Soviet military development throughout WW2 and how its reflected in SPWAW

Charles2222 · Post by **Charles2222** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 3:33 am

Tomo: Hmm. Out of all the stuff I've heard and read on the Gerries, I don't know if anyone came up with the idea that the poor Panther reliability may have sunk Hitler's heart (perhaps even thinking that he would attack again when they were better teethed and more of them [of course I could be totally wrong, but as fickle as Hitler was it almost seems like that at least might've been the last straw]), but I also never heard of anyone thinking of Italy as you did, nor have I. I can't believe I've never seen anyone link the two together when it's fairly obvious as being a contributing factor.

Tombstone · Post by **Tombstone** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 4:32 am

I'm actually accustomed to it being one of the major contributing factors sited in at least three books I've read. Two of them being specifically about Kursk. Perhaps it was the landing at Sicily and not Italy... anyone else got any info on this? I hate having to dig through books for posts.

Tomo

gators · Post by **gators** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 6:00 am

The most relevant point about Soviet development in WW2 is that the victory parade was through Red Square and not the Brandenberger Tor!

Nikademus · Post by **Nikademus** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 6:03 am

Originally posted by Tombstone:
I agree, Mayhem, I mean to say that the Russian performance went up a lot towards the end of the war and the 'huge' casualty thing was done. At that point they no longer had the bodies to throw away with the same magnitude they did earlier. Earlier in the war though, they took ENORMOUS casualties and ridiculous numbers of men surrendered.

Charles: Just cause the Germans had a good ratio at Kursk doesn't mean they weren't losing too many tanks for their own good. The more recent information on the operation suggests though, that the Germans didn't get their asses kicked like people thought. It was a really big, really brutal operation that was really heavy in tanks. Russia lost a LOT of tanks, but at the same time had enough to not only take those losses but have enough tanks that didn't even fight ready to kick off a gigantic offensive. The other big factor at Kursk was that the allies landed in Italy. That spooked Hitler (fair reason to be spooked mind you) and since the offensive wasn't achieving anything in the strategic sense (other than depleting tank reserves -but no one could have guessed *except Manstien*-) he pulled 1SSPzGren Div. 2nd SS PzCorps was the unit that was making the most progress, so the loss of one of three divisions stopped that fast. At Kursk the Soviets had some difficulties coordinating their tank units effectively. They took needless losses, and I think it was one of the reasons why Rotmistrov was taken off command duty and kept to higher level stuff. I'm in the process of finishing a 5 scenario series covering the 3rd SS PzGren Division during Zitadelle. The last in the series "North of the Psel" can be downloaded from Fabio Prado's site if anyone wants to check it out. They are all BIG scenarios... so if that's not your thing you are not going to like them.

Tomo

The W-SS had managed to gouge out the best progess but even 'that' was but a fraction of what the originial goal was and by the Prokanovka battle they were firmly checked with heavy losses. The disaster might have been aveliated somewhat had the Germans been able to hold on to their very modest gains. An often unspoken benefit of the Belograde counter-offensive was that it allowed the Russians to retain the battlefield and pull many damaged tanks into the shops for repair while denying the same benefit to the Germans. Many German tanks were the victims of mines after all.

Would one division or even two have made that much of difference? I serioiusly doubt it.

The Russians ususally get discounted for having had the greater reserves in AFV's and of artillery. What is often overlooked is what it took for the Russians to create the situation where an exhausted, and more than a little battered foe, finds themselves facing fresh forces in overwhelming numbers.

It was far from simply a matter of superiority in resource and manpower. It was also the dedication and near fanatasism of the combat troops holding the front lines. They were the real heros of the Kursk battle.

In the end the Germans have noone but themselves to blame for the disaster. They cant even saddle Hitler (alone) with the blame which is usually the preferred tactic of apologetists. The warning signs were there.

Its also common sense that the more you delay your intended offensive the more time you give your opponent the opportunity to not only guess your intentions but prepare accordingly. (and the Russians did this with a vengence)

In the end the German 'mindset' could'nt envision their opponent being able to withstand a limited "Panzerkrieg" where the traditional Russian tactic of defence in depth (i.e. trade space for time) would be invalidated.

Their strategic viewpoint was outdated, inaccurate and in the end fatally inflexible.
Their enemy had adapted and were aided by the Germans themselves who gave them the time to create one of the most formidable defensive positions of the 2nd world war.

A tragedy really (though a good thing for the rest of the world) since at this point the Germans still had the edge in elite panzer forces, those prepared and reinforced for the coming fight. With their savaging at Kursk, the decline was inevitable.

Had they declined the invitation to a massive battle of attrition the Germans would have remained a much more formidable opponent to not only the Russians but to the rest of the allies as well. They would have retained options though the result would still have been inevitable given the weight of the economic forces pitted against them.

Charles2222 · Post by **Charles2222** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 5:21 pm

I read up a slight amount on Kursk yesterday, and they mentioned that the USSR had found a very reliable intelligence source to find out precisely what the Germans were doing before the attack, the divisions involved, everything. Doubtlessly the Germans were ignorant of this, and the defenses were bolstered only because they had this advantage. I would imagine that had the Soviets not been informed, that the defenses would've been considerably more relaxed and less reactive, but the attack probably wouldn't come close to doing anything like the previous two summers attacks (It also mentioned that Hitler went all out and put his very best divisions, and very best planes, etc. into it. Maybe such a movement of all the very best is what tipped off the Soviet informant). I recall reading elsewhere that the Soviets were afraid that the '43 offensive would amount to another great summer offensive, as they were afraid of German summer prowess. I can't recall if they still had such a fear in '44 or not.

Nikademus · Post by **Nikademus** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 9:16 pm

Originally posted by Charles_22:
I read up a slight amount on Kursk yesterday, and they mentioned that the USSR had found a very reliable intelligence source to find out precisely what the Germans were doing before the attack, the divisions involved, everything. Doubtlessly the Germans were ignorant of this, and the defenses were bolstered only because they had this advantage. I would imagine that had the Soviets not been informed, that the defenses would've been considerably more relaxed and less reactive, but the attack probably wouldn't come close to doing anything like the previous two summers attacks (It also mentioned that Hitler went all out and put his very best divisions, and very best planes, etc. into it. Maybe such a movement of all the very best is what tipped off the Soviet informant). I recall reading elsewhere that the Soviets were afraid that the '43 offensive would amount to another great summer offensive, as they were afraid of German summer prowess. I can't recall if they still had such a fear in '44 or not.

Correct. The tap into the German High Command was code named "Lucy" and provided the Russians with amazingly detailed and intimate information of German plans and intentions. So much so in fact that the info at times was regarded with grave suspicion as thoughts of it being a trap frequently came to mind.

It was but one piece of the puzzle though. The Germans went to great lengths to disquise and hide their intentions for the coming offensive (including forbiding panzermen to wear their distinctive black uniforms when going to the front to scout the terrain) but there was only so much one can do to hide offensive preparations of such a scale as seen at Kursk. The Russians saw the warning signs and were later aided by the delays in the German preparations as they wanted to get a bit more here and there (and specifically get those new Panthers to the Front in time)

From a strategic viewpoint, the focus was fairly evident too as some Kursk writers have pointed out. The German lines as they had stablized in early 43 were somewhat satisfactory for them with the notable exception of the Kursk salient which jutted signifigantly out between Karkov and Orel. It would have aided the manpower starved Germans signifigantly to eliminate this bulge and shorten up their lines.

Tombstone · Post by **Tombstone** » Fri Jul 13, 2001 10:40 pm

It was a no brainer. Kursk was to be pinched out... The soviets had 3 tank armies in the bulge. With or without lucy Kursk would have ended roughly the same. Maybe Germany woulda gotten more territory but it wouldn't have made mucha difference considering how much an edge the Soviets had at that point. The Germans made a a good push considering the comprehensiveness of the defense.

Nikademas: You claim that the Germans had an edge in tanks in 1943 is innacurate. Kursk happened to involve a lot of tank losses but that didn't change things much other than make the fact clear to anyone who was watching. The soviets had tanks enough to lose like a thousand tanks or something in 5 days and be in good enough condition to execute a major offensive. The Germans did a really good job at Kursk and tank losses were much lower than was previously thought. Not that it matters much, cause like you said they were far from achieving anything close to their goal. The plan was that 2nd Pz Army was to attack from the north thru Orel and 4th Pz Army north thru Belgorod. That makes something like 150km for each thrust to cover... The northern group got 9km and was shut down. The southern group got like 30km. So winning the battle of Prokhorovka wouldn't have helped much... Tank losses were bad, but not crippling the way a lot of books make it out to be. What screwed Germany was that it continued to lose tanks from that point on in pretty decent numbers as well... The Soviets lost a lot of tanks too, but we all know production figures for those T-34s. The Soviets didn't defeat the Germans at Kursk with any particular skill either, I think the Soviets made a lot of errors in their tank usage that cost them a lot of tanks for no good reason. Well, I don't mean to knock the Soviet defense tho. The fortifacations, and successive defensive belts was well concieved and properly managed. It's just the tanks that were mismanaged.

Tomo

achappelle · Post by **achappelle** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 12:44 am

I think that the Sov intel, and the massive defense in depth was what won the day. Imagine slugging through belt after belt of fanatical dugin defenders, only to see more of them dugin on the next hill line. The Germans also new they hadn't bled the Sov tank forces enough so the fear of a massive counterattack caused some hesitancy on the German part. Interesting battle, might have been a different result if those G model Panthers had performed properly.

CaptainBrian · Post by **CaptainBrian** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 12:51 am

Originally posted by Charles_22:
I read up a slight amount on Kursk yesterday, and they mentioned that the USSR had found a very reliable intelligence source to find out precisely what the Germans were doing before the attack, the divisions involved, everything. Doubtlessly the Germans were ignorant of this

I'm currently attending a career-level school and we have to give battle analyses. A group of my classmates did Kursk yesterday so my mind is fresh.

As far as intelligence goes, the Soviets were the beneficiaries of information regarding German plans. They had spies within the German High Command, which to my knowledge have still not been revealed. Additionally, on the night of July 3rd a group of German sappers were captured and they revealed detailed attack plans.

In response, the Soviets fired a massive artillery counterpreparation (600+ guns and rocket launchers)catching many German units in their assembly areas and suppressing the German artillery before they could support the attack. The 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division was hit particularly hard. The Germans had their offensive disrupted from the word go.

A few issues back the "Field Artillery Journal" had a good article on artillery at Kursk. If my memory serves me correctly, the Soviets nailed more than 500 known or templated German positions during the before mentioned counterprep.

Tombstone · Post by **Tombstone** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 12:56 am

I heard somewhere that "Lucy" was Brit feeding Enigma info to the Soviets....

Tomo

CaptainBrian · Post by **CaptainBrian** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 1:01 am

Kursk Sources

Lot of good Kursk info

[ July 13, 2001: Message edited by: CaptainBrian ]

Nikademus · Post by **Nikademus** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 4:13 am

Originally posted by Tombstone:

Nikademas: You claim that the Germans had an edge in tanks in 1943 is innacurate. Kursk happened to involve a lot of tank losses but that didn't change things much other than make the fact clear to anyone who was watching. The soviets had tanks enough to lose like a thousand tanks or something in 5 days and be in good enough condition to execute a major offensive. The Germans did a really good job at Kursk and tank losses were much lower than was previously thought.
Tomo

When i said the Germans retained the "edge" I was reffering primarily to the proficiency of their tank crews and commanders. The Kursk battle was a disaster not only due to the heavy tank losses but also due to the loss of so many of these skilled men, along with the well trained panzergrenadier that were to escort them. As for numbers, the Russians had more, but the disperity was not as great as some apolegists would have one believe. Again, it was the Russian tactic of tenacious defence with limited resources while hoarding a signifigant reserve to unleash on the unsuspecting enemy after they'd bled themselves white against the defenders that was just as important as numbers. It was not simply a matter of endless steams of Russian tanks attacking the germans in waves.

As for the German losses not being that severe. Well all i can say for that my friend is that i'd very much like to see the source that makes that claim. I dont think it's a coincidence that after the Kursk offensive was called off that the Germans were never able to again regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. That strikes me as more than a "check" as you seem to be implying.

Why did'nt the Russians steamroll straight to Berlin?

Because they suffered a serious check of their own outside of Karkov a short period after the Kursk battle. Here the situation got reversed and this time it was a ill-concieved Soviet tank offensive into an area heavily defended by German AFV's and high velocity weapons. More tragically the Russians behaved exactly as the Germans did at Kursk and instead of cutting their losses threw themselves back into the frey again and again until finally the mounting losses put the entire Fifth Guards tank army out of commission for the forseeable future. (it may have been the Third guards....dont have the source in front of me)

The Russians had more tanks no question, but they were'nt inexhaustible, and to this day i still find it puzzleing that this is held as point of negation against them. The fact that the Russians were able to build such numbers while large preportions of their country were under enemy occupation speaks to the dedication of the Russian people in resisting and eventually ejecting their "superior" enemy from their homeland.

Steven Zaloga in his book on Soviet AFV's commented on this, stating that the "actual" number of tanks available to both the Germans and Soviets at the Front during most periods of the war was not all that disperate. The key difference was that the Russians had greater reserves so that they could replace their losses more quickly after a heavy battle than the Germans could.

After the Kursk battle and after the Allies invaded Italy and then France this siutation only got worse

[ July 13, 2001: Message edited by: Nikademus ]

Tombstone · Post by **Tombstone** » Sat Jul 14, 2001 11:48 am

Nik: The German's lost the initiative in the east before Kursk. Just cause they were still kicking doesn't mean they weren't doomed. About German and Soviet performance at Kursk tho, here's an article that roughly covers what I'm getting at,

[Article about Kursk]

I think you're misunderstanding me, I'm not trying to knock the Soviets... quite the contrary I believe that they had their shit together way better than most people believe. In the 6 to 8-ish days of Zitadelle the Germans just didn't lose that many tanks (well they lost a lot, but not compared to other major offensives) After Zitadelle was called off the Soviets kicked off Rumianstev and started the 2 year period of war were they pounded on Germans bad. I think you're mistaken about a Soviet failure at Kharkov in 1943. Kharkov in 1942 was super painful for the Soviets after the glorious Stalingrad encirclement... but in 1943 the Soviets did alright, sure they were stopped, but it did a lot of damage, and took back Kharkov (forever). When it comes to actual tank figures, drawing from vol 2 of "Panzer Truppen", "Kursk:A Soviet General Staff Study", and "The Battle of Kursk" the Soviet and German tank forces were relatively even. The germans had a minor advantage in tanks in the south and a pretty significant one in the north. In the north the Germans were stopped COLD by mines, guys, and artillery... in the south were the tank ratio was more favorable for the Soviets the germans made much more progress. Southern side: 1st Tank Army was at like 800 tanks, with like 400 more in 2GTC and 5GTC. 4th Pz Army and Army Det. Kempf added up to like 1500 (200 or so being Panthers who are destined to be at like 30% of their numbers early in the offensive) so the ratio wasn't so bad... Southern attack units withdrew with like 1000 tanks, that does not constitute a serious strategic loss of tanks... not to mention 1st Pz Army didnt even get wet(yet). This is despite the fact that starting 11th June 1943 5th Guards Tank army got involved in the action adding another 600 tanks to the situation. Aside from all these numbers the Soviets ended with 1st Tank Army and 5th Gds Tank Army all but husks after Rumiyanstev. The real error is in thinking that tank losses were as critical as everyone says they are in a war like the one fought between USSR and Germany....

Tomo

rcread · Post by **rcread** » Sun Jul 15, 2001 11:53 pm

The Germans were so successful in the first year of the war because of their operational and tactical doctrine and training. In most countries (including Britain, France, and the US), officers learned tactics in a classroom, and were given lots of time to think through their solutions to every problem. In Germany, officers were marched out into the training area in full battle order, halted, told where the enemy positions were and how they were equipped. Then a student was told to give a solution, on the spot. After he did, the students were requirred to carry it out. So, the Germans were taught that immediate action was more important than the perfect solution.
Also, the Russian Army was headless. Stalin had disposed of all the formally trained and intelligent officers during the purge. Then, like Hitler, he thought himself a military genius, and only the '41 disaster convinced him otherwise. The Russian Army improved largely because the officers around Stalin improved, learned from their mistakes, and were heeded by Stalin (unlike Hitler, he realised he wasn't as smart as he thought).
The best book on the subject is Hitler's Panzers East, which makes a very good case for the idea that the germans could have won the war in '41, and in failing that had no further hope.
The Russian spy was Borgman (I think that was his name), Hitler's personal secretary, according to the Eastern Front's senior intelligence officer (I can't recall his name right now, either). This is backed up by the fact that whenever Hitler went into one of his funks and ignored the war, the Russians were caught by surprise.
Refernce Kursk, the Germans have long claimed that Manstein had defeated the last Russian reserves and was through all the Russain defenses. Several German sources claim the offensive was called off not because it failed, but because the Allies invaded Sicily JULY 12TH, and Hitler panicked. This arguement is backed up now that the REAL, as opposed to the OFFICIAL, Russian histories of WWII are being brought to light. The best book on Kursk is Scorched Earth.
One last remark: take everything you see on TV and most books about the Eastern Front with a truckload of salt. History is written by the winner, and the Supreme Soviet never held much stock by the truth.

gators · Post by **gators** » Mon Jul 16, 2001 12:23 am

one of the keys to Kursk was not just the depth of Soviet defenses but two other keys. One the Russian separated German armor and infantry, second the Russian practice of using batteries of ATGs sited on a single target. It is true that the Panther and Ferdinand vehicles suffered teething problems, but that doesn't seem to be a crucial reason for the German defeat. Another point about the supposed queasiness of Hitler about the Kursk attack is the only source I'm aware of for that anecdote is Guderian, and memoirs always have an element of subjectivity.

achappelle · Post by **achappelle** » Mon Jul 16, 2001 1:58 am

I've read in several books about Kursk that a great proportion of the German AFV losses were due no to Tank v Tank fire, but mechanical failure and minefield attrition. This was particularily true with the Panther "D"s, there were alot of engine fires, because they had designed the engine compartments to be water tight for amphib ops. The engine compartment overheats and whoosh. Defense in depth helps too.

gators · Post by **gators** » Mon Jul 16, 2001 3:33 pm

I knew the Panthers had the disconceting habit of lighting up when just idling. I didn't know the specific design flaw. thanks Alex. The Ferdinand's problem was simpler no mg!

Paul Goodman · Post by **Paul Goodman** » Mon Jul 16, 2001 4:43 pm

Actually, although the Soviets did, indeed, have a very effective source of information at this time, the German attack at Kursk was obvious to anyone. The real discussion at Stavka was whether to attack first, or wait. It was resolved to wait. However, as the German attack was postponed one more time (to get the Panthers), the Soviet argument was renewed, as many thought the German attack had been cancelled.

The wait for the Panthers is ironic. There were 200 of them, all in one brigade (10th Panzer Brigade, I think). These tanks immediately drove into a low area, which was a high density anti-tank minefield, commanded by Soviet artillery and anti-tank guns in the hills beyond (a designated kill zone). It took a couple of days to get the cats out of there (Engineers clearing mines under murderous artillery fire). They lost about 25% of the Brigades strength there. The Panther was ineffective during the battle.

Paul

Tombstone · Post by **Tombstone** » Tue Jul 17, 2001 2:42 am

Hey, who knows details about Bagration? That operation was gigantic, and very successful. A friend of mine whos in the army lost a great uncle at the Vitebsk encirclement in '44. I know that the Soviets had everything planned super well and conducted the dynamic aspects (when to commit who and where, etc.) properly as well... Did the Germans screw that up? Or were they really just being outfought, outplanned, and outproduced...

??

Tomo

Nikademus · Post by **Nikademus** » Wed Jul 18, 2001 12:20 am

Tombstone:

Very interesting article. Thanks for posting the link. Whether or not i agree with it though remains to be seen. I found what the article 'didnt' say to be of as much interest as what it was saying.

It does at least paint a clearer picture of why Manstein disented the way he did.

The Prokanovka battle was interesting but gives the reader the idea that the Russians were facing nothing but Tiger and Panther tanks which was not the case.

All in all i do get the impression that the article seeks to downplay German losses. No question they were less than the Soviets but had the loss been so disportionate i cannot see how they could have conducted a counteroffensive so quickly. Soviet AFV resources were not infinate after all.

Manpower and airpower losses would have to factor in as well. It may well have been a potential lost 'victory' but if so would have been a minor one at best.

On the initiative question. True, the Germans lost the initiative at Stalingrad but this was in the typcial flip-flop vein as seen in 41. Summer = German initiative
Winter = Russian initiatve.

However by spring of 43 the Germans had recovered yet again and regained the initiative for their 43 summer offensive. The only difference was that the Soviets were also in a position to contest this had they chosen but they did the smart thing and let the Germans come to them.

*********

Batragon.

The Russian Military zone has a good article on Batragon. I recall a few general details off the top of my head. Correct, the battle was minutely planned. This was necessary due to the tactical limitations of the Soviet tank forces. Coordination and communications were still being perfected at this point forcing the Russians to rely on set-piece battle plans with limited objectives (to start), backed up by overwhelming firepower on a wide front to limit the German response.

Lack of AFV and more importantly manpower reserves further exaserbated the problem but this does'nt take away from the success of the Soviet offensive, given the result, the shattering of an entire Army group, a good part of which had been entrenched in solid well developed fortifications