The question to ask about The Italians

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

So the very first question we need to have a consensus on is when, realistically, Hitler would have decided a Med strategy is the way to go.

My view is that such a strategy should not be considered until June - and this would have been after the armistice is signed. I say this for three main reasons:

1. Going for any strategy - be it a Med strategy or a Soviet strategy or a Sea Lion strategy - is totally superfluous to Hitler's thinking until such time as Poland and France are defeated. After all, who - least of all Hitler - is going to imagine how the war will pan out in September 1939.

2. Only once Hitler knows Mussolini has joined the war, does the Med even come onto anyone's radar.

3. During May and June 1940 Hitler has his hands full trying to beat France, Britain and their Allies. To suggest that at this time Hitler is going to be diverted from this major operation (Case Yellow) to start thinking earnestly about Spain, and having in-depth conversations with Mussolini and Franco, while France has yet to be resolved, just seems highly unlikely.


Why is this important and the place to start? Well for two reasons:

a) it governs how quickly, after France, an attack on Spain would take place - and that is really important in terms of the knock-on effect elsewhere, the preparedness of the various belligerents etc

Anyone could have concluded that a cross-channel invasion was a fool's errand. Once that point is reached, the obvious next option to get to the British is Egypt. That adds other advantages as well, regarding Middle Eastern oil. They could have come to that conclusion well in advance. And Italy's involvement can easily be anticipated and prepared for. That's what plans are for: to handle contingencies.

If the BEF is still in France, it would not be a fool's errand - unless you are assigned to do it.

If the BEF has been destroyed, it would not be a fool's errand - unless you are assigned to do it.

If the BEF was evacuated without its equipment, it would not be a fool's errand - unless you are assigned to do it.

Nazi Germany can't have detailed plans with Italy unless and until Nazi Germany knows what Italy is willing to do and with what. Since it would be the Italian fleet doing the lifting of supplies and units to North Afrika, other than what flies across the sea, Nazi Germany is dependent on Italy. If you would actually consider that, Italy should come up with plans (not Nazi Germany) then ask Nazi Germany if Nazi Germany would be willing to help and what they are willing to lend.

Nazi Germany would have been better off planning and implementing a cross channel attack even before France fell. If the Armme would have continued to attack on land with the Luftwaffe concentrating on any shipping evacuating the BEF, the losses could have been staggering to the British. It it could have been done before the BEF was even evacuated, there was little in the United Kingdom that could quickly oppose it on land. One the Nazi Germans cross the channel and have troops plus an airfield, the the British radar has little to no warning of raids - especially since some of the radar stations would be captured and/or destroyed.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Whoops Curtis Lemay's credibility has finally fallen through the floor..... You consistently credit me with saying things I haven't said. You are thoroughly dishonest.

Where did you get that rail repair in impossible in Spain. No weasel words, or ignoring the post, please show me where I've said rail repair is impossible.

Where did I say that you did? I posted a rhetorical question. Because you certainly were implying it. But, now it's clear, the Germans can repair the rail lines.

Again you use the most ridiculous of examples - North Africa - to try and make your case in Spain.

Not only is it not a ridiculous example, it's the stake in the heart for the Spanish campaign. Rail repair isn't even necessary. North Africa proves it.

Minimum needs? For an entire army group.... erm..... To be fair, you obviously know more than the US Military and so I guess its only to be expected you know more than the logistics and supply guys that took the German army to the gates of Moscow and the Caucasus.

No. I only need to know as much as the logistic guys that took the German army to Tobruk and El Alamein.

Tripoli to Tobruk: 1257 km (and that's bypassing the Jabal Akhdar - using it totals 1450km).
Tripoli to El Alamein: 1784 km.
San Sebastian to Gibraltar: 1130 km - shorter that any route above. And nothing in Spain is further than that.

I don't know where you get those driving times from.

warspite1

These are current maps with current roads. The times need to be taken with a pinch of salt because I’m pretty sure the Spanish have upgraded their road network and added motorways since 1940 [;)]....... Sorry but its yet another use of Wiki to try and ‘prove’ something it doesn’t. And remember, as stated in previous posts, the problem isn’t necessarily one of time - there are so many variables that Lemay is simply ignoring (see posts 1017,1018 and 1037).

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



Where did I say that you did? I posted a rhetorical question. Because you certainly were implying it. But, now it's clear, the Germans can repair the rail lines.



Not only is it not a ridiculous example, it's the stake in the heart for the Spanish campaign. Rail repair isn't even necessary. North Africa proves it.



No. I only need to know as much as the logistic guys that took the German army to Tobruk and El Alamein.

Tripoli to Tobruk: 1257 km (and that's bypassing the Jabal Akhdar - using it totals 1450km).
Tripoli to El Alamein: 1784 km.
San Sebastian to Gibraltar: 1130 km - shorter that any route above. And nothing in Spain is further than that.

I don't know where you get those driving times from.

warspite1

These are current maps with current roads. The times need to be taken with a pinch of salt because I’m pretty sure the Spanish have upgraded their road network and added motorways since 1940....... Sorry but its yet another use of Wiki to try and ‘prove’ something it doesn’t. And remember, as stated in previous posts, the problem isn’t necessarily one of time - there are so many variables that Lemay is simply ignoring (see posts 1017,1018 and 1037).

If these are current roads, then they may not have even existed in 1940. Think of how many countries copied the Nazi German controlled-access highway system.

Not to mention that Nazi German tanks driving on them would tear up the road surface.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe




I don't know where you get those driving times from.

warspite1

These are current maps with current roads. The times need to be taken with a pinch of salt because I’m pretty sure the Spanish have upgraded their road network and added motorways since 1940....... Sorry but its yet another use of Wiki to try and ‘prove’ something it doesn’t. And remember, as stated in previous posts, the problem isn’t necessarily one of time - there are so many variables that Lemay is simply ignoring (see posts 1017,1018 and 1037).

If these are current roads, then they may not have even existed in 1940.

warspite1

I don't know what route parameters Lemay has chosen, but he may have used the route I mentioned in previous posts, and which were taken from the German plans - Irun-Burgos-Salamanca-Sevilla - the route certainly looks very similar.

If that is the case then yes, we can be certain there was some sort of road in 1940 - because the Germans decided that would be the best route for the troops that would have to march along all 1,200km of it......

However, the point I was making was that the quality of the road back then was not what its going to be today. But regardless, the time expended, whilst an issue, is really not anywhere near the issue - there were far more variables for the Germans to worry about that have been mentioned in the previous posts but that Lemay has ignored.

[warspite1]

Anyone have any thoughts on posts 996 and 1001?

[RFalvo69]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Sadly, I feel this is appropriate.

warspite1

I love World War II history and love to debate it. If people see what I write and believe me to be an idiot because of it, then I'll take it on the chin - and who knows, they actually may be right.

I guess that the point, for anyone involved here, is: "What is your endgame on this thread?" If the answer is "To have someone say 'You know? I thought about what you wrote and I think that you are actually right!'" then I have a leaning tower for sale. [8|]

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Zorch

Sadly, I feel this is appropriate.

warspite1

I love World War II history and love to debate it. If people see what I write and believe me to be an idiot because of it, then I'll take it on the chin - and who knows, they actually may be right.

I guess that the point, for anyone involved here, is: "What is your endgame on this thread?" If the answer is "To have someone say 'You know? I thought about what you wrote and I think that you are actually right!'" then I have a leaning tower for sale. [8|]

That leaning tower, is that they one where they did not properly check the stability of the ground first? If so, I do not want it. Especially if it is like that bridge for sale in Brooklyn.

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

As indicated in the posts yesterday, I think this thread has long since passed it's usefulness. There doesn't appear to be a consensus on any single point. I mean that shouldn't be possible if everyone comes at this with an open mind.

This is Lemay's counterfactual scenario and one he is proposing would have worked for Germany, it is his case to make. But sadly it appears he has no interest in doing that (or at least not in a constructive way).

He believes a series of (apparently concise) one line answers without the need for much supporting 'evidence' is all that is required to confirm that he is right - and who knows? Perhaps he is. But the little 'evidence' he has provided to support his view, is made up of a war game manual, a war game rule book, a war game map, a couple of irrelevant Wiki paragraphs and a WWII Atlas. I believe these should have the appropriate weight placed on them i.e. not much.

Just as disappointing - and hugely surprising I must say - is that he actually has shown a remarkable lack of knowledge about World War II, and I have simply lost count of the number of factual inaccuracies he's offered up. Suggesting Vichy was an Axis ally was probably the last straw for me. We all make mistakes now and again, but such a lack of knowledge about so many aspects of WWII doesn't give confidence when discussing counterfactuals - I mean one needs to know something of the actual history right?

So if anyone is interested I will jot down a Med First counterfactual and would welcome thoughts and insights so that we can come to a consensus on what we think may have been possible (recognising that our knowledge is necessarily limited (we are not historians!) but that, as war gamers with a keen interest in what we play, many of us will have at least some knowledge to impart).

I envisaged that this would have been how the thread would have panned out originally but despite repeated requests for a case to be made, its clearly not going to happen. I'll make a start on it and see what, if any, interest it attracts.

The essentials will be:

- Hitler is persuaded to employ a Mediterranean-First strategy to weaken the British (or ideally get them to surrender) before an assault on the Soviet Union is made in the Summer of 1942.

- This plan will involve the taking of Gibraltar and Hitler will be so persuaded by the plan, that he will - as a last resort - even be prepared to invade Spain

- A second prong of this scenario is a declaration of war against Turkey (if she can't be brought into the Axis camp) and thus a pincer move to take Egypt from the west and north.

- Moving Hitler's thinking in this way is a pretty big alteration to reality so I think we need to sensible in terms of trying to ensure we keep other key players in the scenario acting in line with their character. This doesn't mean everyone is hidebound to do what they did in WWII obviously - everyone can react to changing circumstance - but we just need to be sensible.

Hopefully this will be a bit of fun and I would like to think that there are enough war gamers in our community with WWII knowledge that would be happy to join in and give their 2 cents, or GBP 0.02 or Euro 0.02 [:)]

I think that a Med first strategy would only come about if:

1) The Allies do not agree to peace according to terms acceptable to Adolf Hitler while:
a) Italy has entered the war on the Nazi German side;
b) Nazi Germany and Italy have failed to bring the United Kingdom under control by invasion,
or;
c) Nazi Germany and Italy have failed to isolate and starve the United Kingdom by air and
naval action which might also entail keeping the Republic of Ireland from supplying the
United Kingdom with essentials to include food.

While the Republic of Ireland was "neutral" it did assist the Allies with weather reports including a weather report from Mayo to London which let the Allies know about the break in the weather coming for the 6th of June 1944. That was a rather important weather report.

The Republic of Ireland also did allow Allied overflights but only during the hours of darkness so they could not be visibly seen crossing Irish territory.

I am sure that Ireland also assisted the Allies in other ways as well.

So the Med first strategy would not be a first option unless Italy had detailed planning with Nazi Germany which would have to be done before the French Surrender which was not predicted. Italy under Little Bennie felt that it had to enter the war when it did so it could get something at the peace table. Italy's mistake.

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

So the very first question we need to have a consensus on is when, realistically, Hitler would have decided a Med strategy is the way to go.

My view is that such a strategy should not be considered until June - and this would have been after the armistice is signed. I say this for three main reasons:

1. Going for any strategy - be it a Med strategy or a Soviet strategy or a Sea Lion strategy - is totally superfluous to Hitler's thinking until such time as Poland and France are defeated. After all, who - least of all Hitler - is going to imagine how the war will pan out in September 1939.

2. Only once Hitler knows Mussolini has joined the war, does the Med even come onto anyone's radar.

3. During May and June 1940 Hitler has his hands full trying to beat France, Britain and their Allies. To suggest that at this time Hitler is going to be diverted from this major operation (Case Yellow) to start thinking earnestly about Spain, and having in-depth conversations with Mussolini and Franco, while France has yet to be resolved, just seems highly unlikely.


Why is this important and the place to start? Well for two reasons:

a) it governs how quickly, after France, an attack on Spain would take place - and that is really important in terms of the knock-on effect elsewhere, the preparedness of the various belligerents etc

b) it also governs what Hitler may or may not have ordered during his time of indecision after France surrenders.

So that's my thoughts, but what do others think? So when, realistically, do we think Hitler would have had his light-bulb moment? To be clear this is simply when Hitler decides that a Med First solution is to be planned and not when the planning is finalised - that comes next....

The Med first strategy would only come about after Italy enters the war, it is too difficult with too many other things that have to be done prior to Nazi Germany trying to dominate thesead when it can't even get ships there.

But an invasion of England could have been contemplated and planned for prior to the attacks on the West starting on 10 May 1940. They may not have been that detailed but the prerequisites could have been decided upon that would need to occur before any invasion of England. There could be different levels of initial commitment based upon how many air transports and gliders would be available, what type of sea lift would be needed and where it would come from plus how to get it there safely.

The air transports would also include light aircraft which could fly in a few men or supplies as was done later by using light aircraft to fly an infantry battalion across a river, two men at a time. Any aircraft that could be used as glider tugs would be identified. All pilots for such aircraft would also have to be trained to a certain extend for towing said gliders.

The Luftwaffe would also have to identify which aircraft would be best used to attack enemy water vessels, even light ones such as MTBs. They might find that the ME-110 would be good for that with their cannons plus light bombs.

The sea lift would not only include barges, anticipating also the capture of barges in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France but also German ones that could be spared that could make the channel crossing. Any ferries would also be identified as Ro-Ro vessels but also how to debar said vehicles and equipment if a suitable port in England has not been captured besides identifying the potential French/Belgian ports to utilize.

Complicated? Yes, but that is what the lower staff is for and it would also be good training even if the plans were not used.

Think if Smiling Albert was given a parachute division, an air landing division, a couple of mountain divisions plus panzer support when the BEF was located elsewhere? To go along with a few airfields in England that were out of reach of the Royal Navy's battleships guns? It might be a tough fight but winnable.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Romania and Bulgaria are exactly to the point. You claim that Spain wouldn't flip to the Axis side because of the casualties they would take in an invasion. Yet that's exactly what Romania and Bulgaria did, under the same circumstances (conquest).

warspite1

Again, I don't understand the simplistic nature of your responses. I know less about Bulgaria, but know something of Romania in WWII. So the only reason you think the Romanians switched to the Soviets side, almost four years after joining the Axis, was because under the Germans they took heavy casualties? I mean.... I don't know where to even start with this.

But you think Spain (1940) and Romania (1940-1944) are operating "under the same circumstances"? Why? Please provide a paragraph just setting out how the situations are the same.

You're question was answered above (conquest). I'll try to rephrase it: Romania started out on the Axis side. It fought in Russia, taking thousands of losses to those Russians. The Russians went on to conquer Romania and occupy it. Romania then switched to the Russian side. This would be no different than Spain taking losses to the Germans as the Germans conquered Spain, and then Spain switching to the German side. Clearly, the examples of Romania and Bulgaria show that taking losses from and being conquered by one side does NOT prevent one from switching to that other side. In the case of weak nations, it might even make it probable: they bend with the wind.

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Romania and Bulgaria are exactly to the point. You claim that Spain wouldn't flip to the Axis side because of the casualties they would take in an invasion. Yet that's exactly what Romania and Bulgaria did, under the same circumstances (conquest).

warspite1

Again, I don't understand the simplistic nature of your responses. I know less about Bulgaria, but know something of Romania in WWII. So the only reason you think the Romanians switched to the Soviets side, almost four years after joining the Axis, was because under the Germans they took heavy casualties? I mean.... I don't know where to even start with this.

But you think Spain (1940) and Romania (1940-1944) are operating "under the same circumstances"? Why? Please provide a paragraph just setting out how the situations are the same.

You're question was answered above (conquest). I'll try to rephrase it: Romania started out on the Axis side. It fought in Russia, taking thousands of losses to those Russians. The Russians went on to conquer Romania and occupy it. Romania then switched to the Russian side. This would be no different than Spain taking losses to the Germans as the Germans conquered Spain, and then Spain switching to the German side. Clearly, the examples of Romania and Bulgaria show that taking losses from and being conquered by one side does NOT prevent one from switching to that other side. In the case of weak nations, it might even make it probable: they bend with the wind.

You are incorrect.

Romania started out favoring the Allies. Then part of it was occupied by the USSR. Then Nazi Germany sent in troops so it would not be completely overrun.

Bulgaria never sent units anywhere other than to lands that it occupied. It switched sides before it was invaded by the USSR.

BTW, have you talked with the people who want you to use those pharmaceutical products? Maybe they are causing unintended problems.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Romania and Bulgaria are exactly to the point. You claim that Spain wouldn't flip to the Axis side because of the casualties they would take in an invasion. Yet that's exactly what Romania and Bulgaria did, under the same circumstances (conquest).

warspite1

Again, I don't understand the simplistic nature of your responses. I know less about Bulgaria, but know something of Romania in WWII. So the only reason you think the Romanians switched to the Soviets side, almost four years after joining the Axis, was because under the Germans they took heavy casualties? I mean.... I don't know where to even start with this.

But you think Spain (1940) and Romania (1940-1944) are operating "under the same circumstances"? Why? Please provide a paragraph just setting out how the situations are the same.

You're question was answered above (conquest). I'll try to rephrase it: Romania started out on the Axis side. It fought in Russia, taking thousands of losses to those Russians. The Russians went on to conquer Romania and occupy it. Romania then switched to the Russian side. This would be no different than Spain taking losses to the Germans as the Germans conquered Spain, and then Spain switching to the German side. Clearly, the examples of Romania and Bulgaria show that taking losses from and being conquered by one side does NOT prevent one from switching to that other side. In the case of weak nations, it might even make it probable: they bend with the wind.

warspite1

Okay so you are saying the same circumstances apply to Romania and Spain because they were conquered (although in Spain's case that hasn't happened, but will be, so that's by the by). And that's it........ So to be clear, there are no other considerations that need to be taken into account when trying to determine what Spain's response would have been to an invasion by Germany? Really? You genuinely don't understand that Spain and Romania's position in 1940 and 1944 are so very different on so many levels?

I just can't understand the thinking. I am genuinely struggling to comprehend what your thought process is here.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. I only need to know as much as the logistic guys that took the German army to Tobruk and El Alamein.

Tripoli to Tobruk: 1257 km (and that's bypassing the Jabal Akhdar - using it totals 1450km).
Tripoli to El Alamein: 1784 km.
San Sebastian to Gibraltar: 1130 km - shorter that any route above. And nothing in Spain is further than that.





There, I've just proved you are wrong. The Germans couldn't get supply to their forces west of El-Alamein as there were road works on the via Balbia. No wonder Rommel lost at El-Alamein.....

warspite1

But you don't know what the logistics guys knew in North Africa.

But I do know what they DID! They supplied Rommel well enough to take Tobruk off the Commonwealth via road.

But distance is, in itself, just another problem for the Germans. In the western desert when travelling 1,000 miles each way, it was reckoned that some 35% of vehicles would be undergoing repair at any one time.

Yet they still took Tobruk!

Now, that is using the all weather via Balbia.

That's a valid point: The site I used obviously used modern roads. The shortcut across the Jabal Akhbar wasn't a road at the time. It was just a trail. They actually would have stuck to the coast through the Jabal Akhbar - hills.

Imagine then Spain, with (as the Germans put it) narrow, twisty roads, often in high mountain passes.

See the physical map of Spain I attached. Overlay it with the Spanish path shown and you'll see that the mountainous regions are bypassed. There are hills, but no mountains. The mountains are not continuous across Spain, only in spots. So it is easy for supply columns to bypass them.

Imagine what that would do to the suspension, wheels, tyres and engines?

Think what all the dust did to vehicles in the desert. Spain has no claim to worse conditions than North Africa.

It was reckoned in North Africa, between one-third and one-half of the fuel delivered to North Africa was then expended in getting supplies to the front. Good job Axis oil supplies are plentiful.... oh no wait a minute.

Still getting Russian oil. Oil supplies would be far better in this campaign than in the Desert - or in Russia.

The important point is that this proves that truck supply can be extended the entire way across Spain - even without repairing the rail lines, though that will be done as well.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No. I only need to know as much as the logistic guys that took the German army to Tobruk and El Alamein.

Tripoli to Tobruk: 1257 km (and that's bypassing the Jabal Akhdar - using it totals 1450km).
Tripoli to El Alamein: 1784 km.
San Sebastian to Gibraltar: 1130 km - shorter that any route above. And nothing in Spain is further than that.





There, I've just proved you are wrong. The Germans couldn't get supply to their forces west of El-Alamein as there were road works on the via Balbia. No wonder Rommel lost at El-Alamein.....

warspite1

But you don't know what the logistics guys knew in North Africa.

But I do know what they DID! They supplied Rommel well enough to take Tobruk off the Commonwealth via road.

But distance is, in itself, just another problem for the Germans. In the western desert when travelling 1,000 miles each way, it was reckoned that some 35% of vehicles would be undergoing repair at any one time.

Yet they still took Tobruk!

warspite1

Well you certainly appear excited about Tobruk...but that was not Rommel's aim was it? His aim was Suez and the ejection of the British.

That's like claiming victory because your team was leading at half-time and then got whipped in the second half. Rommel's problem was his supply lines. Whether he could have won ultimately is debatable, not because he didn't have the tactical ability, but because he didn't have the supply. But you are holding the length of supply line in North Africa as your 'proof' about Spain.....

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

The timescale in France was asap because the German economy wasn't equipped for a long war.

OK. The timescale for Spain is ASAP. When have I ever said otherwise. But I'm not going to say when it will be completed. That is not necessary, except that it will be completed before it can delay the postponed Barbarossa.

But for your scenario a timescale is very much required and is absolutely vital. The timescale here you say is anytime before 1942. That is just such a mind-blowingly fatuous comment. The Germans are invading the Soviets in 1942 - and that is non-negotiable for Hitler, before that they are invading Turkey, the Middle East, possibly France (depending on the Syrian response), they are invading Egypt, they are assisting the Italians in Libya, and possibly Greece and Yugoslavia - all in 1941. The Germans don't know what the Soviets will do either and so have to guard against any action in the east. NO the Germans haven't got until 1942, and to airily state they do is not clever and shows a complete lack of understanding of war and warfare - not to mention economics.

Until Barbarossa, the Germans have the European mainland practically to themselves. Far more ground forces than they can even use. Plenty for all the above requirements. If the Russians declare war in 1941, they will have more than enough force in Poland to hold them off - just remember how puny the Russians were at the start of Barbarossa.

As for economics, the Germans were not even in a total war economy, and wouldn't be till after Stalingrad. Plenty of slack to take up regardless of what happens.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

See the physical map of Spain I attached. Overlay it with the Spanish path shown and you'll see that the mountainous regions are bypassed. There are hills, but no mountains. The mountains are not continuous across Spain, only in spots. So it is easy for supply columns to bypass them.

warspite1

But again, you are not listening. If I told you what I thought of the route, I would expect you to take it with a pinch of salt - after all, I've never been to Western Spain. But I am not asking you to take my word for it. I am asking you to take the German supply officers word for it. And I really don't care a jot about this whole mountains/hills business. I care about what the professionals say and yes, when it comes to soldiering, the Germans are generally pretty damn impressive.

So you can say to your hearts content that "it is easy for supply columns to bypass [hills]" but I take what the Germans, tasked with the job, saying about this. You also have mentioned just hills, none of the other obstacles that didn't feature in the desert. .

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Think what all the dust did to vehicles in the desert. Spain has no claim to worse conditions than North Africa.

warspite1

I can acknowledge that. Spain probably had both extremes though, so on balance probably was worse. But let's be fair, neither would have been a picnic.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Well, history suggests otherwise doesn't it? For if anyone could, then what was Sea Lion all about? Quite clearly, anyone didn't did they?

I see. They didn't do it, therefore they couldn't do it. That 86's all hypotheticals doesn't it!

Hypotheticals are about what COULD have happened. COULD they have decided a cross-channel invasion was a fool's errand? Could they have decided that Italy would join the war? Could they have decided Egypt was a better way to get at the British? Could they have decided that they would need Middle Eastern oil?

The answer to those questions are all YES! Not just possible, but even probable had they given it their attention.

[RangerJoe]

Functionally to the military, sometimes there is little difference between hills and mountains. Grades above 7% are an obstacle. Sharp curves are obstacles.

The Italians also got supply to Benghazi.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

The important point is that this proves that truck supply can be extended the entire way across Spain - even without repairing the rail lines, though that will be done as well.

warspite1

Sorry, but you are still missing the point. Yes, truck supply can be extended from Tripoli to El-Alamein. Yes truck supply can be extended from the French border to Gibraltar......

But as has already been explained, this is only part of the story. As Rommel found, it is the quantum that killed him. Now, this wasn't all down to the trucks, this was also due to the capacity of Tripoli and the lesser ports of Benghazi and (eventually) Tobruk. But the Germans know they face bottle necks on the French border too.