warspite1ORIGINAL: spence
IIRC, the Regia Marina suffered from a severe shortage of fuel oil.
I re-present Post 82 from this thread earlier.
warspite1ORIGINAL: JeffK
True or False, the Fuel oil situation cramped the RM actions?
True that oil was limited but mostly False that RM operations were 'cramped'.
In assessing the performance of the RM, just as with any branch or service, the whole picture needs to be looked at. But before I comment on that general question I first want to cover Dilli’s response:
ORIGINAL: Dilli
Yes since begin of 1942. It was practically the last time big ships went of to sea.
[/quote]warspite1
.....is of course simply not true.
The Second Battle of Sirte (March 1942) featured Littorio.
The ‘Imperial balls-up’ that was the Vigorous convoy (June 1942) was mauled by the Luftwaffe but would still have been a success had it not been for the Italian ships that put to sea – including both Littorios.
It was the RM’s decision not to include the Littorios in Pedestal (August 1942) due to a shortage of oil (although as Bagnasco points out, there was an emergency supply and what exactly were they saving their untouchable reserve for if not a major operation like this?). However it was not just oil that was a problem – the RM was running out of destroyers.
The ‘big ships’, now joined by Roma, still put to sea for gunnery exercises periodically from the autumn of 1942 and numerous times during the first eight months of 1943. But they were held back from intervening in French North Africa or Sicily. These were decisions made by Supermarina - not by oil. By the time the US joined the Mediterranean war, the chances of utilising the big ships to good effect quickly diminished oil or no oil. There was still a plan to use the fleet in one final do or die operation against Allied shipping but the armistice ended that plan.
So while oil was in short supply (see below) the idea that the RM's big ships practically never put to sea from the beginning of 1942 is patently false.
To return to the True or False question.
Italy joined the war with a known oil position, namely that her navy would have around 12 months of reserves. Thereafter it is not true that they would have no oil and indeed the RM kept an emergency supply (the so called untouchable stocks) in hand at all times. Apart from this stock, the RM would instead have to seek hand to mouth supplies from the Germans – and which it did.
Of course what '12 months reserve' means in practice depends on what the RM decided to do with that oil and their management of expenditure. The profligate use of oil in the first 12 months (in which the fleet was often put to sea but with no tangible results) was a mistake and in choosing to use their reserves in that way, impacts negatively on any assessment of performance, i.e. the shortage of oil cannot be brushed aside as though it was beyond RM control. As said repeatedly, the RM had the central position, they could pick their battles with the aim of making them count. Instead the fleet kept putting to sea, burning precious oil. That was their decision. Given that oil was at a premium, one is entitled to ask what was the point of putting to sea for the operation that led to Spartivento (for example) only to refuse to sail for the enemy initially despite having (what Campioni believed at that time) to be superior forces? And then, despite his cruisers having made contact with the enemy, to refuse to come to their aid and continue sailing away with his battleships.
As noted previously however, discussing the big ships alone is too limiting. During RN convoy operations to Malta the biggest opportunity for the cruisers, destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats was in the confined waters around Sicily and Malta. The British did not send their capital ships into these waters (apart from a few risky end-to-end operations – none of which happened after May 1941 iirc). But the performance of the RM's smaller units was not up to scratch - and when improvements came along by 1942, the chances to destroy the convoys and their escorts was not taken.
So oil is often mentioned in any debate about the RM. Did oil have an effect on operations? Not in the first 12 months and I cannot recall a major operation that the RM refused because there was no oil. That said, the older battleships were not included in many operations because of oil. The operations in 1942 mentioned above were carried out in response to British convoy operations. Were there offensive operations that could have been carried out but were not because of a lack of oil? Well that is impossible to know with certainty, but given the RM track record, it is unlikely. Even when oil was available the RM tended to limit their operations (outside of those to protect convoys to North Africa) either because a) air cover was not guaranteed b) they did not trust the Germans to be able to differentiate between RM ships those of the RN. The latter was the reason given for the no-show by the RM during the Crete evacuation. Imagine what the RM could have achieved then, in conjunction with the damage and losses caused by the Luftwaffe.
Was the oil position known to Italy? Yes. Did they manage their oil according to the position they were in? No. Most importantly, did the lack of oil actually stop the RM from more aggressive action against the RN? No, it was the orders given to the commanders and the timidity of the commanders at sea. Once the USN and of course the USAAF entered stage left, no amount of oil was going to allow the three Littorios (when they weren’t being damaged by air raids) to do anything other than die had they put to sea.
The time to hurt the over-stretched RN was in 1941 with the arrival of the Luftwaffe and with the oil available for use. The RM did not. The rest is history.
