Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)

[Nemo121]

jay102, well we'll have to see. I'm thinking of giving AE a break and moving on but I suppose that once EA for AE comes out ( I've been tapping away at it for a short while, in some areas I've made major changes, in others, very minor changes. The production model, for example, is already pretty good.) I might try a Japanese game just to see what is possible and refine the design.


Hartwig, LoBaron,
I think we're talking with slightly different terms and probably agree more than we disagree... I often use innovative and extraordinary and unconventional to be the same thing. Basically what I'm getting at is a play style which enter the strategic analysis with no preconceptions and looks at everything with no assumptions. To do that is innovative and unconventional ( if you look at the AARs here you can see very, very few people go into an assessment without preconceptions ) and leads to "extraordinary" ( in soviet doctrinal terms as opposed to English vernacular terms ) operations.

Am I in favour of doing something because others don't? No but I am in favour of doing whatever an unbiased analysis shows as being preferable and oftentimes that will result in doing something the opponent will have discounted without properly examining it.

A real-world example of this would be the use of torpedoes at PH or going through the Ardennes in 1940, or Epaminondas vs the Spartans or Granicus or Issus. Hell, while it wouldn't apply to the first phase of Kadesh I think you could argue that it would apply to Rameses II's committment of follow-on forces in the second phase of Kadesh.


As to the need to prepare to counter every possible operation... I can see what you're driving at Hartwig but I think you're forgetting that the preparation for an operation does not necessarily mean physical committment of troops, planes and ships in-game. I certainly evaluate EVERY possible option my opponents can take ( recently I bolstered the defences at San Francisco a little to protect against a deep KB strike on San Francisco ) and don't consider it wasted effort.

However when I say prepping for a possible enemy operation I don't necessarily mean committing troops. I mean acknowledging the operation migth happen and evaluating its impact on your strategic plans. If it doesn't impact on your plans then your "prep" might simply be:
a) acknowledge that the operation is possible
b) assess the impact of the operation's success on my strategic plans
c) If this is negligible then don't commit anything to prevent the operation and let it happen if it happens.

Obviously that's a very bland, black and white example and in reality I usually try to find a way to turn an operation the enemy might plan to my favour but if I go into that level of detail the clarity of the argument will be lost.

Mostly though by evaluating all possible operations I seek to avoid being over-encumbered in the Orient and Decide portions of the OODA loop. Instead I'm pre-oriented and pretty much have previously decided on my reaction and maximal force committment. I usually haven't thought about it in great detail but I'll have a general idea about what I'd do... and that's enough.

So, I think the exact opposite of what you're worried about, Hartwig, is what actually happens.


As to encouraging operations which are strategically irrelevant - Certainly but to encourage a bad operation you first have to be open0minded enough to actually see it as being possible ( that's where a lot of people fall down ).


bklooste,
I never play for VP. Playing for VP in a game in which a DD sunk gets as many VP as 10 Tabbies crashing on landing is a rather laughable concept. No, bringing VP into play leads to clouding strategic thinking IMO. Each to their own of course.


LoBaron,
Sorry, I have to disagree with you. "innovative" operations which one's opponent never really foresaw are precisely the sorts of things to cause incorrect adaptation and win the initiative.But I think the bottom line problem is I've been rather loose with the terms.

Innovation, unconventionality etc all refers to being willing to go where the rational analysis without preconceptions takes you. A lot of people say they do that but they really don't.

He came up with a decision how to best adapt to your strategy and it is a very interesting one.

Hmm, I'm not sure about this... Unless he has posted something to his AAR about it I must say that I don't see any major strategic shift on his part. There have been some tactical and operational shifts - most of which have served tactical and operational goals but actually hurt his strategic situation- but I haven't seen anything strategic. Maybe he has explained it all on his AAR though but I thought he hadn't posted there in many, many weeks. Someone should go there and ask him. It'd probably be interesting for you guys to see what you can make of the two different viewpoints.

Couple of ground rules.
1. I've been open with him that I'm shipping troops into Southern Sumatra so you can feel free to say I've fortified that and shipped troops in.

2. I haven't mentioned anything to him about Java and the Southern DEI so probably best to play dumb on that score.

3. From what I can see he has no idea the RN is in the DEI region. As far as he knows he hasn't seen an RN ship in about 6 weeks.

4. Marshalls. I've been open with him about my committment there - as it served my purposes to do so - so you can feel free to talk about how the Marshalls, Marcus, Wake, Midway axis really hampers his advance into the Pacific.

5. He knows about the Northern China attempt to advance ( and his forces weathered that storm ) so you can feel free to talk about the CHina theatre openly. He can see my moves now and should already be sweating just how to apportion his forces from the south in order to rescue the centre and north. He can't know that supplies have pretty much stopped my advance - for now... I have supplies shipping into Burma. But, basically, feel free to be open about China in your discussions with him.


So, basically, please play dumb about Java and the Southern DEI but apart from that feel free to chat openly with him using insight from this AAR thread. I will ask not to post anything about my "what I'd do if I were Mike" plan though. That might just be a bit too helpful to him . Basically though you can relax about FOW except insofar as it applies to Java/DEI as that's crucial info I'm playing close to my chest.

[vettim89]

Great discussion here as always.

I find the use of terms here very interesting. I read conventional/unconventional, crazy/exceptional, etc. I think what it all comes down to is how far from the historical model the players drift. So if the conventional Allied approach is to defend the SRA with the weak forces that are already present then the conventional Japanese approach would be to seize these objections with a small but well trained IJA force in a lightning fast succession of invasions.

Of note, with the exception of the number of aircraft (and corresponding Av support/HQ), the troops being committed to Sumatra are those that historically were sent to Malaya as reinforcements; so in essence Nemo has taken the historical forces available to him and more prudently deployed them in more defensible terrain. If the IJA were to bring the overwhelming forces available to him (say from Manchuria), Nemo will only have lost what historically was lost in defense of SE Asia just in a different locale. What Nemo has done here is refused to be bound by historical convention and opting to not do what his opponent would deem as the most likely course of action.

That last statement is the key. The most successful players are those that are able to discern their opponents' intentions and undo the opponents' strategy by refusing to "play along". When it comes down to it, every strategic plan is based not only on one's own capabilities but also on how one expects his opponent to react to the actions requisite to the plan. Also, the OODA cycle comes into play as how quickly one discerns his opponent’s intentions and modifies his own approach is also key to being successful. As Nemo just pointed out, if you introduce a variable into your opponents OODA thinking that he has already considered and dealt with as he deems appropriate, you have not really seized the initiative. If however, you introduce a variable your opponent had not considered, then you have disrupted his OODA cycle and depending how quickly he reacts, may be able to seize the initiative. I think the example of Damian's play is an excellent illustration of this. As Damian became more "comfortable" with Nemo's playing style, he became a better opponent for Nemo. Not that he was a poor player before but, to state the obvious, Nemo's style of play is likely more challenging than most.

Lastly, I think a factor that has not been brought up is risk. We use the terms bold, unconventional, crazy, and aggressive vs. timid, conventional, sane, and conservative. What those mean to each of us is different but I think a lot of it comes down to how accepting of risk each of us are in our play style. Some are willing to make bold moves that have the potential to be disastrous if things go wrong but game changing if they go well. Others never make a move without there being a high chance of success. Neither approach is wrong. What is important is that you recognize both your play style and your opponent’s.

[Alfred]

Nemo121,

If your opponent had kept his AAR up to date, thereby disclosing (a) how much intel he had, and (b) what his current plans were, I probably would have posted something along the lines of my posts #379 and #382. To give him encouragement, subject to how much he knew of your southern Sumatran dispositions, I also probably would have engaged in a number crunching exercise along the lines of my post #395. Now however, following your post #401, it seems that if I post over there anything along those lines, I will be tipping him off. Well I suppose it is his loss for not keeping up to date his AAR.

Regarding the commentary made by others on the term "conventional". On this forum I employ it along the lines of meaning "stereotypical", "unthinking" and most particularly "frontal assault". Too many players, confronted with the size of the Allied force on southern Sumatra, would simply then approach the solution as being based on bringing more Japanese assets directly against Palembang. In other words join the meatgrinder and just add more. The "unconventional" approach is to see how to turn the Allied strength into a weakness.

Alfred

[Nemo121]

Alfred,

Personally I think you should feel free to post whatever you want to his AAR... He knows Sumatra is reinforced so I think you could post a number crunching exercise for "the DEI" and that wouldn't tip him off to anything. All I want to avoid is someone basically saying "Well, there's nothing in Java" through comission or omission. But I think discussion about there being massive reinforcement of the DEI is perfectly valid IMO.

I think a few posts just to make sure he's not going to come into Sumatra blindly would probably be helpful actually in making him recheck his planning assumptions and perhaps see things a bit more objectively. A game which ends with the destruction of the IJN at Oosthaven due to a lack of recon would be somewhat disappointing to me and I'd not like that to happen.


Vettim,
VERY good post. You actually managed to summarise about 3 of my posts very succinctly in your 3rd paragraph and stated what I was trying to say much more clearly than I managed. Thanks [:)]


P.s. By the way I'd like to state how gratifying it is to see so many different posters posting. Interesting discussions like this are why I write the AAR so, thanks guys, this is what motivates me to keep going.

[Capt. Harlock]

10. Pearl Harbour gets hit again with the full might of KB. A single strike aims to catch shipping being repaired and planes on the ground. Once that's done the invasion TF hoves into view and begins unloading on the islands around PH itself, uncrating fighters and bombers and setting up a Netty Nest which will remove Hawaii's utility to the Allies. The Pearl Harbour operation could happen by the end of June.

This strikes me as a classic high-risk operation. Yes, it could work, and yes, it would reap great rewards. But by the end of June the Americans can have rather powerful air assets in place. The KB's air-strike could take severe losses from fighters and AAA. B-17's and B-24's (historically available at Pearl in early June) could raid the surrounding islands, destroying more Netties than a Japanese player would care to lose. (My thinking is that one large airbase can suppress at least two and possibly three small ones.) Given the considerable losses of aircraft that the Japanese have already suffered, and the air assets necessary for successful invasions of both India and the DEI, this could end up breaking the back of the Japanese air arm.

[Nemo121]

Historically, historically, historically.

Surely it is utterly irrelevant how many B17s were there in June 1942 in real life. What matters is what is there in June in-game... If you go around not doing things because historically a given unit was at that base at a given time you're going to cripple your planning. Your opponent won't be following historical schedules.

[bklooste]

Historical is meaningless except as a means to fool your oponent into thinking you are following a histroical line and then divert at a critical moment, .
 
In Chess against all but Grand Master opponents its better to have a slightly inferior position and play your game rather than one your opponent knows well.
 
 

This strikes me as a classic high-risk operation. Yes, it could work, and yes, it would reap great rewards. But by the end of June the Americans can have rather powerful air assets in place. The KB's air-strike could take severe losses from fighters and AAA. B-17's and B-24's (historically available at Pearl in early June) could raid the surrounding islands, destroying more Netties than a Japanese player would care to lose. (My thinking is that one large airbase can suppress at least two and possibly three small ones.) Given the considerable losses of aircraft that the Japanese have already suffered, and the air assets necessary for successful invasions of both India and the DEI, this could end up breaking the back of the Japanese air arm.

 
KBs best pilots are gone anyway he has taken so many losses ..
 
Taking Hawaii will cost you LBA , troops ( you could loose 1-2 Divs) and KB pilots
 
You gain  , you can sink any damaged ships and a number of ships in port , you can attrition US air frames. More important Nemo probably has good assets in the Marshals (AA , inf reg , base forces , tanks and engineers)  by taking Hawaii you basically cut it off  this helps regains strategic intiaitive .  He cant be strong in Hawaii and the Marshals so my guess is Hawaii is weaker in which case its probably easier to take Hawaii apart from Oahu and then the Marshals.
 
A bad allied player will probably react reinforce/resupply PH and try to take Hawaii back ASAP , a good player will ignore it  leave Oahu as a flak trap and move south and supply via Fiji /Oz .  So any Japanese plan for Hawaii must handle these alternatives .
 
re B17s in Hawaii the KB will destory a few on the ground and its better having them in Hawaii then bombing your oil and loading convoys in  Borneo ....
 
Ben

[Nemo121]

I thought it would be useful to give a much clearer outline of just what is present in Southern Sumatra to help people understand my dispostions... Two key things to understand before considering these dispositions:

1. He can't get anything larger than a CA up the river to Palembang. If he wants BBs covering his invasion he MUST land at Oosthaven or Benkoenen.

2. He can't invade Benkoenen until either Java falls OR he moves his entire invasion TF north from Singapore past northern Sumatra ( which I still hold ), past Burma and that island off its coast ( which I've just forgotten the name of and which hosts naval search planes ) and then down the western coast of Sumatra... If he tries that I'll see him in plenty of time to move my reserve.


Oosthaven:
Port: 3
Airfield: 5
Forts: 5 ( 37% of the way to Level 6 forts ).
AV: 2,479
Guns: 1,238
Engineers: 439
Aviation Support 364
Support: Required 4040. Has 4,213

HQs: ABDA, Commandement Marine, KNIL Army, MLD.

Infantry: 6th Australian Division ( 469 AV, 70 Exp ), 18th British Division ( 429 AV, 42 Exp, 92% prep for Oosthaven - which isn't bad given that only some 96 days have passed since the beginning of the game. Basically I began prepping these units for Oosthaven with 5 days of game-start when the initial germs of this plan came together.), 8th Oz Division ( 403 AV, 53 Exp, 84% prep ).

48th GUrka, 63rd Indian Bdes, 1st and 2nd KNIL Regiments, Barisan Regiment, many KNIL Bns. Pretty much all of these are in the high 80s and low 90s of preparation and have Exp of 40 since they haven't seen any action.


CD Defences:
28 x 6" Mk V/ VII guns + 6 x 75mm CD guns.


Artillery and anti-tank guns ( many of which will fire to oppose any landings ):

2 lb ATG: 177
47mm ATG: 36
75mm arty: 48
3" mortar: 101
80mm mortar: 89
18 lber: 16
25 lber: 225
60 lber: 12
3.7" Mountain Gun: 5
4.5" arty: 10

So, overall, about 213 anti-tank guns, 190 mortars and about 294 medium guns, 10 guns over 100mm calibre and 12 super-heavy guns ( the 60 lbers ).


AAA:
40mm Bofors: 233
75mm: 10
3.7" AAA: 156


So, as you can see I went with very strong CD defences at Oosthaven because I figured Palembang would be much more likely to be hit by enemy bombers if he came directly at Sumatra before invading Java ( it is so much closer ) and because he can bring CAs and BBs to Oosthaven when he cannot do so handily to Palembang.


Palembang:

Port 4, Airfield 5, Forts 5 ( 8% of the way to 6 ), 110 mines

AV: 1,195, Aviation Support 216 ( about 50 AV is on the way from Palembang to bring this to over 250 ). Engineers 231.

HQs: Malaya, III Indian Corps, AHQ Far East.

Divisions:
11th Indian: 372 AV, 46% Experience and 78% Preparation.
9th Indian - 289 AV, 46% Exp, 88% Prep

Bdes: 44th, 45th and 46th India + SSVF Bde: All only about 20% Exp but Prep 96 to 99% so soon they'll reach 100% and boost their Experience to 50 by the middle of next month.

5 additional Bns.


Artillery: This is pretty weak since I don't need lots of arty to impale large shipping here....
3 " mortar: 70
2lbr ATG: 40
18 Lber: 29
25 lber: 30
3.7" Mountain Guns: 16
75mm CD GUNS: 8


AAA:
40mm: 169
3.7" AAA: 155

In the last month when he launched bomber raids against Palembang before all of the 3.7" guns were fully ready each raid was suffering between 50 to 66% loss rates. So, if he hits with Oosthaven or Palembang with bombers I expect them to destroy about 50% of each raid with just FlAK alone or force the bombers up so high they achieve nothing.


Lahat:
AV 1,008. Engineers: 213. Airfield 7, Forts Level 2.

HQ: 223rd and 224th RAF Groups - 1 of which is moving to Benkoenen to provide torpedo reloads for PBYs basing there.

7th Australian Division ( Reserve formation prepping for Benkoenen but held centrally to reinforce Palembang if they land there. Can move to Palembang within 3 days if necessary.)

Multiple Bns and a couple of Armoured Bdes: I'm counting anything which isn't a Stuart or Matilda as an armoured car. Using that as a benchmark the armoured forces of my reserve comprise 207 armoured cars and 139 Stuart Is.


Benkoenen:
Basically only has 150 AV, 34 engineers, Level 2 forts ( building rapidly though as I just freed an engineer Bn to help out at Benkoenen and it just arrived yesterday ). Benkoenen is weakly held since:
a) I have 1,000 AV 3 to 4 days away and
b) he can't really invade it until he takes Java and if he does take Java I'll just shift the 7th Oz Division to Benkoenen.

[Wirraway_Ace]

Nemo,

You have cited on multiple occasions the old Soviet constructs of Strategic, Operational and Tactical objectives and their interrelationship (subordination of operational to strategic and tactical to operational).  This brings back a certain intellectual nostalgia for these constructs, which I always found elegantly simple—even after translation to English.  Have you ever read the actual source documents?  My exposure has always been to translations and extensive (I suspect) interpretations.

I am also very intrigued by the interrelationship between your strategic objectives.  The capture of the Marshalls while building Fortress Southern-Sumatra strikes me as a chess-players “fork” as much as a purely military scheme.

Care to bare your soul a little and describe your background for those who don’t know you well?

[Nemo121]

Ah, to paraphrase Sun Bin: He who doesn't know himself or the enemy will lose, he who knows the enemy will win 50% of the time, he who, in addition, also knows himself will win 100% of the time... So, do I know myself and am I happy to give away my secrets to those who may not discern them for themselves? Yeah, sure


Soviet doctrine: No, I was never exposed to the source documents per se as I don't speak or read russian. What I mostly read was very good unbiased analysis at 1 remove from those primary documents. When the US Army puts its mind to it it can turn out very good analyses of doctrinal development in other countries and, before 9/11, one could get access to huge swathes of stuff which is now not at all so easily available.

Anyways, I'd say Glantz, House, Simpkin ( a bit before the time of House and Glantz but very good and very "British" ) were ones I read found were very reliable sources. As you say many sources interpret Soviet doctrine through Western eyes and, as such, mangle it horribly rendering their "translation" unworthy of reading. Apart from that I was fortunate enough to be involved in a few projects about a decade ago which led to interesting interactions with people who may or may not have been from no such agency and the British and US Armies - particularly some SF guys who were involved as "advisors" to various nations in Africa and had to "advise" Western-friendly troops on how to counter the Soviet-era tactics of their opposition. Real-world examples are always illuminating.

All such conversations would, obviously, have only been on publicly-available data obviously. As anyone who has had contact with anyone like that knows those are some very serious and genuine people and they'll cut you down in a heartbeat if you do anything untoward, as they should. Still, when you are talking about doctrinal issues from 70 to 30 years ago having to stay clear of anything which isn't publicly available isn't too difficult.



Chess-players forks... Hmm, it wasn't visualised as such but I think that chess boils strategy down to its essentials and one of the acmes of strategy is to give your opponent only losing choices. A fork in chess is just a very basic, obvious and powerful example of that.



In terms of gaming: I played chess when I was younger but it was difficult to find frequent high level opponents in Ireland once I left our equivalent of High School so I gave it up then. If I was American or British I'd have joined the army then. As it was the fact that the Irish Army wasn't going to see action meant I wasn't interested in joining and I'm not about to join a foreign army. So, since being an infantry officer was out of the question I went into medicine. A bit of a volte face but such is life.

I only started wargaming in my early 20s when I no longer played chess and first PBEMed about 10 years ago ( I only twice played paper wargames... I'm from the computer generation ). I got involved with SSI through complaining about inaccuracy in a few of their games ( I'm such a grog-nerd ) and went on to be Historical Consultant to a couple of their WW2 simulations and am happy to say that within the limits available those games were more accurate on release than they would otherwise have been. Later I got involved with Panzer Elite from Wings Simulations - which was really groundbreaking at the time in terms of graphics and scope - and was involved with a group which helped improve its historicity a lot prior to release. I don't think it was properly supported on release unfortunately. Since then I've been involved with quite a few wargames or warsims but I don't really test anymore... I think I can be of more benefit in terms of analysing the system and giving some input there. Why? Simple, I don't have the patience for testing but I'm pretty good at systems analysis and seeing how disparate things fit together to cause unanticipated consequences.

Later I was probably most involved with Combat Mission and alpha and beta tested that and that's where I first AARed. Over time though the developers there began running the forums as their own little fiefdom allowing bullying by posters they liked and punishing those they didn't and allowing political statements they agreed with while punishing those they didn't. Since they were rather right-wing that left a lot of Europeans feeling very hard done by. I don't care what anyone's beliefs are but I do think that EVERYONE must be treated the same. Either both viewpoints are allowed to post or none are. You can't favour either side. So, since I was young and thought that they might see the "error of their ways" I spoke up, often, and got banned . One reason I like the Matrix forums so much is that the admins DO let people post no matter what their belief and will treat both sides equally if they go overboard.

Anyways, CM was when I first realised I was somewhat good at tactical wargaming. At one stage I had a 120+ game unbeaten run and I began being approached by people asking me to give them tips etc. In the end I had a hidden website which was accessible by a small cadre of people who were interested in really learning tactics etc and that's how I drifted into being interested in AARs which had teaching and 360 degree critique as part of their foundation - which directly led to this AAR.

Being involved in "teaching" as it were with CM and having a bit of a reputation for following Soviet doctrine led to a lot of challenges by serving officers and I ended up playing a lot of US, Canadian and British Captains, Majors and a few Lieutenant Colonels --- which was extremely interesting. Several times we specifically had maps of German terrain made in order to fight doctrinal battles over. Sure Shermans vs Pz IVs isn't the same as M1s vs T80s but doctrinal play doesn't depend on the tank types involved so such matchups still have value. The basic conclusion I took was that the US and Allies would have slaughtered the Warsaw Pact along large portions of the front where only secondary efforts were made but that where the main efforts went in the Soviets WOULD have achieved breakthroughs. Once the battles had degenerated into generalised meeting engagements as the dislocated NATO line re-arranged I think NATO would have won many tactical victories but would have lost the main operational ones, leading to a strategic requirement to retreat westward and out of Germany. Eventually NATO would have had to use nukes.

Anyways, that doctrinal application then led to being asked to serve as a doctrinal proxy for the Soviets for a US Armoured Major's thesis on the use of off-the-shelf wargames for officer training. He was a tough, tough opponent but in the end we shared the spoils 1 win and 1 draw each but, more importantly, validated the ability to replicate the doctrines in-game ( he was using US 1980s, I went with 80s Soviet ). He sent me his thesis afterwards and it does look like the use of CM was pretty much validated for training and was able to show doctrine.

After that I began playing WiTP and that vampire has taken most of my gaming time until now. Recently I began to jones for a tactical fix again and began doing rather intensive research for a project which I think will interest a lot of people here. Nothing will be see the light of day for a year ( at least ) though but I think it'd interest people here.


Why Soviet doctrine? Simple, I always thought German doctrine was very good tactically but wasn't so sure about it operationally. I think American doctrine basically aped the Germans after WW2 and eventually culminated in AirLand Battle which was a means of ensuring every sub-unit manoeuvred for best position but I was just never convinced that it would lead to the overall unit achieving the best exchange rate etc. So, then I looked at the Soviets and saw in their lack of tactical nicety a greater purpose. I'd also point out that Tukhachevsky never advocated them rolling forward like robots irrespective of enemies on the flanks etc - that ended up happening as a result of the Purges in 38 etc. Tukhachevsky was more than happy for them to react to local events when absolutely necessary but was still very much focussed on the need to subjugate the tactical to the operational to the strategic etc.


In terms of profession: Well, psychiatry. Mostly general adult, recently a bit of psychiatry of addiction ( heroin, cocaine all that sort of fun stuff ) and now a nice job teaching undergraduate medical students for a year. My main areas of interest in psychiatry are PTSD and mental health informatics ( using computers to improve mental health etc )


Hmm, I kind of wrote stream of consciousness there so I'm not sure if that's what you were looking for. If it wasn't feel free to ask again and I'll try better next time. Bottom line though - just an amateur and never a day in uniform but having a good grasp of military history etc does come in useful for the PTSD. You'd be surprised just how much a guy will open up when he mentions mouseholing, sees you nod and goes "Do you know what that means?" followed by an explanation of mouseholing for gaining entry to a house etc... I had that exact situation happen with an Irish-American ex US Army engineer who was in Fallujah and only opened up to me when he realised I had some idea what he was talking about and he didn't have to stop his flow of feelings every 10 seconds to explain a term etc.

[Wirraway_Ace]

Nemo, thanks for the background.  I would have guessed prior-service and a PHD in psychology vs the MD in psychiatry, although training and scopes of practice may be very different in the UK.  However, you had referred to psychiatry before, so that was not a surprise.
 
Who was the U.S. Army major I wonder?  I served with many tasked with emulating Soviet doctrine at the NTC and the JRTC during the 90s.
 
 
 
 

[Nemo121]

Psychiatric training in Ireland and the UK is very different than in the US. In the US I think you do a 3 year residency. In Ireland and the UK after 3 years you just MIGHT be clearing the first hurdle of your specialisation... That thought of someone with just 3 years under their belt independently treating people is scary to me. Then again things are much more intense in the US and the need to get out and earning money to pay off college loans puts a different skew on things.

[Nemo121]

So, I saw some 80+ ships in Truk and thought I'd try to sneak some BBs in to bombard, setting their bombard distance to be 34,000 feet when the largest CD guns Japan has on the island have a maximum range of 32,000. I was hoping for a couple of lucky hits on the damaged CVEs Japan has in port at Truk. In all I was sending in 4 old BBs and 7 DDs as a bombardment force and 2 CA, 1 CL and 16 DD as SC TFs to kill any ships guarding the coast. My plan was to run them out 4 hexes from Ponape under LRCAP from some 250 fighters based at Ponape. If they weren't spotted then I was going to send them in to bombard. If they were spotted I'd probably just retreat back to Ponape, use the CAs to set up an SC TF to defend Ponape while sending the 4 BB, the CL and about 16 DDs to the Cocos Islands via Port Moresby and Darwin. That would give me 10 BBs, 1 CA, about 12 CLs ( some of them damaged though ) and about 45 DDs at the Cocos Islands which, I think, should be enough to really rip the IJN apart if they make for Oosthaven.

Anyways the Japanese search planes spotted them and launched some Betty raids escorted by Zeroes. 4 Zeroes and a total of 14 Betties sortied. My LRCAP shot down 14 Bettys and 2 Zeroes, the other two only being damaged. My CAP ( comprising P40Bs, P39Ds and P400s ) suffered two planes damaged enough to leave the fight. So, 16:0 in A2A today. That's another Daitai of Netties wrecked.

Elsewhere nothing much happened. My subs made multiple attacks on IJN DDs near Singapore and Singkawang but achieved no hits. The IJN is definitely gathering in force though, I think the invasion should arrive around the beginning of April and I think it might actually come in at Palembang - I have prepped a Division at Oosthaven for Palembang and I think now might be the time to send it. It is in Strategic Mode so should be there within a couple of days.

[Capt. Harlock]

Historically, historically, historically.

Surely it is utterly irrelevant how many B17s were there in June 1942 in real life.

The minor point being that it's not "gamey".

The *major* point being that two types of 4E's instead of just one means a bigger stream of replacements, which is the key factor in a battle of air attrition.

P.S. Congrats on wrecking another Daitai of Betties -- and that means the suppression of the airfields on Oahu just got even harder.

[Nemo121]

Harlock, Sorry you've lost me.... "Gamey"... Could you explain, I actually can't figure out what you are implying. I can't understand if you're saying something is gamey or not gamey and if so what it is you're applying that to.

[Capt. Harlock]

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Harlock, Sorry you've lost me.... "Gamey"... Could you explain, I actually can't figure out what you are implying. I can't understand if you're saying something is gamey or not gamey and if so what it is you're applying that to.

If my research is correct, Liberators were not used in sustained combat operations in the Pacific theater until November 1942. A Japan fanboy might have protested that the use of Liberators beginning in late June, in a decisive engagement, was therefore unrealistic. (Not that you would have paid any attention to such hypothetical person.)

Incidentally, what's your assessment on being able to keep the Oahu airfields open, should your opponent try to create Nettie airfields within range? I imagine you yourself might be able to do it, given your skill at allocating sufficient (i.e. massive) resources to your operations. But it seems to me that it would be important to achieve strategic surprise, which your opponent cannot now do, since you thought of the plan in the first place.

[Nemo121]

Well, neither did Japan build 300 Zeroes per month in early 1942... In any case if people want to play a game in which no unit is used before it was used in real life and to be limited to the roles it was used to in real life then that's fine. I prefer to explore the "what ifs". So, yeah, I wouldn't be much bothered by someone commenting about LB-30 usage If they're in-game then feel free to deploy them is pretty much my motto.


Oahu:
1. Well, firstly it isn't a matter of keeping the airfields open or not... One shouldn't have major problems keeping the airfields open given the limited number of lightish IJA bombers the IJAAF can deploy against Oahu.

2. Any Japanese player who wastes Netties against the FlAK of Oahu is wasting a scarce asset. Better to lose the light bombers ( Sonia, Lillys etc ) than torpedo-carriers like Netties.

3. I think the way one closes Oahu is simply by sweeping the air of USAAF fighters and then bombing from high altitude. You don't need to keep Oahu airfield closed, you just need to remove the fighters and make it impossible for the USAAF to struggle for air supremacy without "creating" 200+ fighters there on a given day ( and the slow rate of repair will guarantee you you can fight them in dribs and drabs if that's done ). Over time perhaps the supplies will fall so low the US player can't even create the fighters anymore but the key is that all you really need with Oahu is:
a) to prevent his bombers from Oahu closing your airbases in conjunction with a USN counter-offensive.
b) prevent his fighters gaining air supremacy over Oahu as a prelude to his "creation" of bombers at Oahu to strike at your bases.

If you can keep Oahu suppressed ( which is not nearly the same as closing the airfield ) such that your Netties and the IJN can face off against any US counter-attack without interference from US land-based air then you'll do just fine. You don't actually have to destroy stuff to render it useless. This is one of those cases where destruction simply isn't worth the cost but suppression most definitely is.


As to Oahu needing lots of resources etc... No, I think you could do it with 300 AV right now, which is less than he is committing to clearing the Kuriles. Also while suffiicient often means massive it doesn't always. Sometimes a massive force is the minimum needed, at other times the minimum needed is far less. I am always concerned with using the minimum force possible so as to let me run as many operations in parallel as possible ( in order to stretch the enemy physically and psychologically ) so I wouldn't like people to think one must always commit everything to every battle. One should commit the minimum possible consistent with assured victory. If that's 2 DDs and a CL then fine, if that's all of KB, 10 BBs and 12 divisions of troops then so be it. The key is that you commit enough to succeed.

One caveat is that if you don't actually have to run other ops at the same time then one can push additional resources into a given operation in order to turn the force correlation even more in your favour and achieve disproportionate kill ratios as per Lanchester.

But basically - always try to do stuff with the least force possible and then when you're running all the ops you want you can go around and commit uncommitted assets in order to achieve greater overmatches.

[bklooste]

Yes you dont need to shut down Oahu airfields , that is far too expensive . Just sweep and bomb it to oblivion if he has lots of aircraft  their( using Salies/Helens) . It will be more of an attritional fight though you can close it down for a short period if you need in the long term too much flak and too high repair rate.
 
I dont think Oahu is takable since they changed the CD routines and from the AV multipliers Undercovergeek got. Im amazed at all these people who send 5-7 divs there , thats just crazy your not going to get surprise anyway and they need to be there for a long time while you get ready. You can take all of the islands except for Oahu with 2 Divs and begin sieging it ( using Netties against resupply convoys) , blowing up the repair yards and any ships there and attritioning planes at the airfield.  Then depending on your oponennt you can move teh divs there for Oahu If needed and use barges & small expendable ship for the invasion not your high value transports.  Owning Hawaii achieves 90% of the objectives of the whole island the main issue is its easier for him to ocunter attack but who really wants to defend Oahu in mid 43 anyway ?

[FatR]

The big problem with sieging Oahu is the ability of Allies to replenish their airgroups, as long as they have supply... Unless bombarding with Yamatos/Nagatos from extreme range (beyond that of CD guns) proves to be at least somewhat effective, the aifield will be very hard to shut down.

EDIT: And an airfield that isn't shut down will pose major problems for resupplying Japanese own garrizons on neighboring islands. Allied might well try not putting up CAP, instead relying on flak to get a superior rate of attrition and launch only naval strikies.

[Capt. Harlock]

Yes you dont need to shut down Oahu airfields , that is far too expensive . Just sweep and bomb it to oblivion if he has lots of aircraft their( using Salies/Helens)

The point being that you can't sweep and bomb to oblivion if your own airfields have been devastated by hordes of 4E's. (Which can be transferred directly from the west coast without having to be uncrated and assembled.)

One other thought: it isn't just the USAAF fighters that need to be dealt with. What about USN and USMC Wildcat squadrons?