Interesting debate.....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think its too easy to dismiss Chamberlain's efforts in the ultimate defeat of Hitler (and Alfred you have pertinently pointed out the reasons why). I just wish the Munich agreement hadn't happened......

Warspite1

Chamberlain became a key ally once Churchill took the reigns of power. Had the former thrown in his full support to Halifax who in his job as Foreign Minister was in discussions with the Italian ambassador during the concluding weeks of France, the UK might have settled for a negotiated peace to which Churchill was diametrically opposed. Mind you, these discussions were only that.....discussions, but Churchill and his cabinent were aware of it and Halifax seriously opposed Churchill's conviction that Hitler would not take advantage of his victory and offer unacceptible terms.

Exactly, it has been assumed that even if Halifax was to become PM, he would definitely have done a deal with Hitler. However, that conversation referred to by Andrew Marr on the 28th May 1940, was about whether or not talks should begin. Halifax is minuted as saying he was not proposing Britain gives up her independence. May be there would have been no deal even if Churchill was beaten to the job by Halifax.

Another interesting what if, is that had Halifax not declined the job of PM after Chamberlain's No Confidence fiasco and the realization that the new coalition government would not support his remaining PM, it would probably have been a certainey. Churchill must be given props IMO for being the driving force behind Britian's stand against Hitler and what he represented at a time when defeatist elements were present, (like in Joe Kennedy's case who was convinced the UK was a losing bet for the US to support)

Did Halifax feel he had a choice though? One thing that has not been mentioned in all this was that he was a peer, and as such was not able to enter the House of Commons. Perhaps, given this was a time of national crisis, this rule may have been circumvented, but I do not know that for certain. We do like our traditions you know [:)].

But even if it was not really an obstacle to his becoming PM, did Halifax use that as a convenient excuse? Did he really want the job.

Throwing in yet another what if.....the encirclement and loss of the BEF......aiee. Not sure if Churchill could have weathered that. Halifax's position would have been immeasurably strengthened.

As argued earlier, Churchill had been PM only since the 10th May. He could not have been held accountable for what took place in the 18 days since.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Skyros

Warspite when did the attitude of the Oxford Oath die and the determination to fight on take hold? This to me would play a role in determining if a peace would have been negotiated or not. If the rescue of the BEF put the final nail in the "I won't fight for King and Country" crowd then the loss of the army and RN ships may have allowed the peace group to strengthen. If Dunkirk fails there are possibly more naval losses as well.

This is a great discussion.

Warspite1

I don't think the Oxford Union debate should be taken too seriously. It was big news because the Oxford Union is so high profile. Fact was - it was a bunch of largely left wing students and "intellectuals" (a mixture of genuine pacifists, well meaning but mis-guided individuals and looney toon misguided peaceniks) the latter probably getting off on the idea they were being "radical". I would love to know how many who voted they would not fight for King and Country, did so when their king and country actually came calling.

[Saburo Kurusu]

I cherish this forum very much for such great and very interesting high quality discussions which evidently can still develop without any troll assaults! That's a real challenge these days.... Thanks a lot guys!

[Local Yokel]

I'm quite sure the Oxford Union debate need not be taken seriously. Just look at the other side of the coin: the number of British who rallied to the Republican cause in Spain. I guess that most, if not all, were active on the left in politics. There are some quite well-known names from the Trade Union movement who were on the roll of the British Battalion, most notably Jack Jones, who later became Gen. Secretary of the TGWU. Also some names that may come as a surprise to British readers, e.g. James Robertson Justice, better known as a film actor in such roles as Sir Lancelot Spratt in Doctor in the House.

I also see no reason to think that membership of the aristocracy was ever going to be an obstacle to Halifax serving as PM. Insofar as it proved to be an obstacle, an expedient solution would have been found, as it was some years later in the case of Alec Douglas-Home - or indeed Tony Benn, formerly the second Viscount Stansgate.

It's all very well to give credit to Churchill for rejecting any talk of armistice in 1940, but that then leaves the question 'What is Britain to do?' if a state of hostilities continue. Regardless of whether we had succeeded in evacuating 340,000 British and French troops from Dunkirk, I see no credible prospect of the Household Cavalry heading a victory parade through the Brandenburger Tor following the loss of France as a continental ally. We might have hoped that the US would come in on our side, but however much credit Roosevelt was prepared to allow us to purchase arms (with the side effect of leaving us insolvent), even the sinking of American warships was not going to be enough to bring about a US declaration of war. Ultimately nothing less than Hitler's folly of making the declaration himself sufficed to bring the US into the European war.

Recognising that there was no imminent prospect of British troops setting foot on German soil, the response was the pouring of enormous amounts of treasure into Bomber Command. Yet, even as he sanctioned this expenditure, Churchill made comments indicating that he had little confidence in a massive bomber onslaught bringing about Hitler's capitulation. There was a desire to take the fight to Germany, and Bomber Command was to be its expression, irrespective of whether the results were likely to be decisive.

However odious I regard Fascism and the Nazi regime as being, at times I find myself wondering whether Britain's interests might have been better served by concluding a peace with Gerrmany in 1940. Is my tongue in cheek? Yes, a bit, but not necessarily very far.

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

... One thing that has not been mentioned in all this was that he was a peer, and as such was not able to enter the House of Commons. Perhaps, given this was a time of national crisis, this rule may have been circumvented, but I do not know that for certain. We do like our traditions you know [:)].

But even if it was not really an obstacle to his becoming PM, did Halifax use that as a convenient excuse? Did he really want the job...

Halifax being a peer would not in itself have precluded him from becoming Prime Minister.

The last peer to become Prime Minister before Churchill had been the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury (PM 1895-1902). The most recent peer to become Prime Minister was the 14th Earl of Home (PM 1963-64).

As a peer and a member of the House of Lords, Halifax was precluded from sitting and voting in the House of Commons. That Prime Ministers had, since 1902, only been "appointed" from the House of Commons, was and remains only a modern convention. Any convention can be broken and there is no legal remedy to a broken convention.

The modern convention to have as Prime Minister, a member of the House of Commons is based on the following practical considerations.

(1) Since the Parliament Act 1911 severely emasculated the powers of the House of Lords (subsequent legislation has further reduced the Lords), the ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons is the key factor to maintain a stable government.

(2) Money Bills originate in the Commons. The Lords cannot amend nor stop a government's budget

(3) Only the Commons is elected and therefore the proper representation of the popular will in a democracy with universal suffrage.

Prior to the passage of the Parliament Act 1911, any government needed to get the approval of both Houses to get its legisation through Parliament. There was no structural benefit to having the Prime Minister sitting in one House over the other. Hence Prime Ministers came from both Houses. However with the passage of the 1911 legislation, a most definite structural benefit was gained by having the Prime Minister sitting in the Commons and being the Leader of the Commons.

There was therefore no constitutional bar to Halifax being appointed Prime Minister. The difficulty he would have faced was that he could not sit in the Commons and that would have created considerable difficulties in maintaining the confidence of the Commons, particularly as the government was a coalition.

When the 14th Earl of Home was appointed Prime Minister on 19 October 1963, he was a member of the House of Lords. Note that the other leading Tory candidate to succeed Macmillan was another peer, the 2nd Viscount Hailsham. It was the Earl of Home's view that because of the modern convention, the Prime Minister should be a member of the House of Commons. Accordingly, he disclaimed his hereditary title and subsequently entered the Commons by winning on 7 November 1963, the by-election for the seat of Kinross and West Perthshire. But the point remains that when appointed Prime Minister he was both a peer and not a member of the House of Commons.

Today there is no longer a bar on any peer from sitting and voting in the House of Commons and still retaining their titles. Thus a peer can still become Prime Minister and adhere to the modern convention of the Prime Minister sitting in the Commons. How well they would be treated by Fleet Street is another matter.[:)]

Alfred

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: warspite1

... One thing that has not been mentioned in all this was that he was a peer, and as such was not able to enter the House of Commons. Perhaps, given this was a time of national crisis, this rule may have been circumvented, but I do not know that for certain. We do like our traditions you know [:)].

But even if it was not really an obstacle to his becoming PM, did Halifax use that as a convenient excuse? Did he really want the job...

Halifax being a peer would not in itself have precluded him from becoming Prime Minister.

The last peer to become Prime Minister before Churchill had been the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury (PM 1895-1902). The most recent peer to become Prime Minister was the 14th Earl of Home (PM 1963-64).

As a peer and a member of the House of Lords, Halifax was precluded from sitting and voting in the House of Commons. That Prime Ministers had, since 1902, only been "appointed" from the House of Commons, was and remains only a modern convention. Any convention can be broken and there is no legal remedy to a broken convention.

The modern convention to have as Prime Minister, a member of the House of Commons is based on the following practical considerations.

(1) Since the Parliament Act 1911 severely emasculated the powers of the House of Lords (subsequent legislation has further reduced the Lords), the ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons is the key factor to maintain a stable government.

(2) Money Bills originate in the Commons. The Lords cannot amend nor stop a government's budget

(3) Only the Commons is elected and therefore the proper representation of the popular will in a democracy with universal suffrage.

Prior to the passage of the Parliament Act 1911, any government needed to get the approval of both Houses to get its legisation through Parliament. There was no structural benefit to having the Prime Minister sitting in one House over the other. Hence Prime Ministers came from both Houses. However with the passage of the 1911 legislation, a most definite structural benefit was gained by having the Prime Minister sitting in the Commons and being the Leader of the Commons.

There was therefore no constitutional bar to Halifax being appointed Prime Minister. The difficulty he would have faced was that he could not sit in the Commons and that would have created considerable difficulties in maintaining the confidence of the Commons, particularly as the government was a coalition.

When the 14th Earl of Home was appointed Prime Minister on 19 October 1963, he was a member of the House of Lords. Note that the other leading Tory candidate to succeed Macmillan was another peer, the 2nd Viscount Hailsham. It was the Earl of Home's view that because of the modern convention, the Prime Minister should be a member of the House of Commons. Accordingly, he disclaimed his hereditary title and subsequently entered the Commons by winning on 7 November 1963, the by-election for the seat of Kinross and West Perthshire. But the point remains that when appointed Prime Minister he was both a peer and not a member of the House of Commons.

Today there is no longer a bar on any peer from sitting and voting in the House of Commons and still retaining their titles. Thus a peer can still become Prime Minister and adhere to the modern convention of the Prime Minister sitting in the Commons. How well they would be treated by Fleet Street is another matter.[:)]

Alfred

Warspite1

It was Halifax himself, in his memoirs, that made a point of the peerage being an obstacle to becoming an effective Prime Minister.

But this is the point I was trying to make. If the peerage was not actually an insurmountable barrier, AND Halifax was in pole position for the top job, why did he allow Churchill to out manoeuvre him? Did he really want the job, or did he not fancy wanting to go down in history as the man in charge when the UK became a puppet state of Hitler's Germany? Did he therefore use this as a convenient excuse for allowing WSC to take the Premiership?

Unlike WSC, Halifax seemed to regard a peace deal as the only realistic option at the time, although, as I said earlier, what would even Halifax have been prepared to give up AND, what would Hitler have insisted upon?

All very interesting questions, and we will never know for certain.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

It's all very well to give credit to Churchill for rejecting any talk of armistice in 1940, but that then leaves the question 'What is Britain to do?' if a state of hostilities continue. Regardless of whether we had succeeded in evacuating 340,000 British and French troops from Dunkirk, I see no credible prospect of the Household Cavalry heading a victory parade through the Brandenburger Tor following the loss of France as a continental ally. We might have hoped that the US would come in on our side, but however much credit Roosevelt was prepared to allow us to purchase arms (with the side effect of leaving us insolvent), even the sinking of American warships was not going to be enough to bring about a US declaration of war. Ultimately nothing less than Hitler's folly of making the declaration himself sufficed to bring the US into the European war.

Recognising that there was no imminent prospect of British troops setting foot on German soil, the response was the pouring of enormous amounts of treasure into Bomber Command. Yet, even as he sanctioned this expenditure, Churchill made comments indicating that he had little confidence in a massive bomber onslaught bringing about Hitler's capitulation. There was a desire to take the fight to Germany, and Bomber Command was to be its expression, irrespective of whether the results were likely to be decisive.

However odious I regard Fascism and the Nazi regime as being, at times I find myself wondering whether Britain's interests might have been better served by concluding a peace with Gerrmany in 1940. Is my tongue in cheek? Yes, a bit, but not necessarily very far.

Warspite1

What did Benjamin Franklin say? Those that trade Freedom for security, deserve neither and will soon lose both.


From the minutes of Churchill's speach to ministers at 6.15pm in May 1940 after the decision was made by the war cabinet to reject putting out peace feelers.

It was idle to think that, if we tried to make peace now, we should get better terms from Germany than if we went on and fought it out (and lost). The Germans would demand our fleet - that would be called "disarmament" - our naval bases and much else. We should become a slave state, though a British Government which would be Hitler's puppet would be set-up - under Mosley or some such person......Therefore...we shall go on and we shall fight it out, here or elsewhere, and if this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.


Who knows how things would have panned out if a deal with Hitler had been concluded and he was free to launch Barbarossa without worrying about the Western front, the Mediterranean etc. But personally, I can think of plenty of nightmare scenarios that could have played out. Regardless, I can never question Churchill's decision and am immensely proud of the UK's role in ridding the world of Hitler.

[Pascal_slith]

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

Warspite1

...assuming of course the US enters the war before it's all over, and assuming the Germans don't get there first.

[Pascal_slith]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Pascal

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

Warspite1

...assuming of course the US enters the war before it's all over, and assuming the Germans don't get there first.

Germans didn't have the resources to get to the bomb first. But yes, there is an assumption of us entering. That was caused by some strange wiring in Hitler's brain to declare war on us when he didn't have to. The US would have concentrated on the Pacific had he not declared war.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

Germans didn't have the resources to get to the bomb first. But yes, there is an assumption of us entering. That was caused by some strange wiring in Hitler's brain to declare war on us when he didn't have to ...

He was hoping IJ would reciprocate by declaring war against the USSR, which would then be compelled to deploy much of its manpower countering the threat from the East while the Nazis attacked from the West.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Pascal

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

Warspite1

...assuming of course the US enters the war before it's all over, and assuming the Germans don't get there first.

Warspite1

Germans didn't have the resources to get to the bomb first.

This is an interesting point and I have started a new thread for comment on this.

But yes, there is an assumption of us entering. That was caused by some strange wiring in Hitler's brain to declare war on us when he didn't have to. The US would have concentrated on the Pacific had he not declared war.

And this is what the OP was inviting discussion on. Is there a D-Day without a successful evacuation of Dunkirk; the possibility being that without a successful Dunkirk, the British throw in the towel, with the chance that the Germans will then beat the Soviets before the US can get into the war.

[ilovestrategy]

I love these threads. Ive learned so much from you guys over the years.

[Sredni]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

Could have, but would you have?

Was there any of the debate back before hiroshima/nagisaki that we see now about the moral use of the bomb? If all it was in any ones mind, was just another more effective bomb then I would guess the americans would fire it off where needed without any misgivings at all. However if there was any controversy over the use of nuclear weapons against live targets, or if hiroshima/nagisaki were hit first and the effects were realized by more then just a handful of scientists, I could see resistance to using it vs germany where there might not have been any or as much vs japan.

Back then japan remained largely "other", with just a tiny number of japanese people having become americans. Their culture and people were very alien to western eyes. Germany on the other hand was a source of a significant number of americans right from the beginning. I think the german people might have been viewed more as "us", while the japanese people were viewed as "them". Which could have effected willingness to use atomic weapons on them vs using it on the japanese.

[rtrapasso]

ORIGINAL: Sredni

ORIGINAL: Pascal

The Germans lost the war the day Franklin Roosevelt agreed to finance the Manhattan Project in 1939. Dunkirk or no Dunkirk and even D-Day or no D-Day, we could have nuked the Germans out of the war.

Could have, but would you have?

Was there any of the debate back before hiroshima/nagisaki that we see now about the moral use of the bomb? If all it was in any ones mind, was just another more effective bomb then I would guess the americans would fire it off where needed without any misgivings at all. However if there was any controversy over the use of nuclear weapons against live targets, or if hiroshima/nagisaki were hit first and the effects were realized by more then just a handful of scientists, I could see resistance to using it vs germany where there might not have been any or as much vs japan.

Back then japan remained largely "other", with just a tiny number of japanese people having become americans. Their culture and people were very alien to western eyes. Germany on the other hand was a source of a significant number of americans right from the beginning. I think the german people might have been viewed more as "us", while the japanese people were viewed as "them". Which could have effected willingness to use atomic weapons on them vs using it on the japanese.

From what i had read on the subject (some time ago), it seems the US was planning to use the Bomb on Germany as well - except the war ended before the bomb was finished...

The US (and Britain) had few compunctions on firebombing German cities (as well as Japanese), and these firebombings could and did exceed the casualties inflicted by the atomic bomb (even comparing individual attacks). What made the Bomb so horrifying was that ONE PLANE could inflict the damage... the radiation effects weren't really appreciated until much later, but this somehow is forgotten in most discussions about using the bomb.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Exactly, it has been assumed that even if Halifax was to become PM, he would definitely have done a deal with Hitler. However, that conversation referred to by Andrew Marr on the 28th May 1940, was about whether or not talks should begin. Halifax is minuted as saying he was not proposing Britain gives up her independence. May be there would have been no deal even if Churchill was beaten to the job by Halifax.

agreed. Halifax himself made it clear he was not advocating any kind of surrender of British independence and/or territory, but the difference between himself and Churchill might be loosely alluded to the situation via FDR and Congress at the time. FDR was [privately] convinced that nothing short of war with the Dictatorships would ensure the survival of democracy while Congress did not want to contemplate war. Churchill was diametrically opposed to any sort of settlement with Hitler and believed it was to be a fight to the finish vs. what his (Hitler's) government stood for while Halifax was open to the idea of an honorable peace if the terms were right. Chamberlain was initially neutral but eventually sided with Churchill while the rest of the cabinent kept their thoughts to themselves.

Did Halifax feel he had a choice though? One thing that has not been mentioned in all this was that he was a peer, and as such was not able to enter the House of Commons. Perhaps, given this was a time of national crisis, this rule may have been circumvented, but I do not know that for certain. We do like our traditions you know [:)]. But even if it was not really an obstacle to his becoming PM, did Halifax use that as a convenient excuse? Did he really want the job.

From what i've read up to this point, Halifax's biggest concern was that he'd be a lame-duck PM and shied away from Chamberlain's offer of the job. Even the King was not able to convince him otherwise, hence Churchill.....the #2 choice due to strong elements in the HoC being against him, got the job.

As argued earlier, Churchill had been PM only since the 10th May. He could not have been held accountable for what took place in the 18 days since.

What i meant was that had the BEF been encircled and destroyed (with the half million troops lost along with all that equipment), Churchill's "no negotiations" stance would have been greatly weakened, not that he would have been blamed. As you said, he was not in power long enough to be blamed. However such a major disaster might have increased sympathy (including that from Chamberlain) for Halifax's position that the UK government be more open to "alternatives", including the possability of a peace settlement as Hitler both expected and greatly desired with France defeated. (This way he could turn his full attention on his real target.......the Soviet Union)

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Exactly, it has been assumed that even if Halifax was to become PM, he would definitely have done a deal with Hitler. However, that conversation referred to by Andrew Marr on the 28th May 1940, was about whether or not talks should begin. Halifax is minuted as saying he was not proposing Britain gives up her independence. May be there would have been no deal even if Churchill was beaten to the job by Halifax.

agreed. Halifax himself made it clear he was not advocating any kind of surrender of British independence and/or territory, but the difference between himself and Churchill might be loosely alluded to the situation via FDR and Congress at the time. FDR was [privately] convinced that nothing short of war with the Dictatorships would ensure the survival of democracy while Congress did not want to contemplate war. Churchill was diametrically opposed to any sort of settlement with Hitler and believed it was to be a fight to the finish vs. what his (Hitler's) government stood for while Halifax was open to the idea of an honorable peace if the terms were right. Chamberlain was initially neutral but eventually sided with Churchill while the rest of the cabinent kept their thoughts to themselves.

A Halifax approach to the dictators would have confirmed American unwillingness to get involved in Europe.

[Pascal_slith]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Pascal

Germans didn't have the resources to get to the bomb first. But yes, there is an assumption of us entering. That was caused by some strange wiring in Hitler's brain to declare war on us when he didn't have to ...

He was hoping IJ would reciprocate by declaring war against the USSR, which would then be compelled to deploy much of its manpower countering the threat from the East while the Nazis attacked from the West.

Actually, if you read Weinberg's books on Hitler's foreign policy and his book on WWII (A World at Arms), Hitler encouraged the Japanese to go SOUTH, not attack the USSR (which he thought he could take care of himself). At first look, I would have agreed with you, given the German's difficulties in front of Moscow at the time. But it seems the available documentation over the period preceding the Japanes attack on Pearl Harbor pointed to encouragement by the Germans for the Japanese to go south. And the Japanese were reluctant in any case to go north (they had long internal debates about this themselves).

It seems Hitler's decision to declare war on the US was motivated by the expectation that the US would be in any case heavily involved with Japan and that, given he expected it was inevitable that there would be a war with the US, it was in Germany's interest to declare sooner rather than later given the potential of US industrial output (which Hitler and the Germans recognized).

I must say I have not been totally convinced by the arguments, though they are pretty good. We'll never know for sure, but this is the weight of the documentary evidence.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Pascal
It seems Hitler's decision to declare war on the US was motivated by the expectation that the US would be in any case heavily involved with Japan and that, given he expected it was inevitable that there would be a war with the US, it was in Germany's interest to declare sooner rather than later given the potential of US industrial output (which Hitler and the Germans recognized).

I must say I have not been totally convinced by the arguments, though they are pretty good. We'll never know for sure, but this is the weight of the documentary evidence.

I'm wishing i could remember the source, but i recall reading a confirmation on what you said about Hitler's true motivation for declaring war on the US. The usual story is that it was simply one of his "insane" moves but given the time period he was hardly at that breaking point as of yet. Rather, the source in question suggested that he'd been misled by his Intelligence service(s) that indicated the US was about to declare war on Germany so he [Hitler] opted to beat Roosevelt to the punch.

It's impossible to know whether or not FDR could have gotten Congress to add Germany to the list in the immediate aftermath of Dec 7 without a German declaration....but i think it's likely. Ultimately of course Hitler's decision played into FDR's hands as if FDR had scripted it himself.

[oldman45]

Warspites post #66 raised a question for me. Lets say Halifax was the PM or that Churchill decided that a honorable peace could be achieved. Entering into talks with Hitler may not have been a bad thing, what could Germany possibly use as leverage to extract terms they found favorable. I have read enough that said Hitler did want peace with England. I don't know what he expected England to give up territory wise or if he just expected some kind of truce. If nothing else changes except UK and Germany are no longer fighting, The Germans would still be freezing in front of Moscow in 41. They would not have as many troops in France perhaps but still not enough to beat Russia.