I'm a bit lost when you specifically mentioned in previous posts that you were attempting to suggest the factors for a "Tassafaronga engine" for UV and yet now you say that Tassafaronga is an exception to your rules.
It was an editing error on my part. I wrote factors 1-4 and the preceding sentence then added #5 (and should have edited out the "Tfrnga is a glaring exception" sentence).
Drongo, I will concede the point that the USN DDs acting on their own would be *less* likely to launch a coordinated multi-ship attack in 1942 based on *your* pbp of Tfrnga... to this point. Much of the Tfrnga experience still comes down to technology on the USN side and of course firing long after the optimal solution had passed. Since we're talking about a game engine, *if* the UV engine becomes the engine for resolving naval combat in WitP (my primary interest), *then* the engine must consider SG radar and other initial circumstances. It is entirely possible in other island groups that circumstances might favor a meeting engagement where visual observation occurs at short ranges, or that more ships will have SG radar. Alot is going to depend on how much control the players are given over refit and so forth.
The real trick, then, is to assign probabilities of successful attacks that are consistent with historical hit rates, and that allow these same kinds of results to occur even if the battles occur elsewhere. It means that you have to accept the notion that more than one Tfrnga or Balikpapan might occur and look at the circumstances that favor hit rates as high as 12% at night.
Odds that the IJN would *launch* an initial salvo torp attack would be what, about 25%? And for a USN desron in 1942, say, about 10% initially, with possible increase of, say, 1% per engagement? (Again, the "virus model" of information dissemination seems to apply). If one uses the proposed Desron or TF "Group Experience" ratings mentioned in the WitP threads, then this can be tracked by Desron. You'd have higher chances for USN desrons that started the war operating together, and those that trained and deployed together as the war continued.
Re accuracy, "ability to fire or ability to hit" or "success." (1) Much of the IJN's ability to hit was contingent upon initial conditions that favored the IJN that had nothing to do with the relative experiences of the opponents. (2) The lousy hit rates achieved by the IJN on many occasions (*do* remember: modal hit rate zero, mean hit rate 6%, good hit rates 8-12%, statistical outliers in the 25% range) must be duplicated by the game engine. One would expect the better hit rates (setting aside statistical outliers for reasons that are obvious on statistical grounds and in looking at the actions in question) when one of the 5 circumstances that I mentioned exsists.
Finally, on a note that does not necessarily applly to the thread, *if* IJN night training was all that evident in combat, then one would expect them to have substantially better hit rates or at least less varied, *or else* one would have to suspect that strong circumstantial factors were in toto more deterministic than night training.
PBEM of WitP (if you buy it).