The Good The Bad & The Indifferent

[MakeeLearn]

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

Causalities taken vs objectives achieved ?

[T Rav]

CR, I read this AAR every day. Thank you, and have a great New Year. T Rav

[Alpha77]

@ Jeff and Loka, thanks your posts sound correct. Conclusion must be that the IJN must fight hard and risky in 42 and the first half of 43. Later on the faster planes and better radar for the Allies arrive and even huge escort numbers with a good plane like Sam can be outmanvered by the enemy defending air. As long warning time due to good radar and fast planes with good climb can almost nullify your escorts in 44 and 45 as all this allows them to often take perfect positions and ambush enemy raids. Which sounds quite correct historical too.

In my opinion John played good so he reached 1945 even with many good and heavy ships left. However it might have been a mistake not to combine his forces and strike hard when the enemy is already at the doorsteps. Yes, it could be a total failure and 50-60-70% of the IJ forces are lost, but then at least one is sure he must now play on the defensive and can concentrate on that. But the Allies would take losses too and in my estimination higher losses with an "all out all in" strike, then piecemeal strikes over half of the map. Or just concede that all is lost...I also wonder where he got all the fuel to sail so far with the IJN heavy fuel drinkers. Seems he did not lose many TKs and was able to extract oil from almost cut off areas.

Edit, or this mod gives more fuel/oil to the IJ ?

[Canoerebel]

John deserves much praise for sticking with the game until the bitter end. Not many players do that.

But making it to 1945 is not particularly hard for an experienced Japanese player. In a game between equally matched players, or players within reasonable distance of one another, Japan's going to make it to 1945. For the Alies to achieve 3:1 in 1944 is nearly impossible.

[JohnDillworth]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

When this game finally concludes, I'll have three major questions to mull over:

1. Would John have been better off grouping his combat ships and carriers and striking en masse, along with massed LBA, when the Allies ventured deep to strike Luzon, Formosa, China or Korea? If he had consolidated KB and struck with 1200 naval aircraft and massed kamikazes and LBA from interlocking airfields, would he have done material damage to Death Star? Would he have done enough damage that I'd have been unable or reluctant to take on big airfields for some time? I think there's a chance that the answer is yes.

Instead he played a soft defense, devoting a considerable amount of his navy to nipping at the edges, usually far away. The advantage is that he kept his navy mostly intact while forcing me to cover supply lines and missions carefully. The cost was that the Allies invaded all four areas without meaningful opposition. That boggles my mind.

He only chose to attack when Death Star was far away on escort missions. He felt like he could achieve local superiority. But too much of his fleet was far away, leaving him to send in modest numbers of valuable combat ships. in each case - at Shanghai, at Ningpo, at Gunzan - he lost those surface clashes, thus frittering away his fleet ineffectually without ever concentrating and striking hard.

2. How could I have done Sumatra better? That was a wild and crazy invasion for November 1942. By about late January, I knew I was eventually going to lose. Still it took John until about June to really take control. He didn't take Sabang until July, I think. And the last Allied units weren't vanquished until August. I think if I'd have had 300k more supply, I might've made a stand there and employed Death Star to provide support. The two biggest mistakes I made was siphoning off units to invade Malaya and not understanding the meager Allied fighter pools. In the end, because of the peculiarities of how John and I play, and because I have a good feel for his proclivities, Sumatra turned into a strategic Allied victory. But I wouldn't want to repeat the experience against a player who doesn't leave holes in his defenses that can be exploited while his focus is elsewhere.

3. Did I manage the strategic war right? I elected not to directly engage John's major bases in the DEI or to seriously impede his shipping so that I could concentrate on pushing as deep as possible as fast as possible. I wanted to pursue points directly (strategic bombing) rather than indirectly (by strangling the enemy economy). I felt this would be more efficient. Had John not left holes in his defenses, I would've altered plans and instead targeted his resource/oil centers. I think it was more effective to target a weekly defended Luzon, China and Formosa rather than going sideways, but by doing so his economy remained far more robust. Tradeoffs.

What about strategic bombing? I struggled here, taking heavy losses (including a miserable B-29 raid against Singapore that cost me 37 of the valuable bombers). To this point, I haven't figured out how to score the "thousand points a day" that Lowpe predicted. Yet strategic bombing has contributed 27,000 points to my current 55,000 point lead. And I think the upcoming campaign from Korea will prove decisive. To this point, I'd give myself a C for strategic warfare with perhaps a chance to raise that a notch or two with Korea. But I do think the emphasis on strategic warfare was the right way to achieve victory.

Nothing to say. You played your opponent's weaknesses and that was good enough to do the job. I do firmly believe that it is a major mistake for the Japanese player to hold back in 1943 in an effort to save his ships. After mid 44 the hope for a major naval victory really diminishes as the Allies are just too strong. The Sumatra invasion set the table but your carrier victory around the Line Islands sealed the deal. John is a good naval player and has great tactics but you out played him in this particular battle. You held the DL advantage and your attacks were more effective as a result. That was probably his last good chance to defeat you at sea. Your Sumatra plan was good, you just underestimated the power of the Japanese air force at that stage. This is pretty easy for an Allied player to do.

Nothing to say. You played your opponent's weaknesses and that was good enough to do the job. I do firmly believe that it is a major mistake for the Japanese player to hold back in 1943 in an effort to save his ships. After mid 44 the hope for a major naval victory really diminishes as the Allies are just too strong. The Sumatra invasion set the table but your carrier victory around the Line Islands sealed the deal. John is a good naval player and has great tactics but you out played him in this particular battle. You held the DL advantage and your attacks were more effective as a result. That was probably his last good chance to defeat you at sea. Your Sumatra plan was good, you just underestimated the power of the Japanese air force at that stage. This is pretty easy for an Allied player to do.

Not really sure why John became so reluctant to commit his carriers after the Line Islands battle. IIRC he lost 1 CV all of his CVE's and had some damaged CV's. A net lose of 1 CV. Sure he had to repair and Dan pulled off a pretty aggressive invasion right into the heart of Indian country (can I still say that?). John probably never quite had CV parity after that be he was not too far off and he had interior lines. Still, he would never commit his carriers. He probably thought his land units would hold up better. I certainly did. The complete collapse at Formosa was the most surprising. He had good units there, air support, some forts and supply. Still, his defenses collapsed almost overnight. Not sure what went wrong there. All that being said John's late game got much better. He handled his home industry well, accelerated and produced excellent fighters and had plenty of trained pilots to man them. Plus, with pretty much stock night fighters, continues to put up a credible home island defense. I expect John learned an awful lot and will play a bit different next time and be better prepared for the late game. It's been a real privileged to to enjoy both AAR's

[Canoerebel]

Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." I don't know anything about that but assumed that was an item of heavy discussion in his AAR.

I didn't have the feeling that Formosa was well defended. Allied ships and bombers were hitting his bases (with little opposition) for a long time and the Allied army always outnumbered the Japanese by what I felt like was a considerable amount. Especially since the Japanese army had to be disrupted and fatigued.

I too thought that KB had eventually drawn fairly close to Death Star in strength - at one time something like 1800 to perhaps 1400. So whenever I planned to approach big enemy airfields it was pretty daunting. But usually John would then reveal half his carriers somewhere very far away.

Supply constrained my own moves a great deal. Right now, for instance, my 4EBs have been mostly quiet for a month.

I've also lost a lot of 4EB, so that I was glad to rest them a month to be sure they'll be in top form when supply arrives in Korea (coinciding with Gunzan airfield going to level 9).

Readers may have many questions about why I did the things I did. In most cases, I think there will be answers that make sense. To my way of thinking, my biggest mistakes, as previously discussed:

1) Not understanding the severe limitations of fighter production and pools before triggering the Sumatra invasion (I blithefully figured that by 1943 the Allies would be able to stand toe-to-toe with Japan).
2) Not sticking with my instincts about the snap invasion of Malaya following Sumatra; this was encouraged by Nemo, who saw all kinds of opportunities that he'd have fully explored. But I didn't see those things and ended up diluting my forces so that I ultimately weakened my ability to defend Sumatra.
3) I really expected to eventually backfill and take places like Balikpapan, Palembang, etc. I figured John's defenses deep would eventually stiffen, forcing me to go sideways. I had lots of forces prepped and in reserve. But John's deep defenses never stiffened, so I had a pretty good army just sitting for a long time (not a total loss, because that army was centered around Boela, thus making it secure against counterattack).

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." ...

Whenever the consensus explanation for a bad operation is "terrible die rolls", it is time to run to the hills where the clean air will clear the mind of such muddled thinking.

"Terrible die rolls" is never the real reason why an operation failed. Operations fail because they are badly structured with inadequate assets assigned or properly thought through in terms of potential benefits v costs or not factoring into the equation the opponent's reaction.

A "terrible die roll" on a specific occasion can expose a poorly structured operation to a greater check but it is not in itself the problem. A well structured operation can survive a "terrible die roll" and still prosper but a poorly structured operation will not survive a single "terrible die roll".

Alfred

[Bearcat2]

Thank you for the great AAR! I have learned a lot because your style of play is much different than mine. I am impressed with your ability to stick to the plan without deviation.
There a couple of things that I have thought you might done in the context of your play, like trying night bombing of enemy airfields or night bombing port facilities that you see are being used to bring in reinforcement or supply

[Canoerebel]

Thanks, Bearcat, for reading and the encouraging words.

I've occasionally done some night bombing of airfields and port facilities. with rare exceptions, I didn't think the results were worth it. I've lost enough 4EB that I have to be careful in using them, so my preference is to preserve them for direct points scoring (strategic bombing) or decisive use against enemy troop concentrations in base hexes. I don't use 2EB because I don't have enough room and supply for them to bring them forward. Ningpo, Shanghai, Taihioku, and Taichu are filled with fighters and 4EB (with some exceptions - I am using 2EB at Gunzan to hit John's stack in the open, where 4EB aren't allowed per House Rule).

Readers who wish I'd made more use of my air force forward may see a lot more of that soon. With the supply inbound and with Shanghai and Gunzan at level 9, I expect the air war to increase dramatically. I've been working on bringing most of the aircraft forwards and making sure pilots are top notch. Most everything is rested and ready to go.

There is an old saying that no plan survives contact with the enemy. To a large extent, this one has. When the Allies left Pearl in Oct. '43 to invade the DEI, the plan was to sequentially hit Luzon, Foochow, and Korea. I knew those places were poorly defended and that continued to be the case, so the plan held up. There were departures from the plan, mainly Formosa. Also, as noted just above, I never carried through with the plan to widen the shoulders in the DEI to take Balikpapan, Palembang, etc.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

Sometime ago, several readers posted about John suffering "terrible die rolls at Formosa." ...

Whenever the consensus explanation for a bad operation is "terrible die rolls", it is time to run to the hills where the clean air will clear the mind of such muddled thinking.

"Terrible die rolls" is never the real reason why an operation failed. Operations fail because they are badly structured with inadequate assets assigned or properly thought through in terms of potential benefits v costs or not factoring into the equation the opponent's reaction.

A "terrible die roll" on a specific occasion can expose a poorly structured operation to a greater check but it is not in itself the problem. A well structured operation can survive a "terrible die roll" and still prosper but a poorly structured operation will not survive a single "terrible die roll".

Alfred

Sheet happens: plan accordingly.

[BBfanboy]

Just catching up after a week away so I will say belated Happy Birthday, Sir General Admiral! [:)] Glad to hear your cold did not put the kybosh on your tradition!

About the ships not moving for three days ; there was a discussion a few months back about a huge number of disbanded ships at SFO not appearing on the list when the port was selected. It turns out the problem was a limit of 1000 ships for a display. It suggests to me that (possibly) the same number might have been used for the number of ships the game engine can handle in the same hex. Once the carriers left the log jam burst, no?

[Canoerebel]

Thanks, BBfanboy. Welcome back to the forums.

The high number of ships in the Herd is the only thing I can think of, though I'm not positive. I think I've had larger herds that didn't experience this problem. But I've experienced this issue a copule of times in one game and once in the other (the game with Erik). Each time, the logjam broke when I divided the TFs up and had some move separately.

[Canoerebel]

As you guys can probably tell, I'm not a huge football fan.

My wife and I both graduated from the University of Georgia. I was in the Sugar Bowl when Georgia beat Notre Dame for the national championship in 1980. I was there the next year when they lost to Pittsburg. But over the years, my interest in football waned. The last game I went to was in 1997. I doubt I'll go to another.

But I still pull for the Dawgs to win. Tonight, wife, myself, and my two sons watched the game at a local barbecue restaurant (since we don't have a t.v.) My youngest son leaves for Georgia tomorrow. But he cares nothing for football whatsoever. He cared not one whit that Georgia was playing Oklahoma. For the rest of us it was a fun game to watch. And for my daughter, a Dawgs fan who lives in Knoxville, and for my father-in-law, a UGA graduate who my youngest son will be living with now. And for a host of other relatives - aunts, uncles, brothers-in-law, nephews, etc. that attended Georgia.

It was a shame that either team lost that game. Oklahoma is stout.

[Grotius]

Happy New Year, Canoe! I'm enjoying your AAR; it's great to see a game in 1945. I also enjoyed your hike photos. Keep up the good work!

[Canoerebel]

Grotius drops by
and writes a friendly greeting
then gone like the wind

P.S. So good to see you, Grotius. Thank you for stopping by. It's always a treat to have you pop in for a visit.

[Canoerebel]

John has been away since Friday to visit his Mom. He emailed me yesterday from someplace like Curry, Kansas, that he was on his way home and would send a turn this morning. That was the last I heard from him. I have no actual confirmation that he made it home, yet I feel that he must have. Else, I would have felt a disturbance in the Force, after playing against him for so many years. He probably got home, fell asleep, and then got called into work abruptly.

I'm leaving town very early tomorrow morning to take Youngest Son to the University of Georgia. I shall return Thursday night. Hopefully by then John will have regained his bearings, as I'd like to resume the game.

[CaptBeefheart]

Happy New Year! Hiking is a great pastime. I was doing a lot of hiking in Seoul (believe it or not, there are a lot of small mountains and plenty of trails within the city limits) until I finally did in one knee last summer, requiring surgery. Still, I'm hoping to have that sucker rehabilitated by Spring.

There's some grumbling on the other AAR about all those troop losses you had at Sumatra, and that any Allied commander responsible would have been sacked. To that I'd say: 1) this is a game, and the VP mechanism is there to handle losses; and 2) not using the full KB to challenge the invasion of the PI or subsequent closer invasions would have gotten the IJ commander sent to command the garrison at Etorofu. Anyway, it's a very entertaining game and I'm glad both of you gents play it like a game.

Cheers,
CC

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Commander Cody

...There's some grumbling on the other AAR about all those troop losses you had at Sumatra, and that any Allied commander responsible would have been sacked. To that I'd say: 1) this is a game, and the VP mechanism is there to handle losses; and 2) not using the full KB to challenge the invasion of the PI or subsequent closer invasions would have gotten the IJ commander sent to command the garrison at Etorofu...

Cheers,
CC

To which can be added that many mistakes made by players in AE, if replicated in real life, would have seen the responsible (and in some cases someone else made a scapegoat) commander sacked. IRL battles are lost and commanders sacked but the country doesn't automatically sue for peace.

Much more importantly is the utter failure of the Japanese High Command to exploit the Sumatra success. At the time I posted in this AAR several options to exploit the victory. None of them were employed by Japan. I don't know if any of them were suggested over at the other AAR but I doubt they were and if they were they were clearly dismissed by John 3rd.

The few Japanese AARs that I bother to drop by too often are dominated by discussions of aircraft R&D and tactical considerations. The air is full of cries of Banzai and fine tuning the economy, particularly aircraft production. Proper strategic discussion takes a back seat. Which is the absolute reverse order of what is important.

I have been following the games played by these two opponents for more than a decade now. Canoerebel is the strategist whereas his opponent is only a tactician. In any game where strategy is paramount, the strategic player will consistently, over the course of the game, outplay the tactical player. The tactician will gain the odd victory but not the ultimate victory if his strategic opponent is employing sound strategy.

I recommend that people look up the career performances of Bogoljubov against Alekhine, and Samisch against Nimzowitsch. In relative terms Canoerebel is Alekhine or Nimzowitsch whereas John3rd is Boboljubov or Samisch. The career records strongly favour the superior strategist.

Alfred

[JohnDillworth]

I think John neglected to build up his interior defenses or at least Dan found a soft spot in those defenses. Luzon and Formosa did not have the fortified, interlocking based and airfields that would have made them harder to knock over. Easy enough to make planes and move troops around. Much harder to have the vision to have worthy bases to put them. I expect John may have done better in Singapore, the Marianas and the DEI, but that was not the attack vector. Good defensive line in China but just not enough supply. Not sure why Shanghai has not more of a fortress. Supply I guess

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

I think John neglected to build up his interior defenses or at least Dan found a soft spot in those defenses. Luzon and Formosa did not have the fortified, interlocking based and airfields that would have made them harder to knock over. Easy enough to make planes and move troops around. Much harder to have the vision to have worthy bases to put them. I expect John may have done better in Singapore, the Marianas and the DEI, but that was not the attack vector. Good defensive line in China but just not enough supply. Not sure why Shanghai has not more of a fortress. Supply I guess

In addition to the supply issues, I think John does not have enough interest in ground warfare and logistics (including building bases/forts) in general to do all the tedious work involved. He likes to do turns quickly and get some exciting action going (I have the same impulse to keep under control), so I think he just did not devote the time necessary to plan and build - and position the forces needed to move on the next objective. I think his busy work/family/church commitments are part of the reason for this lack of attention to detail.

At any rate, his superficial efforts resulted in a forward offence/defence strategy that was much like an egg - a brittle shell that was not tough enough to give long term resistance. But I applaud his resilience in playing on while his empire crumbles and his hoped-for victories from his new ships have been pyrrhic at best.