Fleet assets

[Mike_B20]

Originally posted by TIMJOT
How do you know this? Each attack will have variable losses.

You have the start of game US strength minus whatever damage your pilots said they did, give or take 1000%:p

[mogami]

Originally posted by Mike_B20
You have the start of game US strength minus whatever damage your pilots said they did, give or take 1000%:p

Hi, I don't think it is as large an issue as most people think. The IJN might not be in shape to launch a strike on Dec 8th. (they lose 30 ac on the 7th and have 60-90 more damaged.)

But did you know on Mar 2 1942 the Japanese could have once again launch a surprise strike on PH?

They had plans but in the actual event 2 lone flying boats flew to PH bombed and returned without encountering any enemy CAP. Whats more the USN had knowledge of the up coming raid and still took no preventive measures. Knowing it's coming does not always equate to action.

[TIMJOT]

I dont think its that big a deal either. Personally I dont think a 3rd strike merits the air losses you would probably incurr. I would though actively hunt for those USN CVs. IMO this is perfectly fair tactic considering in a PBEM game neither player would benefit from hindsite after the first turn. The only advantage is that you know that the Saratoga is not there, but not sure this is so unrealistic, because the Japanese knew from spies that the Sara had not been at PH for a while.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike_B20


In my view there should be some sort of seperation at the start to allow for variety in defense or offense.
Not to say there shouldn't be a what-if scenario but it should be seperate.
I think Pacific War had it about right starting post PH with the IJN fleet half way home.

I agree that a variable USN CV deployment would make a great "what if" scenerio. That would really put the IJN player in the Nagumo hot seat.

I also think there should be a no PH start option and an after PH attack (historical losses) start option.

[Mike Scholl]

To everyone who thinks the US should be able to "Midway"
the Japanese if they stick around to hit PH again.

Only the Yorktown is in range to do so (she docked at PH the
evening of the 7th.

If you want to have 2by3 put in alternate locations for the 2
US carrier to make a combined strike a feasibility the Japs have
to worry about, I say fine. Just be sure that one of those alternate locations is IN Pearl Harbor the morning of the 7th!
They were as likely to be there as anywhere else. If the possibility of hitting the Japanese by suprise still looks like a
good risk to your when accompanied by the possibility of losing
1/3rd you your total CV's in port, then you deserve the chance.

[Mike_B20]

Originally posted by Mike Scholl
To everyone who thinks the US should be able to "Midway"
the Japanese if they stick around to hit PH again.

Only the Yorktown is in range to do so (she docked at PH the
evening of the 7th.

If you want to have 2by3 put in alternate locations for the 2
US carrier to make a combined strike a feasibility the Japs have
to worry about, I say fine. Just be sure that one of those alternate locations is IN Pearl Harbor the morning of the 7th!
They were as likely to be there as anywhere else. If the possibility of hitting the Japanese by suprise still looks like a
good risk to your when accompanied by the possibility of losing
1/3rd you your total CV's in port, then you deserve the chance.

So many times I've seen it posted that the US was 'lucky' at Midway, it was a miracle, it shouldn't have happened, that experts have wargamed the scenario and the US lost nine out of ten times etc.
When I've seen that argument I've always felt that there must have been something missing in the wargamers simulation.

The reality is Midway was a major defeat for the Japs simply because they were caught with most of their planes returning to their carriers or in the process of rearming and refueling.
Midway diesn't strike me as any sort of a miracle but all very logical and proper.

IF the Japs had hung around for a second day at Pearl Harbour and IF they sent most of their planes off at dawn to bomb PH and IF the US carrier aircraft were fully up to strength and IF the US caught the Japs in much the same way as they did later at Midway then maybe, just maybe the Japs could have been badly mauled.
Not likely, as any decent carrier commander would have reserved much of his strength, but hey, they didn't do that at Midway did they?
And of course that result or even Midway would be totally impossible in UV.

[mogami]

Originally posted by Mike_B20
So many times I've seen it posted that the US was 'lucky' at Midway, it was a miracle, it shouldn't have happened, that experts have wargamed the scenario and the US lost nine out of ten times etc.
When I've seen that argument I've always felt that there must have been something missing in the wargamers simulation.

The reality is Midway was a major defeat for the Japs simply because they were caught with most of their planes returning to their carriers or in the process of rearming and refueling.
Midway diesn't strike me as any sort of a miracle but all very logical and proper.

IF the Japs had hung around for a second day at Pearl Harbour and IF they sent most of their planes off at dawn to bomb PH and IF the US carrier aircraft were fully up to strength and IF the US caught the Japs in much the same way as they did later at Midway then maybe, just maybe the Japs could have been badly mauled.
Not likely, as any decent carrier commander would have reserved much of his strength, but hey, they didn't do that at Midway did they?
And of course that result or even Midway would be totally impossible in UV.

Hi, I've "Midway'd" the IJN many time in UV. But once again on Dec 7th or 8th you will not have 3 USN CV launching attacks versus 4 IJN CV(disjointed as they were) you'll have 1 USN CV attacking 6 IJN CV. Or if your really lucky (or unlucky) you'll have 2 seperate USN CV making their attacks. The IJN might be able to launch attacks against both. But the USN strikes will be 36 divebombers each (if they all come together) The IJN TF contain approx 300 bombers and 120 fighters (I edited the numbers down)

[Mike_B20]

Yes, we all know that but my point is the Japs didn't.

Once again, you are using 100% intelligence of US capabilities to plan IJN strategy.

At the time the IJN didn't have that luxury.

Also, there is a difference between a 'Midway' like result and what actually happened at Midway, ie catching the IJN planes refueling and rearming.

[mogami]

Originally posted by Mike_B20
Yes, we all know that but my point is the Japs didn't.

Once again, you are using 100% intelligence of US capabilities to plan IJN strategy.

At the time the IJN didn't have that luxury.

Hi, I do not see where this matters. The Japanese on Dec 8 acting prudently will still have all the advantages. They are close to an enemy base with aircraft. They will have CAP up. They will have scouts out (since the surprise of the day before is gone)
They can without knowing where the USN CV are (place them any where you want) Still fight and win a carrier battle. Part of Midway was sacrificing a large number of USN aircraft. This will not be possible here. The Japanese can keep 75 fighters for CAP and still send 50-75 as escorts (against PH or against USN CV)
The USN has to decide. CAP or escort they can not do both (they can but they only insure both are insufficent)

I do not understand what is so important about this point we have to worry about it. The USN CV will not approach PH (while I am in command) If the Japanese wish to hit PH on the 8th I say go for it. I'll be happy knowing the IJN CV will be out of action for a few months training new pilots.

If I use hindsight to plot Japanese strategy I do the same as Allies. I know my 2 USN CV only have 38 fighters. The "Surprised" Japanese still overwhelm me if I get too close.

[Drongo]

Posted by Mike_B20

Also, there is a difference between a 'Midway' like result and what actually happened at Midway, ie catching the IJN planes refueling and rearming.

That is correct. The elements aren't modeled in the game that would allow the Midway situation to be recreated (although as Mogami pointed out, you can still get similar results in terms of a one sided battle).

UV's game system assumes both sides airstrikes (if they are going out on a mission) will be in the air simultaneously during an airphase, thereby eliminating the chance of catching an enemy strike while it is on the decks being readied.

In those situations where you can catch an enemy CV with a/c onboard (ie, the strike a/c were being rested, no mission was planned), it represents no risk of increased damage to the enemy CV.

What the current system does reflect is the dangers inherent in attempting to engage an enemy air base with your CV TF while there is a chance that enemy CV TFs may be present. If you set most of your carrier strike a/c to airbase attack in an attempt to neutralise the airbase, those a/c cannot respond to the appearance of the enemy CVs. If you try to minimise the risk by setting a primary mission of Naval Attack and a secondary of Airbase Attack, you are giving the land base an opportunity to launch 2 full strikes against you while you are attempting to deal with the enemy CV threat.

It's a realistic dilemma.

Do you see the introduction of some form of Midway surprise rule as a necessity for the game? I assume the surprise rule would only come into effect when a specific set of "Midway" conditions are met and would result in something like the surprised CVs being unable to launch any strikes until the friendly airstrikes are resolved and CV damage received per hit would be considerably increased.

This forum is probably as good as place as any to put forward ideas for new rules.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Mike_B20
IF the US caught the Japs in much the same way as they did later at Midway then maybe, just maybe the Japs could have been badly mauled.
Not likely, as any decent carrier commander would have reserved much of his strength, but hey, they didn't do that at Midway did they?

Mike, they did reserve a a full 4 CV strike for naval attack. It was only after Nagumo vacilated and then decided to rearm that strike for another crack at Midway did the whole chain of events put his CVs in jeopardy. At Midway Nagumo and his staff wrongly believed that the USN CVs could not be in the areal. At PH they were working under the assumption that the CVs were most likely in the area. That is entirely different set of circumstances.

[mdiehl]

TIMJOT

Nagumo did not vacillate at Midway. He rearmed his a/c for a strike on Midway because Midway's air base had clearly not been crippled by the full might of the 1st wave, and because no US CVs were known or even rumoured to be in the area. He rearmed ALL available ready planes. This is precisely why it is reasonable to assume that he'd have done the same given a hypothetical 3rd or 4th strike at PH.

To all in general:

The best way of course for the USN to "Midway" the IJN in a Dec 8 repeated attack on PH scenario is to wait for that 3rd wave to be recovered. A 2 CV strike against KB recovering a/c would almost certainly sink three Japanese CVs. To be sure, the Yorktown strike would be less than full strength, but after the third wave KB would not even have 20% of its air complement fit to fight, from battle damage, recovring a/c and so forth.

If the UV engine does not have a mechanism for Allied CVs to time airstrikes to catch Japanese a/c in recovery or on the flight deck, it's a major missing element and flaw in the program. EVERY boardgame tac-sim and most of the strategic board game sims provide for this possibility.

[mogami]

Originally posted by mdiehl
TIMJOT

Nagumo did not vacillate at Midway. He rearmed his a/c for a strike on Midway because Midway's air base had clearly not been crippled by the full might of the 1st wave, and because no US CVs were known or even rumoured to be in the area. He rearmed ALL available ready planes. This is precisely why it is reasonable to assume that he'd have done the same given a hypothetical 3rd or 4th strike at PH.

To all in general:

The best way of course for the USN to "Midway" the IJN in a Dec 8 repeated attack on PH scenario is to wait for that 3rd wave to be recovered. A 2 CV strike against KB recovering a/c would almost certainly sink three Japanese CVs. To be sure, the Yorktown strike would be less than full strength, but after the third wave KB would not even have 20% of its air complement fit to fight, from battle damage, recovring a/c and so forth.

If the UV engine does not have a mechanism for Allied CVs to time airstrikes to catch Japanese a/c in recovery or on the flight deck, it's a major missing element and flaw in the program. EVERY boardgame tac-sim and most of the strategic board game sims provide for this possibility.

Hi, How can you make this assertion? "Most certainly" The IJN would still have it's CAP up. (and outnumber the USN 2-1 or more in fighters) Unarmed low on fuel ac are not as large a threat as fully armed and fueled ac. There is no reason to assume the USN stike would find 3 IJN CV (it might all go after the same CV) it might fail to locate the target. But most importantly WITP and UV are not tactical level games. Why does everyone keep on demanding tactical routines. At this level if the game reported
"air strike TF 1 hex xx,yy minor damage" or something it would be correct. The added detail makes the game more enjoyable but often over shadows what is actually important to understand.

From the operational level the 6 IJN CV will attack and damage ships in PH. If it sticks around it will inflict more damage but also sustain loss to the airgroups. 2 USN CV widely seperated in distance racing to attack will likely as not fail to find (get close enough) to the IJN. If they do, they will not sink 3 IJN CV. (but they might be hurt themselves) There is nothing in common with Midway. There is no reason to assume the IJN will commit everything on Dec 7th (I don't) There is no reason to assume any Navy can co-ordinate an attack on a TF while it is recovering aircraft. So I do not agree such a mechanism needs to be present in WITP/UV

One more time. Only 1 USN CV has a chance of getting to PH by Dec 8th. It still does not mean it will be in own strike range of the IJN TF (but it would be in range for them to strike)

[mdiehl]

The idea is not that 2 CVs have to get to PH by Dec 8th. It's that 2 CVs have to get to Kido Butai by the time the latter finishes crashing aircraft into drydock gates, or whatever, during waves 3 and 4.

When this is happening, KB will have at most 10-12 a/c on CAP, because the remainder are gassed up waiting for your theoretical naval interdiction hold-back and the rest will either be damaged or away (bombing PH).

The circumstances will be almost identical to Midway. A mission-overtasked Japanese CV fleet with the usual lousy defensive CAP/CAC trying to guard against an unknown number of CVs whose positions are unknown but presumed to not be in the area. (Because, after all, Nagumo LEFT in the first place on the suspicion that US CVs WERE in the area. If he stays, it's reasonable to assume that he's been convinced that they're NOT in the area.)

In these circumstances the initiative is all on the side of the US. And it only takes one or two bombers to ruin a CVs day. The US had more than enough assets on two CVs to sink all 6 CVs. It is readonable and appropriate to assume that they could easily sink 3 of them.

There is no reason to assume any Navy can co-ordinate an attack on a TF while it is recovering aircraft.

Other than the fact that the US did exactly that at Midway, and that US CV tactics specifically envisioned, as a matter of foctrine, taking advantage of opportunities to do EXACTLy that?

[byron13]

Oh, boy! A showdown between Mogami and mdiehl on the Midwayability of the Japanese on December 8th. This could be good!

While trying to stay outside the fray, one CANNOT reasonably assume that the Japanese presence on December 8th means that Nagumo was convinced there were no American carriers in the area. One could only assume that he considered the likely rewards of remaining on station on extra day outweighed the risks. Among these risk calculations would be the likelihood of one or more American carriers putting in an inopportune appearance.

[mdiehl]

Or it could be extremely boring. Mogami and I seem to differ at start in our assumptions of the initial conditions.

[mogami]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The idea is not that 2 CVs have to get to PH by Dec 8th. It's that 2 CVs have to get to Kido Butai by the time the latter finishes crashing aircraft into drydock gates, or whatever, during waves 3 and 4.

When this is happening, KB will have at most 10-12 a/c on CAP, because the remainder are gassed up waiting for your theoretical naval interdiction hold-back and the rest will either be damaged or away (bombing PH).

The circumstances will be almost identical to Midway. A mission-overtasked Japanese CV fleet with the usual lousy defensive CAP/CAC trying to guard against an unknown number of CVs whose positions are unknown but presumed to not be in the area. (Because, after all, Nagumo LEFT in the first place on the suspicion that US CVs WERE in the area. If he stays, it's reasonable to assume that he's been convinced that they're NOT in the area.)


In these circumstances the initiative is all on the side of the US. And it only takes one or two bombers to ruin a CVs day. The US had more than enough assets on two CVs to sink all 6 CVs. It is readonable and appropriate to assume that they could easily sink 3 of them.


Other than the fact that the US did exactly that at Midway, and that US CV tactics specifically envisioned, as a matter of foctrine, taking advantage of opportunities to do EXACTLy that?

Hi, How do you come up with your numbers (at most 10 or 12 fighters on CAP. 6 CV each with approx 30 fighters can not even put up 5 or 6 each? At 50 percent CAP and 50 percent escort you'd have most of 90 fighters up and most of 90 fighters sitting. (I assign fighters every other Carrier. Akagi, Zuikaku and Hiryu on CAP Kaga, Shokaku, and Soryu on Escort)

The IJN are on the eastern side of PH. The USN CV have to at least reach PH to have a shot and only 1 of them can make it by the 8th (possibly I don't think it actually can)

I think the tactical mined player will have to petition GG to revamp "Carrier Strike" as an expansion pack. When a battle is possible the game ports the map and ships to CS and the battle is resolved before porting back to Witp/UV. (easy for games versus the AI somewhat difficult for PBEM games unless there is an online/hotseat option)

[mdiehl]

Hi, How do you come up with your numbers (at most 10 or 12 fighters on CAP. 6 CV each with approx 30 fighters can not even put up 5 or 6 each? At 50 percent CAP and 50 percent escort you'd have most of 90 fighters up and most of 90 fighters sitting. (I assign fighters every other Carrier. Akagi, Zuikaku and Hiry on CAP Kaga, Shokaku, and Soryu on Escort)

The IJN are on the eastern side of PH. The USN CV have to at least reach PH to have a shot and only 1 of them can make it by the 8th (possibly I don't think it actually can)
In these circumstances the initiative is all on the side of the US. And it only takes one or two bombers to ruin a CVs day. The US had more than enough assets on two CVs to sink all 6 CVs. It is readonable and appropriate to assume that they could easily sink 3 of them.

I guess I'm confused. Are we talking "game reality" or the "real world?" If the latter, the real world load out of KB is an average of 22 fighters per CV, prior to any losses as a result of the 1st and 2nd waves, or hypothetical 3rd + waves.

Assuming no losses to PH strikes, that's 132 fighters. Of these, you've specified that two CVs are holding back for naval interdiction. That leaves 80 fighters. Of these, you could expect half to be assigned to the PH strikes, that leaves 40 or so fighters for CAP. To maximize handling efficiency and CAP coordination, you'd use all the fighters from two CVs. Managing a CAP is rather like managing three infants; you diaper one (fuel and arm), feed another (fly CAP), burp the third (land the last CAP), more or less all at the same time. Then you repeat it. Then you repeat it again. Then you start over. At most, 33% of the aircraft actually assigned to CAP should be "effective" at interdicting an inbound strike. If UV says otherwise, UV is wrong.

Then, throw in the fact that KB has no radar capability to detect inbound strikes or to vectore their a/c into position. So, of the a/c currently flying cap, perhaps half of them can actually intervene against a strike. Your down to maybe 9 a/c.

If you try to beef up CAP by assigning more carrier decks to the Job, then you're just adding more control centers to an already confused situation, where no one is keeping track of planes by radar. In short, adding more decks to the job does not provide a commensurate LINEAR increase in cap effectiveness. Beyond a certain point, adding more decks to CAP may even decrease CAP effectiveness.

If you really f@ck the situation up, you fly cap from 4 decks simultaneously, whilst recovering or launching a new wave of airstrikes against anything, and when all this happens a US strike arrives. Even a 1-CV US strike would likely wreak havoc in such a situation.

[mogami]

Originally posted by mdiehl
I guess I'm confused. Are we talking "game reality" or the "real world?" If the latter, the real world load out of KB is an average of 22 fighters per CV, prior to any losses as a result of the 1st and 2nd waves, or hypothetical 3rd + waves.

Assuming no losses to PH strikes, that's 132 fighters. Of these, you've specified that two CVs are holding back for naval interdiction. That leaves 80 fighters. Of these, you could expect half to be assigned to the PH strikes, that leaves 40 or so fighters for CAP. To maximize handling efficiency and CAP coordination, you'd use all the fighters from two CVs. Managing a CAP is rather like managing three infants; you diaper one (fuel and arm), feed another (fly CAP), burp the third (land the last CAP), more or less all at the same time. Then you repeat it. Then you repeat it again. Then you start over. At most, 33% of the aircraft actually assigned to CAP should be "effective" at interdicting an inbound strike. If UV says otherwise, UV is wrong.

Then, throw in the fact that KB has no radar capability to detect inbound strikes or to vectore their a/c into position. So, of the a/c currently flying cap, perhaps half of them can actually intervene against a strike. Your down to maybe 9 a/c.

If you try to beef up CAP by assigning more carrier decks to the Job, then you're just adding more control centers to an already confused situation, where no one is keeping track of planes by radar. In short, adding more decks to the job does not provide a commensurate LINEAR increase in cap effectiveness. Beyond a certain point, adding more decks to CAP may even decrease CAP effectiveness.

If you really f@ck the situation up, you fly cap from 4 decks simultaneously, whilst recovering or launching a new wave of airstrikes against anything, and when all this happens a US strike arrives. Even a 1-CV US strike would likely wreak havoc in such a situation.

Hi, Even your own math is funny. 132 minus two CV (44) equals 88(you say 80) Half of 88 is 44 (you say 40 but the difference here is half as many fighters then you would have up on CAP so I point this out)
2CV for port attack (44 fighters)
2CV for CAP (44 fighters)
2CV for Naval strike (44 fighters)
Now I think each CAP CV could maintain 75 percent of assigned fighters (these are long range ac only 2-3 landing every hour would maintain the CAP (That makes 33 in the air) The number that actually intervened in aircombat can be debated. It would depend on picket ships (or subs of which there are plenty) Allied radio discipline (I'd guess weak on the 2nd day of the war)
And of course whether or not any allied search planes had been spotted. (KB will be several hundred miles from where it launched the Dec 7 attacks) In WITP the IJN has basically a 1 hex range advantage.

Your almost convincing me the USN did not need to build all those CV. They can do Midway on Dec 8 with only one.
The combined arms attack was important at Midway. The torpedo planes did draw down the Japanese CAP. Here there will be no torpedo attacks (just 36 divebombers minus scouts minus damaged) With little or no escort. (But lets say the USN goes all out and assigns 100 percent escort. AC attack in groups of 4.
without any loss from fighter or AA you get 9 bomb runs (possibly more if some of these groups break up)
I don't see this as winning the battle. The IJN counter strike will be much stronger. (but then it is possible you hit the IJN CV reserved for strike. The IJN can counter this by

Akagi Fighters CAP
Vals Port
Kate NI
Kaga Fighters Escort
Vals NI
Kate Port
Zuikaku Fighters Port
Vals Port
Kate NI
etc.

The Japanese player could even logicaly split his TF during the night and assign one TF to stand off at max range and hit the port while the other TF moved 1 hex in and stands guard.

[Chiteng]

Originally posted by Mike_B20
So many times I've seen it posted that the US was 'lucky' at Midway, it was a miracle, it shouldn't have happened, that experts have wargamed the scenario and the US lost nine out of ten times etc.
When I've seen that argument I've always felt that there must have been something missing in the wargamers simulation.

The reality is Midway was a major defeat for the Japs simply because they were caught with most of their planes returning to their carriers or in the process of rearming and refueling.
Midway diesn't strike me as any sort of a miracle but all very logical and proper.

IF the Japs had hung around for a second day at Pearl Harbour and IF they sent most of their planes off at dawn to bomb PH and IF the US carrier aircraft were fully up to strength and IF the US caught the Japs in much the same way as they did later at Midway then maybe, just maybe the Japs could have been badly mauled.
Not likely, as any decent carrier commander would have reserved much of his strength, but hey, they didn't do that at Midway did they?
And of course that result or even Midway would be totally impossible in UV.

Actually he DID reserve his strength at Midway. They were armed with Torps and AP bombs. It is because they were changing
these munitions to attack the airfield that there was a problem.
That and the landing planes.