ORIGINAL: Buckrock
Now you're really making me see red.
Again I'll point out, this has little to do with hindsight. It was based on historical discussions in 1941 involving the War Cabinet, the Chiefs
of Staff and the individual theatre commanders. In these political and military discussions, reinforcements to the Far East and other theatres
were weighed up against the needs of the Home Front and from July onwards, the Soviet Union. Through these discussions, you can see when
reinforcements were considered impossible and when they could be reasonably spared, including the arguements as to why and why not within
the strategic situation that you keep suggesting was so limiting.
If you get the chance, read up on the discussions during Jul-Aug '41 that concerned British aid to the Soviet Union and what numbers and types
of aircraft might be sent on the initial "Dervish" convoy. It came at a time when there was widespread acknowledgement of the inadequate fighter
defences in the Far East. How what was considered by many as little more than a political "gesture" to the Soviets could trump the pressing needs
of the Far East is enlightening. It may change your mind on whether Britain's "tight" strategic situation in 1941 really could excuse some of the
key decisions made during that time.
warspite1
I trust that the Amy Winehouse approach works for you here? i.e. I have gone
Back to Black [;)]
Well I’m always open to new information and I would be happy to read any examples you care to share. In the meantime, and in the absence of anything new, I think we will have to agree to disagree.
You mention 'pressing needs' in relation to the Far East – and I agree. History shows us that the defences of Malaya and Singapore proved to be inadequate. But this was hardly the only pressing need.
It should not be lost sight of that some of the assumptions in the early war about Japan and the limited threat to Malaya (due to distance) remained valid even into early 1941. The Japanese occupation of southern Indo-China in July 1941 changed that picture dramatically – the freeze on Japanese assets on 26 July, added to the threat of war, the oil embargo a few days later pretty much made war inevitable.
So here they were, August 1941. War with Japan seemed likely and the defences of Malaya/Singapore were inadequate. So why not send more reinforcements? Simple. Because it was not that simple.
August 1941. To the outside world, the USSR is being steam-rollered – same as France before her, the Germans are well on their way to Moscow and all sage military opinion is that she won’t last to the end of the year. And that assumes Stalin doesn’t come to a deal with Hitler to save his own skin before then.
To Churchill the answer is pretty obvious. They have to keep the Soviets in the game. The Soviets have to know that help is coming. As said, the conquest of the USSR spells the end for the UK anyway. These are the stakes being played for. Political ‘gestures’? I think anything that helps keep the USSR in the game, anything that convinces Stalin he is not on his own, is about as far from being a ‘gesture’ as it’s possible to get.
So at the time Japan moved into southern Indochina, Roosevelt made his decision to embargo oil (and the British and Dutch followed) and war now seemed inevitable, what was the position? Well put it this way, it wasn’t good:
- The British Commonwealth remained alone (remember there was no
guarantee that Japan would not simply attack the Dutch and British and leave the US out) - albeit we now have a new BFF in Uncle Joe - so long as he doesn't get beaten, which at this point seems likely.....
- Churchill’s disastrous decision to ‘aid’ Greece meant a double whammy of not finishing off Italy in North Africa, but also meant the RN was badly mauled in evacuating the troops with no air cover.... again....and not for the last time. 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers sunk, but also 2 modernised battleships, 1 modern carrier, 5 cruisers and 5 destroyers badly damaged and out of the OOB for many, many months to come. (As we have seen earlier in this thread the effects in the Mediterranean of this (added to serious losses already) would be felt into 1942 – not to mention the knock-on effect of what is available for the Far East).
- So with the USSR being rolled up, what are the British doing to put pressure on the Germans? Well, also as discussed earlier, the only place in which the British can fight the Axis is in North Africa. Another consequence of the Greek debacle is that the Germans have landed in North Africa and pretty much wiped out the British gains from Compass. Only Tobruk remains as a thorn in Rommel’s side. Urgent aircraft and tank reinforcements are sent through the Mediterranean so that in May, an operation (Brevity), can be launched to relieve Tobruk; the operation is a failure and a second operation mounted in June (Battleaxe) is another failure and results in yet more tank and aircraft losses that need to be made good for the next operation (Crusader) that will be mounted in November.
- Mention is made of the home front, but again there needs to be some context. Firstly, if the military great and the good are all correct, the USSR will be conquered before the end of 1941. That means in 1942 the UK is ripe once more for invasion and so (and remember we are talking August here) why do the British decide to denude defences of the UK when defeat of the UK spells defeat in the Far East/Middle East anyway? And that assumes all shipping is available for all this. In addition, with each conquest by Hitler (and so ultimate victory becoming more assured) the more chance of, for example, Spain or even Vichy (if Hitler so wishes) joining the Axis cause. Reserves need to be available to rush to the next crisis point. Malaya/Singapore could be considered a crisis point of course, but defence of the UK, for obvious reasons, is higher priority.
- Given this series of disasters, reinforcements to Egypt are not a luxury at the expense of the Far East. Given the losses suffered in Crete, Brevity, Battleaxe (and the Axis operations in between) there is a genuine need for these reinforcements to stop Egypt falling let alone anything else.
- As for ‘widespread acknowledgment of the inadequate fighter defences in the Far East’, well I am quite sure there was – that would not need a military genius to conclude that but it would be right that it was pointed out by professional advisors, as would:
• Inadequate numbers of modern aircraft carriers
• Inadequate (non-existent) modern aircraft to operate from said carriers even when those carriers are available and not being heavily damaged thanks to an inadequate (non-existent) number of modern aircraft
• Inadequate numbers of modern, fast battleships and those entering service are less powerful than the Tirpitz, the Littorios and the Yamatos (and let’s not even go there re the R-class).
• Inadequate convoy defence vessels
• Inadequate merchant shipping
• All of the above were being built but limitations of industry meant that some programmes had to be suspended to allow for more pressing needs – hence battleship construction – and even aircraft carrier construction had to be delayed or cancelled at various times
• Increasingly inadequate numbers of fleet destroyers and cruisers to allow for capital ship operations
• Inadequate FAA size as the Battle of Britain sucked resources from naval air to fighter command
• Inadequate numbers of heavy bombers (the heavies would arrive later) to take the war to Germany
• Inadequate numbers of coastal command aircraft to meet the increasing U-boat threat
• Inadequate numbers of land based torpedo bombers and naval fighters to provide support to naval operations/anti-shipping operations
• Industry was cranking out ships, aircraft, guns and AFV’s as fast as it could and numbers were impressive and growing, but of course not all these were up to scratch (thinking tanks in particular) and some of course struggled to merely replace losses.
• Inadequate numbers of trained servicemen thanks to losses to date
So for a whole variety of reasons, some caused by factors largely outside of Britain’s control, some self-inflicted, some which had their genesis in the inter-war years and some more recent, some which provided a quick fix and others that were more long-term, the United Kingdom and her Commonwealth Allies had a number of adequacy issues in the dark days of 1941. The Far East was but one.
As a Briton the whole Malaya/Singapore episode is pretty sad and the nagging feeling that a few decent fighters, some decent torpedo bombers, another division perhaps, or even a couple of tank brigades could have tipped the balance, is as intriguing as it is frustrating.
Its really interesting to look at what happened and why, but those who are simply critical of the decisions taken (and I am not aiming this at you) can be so from a position of strength because they know Malaya/Singapore
was lost and a.n.other course of action
would have made it 'all okay'. So long as it is recognised and caveated that a different course of action may not have been 'all okay' then no problem. In the same vein I do believe, given what we know of the Japanese attack, that there would likely have been a tipping point at which additional reinforcements would have made a difference. But anyone suggesting that the decisions taken were wrong, need to bear in mind that it is by no means certain that:
a) Singapore/Malaya could have been saved in any case (the military leadership there appeared lacking)
b) the 'extra' reinforcements sent (I am sure there were lots of differing opinions on what would be 'enough') would have made enough of a difference - what is being suggested would have proved decisive?
c) there would have been no adverse knock-on effect elsewhere (e.g. the loss of the Middle East), and
d) as bad as the loss of men, territory and prestige was, whether a stronger effort to save Malaya/Singapore (but one that also failed) would have actually changed the war for the worse for Britain in terms of throwing good after bad and simply losing more men and equipment.
Therefore while the defence of Singapore/Malaya is one of the things that Britain got wrong in WWII, I believe, until proven otherwise, that the wrong decisions were taken for sound – or at least understandable - reasons.
