Citizens of London facing German Army

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
The pillboxes and obstacles which were installed in open areas were mainly intended as a defence against parachute troops and glider landing. They might have held up quite well against lightly armed paratroops, but they would not have had much impact on a serious ground attack by an invading force with heavy weapons. [:)]

Of course, that depends on what you call "heavy weapons" ... you realise, of course, that the initial planning for Sealion had the *elements* of the Infantry divisions landed with only Mortars, and no heavier artillery. AFAIR at this period of the war, that means 81mm Mortars, as the German 120mm model was basically a copy of/or inspired by their contact with the Red Army during the opening stages of Barbarossa.

Even the later plans, the ones for elements of 12 Infantry divisions being landed (the equivalent of 3 divisions spread along the whole east coast from Dover south and west) initially, didn't have anything more than mortars for this stage ... and the followup wave was going to be, seriously, *three weeks later* ...

The Luftwaffe was supposed to be the artillery. And simultaneously fight off the RAF *and* the RN.

So maybe those pillboxes would have done better than you think under the actual circumstances on the ground.

The German planners were even somewhat worried by the presence of the Martello Towers erected by Henry VIII, IIRC [8D][:D]

Phil

[battlevonwar]

From documentaries I watched as a boy until very recently I remember the ole drills of watching German Paratroopers loaded unto massive super gliders. The Germans were very innovative at getting things done. They even had light tanks in the nose. I'm sure anything is possible..(in small #s)

Imagine if you will a few SMGs, lots of Mausers, Grenades and perhaps if you were lucky LMGs... Imagine a silkscreen of divebombers. 20 miles of the awful questionable English Channel could have made it unlikely for anything but that. A few lbs in water sinks like an elephant! Ask a Navy Seal.

Although I hear that the RAF would have been moved North in the event of a real invasion, reserved for the inevitable. I heard that if the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk there would be nothing left to fight the Germans at all. It would be just a cakewalk period...

We must assume the threat was very real though. Look at the way the English built up for it. Look at the Speeches, the Dogfights! 109s with 30 minutes to Rock N Roll over English territory until suitable landing strips were created!

This was a logistical nightmare for either side given different circumstances. So it's not impossible, just EXTREMELY expensive for either side. So much the Germans decided against it and the British were willing to pay their entire Fighter Defense for it.

"Londoners fighting? There are some pretty vicious and nationalistic men there. As bad as Americans or Russians? The Russians knew what was coming I don't think they were as naive as we think. I think they knew the Germans were bad by December '41. London could have been street fighting, that could have had tens of thousands of poorly equipped strong willed 14-65 year old men!"

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
From documentaries I watched as a boy until very recently I remember the ole drills of watching German Paratroopers loaded unto massive super gliders. The Germans were very innovative at getting things done. They even had light tanks in the nose. I'm sure anything is possible..(in small #s)

Pretty sure that what you saw has been misremembered. AFAIR the Germans didn't have light tanks designed to be used in Gliders. The Brits did, but they were basically useless ... and not available in 1940.

The Germans *did* have a big glider, the Me-321, from which the 6-engined Me-323 "Gigant" was developed. But, as far as I can tell, though it was the result of a 1940 design competition for a large Glider for Sealion, it didn't actually enter service until 1941, and not in large numbers at that time.

Both models had a maximum payload of 20 tons, give or take, and that precludes carrying anything larger than a Panzer I/II or, perhaps, a Panzer 38(t) [both weighing in at around 10 tons, whereas the Panzer III was c. 23-24 tons, and obviously too heavy) ... *if* the Me-321 had been available, which it wasn't.

All the Germans had for Sealion were a number of DFS-230's, with a payload of 1200 kg or 9 soldiers. And I don't think they had very many of those, as, for example, they were only able to muster *80* for the entire Marita-Merkur operation (the invasion of Crete).

Also, the reality was that the number of Ju-52's available for Sealion operations was much more limited than for Crete, for the simple, obvious, and rarely understood fact that the losses (damaged and destroyed) to the Ju-52 force in the operations against Holland, Belgium and etc. had savaged them ... and, indeed, of the (IIRC) 3 parachute Divisions (really Brigades, strength wise) available at the beginning of the operation, only one was still operationally viable at the end ... and there evidently weren't enough Ju-52s and Gliders to carry all of what was available, even these reduced numbers, all in one wave.

(Oh, and production of Ju-52s had, IIRC, ceased even before Fall Gelb, so operational losses couldn't even be replaced by new productiuon)

Of course, as the Battle of Britain progressed, the reorganisation of the Parachute Divisions and Ju-52 units rectified the situation somewhat, but never to the point where the Germans could manage an entire divisional (and these were small even by US/UK Airborne Divisional Standards, around 6-7k IIRC) drop with the resources available.

So, they *might* get a half division drop, or less, over the UK. Once. After that, well, what do you call Gliders and Glider Tugs and Ju-52s in general in disputed airspace?

Targets.

Dead targets.

Don't like the chances of the second and succeeding waves, no siree!

So, no tanks on Gliders.

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
Although I hear that the RAF would have been moved North in the event of a real invasion, reserved for the inevitable. I heard that if the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk there would be nothing left to fight the Germans at all. It would be just a cakewalk period...

Most people don't know that the RAF only committed three of five Groups against the Germans directly, and those three Groups only had 55% of the fighter strength.

So, even if the Germans *had* savaged the 3 Groups committed to the BoB, they'd only have been up against 55% of the RAF fighters.

The RAF plan was that, if the fighter strength of the three Groups committed was reduced to less than 50%, they'd withdraw north of the Luftwaffe Fighter range ... which would leave the RAF with 45% (uncommitted) plus 27.5% (half of the 55% committed) = 72.5% of their entire fighter strength and, therefore, actually *more* than they had committed originally, left to sortie south in the event of an invasion.

Now, the Germans, as is shown historically, couldn't even handle the 55%! With an additional 20%, and with the Luftwaffe now committed to Air Superiority PLUS Ground Support PLUS Anti-Surface Warfare *simultaneously*, 24/7 ... well, lets just say that it doesn't look good ... for the Luftwaffe [;)]

As for the BEF. Most people, back in 1940 as well as now, assume that 100% of the BEF was pocketed in the Dunkirk pocket and could, therefore, have been lost "if only" Hitler hadn't told the Panzers to halt.

Sadly, none of the above is true.

Around 45% (yes, again) of the BEF was *not* at Dunkirk and was never encircled. It was able to withdraw (mostly, not all, and not with a lot of their equipment) through the Breton ports about a month or six weeks later. So, no, the whole of the BEF wasn;t ever going to be lost.

As for whether all of what was in the Dunkirk pocket was losable, the assumption here is based on Hitler's (in)famous "Stop" order to the Panzers. Allegedly (postwar, mainly) the argument is that Hitler did this because he didn't want to destroy the BEF, somehow seeing this as a political ploy that would make Churchill more likely to negotiate.

"Rubbish" wouldn't be too strong a word for this theory. Mostly it's postwar justifications by German Generals blaming Hitler for every alleged mistake made during the entire war.

The reality is that the Panzer divisions had just about shot their bolt. Divisional records show that they had largely outrun their supply network, and were short on fuel, ammo and other supplies, and their ability to initiate another offensive was much reduced, if possible at all. The other thing that the German divisional records show is that the rate of traffic accidents amongst Tank and Truck (and other) drivers was skyrocketing ... because the units had been in virtually nonstop action since the beginning of the campaign and drivers were, quite literally, falling asleep at the wheel! So whether the soldiers would have been able to continue with another assault, given the poor supply situation, is also questionable.

Then there's the fact that the Panzer divisions had outrun the infantry. There's two issues here, the Panzers were more exploitation than breakthrough units ... the Infantry's heavy artillery was to provide the rupture through which the Panzers would then rumble. So they'd have been being asked to do something for which they were not really equipped, while short on supply and with exhausted soldiers.

Then there's the other problem ... their flanks were, quite literally, in the air ... nothing was securing them. Now, with the advantage of 20:20 hindsight we know now that the French, even their armoured formations, had well and truly shot their bolt and were, at best, able to offer limited resistance to attacks and had no hope at all of mounting another offensive such as the one led by De Gaulle at Arras (which has been much overblown in significance, but worried the Germans regardless), but neither the French nor the British nor the Germans knew that at the time. In fact, based on what the Germans *did* know, they were very worried about moving further ahead until the Infantry caught up.

So, in reality, the German generals in charge actually had stopped the advance, for good and sufficient reasons, and Hitler more or less formalised it when they explained their reasoning.

Even if they *had* resumed (or attempted to) their advance/attack, the likelihood is that it merely reduces the number of British and French (mainly French, indeed, as few people realise as well) soldiers that are evacuated rather than preventing it completely.

But say they did get most of the forces in the Dunkirk pocket ... that still leaves almost half still intact. A disaster, sure, but not an overwhelming one.

Then there's the issue of how many soldiers were in the UK at the time.

Lots.

And Lots.

And Lots and Lots and Lots.

More than were in France.

Much More.

Much Much More.

There was a whole, fully equipped, Canadian Division in the SE. A whole UK Armoured Division (not with the best tanks, but since the Germans weren't likely to have *any* at the beginning of the Sealion window, and the Brits were replacing their losses every week of delay ... IIRC even the final Sealion plan only planned on a dozen or so tanks being committed to the first wave ... and the second wave was to be *three weeks later* ... seriously! [8|]) was also in the area. There were several more fully equipped Brigades in the SE, and there were the equivalent of a dozen more divisions spread around the country, in various stages of training and equipment, but the UK would *always* have been able to outnumber any planned German invasion force from very early on ... even the final plan involved elements of 12 divisions in the first wave (and German divisions were anywhere between half and 2/3rds the manpower of British Divisions, and all British units were motorised ... the Germans were planning on bringing their horses with them, and one of the problems their planners faced was brining fodder enough for said horses over) ... or about 3 divisions in absolute strength, spread across the SE coast from Dover to Southhampton ... and the second wave would be *three weeks later*.

*THREE WEEKS LATER*

That was their *best* plan. And even that was, obviously, a fantasy.

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
We must assume the threat was very real though. Look at the way the English built up for it. Look at the Speeches, the Dogfights! 109s with 30 minutes to Rock N Roll over English territory until suitable landing strips were created!

Nope. Not a real threat at all. Not even close.

Of course, all this is with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight. No-one at the time *knew* this for sure.

I suspect the British had a fair idea of the problems the Germans were likely to face ... they mainly feared a coup de main, and even that wasn't (as we now know) very likely at all.

The Kriegsmarine seem to have had a pretty fair idea that it was impossible.

The Wehrmacht? Not so obviously sure as the Kriegsmarine, and perhaps thinking it might work.

The Luftwaffe? Well, Goering professed to think it possible ... but he was a blowhard. I suspect the rest of the Luftwaffe may have been somewhat more sanguine at their chances.

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
This was a logistical nightmare for either side given different circumstances. So it's not impossible, just EXTREMELY expensive for either side. So much the Germans decided against it and the British were willing to pay their entire Fighter Defense for it.

"Londoners fighting? There are some pretty vicious and nationalistic men there. As bad as Americans or Russians? The Russians knew what was coming I don't think they were as naive as we think. I think they knew the Germans were bad by December '41. London could have been street fighting, that could have had tens of thousands of poorly equipped strong willed 14-65 year old men!"

Nope. 27.5% of their fighter strength

I seriously doubt any significant number of Germans would have gotten anywhere near the streets of London except, perhaps, passing through them on the way to POW camps [:)][:D]

Phil

[Greyshaft]

I think there is a bit more to say about Fighter Command.

During the Battle of Britain their were only four effective Fighter Groups, each controlling a different part of the UK. 11 Group took the brunt of the German attack, as it controlled southeast England and London. It was reinforced by 10 Group, which covered southwest England, 12 Group, which covered the Midlands and East Anglia and 13 Group which covered the North of England and Scotland.

So what about 14 Group? On 20 January 1940 No. 60 Wing in the British Expeditionary Force was raised to Group level as No. 14 Group. The Group was then disbanded on 22 June. However a few days later it was reformed in Fighter Command to provide cover for Scotland. The Group was disbanded on 15 July 1943. This Group was never a serious operational command in the same league as the other well established Groups. It was based around the squadrons returning from France (remember the BEF?) and it had additional Fleet Air Arm squadrons allocated to it for a while. It was based in the Petershead/Dyce area of northern Scotland but IMHO it was more of an administrative shuffle rather than a serious attempt to create another Fighter Group.

In addition Richard Sauls 13 Group in the north rarely got to fly their planes in anger. "On August the 15th 1940 the German air force attempted its one and only daylight flank attack on Northern England. North East England was attacked by 65 Heinkel 111s escorted by 34 Messerschmitt 110s, and RAF Great Driffield was attacked by 50 unescorted Junkers 88s. Out of 115 bombers and 35 fighters sent over 16 bombers and 7 fighters were destroyed"

In any event the individual squadrons were transferred between Groups as required to allow the burned out fighters of 11 Group to get some R&R during a spell in 12 or 13 Group. The Groups controlled the airfields and they only controlled the squadrons while those squadrons were based at airfields within that Groups territory. What this means is that 12 and 13 Group were not composed of completely 'fresh' units waiting to be let loose into the battle - they had a high proportion of squadrons who were just as weary and war-torn as the squadrons currently based on the front line in 11 Group.

So the real strength of Fighter Command over any German bridgehead was never based on a percentage of RAF squadrons allocated to 10 and 11 Group but rather on the number of effective squadrons that were available at all Groups. You may consider this to be splitting hairs but I think its a key point. You say ...

The RAF plan was that, if the fighter strength of the three Groups committed was reduced to less than 50%, they'd withdraw north of the Luftwaffe Fighter range ... which would leave the RAF with 45% (uncommitted) plus 27.5% (half of the 55% committed) = 72.5% of their entire fighter strength and, therefore, actually *more* than they had committed originally, left to sortie south in the event of an invasion.

... while I say that the "uncommitted" 45% in the north were not all fresh units and that if the 55% in the south HAD been reduced to less than 50% strength then they could hardly have been relied on as 'Category A' units. In this case the remaining half of 55% may well have been totally unfit for battle - you can scramble the squadrons but would they still fight effectively having lost half of their strength? I don't think morale works on a linear reduction method. Once it cracks it is completely gone and the fighting man runs for cover as fast as his overworked Merlin engine will carry him.

OTOH we also need to consider that RAF Training Command held an additional reserve of highly skilled instructor pilots. These pilots were the cream of Fighter Command and were withdrawn from active duty as required to assist in the training of the next generation of pilots. If the Germans had landed you can bet that classes would have been suspended for a month as all of these pilots were transferred back into the battle.

My point is that using precise statistics is very misleading. This was a very complicated situation and I doubt anyone will ever be able to untangle the ball of string and arrive at the "correct" figure (which would have changed on a daily basis anyway). So aspqrz, I agree with the thrust of your argument that Fighter Command could have mounted an effective "maximum effort" assault on any German bridgehead and for what its worth I believe that they would have won the day against the Luftwaffe. I just think your numbers are open to debate (in the friendliest possible way)


BTW: all quotes in italics are from Wikipedia. Now I agree that Wikipedia is hardly an authoritative reference but those quotes agrees with my other references and its easier to cut and paste from Wikipedia than to retype from a hardcover book.

[aspqrz02]

Indeed, you are quite correct.

However, the problem is that the Germans were almost certainly not able to react as quickly to any withdrawal by the Groups involved as would be needed to stage the invasion.

Depending on the point at which they manage to force the withdrawal of the RAF ... which, of course, they never actually achieved, which should be remembered ... you need to consider how quickly they would have been able to load the troops slated for the operation onto whatever vessels they had available at that point. And, IIRC, they never did assemble all the troops allegedly committed all that close to the ports where the vessels to be used were being gathered.

Since they cannot predict in advance that when, or even if (*they* didn't know what the Brit plans were, after all!), the RAF will withdraw, they don't really have a capacity to load the barges and boats all that quickly ... I'd guess several days, more likely several weeks ... which brings us to the *other* part of the RAF plan.

The RAF wasn't planning to simply run away, tail between legs and remain beaten ... they were planning to rest, train, re-equip and build up their forces and go back south again *as soon as possible* ... given that the Brits were outproducing the Germans in numbers of aircraft *and*, more importantly, out-training them in number of pilots, pretty much every day during the Battle, even a couple of weeks delay would mean that the RAF would be able to return south considerably better off than when they had withdrawn.

Then the Germans have a serious problem.

Their "plan", such as it was, *always*, in *every* version, relied not just on the Luftwaffe attaining air superiority, but on the Luftwaffe attaining air *supremacy* ...

The former wasn't enough, as it implies that your opponent is still there, but overmatched more often than not ... the latter means that the opponent has been *destroyed* to all intents and purposes.

Why was this necessary?

Well, for the simple reason that *all* iterations of Sealion required the Luftwaffe to do *three* separate things *simultaneously* ...

* Maintain Air Supremacy (see above)

* Act as artillery for the Wehrmacht, as they had no way of getting artillery support ashore with the first wave ... or, indeed, for a long time thereafter ... and *none* of the plans allowed for this to be achieved in the first wave.

* Prevent the RN and RAF from destroying the Kriegsmarine and the invasion barges and etc.

But the problem was that the Luftwaffe couldn't perform all three functions, it simply wasn't a big enough force and wasn't equipped and trained to do all of them in the strength needed.

For example, there weren't enough Stukas to act as Artillery. The medium bombers were less than useful in this role, comparatively. And the Fighters, apart from their small potential bombload ... well, they have to maintain air supremacy, so cannot be used because the Luftwaffe was simply never capable of destroying the RAF.

But there's more!

While the Stukas and medium bombers are *entirely* committed to providing artillery support to the ground forces, they *also*, simultaneously, have to sink the RN ... I could point out that the Luftwaffe, in 1940, had exactly *one* Squadron trained and equipped for aeronaval warfare. *One* squadron.

Oh. And the torpedoes they were equipped with? Broke up or otherwise failed completely in the overwhelming number of launches ... in the end they solved the problem (out of BoB/Sealion timeframe) by buying *Italian* torpedoes.

Level bombers, as pretty much everyone involved in WW2 found, unless specially trained for aeronaval attack, are pretty much useless for sinking any sort of ship.

Dive Bombers, well, again, unless they're trained for it, they're better than level bombers, but still piss poor. Luftwaffe Stukas *did* sink RN vessels off Crete ... usually, however, only when they'd shot off all their AA ammo. One of the RN ships actually kept the Stukas at bay, and survived, by firing *practise* ammo, which did nothing but make pretty smoke puffs, at the attacking Stukas.

And, of course, the Stukas are already fully committed to the artillery support of the invading ground forces.

Consider the two main Sealion variants ... the earlier one involved sending the troops across largely in unpowered, towed, Rhine River Barges ... and, from the ports where they were stationed, it was approximately a 48 hour *one way* trip at the top speed at which they could be towed by the vessels available ... which means that, no matter how they cut it, there are at least two night periods *each way* that they'd have to be "at sea" ...

The Luftwaffe's record of successful aero-naval attacks at *night*?

Pretty close to, if not, zero.

So, the RN remains north of the Luftwaffe's daylight escorted bomber range and sorties south to hit the invasion barges, coming and going, and gets two bites at them *each way*, withdrawing north before the Luftwaffe can attack them each morning ... and we're talking ships that can do 30 kts, compared to barges which could manage 3-4 kts here, remember.

Now, one of the reasons that the Barges were so slow was because they were unpowered, most of them, and had to be towed, and there simply weren't enough powered barges and/or potential towing ships to pull them at greater speeds ... but *another* reason was that the Germans found that their low freeboard (no more than 18 inches, and often as little as six inches) meant that towing them at higher speeds led to the wake of the tow vessel, or of the barges themselves, slopping over the sides and, potentially, rapidly sinking the barge.

So, one planned RN method of dealing with them was simply to do a high speed pass against a line of them, and watch them be swamped ... and since access to them was often restricted, and the soldiers were deep inside, one could assume a lot of soldiers drowning before they could get out ... oh, and the Kriegsmarine found they could only provide one trained sailor or less per Barge, compounding the problem.

I suspect, of course, that considering the RN was pretty fair at night gunnery, though not up to Japanese standards, perhaps, that being swamped by the wake of the passing RN warships would have been the least of the problems the barges would be facing.

Did I mention that they would have been attackable at night *twice* in *each* direction?

So, yes, they might get one wave ashore ... but the savaging they'd get in withdrawing and attempting a resupply ... which couldn't be done in less than a week, would be debilitating to the point of making it impossible.

Their second brilliant plan was to wait *three weeks* between the first wave and the second, with *no* intervening attempt to resupply ... and the problem with that should be obvious.

So, really, there are so many things wrong with Sealion in real world terms that it is simply a joke to take it seriously.

In fact, it's been discussed to death on soc.history.what-if, where I often hang out, and the most believable suggestion for German victory involved the use of millions of tons of jello dumped by the Germans into the Channel so they could drive across

[:D][:D][:D]

Phil

[Lascar]

Phil,

You present a compelling case how operation Sealion could never have been more than a bluff by the Germans. I recall seeing a documentary several years ago that had discovered some documents in the German archives that demonstrated just that. If it took the British and Americans more than two years to build up sufficient forces for Overlord, with the vast industrial might of the U.S.A. behind it, it is fanciful to believe that the Germans could have pulled off an impromptu Jerry-rigged invasion in 1940, even against a British army trying to recover from Dunkirk. Even if the RAF had been totally annihilated it is hard to see how the Luftwaffe could have kept a determined Royal Navy from entering the channel ravaging the Germans invasion barges. It would have been a slaughter.

The question as to whether the civilians of London would have resisted a German attack is really besides the point. The point being that operation Sealion in 1940 was simply not possible.

[Greyshaft]

Personally I believe that the best German strategy for late 1040 would have been a holding action in the BoB and to divert all resources to a push on Egypt and beyond. Control of the Arabian oil fields would have solved a lot of German problems.

[battlevonwar]

Interesting statistics :: eyes get wide :: you're a true buff to the core. I started a book earlier this year about the invasion of Poland. It was something else, I don't recall the feeling I was getting from it. They seemed to praise the German Generals and share the dread that they had for this invasion, it may been the men on the ground, not just drills.In terms of statistics, talk about nightmares? Which was a worse choice? To lose outright a million men in the Channel to the Royal Navy or many millions to a long protracted war, you could never win. My whole feeling was sue for peace and pray that you kept most of your winnings.

I have to agree with the United Kingdom being a near impossible target. Fun to imagine though in a game and we know from History, no plan is perfect, no one statistic means everything. Gambling was a German Virtue. they won a lot of territory due to it

~if in this game the RAF commits everything and the Royal Navy runs off to fight elsewhere, i.e. protecting from the real threat, U-boats, aid Allied Invasions too early in the war....then the consequence should be a possible Sea Lion. To keep the Brits Honest.

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
~if in this game the RAF commits everything and the Royal Navy runs off to fight elsewhere, i.e. protecting from the real threat, U-boats, aid Allied Invasions too early in the war....then the consequence should be a possible Sea Lion. To keep the Brits Honest.

RAF doesn't really matter once you get ashore. It's easy enough to recon their locations then strafe them with your own fighters or overrun them with Panzers.

The RN should be the impenatrable Channel shield perhaps 30% of the time with varying levels of response for the other 70% of the time.

[Lascar]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

Personally I believe that the best German strategy for late 1040 would have been a holding action in the BoB and to divert all resources to a push on Egypt and beyond. Control of the Arabian oil fields would have solved a lot of German problems.

You are quite right about that. The Germans had not "earned" the right to invade England in 1940. They simply hadn't built up the necessary sea-lift,amphibious capability and naval and air power to pull of a credible invasion. It takes a lot of time and hard effort to prepare for something like that.

The only viable strategy the Germans could have had against Britain in 1940 to 41 would have been to blockade Britain with the Kriegsmarine with support by the Luftwaffe (and equipping and training Luftwaffe units to effectively operate against ships at sea) They could have effectively neutralized Britain with an aggressive blockade while devoting sufficient forces to an aggressive Mediterranean strategy. Take or at least neutralize Malta, pressure Franco to cooperate in the capture of Gibraltar, support the Italian army fully in their drive on Egypt and once in the Middle east securing the Iraq oil fields and also threaten British access to the Persian fields. Meanwhile they are giving priority to U-boat construction and to building up the strength of the Luftwaffe. This of course would have meant postponing Barbarossa for a post 1941 start date.

In this position Britain might have had to come to terms without the Germans having to invade. The Germans would have been in a superior strategic position that would have allowed them to expand their production of panzers and vehicles for a more fully mechanized army, because they would have had adequate oil supplies. The USSR would have been threatened from the south which may even had encouraged Turkey to join the Axis once the Germans and Italians had conquered the middle east.

This is a viable war wining strategy for Germany that is also in alignment with the constraints facing Germany in 1940. The ease that operation Sealion seems to be pulled off ToF in 1940 may be fun in a fantasy sort of way but it really is coming off as more of a cheat that doesn't make the player really prepare and work for it. Sealion should be possible at a later date...1941 or whatever, but the German player should have to make hard choices and plan for it and not have it handed to him on a silver platter.

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: Lascar
This of course would have meant postponing Barbarossa for a post 1941 start date.

which raises the ever-entertaining question of whether Stalin was actually preparing to attack Germany in 1941. If so, then Germany might have been quite stretched for a while... perhaps fatally so.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Lascar

Phil,

You present a compelling case how operation Sealion could never have been more than a bluff by the Germans. I recall seeing a documentary several years ago that had discovered some documents in the German archives that demonstrated just that. If it took the British and Americans more than two years to build up sufficient forces for Overlord, with the vast industrial might of the U.S.A. behind it, it is fanciful to believe that the Germans could have pulled off an impromptu Jerry-rigged invasion in 1940, even against a British army trying to recover from Dunkirk. Even if the RAF had been totally annihilated it is hard to see how the Luftwaffe could have kept a determined Royal Navy from entering the channel ravaging the Germans invasion barges. It would have been a slaughter.

The question as to whether the civilians of London would have resisted a German attack is really besides the point. The point being that operation Sealion in 1940 was simply not possible.

While it is reasonably obvious that Sealion was a major league longshot - impossible to any reasonable way of thinking, in fact - I have pointed out for a number of the related issues that understanding its inherent unlikelihood is best done with 20:20 hindsight.

So, did the Germans think of it as a bluff, is, I guess, the question. There seems little doubt that, initially, all the parties involved on the German side saw it as mostly being a way of forcing the UK to negotiate a peace ... so, on that level, yes, it was a bluff ... but, after it became obvious that Churchill and the Brits were *not* going to roll over and play dead, Hitler became angered and, encouraged by Goering's claims about what the Luftwaffe could do, decided to make at least a semi-serious attempt at it. At *that* point it became something more than a bluff in his mind ...

We are well served by knowing all sorts of facts that *neither* side knew at the time ... so, on balance, I'd say that, to begin with, yes, it was largely (but not entirely) a bluff ... and that it took on a life of its own, becoming a semi-serious plan as time went on ... before other factors (failure of Luftwaffe to win BoB in the needed timeframe, as much as anything else) intervened and scuttled it.

Phil

[Lascar]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

ORIGINAL: Lascar
This of course would have meant postponing Barbarossa for a post 1941 start date.

which raises the ever-entertaining question of whether Stalin was actually preparing to attack Germany in 1941. If so, then Germany might have been quite stretched for a while... perhaps fatally so.

Viktor Suvorov proposed such a possibility in his book Icebreaker and others. This is still being hotly debated among historians. Axis History forum, which has a fair number of very well informed contributors, has discussed this exhaustively. The consensus there seems to be that Stalin had no intention of attacking in 1941. Though many Soviets units were deployed forward in what could be interpreted as a offensive stance many of those units, especially tank formations, were not up to strength and were in the midst of organizational changes. However, by 1942 the Soviets could have been ready for a general offensive against the Germans. If the Germans had followed a Britain first Mediterranean Strategy in '40-'41 they would have been in a very favorable position that would have given Stalin pause about attacking first in '42. This is the sort of "what if" scenario that makes strategy gaming fun. But a Sealion '40 invasion under actual historical constraints that existed in 1940 is not a "what if" it is more like a fantasy scenario. Rigging the scenario by having the Royal Navy not enter the English Channel to intercept the German invasion and allowing the Germans to build transports in a few weeks doesn't create a credible "what if" scenario.

[Lascar]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: Lascar

Phil,

You present a compelling case how operation Sealion could never have been more than a bluff by the Germans. I recall seeing a documentary several years ago that had discovered some documents in the German archives that demonstrated just that. If it took the British and Americans more than two years to build up sufficient forces for Overlord, with the vast industrial might of the U.S.A. behind it, it is fanciful to believe that the Germans could have pulled off an impromptu Jerry-rigged invasion in 1940, even against a British army trying to recover from Dunkirk. Even if the RAF had been totally annihilated it is hard to see how the Luftwaffe could have kept a determined Royal Navy from entering the channel ravaging the Germans invasion barges. It would have been a slaughter.

The question as to whether the civilians of London would have resisted a German attack is really besides the point. The point being that operation Sealion in 1940 was simply not possible.

While it is reasonably obvious that Sealion was a major league longshot - impossible to any reasonable way of thinking, in fact - I have pointed out for a number of the related issues that understanding its inherent unlikelihood is best done with 20:20 hindsight.

So, did the Germans think of it as a bluff, is, I guess, the question. There seems little doubt that, initially, all the parties involved on the German side saw it as mostly being a way of forcing the UK to negotiate a peace ... so, on that level, yes, it was a bluff ... but, after it became obvious that Churchill and the Brits were *not* going to roll over and play dead, Hitler became angered and, encouraged by Goering's claims about what the Luftwaffe could do, decided to make at least a semi-serious attempt at it. At *that* point it became something more than a bluff in his mind ...

We are well served by knowing all sorts of facts that *neither* side knew at the time ... so, on balance, I'd say that, to begin with, yes, it was largely (but not entirely) a bluff ... and that it took on a life of its own, becoming a semi-serious plan as time went on ... before other factors (failure of Luftwaffe to win BoB in the needed timeframe, as much as anything else) intervened and scuttled it.

Phil

You pointed out in your two well considered posts that at least at the operational levels the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine commanders knew the extreme hurdles they had to overcome to launch a successful Sealion. Of course all they could do is present the facts to their superiors with no assurance that they would see reason and not give orders to proceed with an overly ambitious operation that they were ill prepared to execute.

As you pointed out, if the Luftwaffe had achieved air supremacy they were unlikely to have been able to engage the Royal Navy with the effectiveness required to defend the amphibious operations and follow up naval transport of reinforcements and supplies.

Which brings us back to the original question posed by doomtrader. The defense of London 1940 is only of concern in ToF because the current scripting of the AI makes the RN passive and the rules allow the Germans to quickly assemble amphibious capacity and the Luftwaffe is able to take on the RN and win. This is not really a legitimate "what if" scenario under those rigged conditions. If a proper Sealion "what if" scenario is desired. Force the Germans to prepare for it. Spend the time (months, not weeks) to build the amphibious capacity, have the Luftwaffe spend the time and resources equipping and training units that can effectively attacks ships at sea. Certainly this can be done without adding undo complication to the mechanics of the game. Just modify the parameters of what is already in place.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

Personally I believe that the best German strategy for late 1040 would have been a holding action in the BoB and to divert all resources to a push on Egypt and beyond. Control of the Arabian oil fields would have solved a lot of German problems.

Ah.

Something else discussed to death on soc.history.what-if.

And something generally accepted as also being impossible.

See, as with Sealion, the problem boils down to ... logistics, logistics, logistics and ... wait for it ... logistics ...

For a start, the Germans have to rely on Italian shipping in any Mediterranean campaign.

Problem is, Il Duce, when he declared war on the Allies in 1940, did so when, cunningly, something like 80% of the Italian Merchant marine were in enemy or neutral ports and were entirely captured or interned.

Now, the Italian MM wasn't much shot anyway, but it was even more hobbling afterwards.The Italians found they could not simultaneously support would be operations in the Balkans/Aegean and North Africa at the same time. They simply didn't have the shipping.

When their initial offensive failed and the DAK was formed and sent, the Germans had the same problem ... lack of shipping.

But it was made worse by the simple fact that the main ports used for unloading had a maximum unloading capacity of (this is from memory) eight ... count 'em, yes, eight merchant ships of *any* size at once. The rest of the North African ports were worse. Then you had to ship the supplies to wherever the front was ... but the Italians and DAK never had enough coastal shipping to manage this, so a considerable percentage (a majority, more often than not) of any supplies had to be sent by truck ... and this meant that the supply trucks burnt several times their load of POL to get a single load to the front, when at full extension ...

Oh.

Did I mention that the small Italian Merchant Marine was 80& captured? I did? Good!

That included almost all of the very few Tankers they had.

So, how did they send POL to North Africa?

In just about the most inefficient way possible. They shipped it in 44 gallon drums or jerrycans.

Or, when things were getting desperate (in 1942-43) by *flying* it across in Me-323 Gigant transports ... in 44 gallon drums ... which is amazingly ridiculously profligate.

This is all covered, in some detail, in an excellent book by Van Creveld "Supplying War" which makes it plain that the North African campaign was a marginal operation at best.

But, say, by some fluke, Rommel manages to take Alexandria and Cairo.

He rolls on to take the Iraqi, Saudi and Persian oil fields, right?

Nope.

Not even close.

There are several divisions of troops in the way, and, indeed, holding said areas.

And there's no real direct route through the Syrian/Palestinian deserts for an armoured thrust.

But, somehow, the Germans cobble together a credible attempt.

What do they get?

Burning oilfields and destroyed refineries.

And destroyed pipelines.

Now, re-drilling the wellheads and rebuilding the refineries requires lots and lots and lots ... tens of thousands of tons, in fact ... of special order, *not* off the shelf ironmongery.

Guess what the Germans were short of through the entire war? Had to be rationed almost as closely as POL?

Iron and Steel.

So, not much chance of making it all.

Even so, imagine they managed by melting down iron bedsteads or somesuch.

How do they get it there?

By ship?

Oh.

Did I mention that the Italian Merchant marine was largely captured by the Allies at the outbreak of war?

So. Not by sea.

That leaves Turkey. Where Kemal Ataturk, whom the Turks still think rather highly of, had recently died (1934?) and left pretty specific instructions to *not*, under any circumstances, support Germany in any future war.

But say the Turkish government ignores that advice, or that the Germans don't invade Russia and invade Turkey instead (!) ... can the send all the assorted ironmongery needed by rail.

Er. Well. No.

The Berlin-Baghdad rail line was slighted at the Iraqi border at the end of WW1. All that remains is the roadbed.

And the lines through Turkey to the area are all single tracked, with limited capacity, made worse by the fact that the Turkish pre-war railways had a serious shortage of rolling stock and locomotives (and so did the Reichsbahn compared to what it was already being expected to do) ...

So, to get the ironmongery to re-drill the wells and rebuild the refineries in Iraq etc. they need to rebuild the rail line first ... and look at all the problems they had doing that in Russia!

So, at best, it's going to be several years, if ever, before they manage to do all this.

But. Wait. How do they get the fuel out of Iraq?

Not by sea. No tankers.

Worse, the pipelines across Syria etc. have been destroyed ... so, there's more ironmongery to transport in an already inadequate logistics net.

By rail?

Remember that the rail line into Iraq is a single track line?

A single track railway can support 20ktons of supply per day. That's total. So, in this case, 10ktons in each direction.

But Iraq, Saudi and Persia have to be garrisoned ... and a minimal garrison will actually consume somehwre between closwe to and more than 10ktons per day in assorted supplies. Double tracking the rail line would invole major engineering works building or rebuilding or diverting the track through single track tunnels or over single track bridges or whatever. Not gonna happen overnight. And requires more of the scarce, special purpose, not off the shelf, ironmongery that Germany is already short of.

Worse, the Reichsbahn suffered a perennial shortage which, because of iron and steel shortages, they were never able to rectify, of POL tankers ... so, in effect, you've made this issue an even bigger problem ... it is unlikely that even if the rail line is gotten back into service that they'd be able to ship a significant percentage out on it.

I mean, scheduling problems alone would mean that the 20kton per day limit would mean that the Germans would be able to ship in only so many empty tankers before it bit into the supplies they needed for their defensive operations. Which limits the amount they could ship out ... and that's not even considering the POL tanker shortfall!

And even if you do all this, its gonna take several years. The Japanese, for example, who had actually done some preparation and had specialists with the invasion force, took the best part of the war to get the DEI and Borneo oilfields and refineries back to just 80% of pre-war peacetime output ... which was, in fact, inadequate for their needs in any case.

It seems unlikely that the Germans would do any better in the Middle East.

So, on the whole, no.

The Middle East was another chimaera. Mirage. What have you.

(Again, a lot of this we only know through 20:20 hindsight, so you shouldn't assume that the Germans wouldn't have, at least, *tried* it ... its just unlikely they had a realistic chance of succeeding, but may not have known this)

Phil

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
~if in this game the RAF commits everything and the Royal Navy runs off to fight elsewhere, i.e. protecting from the real threat, U-boats, aid Allied Invasions too early in the war....then the consequence should be a possible Sea Lion. To keep the Brits Honest.

RAF doesn't really matter once you get ashore. It's easy enough to recon their locations then strafe them with your own fighters or overrun them with Panzers.

The RN should be the impenatrable Channel shield perhaps 30% of the time with varying levels of response for the other 70% of the time.

Only in fantasyland.

Phil

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: Lascar
Rigging the scenario by having the Royal Navy not enter the English Channel to intercept the German invasion and allowing the Germans to build transports in a few weeks doesn't create a credible "what if" scenario.

However playing WWII without the possibility of Sealion makes BoB pointless for the Germans and is an enormous boost for the Allies. After the Fall of France the Axis player is forced to ignore the Britain isles (which is completely ahistorical) and can look for victory only in Russia.

Barbarossa 1940 perhaps?

D@mned if you do and d@mned if you don't.

[Lascar]

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft

ORIGINAL: Lascar
Rigging the scenario by having the Royal Navy not enter the English Channel to intercept the German invasion and allowing the Germans to build transports in a few weeks doesn't create a credible "what if" scenario.

However playing WWII without the possibility of Sealion makes BoB pointless for the Germans and is an enormous boost for the Allies. After the Fall of France the Axis player is forced to ignore the Britain isles (which is completely ahistorical) and can look for victory only in Russia.

Barbarossa 1940 perhaps?

D@mned if you do and d@mned if you don't.

It doesn't have to be reduced to a simple either/or. For game purposes Sealion should be possible but not necessarily in 1940 with a RN held back on a leash by AI scripting or the Luftwaffe being adept at sinking the RN at sea and the Germans not relying on a Jerry-rigged amphibious lift but instead building a real amphibious capability. Those things should be possible with the proper investment in time and resources in game terms. It allows for the fun of "what if" without creating the sense of there is a "cheat" or "give away" that is making it all possible.

Same could be said about Phil's comments on a German Mediterranean and Middle East first strategy. Many of the constraints of those initial conditions in 1940 may have been there but the game should allow for remedies to those limits put in place through the framework of the games production, logistics, and other rules that give the player a sense of creating a new set of conditions that allow for a "what if" to be explored.

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: Greyshaft
The RN should be the impenatrable Channel shield perhaps 30% of the time with varying levels of response for the other 70% of the time.

Only in fantasyland.

Phil

Wargaming *IS* fantasy - we just all have a different point at which we believe whether that fantasy becomes so implausible as to be not worthy of being played (or is no fun or whatever reason you want to use as justification for not playing the game any further). On one side we have the historical 'What-if?' and I personally come down on the side of:

• If Goring had achieved a measure of fighter superiority ( could have been possible if he'd kept attacking airfields rather than switching to London), and
• Hitler had bullied the Kreigsmarine into towing their barges across the Channel, then ...

... some German troops would have landed in England but the invasion would eventually fail. A wargame of Sealion was played by the Sandhurst Military College back in the 1970's which supports that conclusion. They had people such as Adolf Galland as umpires so their result was as professional as you can get.

However the invasion itself may have convinced Franco to join the war which would take us even further from reality. I'm comfortable playing with those possibilities but I accept that others will not be. For every person who complains that Sealion should be impossible there will be a person who insists it must be achievable. So Doomtrader and co have invented an alternative reality kit that will disappoint all of us because it inevitably fails to live up to our personal expectations of what was possible in WWII. Every game eventually fails that test but before I pack it away for the last time I expect to have many dozen (hundreds of?) hours of enjoyment and I thank Doomtrader for that.

[Greyshaft]

ORIGINAL: Lascar
... the Germans not relying on a Jerry-rigged amphibious lift ...

[:D][:D][:D]