Italy Oil

[aspqrz02]

The real limit on Italian imports were financial ... she was perennially short of foreign exchange with which to actually buy oil.

Also, I seriously doubt that Italy would have been able to use all of the Oil she imported for military purposes ... so she simply couldn't have (as Axis players will attempt to do) stockpile ALL of her Imports. So, to represent this, I'd suggest that she actually get OIL 2 to OIL 4 a month (i.e. OIL 1 or OIL 2 per fortnight turn) to represent this.

I suspect that German Oil Imports may need to be modified to represent the same thing for Germany.

Phil McGregor

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: Journier
The axis as a whole have plenty of oil for 12 -14 tank corps at barbarossa start and can then drag out the war quite well into 43

Assuming 2 Panzer and 1 Panzergrenadier or Motorised Division per Corps, that's 24-28 Panzer Divisions and 12-14 Panzergrenadier or Motorised Divisions.

That's actually pretty close to the actual number (not including some of the 'shadow' and nominal 'Divisions' added in 1944-45) of Panzer Divisions Germany fielded ... but several of those were deployed elsewhere.

It's fewer than the ~20 or so full strength Panzergrenadier Divisions they fielded ... but some of those were converted to Panzer Divisions at some point.

Assuming you had to carefully husband your stockpiles between the conquest of France and the Low Countries and Barbarossa and then carefully calculated the use of all Oil consuming units IN Russia, then that's historical, too.

The Germans, historically, had to make operational move/deploy commitments based on Oil availability as early as late 41 ... it didn't prevent them from moving things, it just forced them to be economical, and made some moves ... uneconomic.

Phil McGregor

[Journier]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz02

ORIGINAL: Journier
The axis as a whole have plenty of oil for 12 -14 tank corps at barbarossa start and can then drag out the war quite well into 43

Assuming 2 Panzer and 1 Panzergrenadier or Motorised Division per Corps, that's 24-28 Panzer Divisions and 12-14 Panzergrenadier or Motorised Divisions.

That's actually pretty close to the actual number (not including some of the 'shadow' and nominal 'Divisions' added in 1944-45) of Panzer Divisions Germany fielded ... but several of those were deployed elsewhere.

It's fewer than the ~20 or so full strength Panzergrenadier Divisions they fielded ... but some of those were converted to Panzer Divisions at some point.

Assuming you had to carefully husband your stockpiles between the conquest of France and the Low Countries and Barbarossa and then carefully calculated the use of all Oil consuming units IN Russia, then that's historical, too.

The Germans, historically, had to make operational move/deploy commitments based on Oil availability as early as late 41 ... it didn't prevent them from moving things, it just forced them to be economical, and made some moves ... uneconomic.

Phil McGregor

Absolutely, if you go all out with air operations, and tank movements every turn year round you wont have any oil reserve going into late 42-early 43. Actually you can drain yourself quite easily early in 1940 by doing heavy tank operations across france, then yugoslavia, then greece against a human.

You need to husband the oil stockpile during the winter months, make forceful pushes during summer, then begin your hold in september again for mainly infantry operations, It feels good to me personally, however, thats with me feeding italy after the fall of france 20-25 oil a turn. until my oil stockpiles run close to dry in 43 or so, then italy gets cut off from oil imports for my main thrusts of tanks and aircraft for 1944 trying to force my way toward baku.

[aspqrz02]

I suspect only players who want to do things (and actually DID do them) that ignore the real world constraints thought your claims unrealistic.

Seems like you cracked the 'secret' of Germany's operational guidelines, for which I can only say ... Well done!.

Phil McGregor

[tigercub]

Each year Italy, a country of limited natural resources, is forced to import tons of fuel of various grades from multiple sources. This dependency on imports is particularly aggravated during war times when the larger part of these imports ceases. During World War I, when Italy was allied with the "Lords of the Sea" and with the countries controlling most of the world’s natural resources, this problem did not exist. Instead, the Central Empires were tormented by this problem, and being unable to procure what was necessary to keep the war machine running, forced to surrender. When Mussolini declared the "Autarchia" (national self sufficiency), complete self-reliance of the whole Italian industrial complex, one could not but notice the paradox of such a proclamation. Italy, even if she had had the necessary industries to sustain her (a far-fetched assumption considering the backward state of the whole apparatus), would have been unable to obtain the necessary energy to keep it running.

In the 20s and 30s, Italy imported an average of 12 million tons of good quality coal necessary for industrial production, the generation of electricity, locomotion, and winter heating. When Great Britain decided that an Italian intervention along with Germany was preferable to a pro-German neutrality, Italy was informed on January 14th 1940 of an imminent naval blockade of all coal import from Germany ( at that time coming through the then neutral Netherlands). On February 3rd, London informed Rome of the necessary prerequisites for the reinstitution of shipments of the indispensable coal, which, under the plan, would have been shipped from England. Italy was asked to provide London with a large quantity of war materiel. Following the mediation attempts conducted by the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, Great Britain materialized her threats and on March 1st, when units of the Royal Navy interdicted and captured 13 Italian coal ships taking them to internment and confiscating their cargoes.

On the 10th of the same month, when Italian reserves of coal had already decreased to less than one month, the Germans informed that they were ready to commence transferring coal through the Alpine passes at a rate of about 1 million tons per month. This remedy, which the British thought impossible, was the result of collaboration between the "Reichsbahn" and the "Ferrovie dello Stato" and lasted until late summer 1944. Considering that from June 1940 through September 1943 the Regia Marina had to face an ever increasing crisis with the supplies of oil fuel, which at one point paralyzed the fleet leaving the control of the Mediterranean in the hands of the enemy, how did the Italian war ships fill up to reach Malta, where they surrendered?

After several studies, some well-known historians pointed out several discrepancies between the fuel status reports the Regia Marina was sending to the Germans and the quantity reported by the historical bureau of the Italian Navy. The most evident of these discrepancies was noted in the meeting of Merano, in February 1941, where the head of the Navy, Admiral Riccardi, stated that the Navy had only 610,000 tons left when in fact, reserves amounted to over 1 million tons. One can easily assume that the Navy had created a sort of black fund of oil fuel to be used as a last resource with the double scope of obtaining more of the now available German fuel and, in relative security, to coordinate naval operations.

1940

The Regia Marina, expecting the imminent conflict against Great Britain, had planned in the years preceding the war and had been able to accumulate hefty quantities of oil fuel for her boilers to about 2 million tons. This quantity was thought sufficient for about one and one half years of war without any limitations. The Navy was the only armed force, which was able to accumulate a large quantity of fuel, and in the first week of June the Minister of Corporations withdrew 250,000 tons for the operation of industries and also for the Regia Aeronautica. The Regia Aeronautica had used tanks built of tin, instead of iron, which had caused the gasoline to spoil, so the Navy had to transfer 50,000 tons of gasoline.

Italy entered the war not only with the most complete lack of readiness of her armed forces, but also without much fuel. It was thought that the war would not have last long and that the little fuel reserve would be sufficient. As a matter of fact, until January 1941, there were no limitations on the use of oil fuel, but during this month 671,560 tons had already been burned. Supermarina was forced to reduce training. Up to that moment, no large shipment of oil fuel had been acquired to replace the spent one. The 50,000 tons coming from Rumania were all destined to the Regio Esercito and civilian use, while the Regia Aeronautica benefited from 200,000 tons of very poor quality oil coming from the Albanian oil wells. The Regia Marina even attempted to increase domestic production obtaining annually 10,000 tons of low-grade fuel. The first replenishment was only 15,000 tons and it arrived from Rumania as part of an extraordinary shipment.

1941

To worsen this situation came the attempted coup d’ètat in Rumania, which tried to replace the pro German government. Despite Rome’s denial, it was common opinion that the Italian government had supported this action and therefore all shipments of fuel were immediately ceased. For the Regia Marina this situation meant that in addition to losing any hope of replainge the oil fuel burned, 250,000 tons had to be transferred to the Ministry of Corporations which declared it "intangible" while an additional 34,000 tons had to be transferred to the national industry. During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel and of this 163,000 tons were "donated" to the Navy. At this point the situation became really dramatic and the monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons and during this period of crisis it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. To worsen this already negative situation, after the November British attack in Egypt, the high command and Mussolini requested that the fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This strain, which eventually paid off, was only possible thanks to the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel, which was delivered at the end of the year.

1942

On January 10th, 1942 Admiral Riccardi informed the Germans that the Navy’s supplies of fuel had gone down to 90,000 tons. Admiral De Courten, in his memoirs, affirms that in that month the actual reserves were 200,000 tons. This discrepancy can be explained by the 130,000 tons of "intangible" fuel assigned to the corporation. During these months, the bottom was finally reached with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The situation was further deteriorated by the shipment of 9,000 tons of German oil fuel of quality too low to be of any use.

Fortunately, at the end of April, it was possible to start importing 50,000 tons of oil fuel per month from Rumania. Suspending the escort and mining missions conducted by the cruisers further reduced consumption. These precautions and new shipments allowed for the deployment of the whole fleet in the double operation (east and west) during the battle of mid-June. Despite the new shipment, the situation kept deteriorating because, up to the armistice, the Regia Marina transferred 40,000 tons to other units and only two shipments of German fuel (10,000 tons in July and 23,000 in September) were received. These shipments allowed for the deployment (then cancelled), of some cruisers during the battle of mid-August and the replenishment of the bunkers aboard the two naval squadrons. At the end of November, the oil fuel reserve was about 70,000 tons plus all which was stored aboard the ships; enough for one sortie of the whole fleet. At the end of December, the old battleships Cesare, Duilio and Doria were removed from service, thus allowing for their crews to be redeployed to new escort units which were just entering service.

1943

The allied landing in North Africa and the subsequent doubling in consumption was the new event which, once again, placed the Regia Marina in a state of crisis. In fact, now instead of just refurnishing Libya, the Navy had to supply Tunisia. These new missions were made possible by the shipment of 40,000 tons of excellent German oil fuel. In January 1943, the crisis reached its climax and the three modern battleships had to be removed from service thus eliminating the Italian battle force. The only naval division still operating was the 3rd, based in La Maddalena (Sardinia). The crisis worsened with only 3,000 tons received in February 1943 and in March and April the modern destroyers had to be removed from escort missions. Meanwhile, on the 10th of April, the only major naval force, the 3rd Division, was annihilated when the Trieste was sunk and the Gorizia seriously damaged by an allied air bombardment. Expecting a possible Allied invasion, the remaining destroyers were reactivated along with the battleships which had half their bunkers filled with diesel fuel used by submarines.

In the month of April, the 9th and 7th Divisions were active and the destroyers were used in escort missions. It must be noted that, at this point, there was no reserve of oil fuel left; so, how did the Regia Marina reach Malta? To find the answer, we have to step back. When the Germans unexpectedly occupied the French base of Toulon on November 27, 1942, where most of the French fleet still afloat was kept, they were able to capture 80,000 tons of oil fuel. Having realized that the Regia Marina could not launch any offensive mission, the Germans transferred "on loan" 60,000 tons of "special" oil fuel thus allowing for the three battleships to be reactivated, along with the cruisers of the 7th and 8th Division, the light cruisers based in Taranto, and, at the end of June, the two battleships Doria and Duilio, while the Cesare was in Trieste being rebuilt. This oil fuel allowed for several training missions, event which had not happened in a long time. The final mission was not even compromised by the total cessation of German supplies following Mussolini’s fall. In fact when Italy surrendered on September 8th, the Fleet had enough fuel to reach and surrender in Malta.

[ericdauriac]

HellO,

1) But don't we already have 10 OIL supplied by romania to italy?


2) When you use another author's text in its entirety, you have to cite your sources, it's a question of intellectual honesty (and it's the law!).

Regards

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: ericdauriac
1) But don't we already have 10 OIL supplied by romania to italy?


2) When you use another author's text in its entirety, you have to cite your sources, it's a question of intellectual honesty (and it's the law!).

1) Possibly, if so, that probably shouldn't be the case. It is my understanding that by 1939 the Romanians were sending virtually 100% of their OIL to Germany. It would make more sense to have a Central/South American Convoy as suggested by others ... as this is where 70-90% of the OIL actually came from.

2) Really? Who woulda thunkit. Seriously ... IF this were an academic journal and IF the poster was trying to pass it off as their own work, neither of which is the case, then you might have a relevant point. As it is? Well, for a start, I don't think the Copyright Police will be knocking on his door to cart him off in manacles and, secondly, come on seriously?

Phil McGregor

[tigercub]

Phil is 100% right , I was just sharing information because most of us love to read and gain insight!
that's all it is.

Tigercub

[battlevonwar]

Smart Axis player will not use his oil. So it doesn't really matter. Smart Axis player will end moves on rails, will not bother with neutrals that pay nothing back(Historically didn't the Axis pillage and rob the oil supplies of the nations they annexed? Not represented in game at all...)

Furthermore a smart Axis player has key builds he/she can focus on and plenty of infantry. Enough manpower to use and has to do her job in time to do in the major Threats, the Western Allies early, Russian Bear, Early and that should be the game. Italians aren't all that important other than to keep them from surrendering.

I really would use their air force but their navy is quite obsolete quickly unless you invest in it but why would you? Just use their air force is a better expenditure.

As far as Italian Oil, It makes no difference if you give it 5 or -5... It wouldn't change my builds or abilities in the game. It's tanks/mechs are pathetic and it's navy would be good for a few months before the Brits get themselves together then that's over with.

Italians are a great distraction though as they were historically... One German General said, "You should of invaded from the top down."

Funny the whole time this is going on the Axis and Allies are blaming each other for poisoning water wells in Libya that were actually full of oil. LOL

[battlevonwar]

At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia.

~https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=78524
Dire situation, as Germany Italy would get "zero" oil from me...

[aspqrz02]

Actually I believe it was mentioned somewhere in a previous thread by Alvaro that the conquering player gets 1/3 of a conquered country's OIL reserves.

Phil McGregor

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia.

Dire situation, as Germany Italy would get "zero" oil from me...

15 million bbl is ~2.15 million metric tons (~7 bbl = 1 metric ton). That's 364 OIL. Stockpile, not per turn.

The booty from Norway, the Low Countries and France (5 million bbl) is therefore ~120 OIL. Again, a one off boost, not per turn.

Russia provides 4 million bbl, so about 26 OIL per turn.

Military requirements of 7.25 million bbl per month (i.e. two game turns) is therefore ~24/25 OIL for each of those turns.

Of course, that's for MAY 1940 ... I'm 100% sure that the pre-Barbarossa estimates of fuel use were WAY off. IIRC the actual fuel consumption figures were at least DOUBLE (possibly much more) ... so 48/50 OIL per turn.

Of course, only 40% of the available reserves in 1941 were allocated to Barbarossa ... and that was evidently only 500,000 tons or ~85 OIL, so maybe the equal to 3 turns (6 weeks) from stockpiles based on planning projections ... or 1-2 weeks of actual consumption.

Phil McGregor

[battlevonwar]

Phil,

been through about 3-4 Novels on Operational Levels of Barbarossa between 2014 and 2019. Rarely fuel is mentioned as the main issue but more a lack of clear cut goals, spare parts, Morale is even a bigger issue. Many of the units for instance that prepared for Operation Typhoon weren't full strength anymore and lacked much of their pre-Barbarossa Strength. Many Mechanized units would probably cease to be Panzer Korps Divisions and more skeletons of such... Perhaps why fuel was less important?

[tigercub]

happy new year

[tigercub]

Hitler wanted to go south for the Oil from the start...was talked out of it, Oil was the biggest problem the Axis had and was the reason for the lose of the war in Russia by 1942 the Russian people were staving and only just held on, food way more than combat losses was bringing Russia close to its knee's one study i have been looking at.

Tigercub

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: tigercub
Hitler wanted to go south for the Oil from the start...was talked out of it, Oil was the biggest problem the Axis had and was the reason for the lose of the war in Russia by 1942 the Russian people were staving and only just held on, food way more than combat losses was bringing Russia close to its knee's one study i have been looking at.

Hitler wanted so many things. He was never, ever, clear on the details of what he wanted, however, and doesn't seem to have ever been able to settle on any coherent idea of his aims ... have you ever tried to read Mein Kampf or the even more turgid 'Second Book'? If you can get anything coherent out of either you're better than pretty much anyone else, ever.

The US War Department Pamphlet I gave the link to in another thread just last night is also interesting in its lack of any specific and coherent goals beyond 'take all of European Russia' ... and the initial primary (insofar as Hitler articulated them) aims were to take the Industrial and Bread Basket areas west of the Volga.

Thereafter he dithered. Repeatedly.

Even if he had concentrated on the OIL in the Caucasus, the evidence is disastrously clear ... he would have gotten diddly squat.

1) The Russians destroyed any wells and refineries before the Germans could capture them.

2) The Germans had exactly ONE 'Technical Oil Brigade' whose capacity for repairing such and getting them back into production was such that it managed, IIRC, to get one or two wells back into production and up to a massive 200 bbl or so a day before they were thrown out.

At that rate they would have taken a decade or more to get the fields back into production. Great in the long run BUT they wouldn't benefit in the short term, which is when they needed the oil.

3) German Tanker Car capacity for moving Oil by rail was short of what was needed merely to move POL around for their existing requirements. This was not solvable during the war as the steel needed to produce more tanker cars would have had to have been diverted from producing oh so unimportant things such as planes for the Luftwaffe (aerial defence of the homeland as well as tactical use) and tanks, trucks and artillery for the Heer (taking on the rest of Russia) ... and, NO, the resources captured in European Russia did NOT change the shortage materially. The Germans were short of tanker cars for the ENTIRE WAR.

(I could go into chapter and verse as to why, but it boils down to the fact that they started the war in a deep hole trying to dig their way out the supposedly cheap way of stealing goodies they needed... and found out the hard way that all they were doing was digging the hole deeper because the costs of stealing those goodies was far greater than actual peaceful trading)

4) The Russian rail net was fucked. Wrong gauge. Worse, not enough coaling, watering and, more importantly, repair and maintenance facilities ... and German planning had not taken into account the fact of the latter ... and that all of the equipment needed for the latter was special order stuff that had a long lead time to manufacture AND also took steel and capacity from the oh so unimportant aircraft for the Luftwaffe and Tanks, Trucks and Artillery for the Heer.

So theoretical capacity was never reached.

5) Nope. Can't ship it across the Black Sea either. No indigenous merchant marine with the needed tanker capacity ... heck, no indigenous merchant marine with the needed ship capacity if you tried to ship it in 44 gallon drums. No shipyards to manufacture such ... and, yes, you guessed it, to attempt to do so would have taken steel from the unimportant Luftwaffe and Heer requirements.

In any case, none of the Russian Black Sea ports had the physical wharf and pumping capacity to handle the number of tankers or other merchantmen that would have been required even if they HAD existed. Expanding Port Capacity would have, again, taken steel from the unimportant Luftwaffe and Heer needs.

Likewise, the Romanian and Bulgarian ports didn't have the physical wharfage and pumping capacity.

Then it gets worse, even assuming you get any oil across the Black Sea the Romanians were ALREADY at capacity for their Ploesti oil being shipped back to Germany ... in fact, they couldn't send all they produced because their RR links and Barge capacity on the Danube were inadequate. The Germans, from memory, were trying during the war to run a pipeline from southern Germany down to Romania and, to a limited extent, managed a bit ... but the pipeline head never went far enough to solve the problem. To do so would have diverted high pressure extruded pipe (expensive in terms of Reichsmarks, but more so in terms of production facilities and steel needed by the oh so unimportant Luftwaffe and Heer) was also needed to repair ongoing bombing damage to the German Oil refineries and Synthetic Oil plants and would have had to have been diverted from that.

Look, I know you'll just pooh pooh all this and claim you're a better planner than Hitler ... but these were real world constraints that even the General Staff and, later, Speer simply COULD. NOT. OVERCOME. Hitler may have been clueless, but neither the General Staff Planners nor Speer were ... they tried their hardest to make bricks without straw ... and found out the hard way you can't.

So I suppose it boils down to how much of a fantasy game you wish WarPlan to be?

Phil McGregor

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: battlevonwar
Phil,

been through about 3-4 Novels on Operational Levels of Barbarossa between 2014 and 2019. Rarely fuel is mentioned as the main issue but more a lack of clear cut goals, spare parts, Morale is even a bigger issue. Many of the units for instance that prepared for Operation Typhoon weren't full strength anymore and lacked much of their pre-Barbarossa Strength. Many Mechanized units would probably cease to be Panzer Korps Divisions and more skeletons of such... Perhaps why fuel was less important?

They didn't mention it because they managed to plan around it. As I noted, the German Armed Forces were making operational move/deploy plans directly based on a lack of POL from late 41/early 42 in Barbarossa ... and thence to the end of the war ... they were good planners, and found ways to maximise their use of an increasingly inadequate resource, but it was always a planning issue.

Now, yes, a lot of this wasn't understood until quite recently, or, perhaps more accurately, WAS understood but wasn't widely disseminated beyond very specialised military and economic historical circles. It still hasn't penetrated into more widely accessible historical material even from quite reputable historians YET.

However, if you drill down into specialised material and even some of the more generalist works from the last decade or so you'll find it is coming more and more to light, though you may have to read between the lines.

Phil McGregor

[tigercub]

Phil thanks i have read all you are saying and agree for the most part i have read this somewhere before recently. anyway the food study was interesting it also talked about if Germany took the oil fields even if it could not use them or cut them off so the Russians could not use them this could have spelt the end for the Russians or perhaps the leadership.
like most people writing history after the fact its all hearsay.

Tigercub

[Franciscus]

Interesting discussion, thanks

DC: Barbarossa depicts very well IMHO pretty much all this. The lack of oil; the planning difficulties; the various conflicting needs and personalities involved in Germany’s high command.

Regards