Gary Grigsby/Joel Billings interview

[Mr.Frag]

Poor, poor Germany. If we are to believe what many revisionist historians have written, it is a wonder that the German soldier and sailor were even able to get out of bed.

The most valid point of the thread Are you sure they could read and write? Perhaps it was the yanks who taught them how?

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Mr.Frag
The most valid point of the thread Are you sure they could read and write? Perhaps it was the yanks who taught them how?

LOL

1) For those who are interested, here is a link to one excellent site.

CAMPAIGN SUMMARIES OF WORLD WAR 2

GERMAN U-BOATS AT WAR (Part 1 of 6):

http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats.htm

It is an exhaustive month-by-month examination of the U-boat war. It is objective, presenting only the facts. Highly recommended.

Take a look and see for yourself.

Between Sept/39 to Dec/40, 1,280 British, Allied and Neutral ships were sunk, for a total of 4,700,000 tons.

Between Jan/41 to Dec/41 another 1,299 British, Allied and Neutral ships were sunk, for a total of 4,329,000 tons.

More than half the total tonnage losses are due to German U-boats (and a relatively small fleet of U-boats it was).

I would say that those are serious numbers. And this is even before the entry of the USA.

Considering that Britain had to import almost everything for its survival and for waging war, it is little wonder that Churchill was worried about the U-boat.

And remember, the Battle of Britain was also being waged for several months throughout 1940 (as bombs dropped on London, Coventry, etc), while hundreds of ships were being sent to the bottom.

This site provides an overview of the Battle of Britain:

http://www.iwm.org.uk/online/battle%20o ... /intro.htm

To say that Britain was fighting for its very survival is an understatement.

And when you realize some of the BIG mistakes that were made by Germany in both the airwar and at sea, you can then appreciate how close Britain came to defeat.


2) Here is another good site that presents the facts in a readable format:

http://www.warshipsifr.com/pages/battle ... antic.html

Cheers!

[Ron Saueracker]

If the German boats were inadequate for the job as Blair states, I'd like to see how the Allied boats would have fared vs the ASW arrayed against U Boats. Fact is, most of the advances in sub tech during WW2 were thanks to Germany. Not to knock the US submariners, but fighting Japan as opposed to what the Germans were dealing with were worlds apart.

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
If the German boats were inadequate for the job as Blair states, I'd like to see how the Allied boats would have fared vs the ASW arrayed against U Boats. Fact is, most of the advances in sub tech during WW2 were thanks to Germany. Not to knock the US submariners, but fighting Japan as opposed to what the Germans were dealing with were worlds apart.

Good point. That opens a whole other kettle of fish: Japan's poor use of its submarines, and its lack of protecting its own merchant ships.

One of the major things Blair seems to over-look in his "analysis" was Hitler's constant interference in the operation of the U-boats.

Examples:

1) In the summer of 1941, Hitler ordered 12 U-boats to leave the Atlantic and to go to the Med. This hindered Donitz's campaign against Allied supply ships, effectively giving the Allies a two-month holiday, allowing convoys to get through, and unload supplies in Britain.

2) In 1942, Hitler again intervened and ordered more U-boats to be sent into Norwegian waters because he thought the British were going to attack it. Again, this allowed convoy ships to get through to Britain unmolested.

- (source: "Chronicles of WW II", pp 222-223)

[Von Rom]

And this site clearly shows, contrary to the ideas expressed in Blair's books, that the U-boat crews were well trained (even during wartime), had high morale, and considered themselves to be an elite branch of the German armed forces:

http://www.angelraybooks.com/diewehrmac ... ubt.htm#ii


In part Doenitz wrote:

"1. I wanted to imbue my crews with enthusiasm and a complete faith in their arm, and to instill in them a spirit of selfless readiness to serve in it. Only those possessed of such a spirit could hope to succeed in the grim realities of submarine warfare. One of the first things that I had to do was rid my crews of the ever recurring complex that the U-Boat, thanks to recent developments in British anti-submarine defense, was a weapon that had been mastered...

2. The U-Boats had to be trained as far as possible for war conditions. I wanted to confront my U-Boat crews in peacetime with every situation with which they might be confronted in war, and to do it so thoroughly that when these situations arose in war my crews would be able to cope with them."


As an aside, it would be very interesting to get comments on Blair's book from someone who actually served on U-boats during WWII.

[Ron Saueracker]

Originally posted by Von Rom
And this site clearly shows, contrary to the ideas expressed in Blair's books, that the U-boat crews were well trained (even during wartime), had high morale, and considered themselves to be an elite branch of the German armed forces:

http://www.angelraybooks.com/diewehrmac ... ubt.htm#ii


In part Doenitz wrote:

"1. I wanted to imbue my crews with enthusiasm and a complete faith in their arm, and to instill in them a spirit of selfless readiness to serve in it. Only those possessed of such a spirit could hope to succeed in the grim realities of submarine warfare. One of the first things that I had to do was rid my crews of the ever recurring complex that the U-Boat, thanks to recent developments in British anti-submarine defense, was a weapon that had been mastered...

2. The U-Boats had to be trained as far as possible for war conditions. I wanted to confront my U-Boat crews in peacetime with every situation with which they might be confronted in war, and to do it so thoroughly that when these situations arose in war my crews would be able to cope with them."


As an aside, it would be very interesting to get comments on Blair's book from someone who actually served on U-boats during WWII.

Perhaps Blair has waited this long to revise the history of the Battle of the Atlantic so that actual participants could not refute his position due to rigormortis. spelled that wrong!:D

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Von Rom

Again, I do not intend to re-hash everything that has already been stated. Britain was in peril; not America.

In peril? Thats the point. Yes you've posted some data....essentially raw tonnage figures. You've also posted some examples of negative commentary on Blair's work, comments that mostly focus on vulnerabilities of the author's writing style and his possible bias in favor of the USN. However the main thing i notice is that neither your data nor these articles refute the economic data his work presents, the fact that most (99% if he is correct) material delivered arrived at it's destination, nor addresses the technological challenges that faced Germany's Uboats in 39 much less in 1942.

I have no doubt that more Uboats might possibly have caused signifigantly more damage....but what i object too is the continued asertation that Britian was "in peril" i.e. brought to the brink by what the Uboats historically acomplished....yet the economic data, and the fact (unrefuted thus far) that most of all convoys sailed made it to their destinations remains.

That is the data i would like too see.

Anyway, we are beating a dead horse.

on that i agree 100%

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
Perhaps Blair has waited this long to revise the history of the Battle of the Atlantic so that actual participants could not refute his position due to rigormortis. spelled that wrong!:D

Not sure what Blair's agenda was. I would like to think that being involved in so much research, he lost the forest because of the trees. About 80% of his book is devoted to stories about individual U-boats. His research is important. But he simply drew the wrong conclusions.

Anyone who reads even a general history of the period from Sept/39 to Dec/41, cannot help but wonder at the close call the west had.

If Britain had fallen - how would Europe have been invaded? Indeed, if Britain had fallen, would America have entered the conflict, even if Germany wanted peace?

The free world owes more to Churchill's defiant stand and to the British Empire's stoic defense, then it can ever hope to repay.

Perhaps Blair's book was an attempt to steal away some of this magnificent history. . .

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Nikademus
In peril? Thats the point. Yes you've posted some data....essentially raw tonnage figures. You've also posted some examples of negative commentary on Blair's work, comments that mostly focus on vulnerabilities of the author's writing style and his possible bias in favor of the USN. However the main thing i notice is that neither your data nor these articles refute the economic data his work presents, the fact that most (99% if he is correct) material delivered arrived at it's destination, nor addresses the technological challenges that faced Germany's Uboats in 39 much less in 1942.

I have no doubt that more Uboats might possibly have caused signifigantly more damage....but what i object too is the continued asertation that Britian was "in peril" i.e. brought to the brink by what the Uboats historically acomplished....yet the economic data, and the fact (unrefuted thus far) that most of all convoys sailed made it to their destinations remains.

That is the data i would like too see.

See what I mean about the discussion going round and round -- LOL

99% of ships getting through represents the total number of ships over the entire war from 1939 to 1945, and includes America's entry into the war. After May, 1943, the role of the U-boat, and its effects upon shipping, was greatly diminished.

This glosses over the real impact of shipping losses during the period of 1939 to Dec/41, as it relates to Britain. During this period (2 years) more than 2,500 ships were sent to the bottom (or almost 50% of ALL Allied shipping losses sustained in WWII).

If you have read any good histories of this period, and if you still think Britain was not in peril, then all the words I type will be of no value.

Cheers!

[Nikademus]

Originally posted by Von Rom
See what I mean about the discussion going round and round -- LOL

99% of ships getting through represents the course of the entire war from 1939 to 1945, and includes America's entry into the war. This glosses over the real impact of shipping losses during the period of 1939 to Dec/41, as it relates to Britain.

If you have read any good histories of this period, and if you still think Britain was not in peril, then all the words I type will be of no value.

Cheers!

heh, well thats convienient.

I'm not interested in broadening the subject to Britian's overall military fortunes. I am aware of those aspects. I want too see data that refutes the points i have highlighted. You have been steadily expanding on the orig subject regarding the Uboat war to focus now on Britian and have added other non-related aspects (BoB for example)

I remain focused on the Uboats and Blair's thesis and remain waiting for info on the key aspects i've highlighted that remain untouched. This includes Britian's economic state before US entry into the war and is part of Blair's first book. Were Britian truely "in peril" to the point that a few more Uboats would have tipped the balance, his data would have shown it.

Stubborn I is.....

[sbond]

I completely disagree with the idea that the AI should take second seat to the PBEM. I will buy it for single player not for PBEM, I do not care for PBEM because it is rarely exciting for me waiting a day per turn (just an opinion), sometimes never hearing from the people again...

I will only buy a strong single player game, I have always played against the AI and will look forward to this one, even if it must be dumbed down for the massive game. I will pay the 60 or 70 dollars for the game also, it will take to develop the game.

[LTCMTS]

1. The RN was aware of the German U-boat building program and its approxiamate size.

2. The RN was also aware of the German surface ship program and built BBs, CVs, CLs and DDs to counter them. RN aerial recon and British intelligence couldn't give the British leadership the exact specs for the German capital ships, but enough was known to guide British designs within Naval treaty limits.

3. The building of surface ships was not an aberration by the KM. The classic study of raiding warfare in WWI by CAPT Warner showed the desirability of presenting the RN with multiple threats. Some of the most successful German attacks on convoyed shipping came from real or threatened combined arms (surface, air and sub-surface) operations.

4. If the KM had not build capital ships, the RN would have reduced its own capital ship program in favor of escorts. Or built more Spitfires, or more Matildas.

5. Is the number 30,000 Shermans based on projected sinkings or a stab from total Allied losses? Not all Allied losses were burdened hulls, many were travelling "dead head". Not all Allied shipping losses were capable of carrying, much less loading and unloading 30 ton tanks.

[Mr.Frag]

Is the number 30,000 Shermans based on projected sinkings or a stab from total Allied losses? Not all Allied losses were burdened hulls, many were travelling "dead head". Not all Allied shipping losses were capable of carrying, much less loading and unloading 30 ton tanks.

It is purely an example of the amount of tonnage lost capacity wise compared to what those ships could have delivered to the UK. It doesn't really matter if you translate it into ball bearing to build engines to power the tanks. The point is that amount of goods were lost to the war effort that could have brought D-Day into play a few years sooner.

I seriously adjusted downwards from the actual tonnage lost to take care of empty ships and such. If one looked directly at the tonnage and assume that each ship would make multiple crossings per year, you could probably multiply that number by a factor of 100x and still not be close the the actual effect of the ships sunk. Just as in the old days, one formed a blockade to starve a country out, the U-Boat was the modern version of the Spanish Armada.

Yes, some will always argue that the USA geared up and outproduced the losses after a time, but the point does not undo the fact that those ships HAD to be built instead of tanks and guns and planes. How much actual potential was used to fight against the U-Boat threat? That is the true measure of the success, not purely the numbers sunk. One can debate that the USA has spare capacity anyways, but I would argue only at the expense of peoples lives which were traded for time. Remember how long the war had been going on when D-Day finally happened...

[sbond]

Perhaps Blair's book was an attempt to steal away some of this magnificent history.

Perhaps the German Uboats were much like Rommel, they road the wave of perceived magnificence...

[mogami]

Hi, I think the US ran production flat out. Shipyards can not build tanks. They build ships. The type of ship is planned well in advance. The merchant ships were not built in Naval Shipyards. They were built in merchant shipyard (Kaiser et al) The merchant ships were built thinking they would soon be sunk (they were amazed by how few of them actually were sunk)

No major ship fought in WW2 that was not already planned to be built. (many of the ships that the USN said they needed after the war began never sailed in a combat mission, many by wars end had not been commisioned) The war was fought by ships already in commision, under construction, or already paid to be laid down prior to Dec 7 1941)

Take USS Essex CV 9 as example. This ship was authorized on May 17th 1938 Contact signed on July 3 1940. Keel laid on Apr 28 1941 (She was to be completed by Apr 15 1944) but once war began she was worked around the clock and finshed (accepted by Navy and commisioned) on Dec 31 1942

8 CV had contracts to build signed on Sept 9 1940.
Bunker Hill CV 17, Franklin CV 13, Hancock CV 19, Hornet CV 12,
Lexington CV 16, Randolph CV 15, Ticonderoga CV 14, Wasp CV 18

(I can't find any CV authorized after Dec 7 1941 that saw service before late 1944 (if ever)

The CVE were of course all post 1941 contracts but they were churned out assembly line fashion (by Kaiser) without any impact on (Kaiser) merchant ship production (It seems he first just built a shipyard for merchant production and then built another for CVE production) (I'm betting he could have built another shipyard if there had been enough demand. But since these ships were not lost as fast as they were built the Navy found it's self with more transport then it had thought would be available.

This had no impact at all on Tank or aircraft or AA gun production.
The US had planned to build a 12 million man military but reduced it once they figured out it would not be required.
The US had room to expand if it was required. (The Pacific war used less then 30 percent of production.

My main point being the U-boat had almost no impact on US production. It attacked one of the USA's strong points.

(I don't concurr the U-boat delayed D-Day)

In the last seven months of 1941, U.S. tonnage supplied British campaigns
in the Middle East, Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean with
48,958 vehicles, 302,698 tons of dry goods, and 814 airplanes.

On the eve of Pearl harbor, the Maritime Commission's schedule for deliveries had risen
from the initial target of fifty ships per year, or roughly 500,00 deadweight tons,
to 5,000,000 deadweight tons for 1942 and 7,000,000 for 1943. Directly after U.S. entry
into the war, these goals were increased, and then effectively doubled.

Whereas in 1939 the Maritime Commission produced one ship every thirteen days,
and during 1941 a ship every three and half days, during 1943 launchings reached a record
five ships per day. In that year alone, the nation's shipyards produced
19,210,000 deadweight tons, a quantity larger than all the tonnage delivered in the
United States from 1914 through 1938

Kaiser converted his construction expertise into mass production of 1,552 ships
for the Maritime Commission between 1941 and 1945.

Before the US enters the war shipyard expansion takes place. The ships are to be built for Britian. (So she can build warships not merchants)
The US Maritime Commission financed eight new shipyards on the Atlantic coast consisting
of 62 slipway's; four on the Gulf of Mexico with 35, and six on the Pacific coast with 62
building ways. This required a prodigious investment of $300 million.
The first of the Liberty ships was launched on 7 September 1941 at the Bethlehem Fairfield
Yard, Baltimore, Maryland; she was commissioned three weeks later as the Patrick Henry,


German Navy Strategy
The head of the German Navy U-Boat arm, Admiral Donitz, had indicated in May 1942:
"The total tonnage the enemy can build will be about 8.2 Million tons in 1942, and
about 10.4 Million tons in 1943. This would mean we would have to sink approximately
700,000 tons per month to offset new construction. Only what is in excess of this amount
would constitute a decrease in enemy tonnage. However, we are already sinking 700,000 tons
now."

His goal was in fact less then half of what the USA actually built.

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Nikademus
I'm not interested in broadening the subject to Britian's overall military fortunes. I am aware of those aspects. I want too see data that refutes the points i have highlighted. You have been steadily expanding on the orig subject regarding the Uboat war to focus now on Britian and have added other non-related aspects (BoB for example)

I remain focused on the Uboats and Blair's thesis and remain waiting for info on the key aspects i've highlighted that remain untouched. This includes Britian's economic state before US entry into the war and is part of Blair's first book. Were Britian truely "in peril" to the point that a few more Uboats would have tipped the balance, his data would have shown it.

Stubborn I is.....

Hi

You mention that you are not interested in Britain's overall military fortunes. And it appears from the research that Blair wasn't interested in it either. By examining the U-boat peril in "isolation", Blair has both handicapped his research and its results.

Let me explain.

Blair's approach to the study of the U-boat is a bit odd, in that he worked with numbers and then extrapolated this information into faulty conclusions. For example, it is one to say that between 1943 to 1945 that 99% of all convoy ships reached their destination; it is quite another to examine the perilous years of 1939 to 1941 and realize that 50% of ALL WWII Allied shipping losses occurred during those two years. The other 50% shipping losses had occurred through the last 4 years of war. The fact that Britain bore the brunt of most of these shipping losses further compounds the problem. Unlike America or Germany, its very existence depended on maritime trade.

This shipping loss is further magnified by the fact that so few U-boats accounted for these terrible losses. Most historians agree, that had Hitler not intervened in the U-boat campaign on many occassions, and had more U-boats been built, then Britain faced a possible defeat. This aspect of the U-boat war was not a part of Bair's "analysis". So his selective use of statistics presents a faulty picture.

The following is a bit lengthy, but I feel is important in this discussion. The following contains information with sources noted.

*******

"If Germany had prevented merchant ships from carrying food, raw materials, troops and their equipment from North America to Britain, the outcome of World War Two could have been radically different. Britain might have been starved into submission, and her armies would not have been equipped with American-built tanks and vehicles.

"Moreover, if the Allies had not been able to move ships about the North Atlantic, it would have been impossible to project British and American land forces ashore in the Mediterranean theatres or on D-Day. Germany's best hope of defeating Britain lay in winning what Churchill christened the 'Battle of the Atlantic'.

"The Battle of the Atlantic was one of the longest campaigns of the Second World War, and it was proportionally among the most costly. . . The stakes could not have been higher. If the U-boats had prevailed, the Western Allies could not have been successful in the war against Germany."

(Source: Dr Gary Sheffield is Senior Lecturer in the War Studies Group at King’s College London, and Land Warfare Historian at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham.)

********

"The British almost lost the war though by ignoring the U-boat peril, a mistake they also made in World War I. The German U-boat (submarine) threat grew from a single sub in 1935 to 57 by the time the war began.

"Britain is an island nation that needs constant resupply of goods, raw materials, and armaments or it could be quickly starved into surrender. With two-thirds of her raw material and half her food imported from abroad, safe shipping was essential. Britain needed at least 1 million tons of imported shipping each month merely to subsist. However, the prewar Admiralty evaluated the U-boat threat as negligible.

"In the first nine months, 701 ships and 2.3 million tons of cargo were sunk by subs. By the end of the first year with only six U-boats at sea at any one time, more than 1,000 ships, a total of 4 million tons, an incredible 25 percent of the entire British fleet, had been sunk.

"The fall of France on June 21, 1940, opened the French coast up for construction of five German submarine bases that were 450 miles closer to the sub targets in the Atlantic Ocean, saving both fuel and time for the Germans."

(Source: The Daily Times)

**********

"By the end of 1940 the Germans had sunk 1,281 ships, mostly British, totalling 4,747,033 tons. This was equivalent to more than one fifth of Britain's 1939 merchant fleet or to five years' peace-time construction of new vessels.

"But there was a period during the winter of 1942-3 when the Germans came close to cutting the North Atlantic lifeline. The crescendo of this crisis was reached in March 1943.

But the Germans had made one vital mistake:

"During the first year after the war had started, the U-boat construction programme had almost been halted; only thirty-seven new boats were commissioned in those first twelve months, despite earlier plans to have over 100 boats in that time. Hitler had hoped for a quick vistory on the Continent and that Britain would agree terms for peace when she found that she stood alone in Europe. It was 1941 before the building programme was really going again, but a valuable chance had been lost. Although 230 new boats were being built in April of that year, only thirty-two boats were available for operations!

"If Hitler had not miscalculated the British mood and had allowed the U-boat building programme to proceed in 1940, Donitz could possibly have won the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941 or 1942. . .

"By October 1942 Donitz had no less than 196 front-line boats, compared with under 100 at the beginning of the year. The German shipyards were turning out twenty new boats every month. . .

[Note: Had Germany originally built 20 U-boats per month from Sept 1939 onwards, it would have had almost 400 U-boats by the end of 1940. These additional U-boats would have substantially added to the shipping losses. This type of analysis is completely ignored by Blair.]

"All through the autumn and into the winter the battles continued. In the last six months of 1942 the U-boats sank another 575 ships in all areas, totalling 3,000,000 tons. This brought the total sinkings by U-boats for 1942 to a staggering 1,160 ships of over 6,000,000 tons weight, and a further 1,600,000 tons had been sunk by other German forces. This was more than had been sunk in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 combined. The Allies had now lost 14,000,000 tons of merchant shipping through all causes and had replaced less than half of it with new construction."

(Source: "Convoy" by Martin Middlebrook, NY, 1977; pp ix, 8, 17, 18)

****************

Martin Gilbert wrote the definitive biography of Winston Churchill in 8 volumes. He was given unprecented access to all of Churchill's public and private papers, letters, diaries as well as access to the diaries of foreign leaders.

Here is what he wrote:

". . . it was the Battle of the Atlantic that threatened to close Britain's food and supply life-line. One of Churchill's staff, reporting a particular convoy disaster on February 26 [1941], called it 'distressing'. Churchill replied: 'Distressing! It is terrifying. If it goes on it will be the end of us. . .

"At Chequers on March 1 Churchill told the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, that the German sinking of merchant ships was 'the supreme menace of the war'.

Churchill stated: "The Battle of the Atlantic, 'on which our life depends', as well as the movement of convoys under constant submarine and air attack, 'strains our naval resources, great though they be, to the utmost limit.'"

(Source: "Churchill: A Life" by Martin Gilbert, Minerva, 1994; pp. 690, 691, 704)

**************

It does not take much logic to conclude from the above, that if 20 U-boats can bring Britain's naval resources to the breaking point, then adding 20, 30, 50 or more U-boats can effectively help tip that balance. Yet again, this type of analysis is ignored by Blair.

By leaving out all outside influences on the development of the U-boat, its use, and the interference in its operation, leaves Blair's book, while good in so many other ways, as myopic in approach.

This is further compounded by the fact that Blair has ignored other influences that were greatly impacting Britain at the time: its isolation in fighting Germany; the fact that Britain was strained to the limit in fighting in North Africa; its naval resources were reaching the breaking point in the Battle of the Atlantic; and that both the Battle of Britain and later the Blitz were pounding Britain mercilessly from the air, and in which over 60,000 citizens died.

As the leader of Britain, Churchill had to look at the total picture, and not just at the U-boat threat. Yet, as a tool, the U-boat was a helping and effective instrument in bringing about Britain's demise.

The evidence is clear: the U-boat was a highly effective instrument of German warfare. The biggest problem in its failure to eventually defeat Britain was not in its use; rather, the problem was that more U-boats were not employed in attacking Britain's shipping.

Yet, Blair, by painting a faulty picture of the U-boat's effectiveness in the first several hundred pages of his work, has then laid the ground work for the next several hundred pages (almost 300) for defending the American Navy's (King's) failure to provide escorts for ships on the US east coast (585 ships were sunk before something was done).

By showing that the U-boat was not a threat (hey all types of ships got through), Blair is better able to convince the reader that escorts for these convoys were not all that important, thus allowing the American Navy to get "off the hook".

By using this approach Blair has 1) presented a false picture of the very real threat of the U-boat; and 2) has used this approach to present a defense for the US Navy. The first is simply wrong, and the second is indefensible.

[mogami]

"All through the autumn and into the winter the battles continued. In the last six months of 1942 the U-boats sank another 575 ships in all areas, totalling 3,000,000 tons. This brought the total sinkings by U-boats for 1942 to a staggering 1,160 ships of over 6,000,000 tons weight, and a further 1,600,000 tons had been sunk by other German forces. This was more than had been sunk in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 combined. The Allies had now lost 14,000,000 tons of merchant shipping through all causes and had replaced less than half of it with new construction."

Hi, The ships lost before Dec 7 1941 were more then made up by USA entering war.
In 1942 The USA built over 10 million tons of shipping. So the Allies finished 1942 with 3 million more tons then they began the year with. (on top of US and other United Nations merchant fleets entering war)(not counting any ships built in Canada or any other nation)
In Jan 1943 Germany was very far from where she had been in 1939. The effect was the same as if she had never sunk a single ship and had to start all over again. (With many more U-boats but also against a much larger and more prepared foe)

(In 1943 USA would build 19 million tons of shipping)

One of the basic false assumptions of the 300 U-boat scheme is that the USA was not doing anything. As I've pointed out the merchant ship programs were all producing ships before Dec 41.
The 300 U-boats would need to defeat Britian before Dec 1941.
The USA was delivering goods to Britian. The Germans would need to attack US ships to totally stop this. (Bring the USA into the war before Dec 41)

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Mogami
"All through the autumn and into the winter the battles continued. In the last six months of 1942 the U-boats sank another 575 ships in all areas, totalling 3,000,000 tons. This brought the total sinkings by U-boats for 1942 to a staggering 1,160 ships of over 6,000,000 tons weight, and a further 1,600,000 tons had been sunk by other German forces. This was more than had been sunk in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 combined. The Allies had now lost 14,000,000 tons of merchant shipping through all causes and had replaced less than half of it with new construction."

Hi, The ships lost before Dec 7 1941 were more then made up by USA entering war.
In 1942 The USA built over 10 million tons of shipping. So the Allies finished 1942 with 3 million more tons then they began the year with. (on top of US and other United Nations merchant fleets entering war)
In Jan 1943 Germany was very far from where she had been in 1939. The effect was the same as if she had never sunk a single ship and had to start all over again. (With many more U-boats but also against a much larger and more prepared foe)

(In 1943 USA would build 19 million tons of shipping)

One of the basic false assumptions of the 300 U-boat scheme is that the USA was not doing anything. As I've pointed out the merchant ship programs were all producing ships before Dec 41.
The 300 U-boats would need to defeat Britian before Dec 1941.
The USA was delivering goods to Britian. The Germans would need to attack US ships to totally stop this. (Bring the USA into the war before Dec 41)

Mogami:

I am referring to the years 1939 to 1941, long before the USA entered the war.

60 years after the fact we know the USA entered the war. But in the dark years of 1939, 1940, and 1941, the British had no such knowledge, nor the luxury of having those ships at that time.

Remember, 50% of all Allied shipping that was sunk in all of WWII fell on Britain in those first two years.

Germany could easily have built 20 U-boats per month from Sept/39 onwards. That Germany did not do so, is a product of Hitler's bungling, and not because the U-boat was not effective.

Cheers!

[mogami]

Hi, The following is a list of ships authorized or under construction for USN before 1 Jan 42. (Not a complete list)


10 CV
10 BB
3 BC
8 CA
25 CL

Now do we see why Japan went in 1941? By 1944 they would be helpless. And this was "Peacetime" USN expansion

[Von Rom]

Originally posted by Mogami
Hi, The following is a list of ships authorized or under construction for USN before 1 Jan 42. (Not a complete list)


10 CV
10 BB
3 BC
8 CA
25 CL

Now do we see why Japan went in 1941? By 1944 they would be helpless. And this was "Peacetime" USN expansion

And I notice not a single ship you listed can fight U-boats, even though the Battle of the Atlantic had been raging for two years.