ORIGINAL: dr.hal
So it would appear!!! I take full responsibility Buckrock.... I'll try to be more careful in the future!
Dr. Hal-
Are there any threads of yours from, say, 2010 that you'd like to discuss again? [;)]
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
ORIGINAL: dr.hal
So it would appear!!! I take full responsibility Buckrock.... I'll try to be more careful in the future!

ORIGINAL: dr.hal
I'll have a look and get back to you!

warspite1ORIGINAL: dr.hal
So it would appear!!! I take full responsibility Buckrock.... I'll try to be more careful in the future!
warspite1ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1ORIGINAL: warspite1
So back to In Passage Perilous and there is another point raised in the book within the conclusion that is worthy of mention and posts 104 and 105 refer to this. O’Hara again makes the point that the Mediterranean was the British main effort and that while Italy used the majority of its navy, most of its air force and a small portion of its army, for Germany the numbers were: less than 2% of its army, circa 15% of its air force and a “small fraction” of its U-boat arm. He rounds off this analysis with this conclusion: Every day it could deflect its enemy’s main effort with tiny forces in Africa or anywhere along the Mediterranean shoreline was a successful day for the Reich [my italics].
Lebensraum was Hitler’s raison d’etre and it does not take the powers of hindsight to know that this war was where Germany would succeed or fail and the last thing he needed when warring with the USSR was his southern flank being exposed.
Indeed, after the losses suffered in the first 9 months, in order for Army Group South to launch Operation Blue, the Germans needed to raid the assets of the other two Army Groups, for most of their .....air assets.
Given such a situation, ANY German assets being expended anywhere but in the east was, far from being a success, actually helping Germany to lose the war. O’Hara likes to repeat the mantra that North Africa was Britain’s main focus (as though the Italians were holding off the entire weight of the British Empire forces) but in reality situation was very different.
Similarly given the colossal losses of Luftwaffe aircraft in the USSR during that period, ANY aircraft assets being utilised in the Mediterranean rather than in the east was nothing short of a disaster and 15% is not insignificant.
And all this ignores the fighter strength and AA units that were defending Germany from Bomber Command (and from 1942 the USAAF)
I have recently read the very good Eagles Over The Sea - Luftwaffe Maritime Operations 1939-1942.
Reading the book brought to mind the discussion on the performance of the Regia Marina from a couple of years ago; and specifically O'Hara's rather disappointing quote from In Passage Perilous that 'Every day it could deflect its enemy’s main effort with tiny forces in Africa or anywhere along the Mediterranean shoreline was a successful day for the Reich'.
The description of the German air forces, allocated to naval war, being pulled from pillar to post - to western France, to the Baltic and the Black Sea, to the Mediterranean and to the Arctic just helps reinforce how faintly ridiculous this assertion was.
It reminded me of a scenario I read elsewhere too. In The Fast Carriers Reynolds vividly describes how the Japanese had to remove their carrier aircraft from their carriers in the defence of Rabaul so short were they of aircraft. I mentioned during the initial discussion how much the Germans needed aircraft in the Soviet Union - where the war was to be decided - but this was also true of the Atlantic (and Arctic at least until the Persian and Pacific routes opened up). The book makes clear just to what extent the need to bolster the Italians, far from being a successful day for the Reich as O'Hara so falsely states, was actually a disaster in terms of Germany's two main wars - The Eastern Front and the Battle of The Atlantic.

Yes it has indeed been illuminating. I did step away for about a year or so as I've had lots going on. As for changing my views, maybe marginally. I still think the Italian Navy and Air Force are not given an even hand by some authors despite the facts presented in this book and others. But then again, the services did start off rather poorly and sometimes first impressions stick with folks despite later performances...ORIGINAL: warspite
Indeed. I re-read the initial pages and I think you got a little more than you bargained for!! I wonder if your view of the Regia Marina has changed as a result, although you appeared to step out of the debate pretty quickly.
It certainly doesn't rely upon the traditional/accepted Japanese viewpoints.
warspite1ORIGINAL: dr.hal
Yes it has indeed been illuminating. I did step away for about a year or so as I've had lots going on. As for changing my views, maybe marginally. I still think the Italian Navy and Air Force are not given an even hand by some authors despite the facts presented in this book and others. But then again, the services did start off rather poorly and sometimes first impressions stick with folks despite later performances...ORIGINAL: warspite
Indeed. I re-read the initial pages and I think you got a little more than you bargained for!! I wonder if your view of the Regia Marina has changed as a result, although you appeared to step out of the debate pretty quickly.

warspite1ORIGINAL: John 3rd
Nearly done with Scratch One Flattop. Pretty fair work in my opinion. Really does an excellent job of sowing together the OFFICIAL Japanese history, Lundstrom, and several of works (Black Shoe Admiral for instance) into a solid narrative. Have learned a few things and like the format as well as heavy citation work at the end of each chapter.
Looks like I need to order that Arctic Convoys book...
It's a fascinating place. It was one of my "case studies" for my degree. I studied the Maltese Navy (yes they have one) and learned a LOT about the place including its plans for defense during the war (and now). As you say, it was dripping in history.ORIGINAL: fcooke
Visiting Malta is on the bucket list. Dripping in history.