Allied fighters suck

[mdiehl]

Eastern Solomons (Lundstrom, 1st Team at Guadalcanal)

F4Fs lost to A6Ms
Dufilo to Hidaka’s shotai, p.131

A6Ms to F4Fs
Hoyashi to Sumrall, p.130
Unid. A6M to Gay, p.143
Unid. A6M to Disque or Knight p.143
Unid. A6M to Halford, p.144
2 Unid. Hidaka Shotai A6M to Runyon and/or Starkes p.139

MIA A6M accounted before by above Unids. Komachi, Garu, Shigeru, Hajime, Tosihara, Sadamu (of these, two ditched).

MIA USN F4Fs Reid, Barnes
MIA possible friendly AAA or Zeroes Smith, Bass

Totals: A6Ms lost to F4Fs 8, unaccounted for: 2, sum: 10
Totals F4Fs lost to A6Ms 1, unaccounted for: 4, sum: 5.

Santa Cruz (same reference as above):
A6Ms lost to F4Fs:

Utsumi to Mead (?), p.367
Kawasaki to Mead (?), p.367
Matsumato to multiple elements of Reaper 1, p.367
Seki to Souza, p.373
Okamato to Sorensen and Jennings, p.374
Yukuo to Bilss p.393
Hoshiya to Emerson? P.403
Osamori to Emerson? P.403
Yoshisuki to elements of division Blue 4 p.387-388, 406

F4Fs lost to A6Ms:
Mead to Hidaka or Matsumoto, p.368
Rhodes to elements of 16th shotai, p.368
Johnson to Seki, p.373
Franklin to elements of 11th shotai, p.389
Landry to ekements of 13th shotai, p.389
Formanek to Miyajima and Masashi p. 393
Caldwell to Shirane or other shotai element p.403

F4Fs unaccounted for:
Leppla, somewhere in pp.368-370, possibly to A6Ms Hidaka or Matsumoto
Bower, possibly to Okamoto and Maki, p.373, or not accounted for p.381
Fulton, possibly to Shirane (p.403)

Totals: A6Ms lost to F4Fs: 9
F4Fs lost to A6Ms: 7 (possibly as many as 10).

Lundstrom, John B. The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 1994. Reprint 2005.

[mdiehl]

You are confused. I never said that the F4F's shot down over Wake came from Lundstrom's work. I also never said they were navy F4F's.

Pretty disingenuous of you to bring up that claim as a rebuttal when I've been talking about VF combat. One supposes you're talking about the defense of Wake in 1941. I'll trade an F4F for a DD any day.

VF-2? what the whole escort, low power again....what? the whole time?

What part of "entered the fight at low power settings" was not clear? Or are you still desperately fishing for an escape clause to save you from your embarressing lack of knowledge. Here's an offer. You dive out of the conversation and I won't leave you burning on the water again.

[mdiehl]

Right in the text it says fewer than one quarter. You're doing the selective reading.

I doubt that you've read it right. If 110 planes were lost from a complement of 4 IJN CVs that typically carried 50 to 80 a.c, then your 440 a.c. required to get 25% losses require two ghost IJN CV platforms that weren't in the fight.

[Astarix]

I'm not any kind of expert here, but I believe the citation read 110 "aircrew" not 110 "aircraft". Thus the less than 25% of the total aircrew at the battle. Total aircraft losses would seem to be on the order of 100% from all causes, given that all four Japanese carriers were sunk.

Reading between the lines it would seem that the only conclusion anyone can draw from this argument is that there was a rough parity, through the period in question, given all factors. Including durability of airframes, training, experience, localized factors (such as basing in the middle of an ongoing ground battle), national doctrine and so forth.

The display of name calling reflects poorly on everyone who engages in it, regardless of cause, and automatically lessons the value of ones argument regardless of how well sourced or reasoned it may be. The only thing it demonstrates is inflexibility. Which isn't to say I, like others, don't find it amusing.

I agree with UniformYankee, this thread needs more...

ALLIED FIGHTERS SUCK!!

Merry Christmas or Happy Holidays whatever yours may be.

Jason

[Sardaukar]

Well, I think I believe what Lt Col Jack Bauer, commander of Cactus fighter force and Joe Foss said about F4F vs. Zero.

"A Zero can go faster that you can, it climbs faster than you can and it can outmaneuver you. Aside from those things, you got a better airplane."

"If you meet Zero at same altitude and speed, you are outnumbered and should go home."

If they considered Zero being better in those aspects, it is good enough for me. This was of course offset by better Allied tactics and co-operation, so that even early war losses were not lopsided but quite even. IJNAF was beaten back by first generation fighters like F4F anyway.

[xj900uk]

Thank you & agreed.  I will go with the pilots on the ground who experienced Air-2-Air for themselves.  The Cactus pilots were very experienced and skilled, yet it is obvious they considered the Zero the better plane and thus developed tactics and teamwork to try and nullify this advantage (which by & large worked).  Thatch did the same thing for the USN and Chennault was about a year ahead of both with the AVC.
Over Guadacanal the Zero's were operating at maximum range from Rabaul (why the Japanese never finished the landing strip at Shortlands or started the emergency one at Munda sooner is beyond me) which is a disadvantage to begin with,  and a lot of their top aces & pilots perished over Guadanal or on the return leg (remember,  most Zero's had no radios or survival gear, and the Japanese pilot rescue & recovery organisation was non-existant unlike the USN/USAAF)

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Thank you & agreed.  I will go with the pilots on the ground who experienced Air-2-Air for themselves.  The Cactus pilots were very experienced and skilled, yet it is obvious they considered the Zero the better plane and thus developed tactics and teamwork to try and nullify this advantage (which by & large worked).  Thatch did the same thing for the USN and Chennault was about a year ahead of both with the AVC.
Over Guadacanal the Zero's were operating at maximum range from Rabaul (why the Japanese never finished the landing strip at Shortlands or started the emergency one at Munda sooner is beyond me) which is a disadvantage to begin with,  and a lot of their top aces & pilots perished over Guadanal or on the return leg (remember,  most Zero's had no radios or survival gear, and the Japanese pilot rescue & recovery organisation was non-existant unlike the USN/USAAF)

I really really wanted to avoid this thread, for obvious ad hominim reasons. BUT...I would offer that I suspect that the USN pilots, while recognizing the limitations of their airframes (manueverability, rate of climb, etc.) vis a vis the zero probably also recognized the strengths of their aircraft (firepower, rate of fire, armor, frame survivability, radio communication, self-sealing fuel tanks to limit the 'Ronson' effect of the zero, dive rate, etc.). You do the best against your enemy with what you have.

Thus, I would argue that the USN aviators felt that the F4F was not the same plane as the A6M and strove to identify ways to apply its strengths against the opponent's weaknesses. To (badly) paraphrase Sun Tzu, "Strike emptiness with fullness". I doubt that most of the USN aviators, given an opportunity to swap airframes, would have selected the A6M as their battle chariot, F4F warts and all.

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Thank you & agreed.  I will go with the pilots on the ground who experienced Air-2-Air for themselves.  The Cactus pilots were very experienced and skilled, yet it is obvious they considered the Zero the better plane and thus developed tactics and teamwork to try and nullify this advantage (which by & large worked).  Thatch did the same thing for the USN and Chennault was about a year ahead of both with the AVC.
Over Guadacanal the Zero's were operating at maximum range from Rabaul (why the Japanese never finished the landing strip at Shortlands or started the emergency one at Munda sooner is beyond me) which is a disadvantage to begin with,  and a lot of their top aces & pilots perished over Guadanal or on the return leg (remember,  most Zero's had no radios or survival gear, and the Japanese pilot rescue & recovery organisation was non-existant unlike the USN/USAAF)

I really really wanted to avoid this thread, for obvious ad hominim reasons. BUT...I would offer that I suspect that the USN pilots, while recognizing the limitations of their airframes (manueverability, rate of climb, etc.) vis a vis the zero probably also recognized the strengths of their aircraft (firepower, rate of fire, armor, frame survivability, radio communication, self-sealing fuel tanks to limit the 'Ronson' effect of the zero, dive rate, etc.). You do the best against your enemy with what you have.

Thus, I would argue that the USN aviators felt that the F4F was not the same plane as the A6M and strove to identify ways to apply its strengths against the opponent's weaknesses. To (badly) paraphrase Sun Tzu, "Strike emptiness with fullness". I doubt that most of the USN aviators, given an opportunity to swap airframes, would have selected the A6M as their battle chariot, F4F warts and all.

Indeed they seem to have done that. Allied pilots, especially USN, did learn quite fast to fight on their terms, not enemy's.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Thank you & agreed.  I will go with the pilots on the ground who experienced Air-2-Air for themselves.  The Cactus pilots were very experienced and skilled, yet it is obvious they considered the Zero the better plane and thus developed tactics and teamwork to try and nullify this advantage (which by & large worked).  Thatch did the same thing for the USN and Chennault was about a year ahead of both with the AVC.
Over Guadacanal the Zero's were operating at maximum range from Rabaul (why the Japanese never finished the landing strip at Shortlands or started the emergency one at Munda sooner is beyond me) which is a disadvantage to begin with,  and a lot of their top aces & pilots perished over Guadanal or on the return leg (remember,  most Zero's had no radios or survival gear, and the Japanese pilot rescue & recovery organisation was non-existant unlike the USN/USAAF)

I really really wanted to avoid this thread, for obvious ad hominim reasons. BUT...I would offer that I suspect that the USN pilots, while recognizing the limitations of their airframes (manueverability, rate of climb, etc.) vis a vis the zero probably also recognized the strengths of their aircraft (firepower, rate of fire, armor, frame survivability, radio communication, self-sealing fuel tanks to limit the 'Ronson' effect of the zero, dive rate, etc.). You do the best against your enemy with what you have.

Thus, I would argue that the USN aviators felt that the F4F was not the same plane as the A6M and strove to identify ways to apply its strengths against the opponent's weaknesses. To (badly) paraphrase Sun Tzu, "Strike emptiness with fullness". I doubt that most of the USN aviators, given an opportunity to swap airframes, would have selected the A6M as their battle chariot, F4F warts and all.

AMEN! The Zero (as virtually all Japanese aircraft, was built to meet very specific guidelines. Extreme manueverability and extreme range were the top priorities..., and virtually all other aspects of design were sacrificed to these ends. It made them very effective in their designed roles, especially when their opponents would co-operate and play the "dogfight game".

It also made them horribly vulnerable to ANY fire from anything..., a problem that none of the opposing A/C shared. And when the opposition began refusing to play the "dogfight game", it leveled the playing field. The Zeroes were more likely to get into position to shoot at Allied A/C with their advantage in maneuver---but the Allies were much more likely to destroy a Zero when they got a shot at it.

[Sardaukar]

The words of LT Cmdr John Thach, August 1942:

In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we had against the Zero is not due to performance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by few of their pilots and superior marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots.

Words of VMF-121 veteran Roger Haberman: ...we'd work like hell to to climb to 23 000 - 24 000ft. At that altitude when you make a turn, you lose 1000 ft and it's very easy to stall out. In theory F4F had a higher service ceiling but not in practice. You'd look up and there sit the Japs at 30 000 ft looking right down your gazoo. A real fun time. You couldn't get that bird much higher than 24 000: not you, not Jesus, nobody. The bird wouldn't go any higher.

Seems that recorded words of veterans who flew F4F against Zero considered latter having very much advantage in many aspects. Those were not words of beaten guys, but those who often were aces and double aces. Their successes did not come from superior aerial ability of F4F, but from teamwork, skill and rugged durability of "Grumman Iron Works".

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

AMEN! The Zero (as virtually all Japanese aircraft, was built to meet very specific guidelines. Extreme manueverability and extreme range were the top priorities..., and virtually all other aspects of design were sacrificed to these ends. It made them very effective in their designed roles, especially when their opponents would co-operate and play the "dogfight game".

It also made them horribly vulnerable to ANY fire from anything..., a problem that none of the opposing A/C shared. And when the opposition began refusing to play the "dogfight game", it leveled the playing field. The Zeroes were more likely to get into position to shoot at Allied A/C with their advantage in maneuver---but the Allies were much more likely to destroy a Zero when they got a shot at it.

One quote from Japanese ace:

You'd always know if it was enemy plane or one of us that has crashed into sea. Ours left burning patch of fuel on surface.

Allied planes were usually able to put lot more "lead" in the air, thus head-on-pass was acceptable. Plus they could usually dive out unless suckered into "low & slow". One exception was Ki-61 Hien/Tony, in many aspects lot better fighter than Zero.

Fortunately, story of Ki-61, with words of E.M.Bergerud, is one "why Japan should not ever gotten into war against Allies".

[mariandavid]

In one respect the game reflects air combat more accurately than endless evaluations of turn v dive, power high versus weight low etc etc. In reality as demonstrated in those books that cover engagements consistently from both sides the prime determinants were observation and aptitude, with technical features (though exceedingly lovable to people like us) merely add ons. It correctly emphasises that relative heights, warning times etc matter first before the fun part of who goes on whose tail and for how long. I know far more about the Mediterranean airwar than the Pacific but suspect that the Allied inferiority of '42 and the superiority of '44 is a reflection more of increasing numbers, better radar and longer training than anything else. Note that I admit ignorance especially of the critical issue which is what was the proportion of kills achieved by crack pilots versus total kills in the Pacific region. We more or less know this for the RAF, LW, RA, USAAC fighters in the European - even in some cases down to the fascinating comparison of the ratio of fighter to bomber shot down and its implications in terms of dog-fighting. 
 
 

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Astarix

I'm not any kind of expert here, but I believe the citation read 110 "aircrew" not 110 "aircraft". Thus the less than 25% of the total aircrew at the battle. Total aircraft losses would seem to be on the order of 100% from all causes, given that all four Japanese carriers were sunk.

Reading between the lines it would seem that the only conclusion anyone can draw from this argument is that there was a rough parity, through the period in question, given all factors. Including durability of airframes, training, experience, localized factors (such as basing in the middle of an ongoing ground battle), national doctrine and so forth.

The display of name calling reflects poorly on everyone who engages in it, regardless of cause, and automatically lessons the value of ones argument regardless of how well sourced or reasoned it may be. The only thing it demonstrates is inflexibility. Which isn't to say I, like others, don't find it amusing.

I agree with UniformYankee, this thread needs more...

ALLIED FIGHTERS SUCK!!

Merry Christmas or Happy Holidays whatever yours may be.

Jason

Quite correct, sir. And I will add that 'aircrew' also is not limited to pilots, rather the figure includes all aircrew.

As far as the planes go - the Zero had some important advantages, and the F4F had some important advantages. The IJN started out with generally top notch pilots, the USN with some as good and many quite good. The early general lack of understanding of how the Zero's advantages would manifest themselves (or even maybe what were those advantages at all) was a problem for the USN. The relative speed with which the USN adapted to those performance disadvantages with teamwork and other tactics that played to the strength of their own aircraft is firm testimony on their behalf.

[frank1970]

Hm, the absence of The one poster we all love, cooled down the spirits in this debate ....... [;)]