let's look at the loss of Blue, again from Joseph Czarnecki's excellent analysis of IJN torp doctrine: "Having dropped off its Tokyo Express run, an IJN DD encountered two USN DDs escorting a pair of transports, making an attack of opportunity. The IJN DD crippled one USN DD which was later scuttled, but failed to follow up its success. The IJN DD made a probable single launch of 4 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 1 hit which crippled USN DD Blue."

This is a rather nice 25% hit rate (and a statistical outlier) against a USN group tied down to transports. The USN DDs fulfilled in substance the duty of pickets -- to warn of enemy attack and conduct spoiling attacks in defence of escorted vessels. You'll see this card played again at 2nd G'canal.

Cape Esperence. "The Battle of Cape Esperence: A USN force of two CAs, two CLs, and five DDs looking to intercept a Tokyo Express run encountered and ambushed its covering force
of three IJN CAs and two DDs. The USN forces sank one CA and one DD and severely damaged a second CA, handing the IJN its first defeat in a surface engagement, but failing to intercept the supply run. During the action, one CA may have conducted a
launch of at least 2 Type 93 torpedoes, scoring 0 hits. This is a hit rate of 0%. This action fits into the Decisive Battle scenario as an example, on a small scale of how an attacker can be surprised and defeated in disorder."

With respect to UV and conversations in this forum, this battle also shows that rumours of night training giving the IJN better reactions to being ambushed at night (a position supported by the results of Tassafaronga), Cape Esperence contradicts the claim.

Must I go through every battle to explain why initial conditions, CAC, alert status, assigned jobs (escort, picket, battle line) had a much more obvious impact on outcomes than such intangibles as training or the *manifestly* fallacious claim that USN DD commodores lacked a torpedo doctrine? Let's skip to the ending.

Here' are Czarnecki's conclusions, FYI:

"In terms of efficiency (rounds expended per hit obtained) the Japanese needed to achieve a rate of 6.67:1. In actuality, they achieved a rate of 16.76:1. Instead of achieving a hit rate equivalent to slightly more than one per average destroyer (8-tube Kagero Class) firing a full load, the IJN achieved a rate slightly worse than one per two full loads fired from an average destroyer."

To repeat. "Slightly worse than one per two full loads fired from an average destroyer."

Why was this?

"The first [the second is a discussion of IJN torp duds and depth setting probklems -- MD] is a review of the Type 93 torpedo by range fired, and speed setting employed. The dismal performance in such long-range actions as Java Sea and Komandorski Islands, and the relative success in the close-range actions of the Solomons Campaign, imply that the weapon’’s speed was a greater asset than its range. It may be that the Japanese misappreciated their own weapon and would have been better
served by a plan which eschewed ““long-range concealed firing”” in favor of short- range attacks that offered the enemy less time to evade."

That conclusion is consistent with the fact that most IJN torp hits were at ranges under 8000 yards, fired, not as initial volleys from the cloak of darkness and distance ("Yamamoto's" proposed fix to UV) but in the heat of the brawl.

So, I'd expect a USN DD group if it were undetected to attempt a torp doctrine attack. The success would be primarily contingent on the range, the alert status of the enemy, and the disposition of forces, as it seems to have been for the IJN victories.

[TIMJOT]

Okay one more time. I said S U C C E E D ! As in being successfull. Success defined as actually hitting something. You dont get points for just putting fish in the water.

Again the score 22 ships to 0 in the first year of the war.

You like to recite how variable IJN hit rates were. Anywhere between 0 - 25 % I believe. You seem to ignore the fact that allied hit rate was between 0 - 0 during that same time period. No variable there.

I stand by my statement that the historical record indicates that an allied torpedo attack would have a less chance to succeed.

BTW. Bandoeng strait was fought at night. Roughly between 10:00pm and 2:00am.

Again one final time. The Blue and Henely were in fact DETACHED from the convoy. As in no longer tied down as you say. They were on a search and destroy mission ther were not on pickett duty.

[Drongo]

Posted by mdiehl

Since you want clarification -
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you actually read what I say or do you just get so angry at the thought that someone could be giving credit to the IJN
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That's what offends. It's most definitely a slur on my motives, and has no bearing on the merits of the arguments put forth by either of us.

Thats strange, I thought there was a smiley face attached to my quote (refer light weight comments).

You seem to be very sensitive for someone who will often bluntly tell other posters that they don't know what they're talking about.

My quoted comment was in jest but since you have brought it up, I feel that it could also have some justification in the way that these discussions have gone.

Every time I've tried to explain what I considered this thread was about (in game terms), how the game currently portrays surface combat, why the "systemic solution" was appropriate to consider and why including your suggestions will not achieve the desired game objective, you rarely make an effort to deal directly with what I said. Instead, you normally attempt to justify your stance on the relative IJN/USN historical capabilities. When I attempt to then meet your historical arguements, rather than responding to my points, you normally then give either a completely new point of justification to me or reply that you are simply responding to Yamamoto's post. If I really had been frustrated, I think I would have had cause.

For example, you posted the following.

Savo: torpedo doctrine was partly implemented there by the IJN and torp use substantially successful there because of other factors having nothing to do with USN night experience, training or doctrine. Find three torp-doctrine actions at G'canal, if you can, and then look at the initial conditions. The only clear cut drop dead doctrinal failure by the USN is Tassafaronga, and the USN DD commodore was practically begging to be allowed to shoot

I said that the ability of the IJN to successfully execute the attack at Savo had a lot to do with their high level of night training. You made no response.
I asked, why did I have to supply 3 battles? You gave no answer as to why or even what the whole exercise was about.
I gave you 4 examples. You qualified one as a picket action and made no mention of the rest.
I asked you to explain your point about the relevance of initial conditions as I did not feel it was relevant. No response.
I asked you to return the favour and also name 3. In response, I got one that wasn't even at Guadalcanal and one other that was (in which, you stated, the USN DD's did not get the chance to launch the torpedo doctrine attack).

As to the game: It comes down to whether you think it is reasonable to allow players to choose the ships in their TFs. From your POV the USN player should not be allowed in 1942 to create a DD TF without attaching it to a CA gun line. Or else you would want the DD TF to be qualitatively inferior w/respect to torp doctrine, absent a CA gun-line, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. Either choice leaves the Allied player (arbitrarily and without any supporting historical evidence) penalized if for some reason DDs are the *only* units available, as at Bppn.

You had "told" me that one of my points of view on DD's was that they had to be attached to CA's in '42. I pointed out that I had never said that. No response. (being wrongly told what my point of view was and, after clarifying what it really was, not receiving recognition that a mistake had been made, could almost be considered an insult by some people).

Also,
you had stated previously that you no longer knew what I thought the subject was. I explained it. No response.
I also explained my concept of what "torpedo doctrine" meant in both historical and game terms as it seemed to be central to what we were debating. You gave no recognition of this.

As to the whole debate we're now locked into,

I think this will just remain as a stalemate between us. I will continue to argue that the "systemic solution" is appropriate as it is appears to be a simple way of allowing both sides the potential to deliver an early, multi-ship torpedo attack while still using only (I assume) values already existing in UV.

This also gives each IJN ship a greater chance than the allied torpedo carrying ships of being involved in the initial torpedo firing round during combats in '42 (due to experience % differences). I think this is justified and I have continually argued why. You do not think it is justified and continue to argue why.

We also seem to be in complete disagreement with the value of the IJN's night training.

Neither of us (nor TIMJOT, I've noticed) can be swayed by the opposing arguements.

Since we've all stated our views and aren't prepared to change them, is there any point continuing the debate since it is now down to only the 3 of us?

[Nikademus]

Excellently argued Drongo, TIMJOT.

The only thing i can add to this, is to clarify the latest "source" being used by your opponent.

The title of the post/essay alone has merit in of itself.

"Were the *Best* good enough?"
(The Performance of Japanese Surface Forces in Torpedo Attack versus the expectations of the Decisive Battle Strategy)

The thesis of the essay was to ask the question of whether or not the Japanese focus on torpedo tactics, as part of the overall
"Decisive Battle" strategy vs a Plan Orange USN counter-attack would have been sufficient to give them a theorized 'statistical' enough hit rate to have succeeded. The first paragraph makes this clear;

**
The acumen of World War Two Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser and destroyermen in torpedo attack is an accepted fact. The range and power of their Type 93 torpedo (dubbed the “Long Lance” by historian Morison) have become the stuff of legend. To call the Japanese surface forces the best at torpedo attack is easily defensible.

But were they good enough to meet the standard required for their own strategic and tactical preconceptions? <snip>

**

The article was not about comparing the acrumen of USN and IJN Destroyermen or their ability to use overall night battle doctorine.
The IJN dominance in that area is established from the get go. The article though then goes on to discuss (in the author's opinion) whether it would generate enough results to make a difference in an overall fleet battle.

[TIMJOT]

Thanks for bringing that up Nicademus. I am very familiar with the aforementioned essay. As you, I find it interesting and compelling, but hardly relevent to the context of this debate.

I find it interesting how some love to recite this particular source's numbers as though they are fact. When the author himselfs makes no pretence as such. He readily admits having to make assumptions or educated guesses regarding the number of torpedos expended in some engagements. The lack of concrete numbers make it impossible verify that the percentages are correct. To the authors credit he makes it perfectly clear that his thesis is just that "a thesis" not a historical document.

Again, just to make it perfectly clear I have nothing against the aforemention essay. I found it compelling and he's conclusions quite plausible, but as Nikademus points out its hardly relevent to the debate, and if anything supports rather than disputes the arguement the IJN was superior in the torpedo attack.

[Drongo]

Posted by Nikademus

But were they good enough to meet the standard required for their own strategic and tactical preconceptions? <snip>

Mate,
I thought we'd managed to drive everyone away from this thread.

I think I came across the article you refer to a little while back (and recognised some of the hit %'s that mdiehl has quoted before).

It pointed out that the IJN, based on their actual WWII torp hit rates, would not have been able to inflict the required damage at night on the USN fleet to give them the advantage in the battle line to battle line action next morning (if the two battle fleets had clashed as expected). I found no fault with the logic.

I have not been concerned with argueing over hit %'s for three reasons.
1) I never saw anyone advocate the use of any hit % other than what is already in the game, as accuracy was never the issue in any of the posts that discussed the thread problem.
2) I had always argued that I favoured the proposed thread solution (or something similar) as it would give at least some chance of each torp carrying ship getting an opportunity (depending on the initial tactical situation generated by the existing UV routine and the ship's night experience level in UV) to release their torps prior to the battle settling into the gunfire "slugging match" of UV (and hence giving some chance of a Savo or Tassafaronga style victory without the need for a major game combat overhaul).
3) The chance of torp equipped ships to both recognise an opportunity to release their salvo (and be able to do so) should (IMO) be very much centered around their night training+experience+doctrine. The accuracy of that strike can then be entirely left up to the existing UV routine to decide (in other words, the hit % will be the same as in the game now - the solution would just mean that torps could sometimes bring about a Savo/Tass result - something impossible at the moment).

Thanks for the post and reference:)

TIMJOT, are you happy with the existing torp hit % in UV?