A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Platoonist]

Frankly, the US would only need a few surviving fighters (and remember they will be immediately bolstered by the survivors from the carriers) to make total mincemeat of the exposed Bettys. This of course assumes the Bettys have a friendly owned airfield to land on in the first place....

For purposes of discussion this was the 7th Air Force tabulation of remaining active air strength on Oahu after the actual raid. It doesn't count Marine or Navy aircraft or spare planes that were still in shipment crates.

Appendix B.jpg (218.74 KiB) Viewed 1142 times

[Platoonist]

The Zeros will come from a group from one of the carriers. Instead of coming back from the last strike on Pearl, they will just land on Maui instead. Then that group will be replaced by the group from the Luzon operation later.

And their maintenance crews, mechanics, armorers, spare ammunition, parts and aviation fuel fly magically along with them? Have you accounted for how many more destroyers you're gonna pull off duty to act as taxis for them and all their equipment? In the actual raid 111 Japanese planes were damaged, of which 15 were damaged so severely they were jettisoned overboard. If you want to keep these Zeroes flying somebody has to fix and service them. Unless you're planning on having the pilots practice do-it-yourself aircraft repair the same way the navy crews do DIY APD conversion.

In small anchorages, cargo had to be loaded onto lighters (barges or landing craft) that could put to shore, where the cargo was manhandled off the lighters. As can be imagined, this was a time-consuming and labor-intensive process and that's assuming you own the port. The idea that you're gonna magically land and set up two to three airbases in hostile territory for both fighters and bombers that are operational the same day is farcical. But I'm sure it'll all go smooth, flawlessly and by the numbers. Kind of like that first Japanese landing at Wake.

There are Japanese spys on Maui providing pathfinding service.

Now suddenly we have spies! I love how this plan just gets spun up out of whole cloth as we go along.

[Buckrock]

Regardless of your opinion, what I've described in my previous posts was based on Japanese accounts from the "Pearl Harbor Papers" and "The Pacific War Papers". Peattie's "Kaigun" even has an organization chart in chapter 13 confirming that division of authority in 1941. Pretty sure some of the USSBS reports covering the IJN touch on this aspect as well. The takeaway was that Japanese bureaucracies sucked.

Let me get this straight: You're saying that, in a time of war, a Japanese warship would be denied access to a Japanese controlled port that otherwise had space for it. I want to see real evidence for that.

LOL, I'm supposed to provide historical evidence about something the real Yamamoto would probably not have done in the first place, and all to disprove your comic book version of 1941 Japan.

Are you seriously saying you can't imagine the circumstances in 1941 where Yamamoto's orders for his destroyers might be unable to take precedence over existing orders and plans from those with superior authority to him? He could just decide to grab a port berth somewhere that has a crane and tie it up for 12 weeks and none of the relevant authorities could say boo? Even with all the frantic preparation work going on in 1941? Yeah, right.

Yamamoto was CinC of the Combined Fleet (just like there was a CinC of the China Area Fleet) but still subordinate to the Naval General Staff, headed by Admiral Nagano. The Navy General Staff were also one half of the IGHQ, the ultimate military authority. The other half of the IGHQ were the Army General Staff who added in the IJA's own needs. Then there was the Ministries of the Tojo Government, including the Navy Ministry which was led by Admiral Shimada. They also had authority regarding Japan's national infrastructure. Last but not least were the CinC of Strategic Ports and the CinC of Naval Bases. These two were not even subordinate to the Navy General Staff but reported direct to the Emperor, as effectively did the IGHQ and the Tojo Government.

Other than the near-feudal nature of Japan's military and civilian bureaucracies, none of this should have created insurmountable problems for those who operated within the limits of their own authority. I never said otherwise. It was you who decided to have Yamamoto go rogue in a system not known for its flexibility.

These hierarchies were real. I would have considered supplying you Peattie's chart from Kaigun but can't currently be bothered doing a scan&paste given the fact that all you're doing is spitballing stuff in the hope of making something stick.

[Buckrock]

warspite1

And the amendments to the NEI invasion?

As suggested in my earlier post, there looks to be a slight problem with Lemay's PI calculations. The only Japanese aircraft types that could reach the main US Luzon airfields from Formosa were the 263 Zeros, Bettys and Nells. Since he is not going to invade PI territory other than Mindanao, that means other shorter-ranged aircraft types like the JAAF aircraft can not play their historical part in the neutralization of US airpower on Luzon. So by taking 80 Bettys/Zeros away, Lemay has effectively reduced the aircraft numbers that the Japanese could use against Luzon by 80/263 or about 30%. And that is only for December as after that the JNAF aircraft historically had to leave the skies over Luzon and redeploy south to participate in the DEI invasions.

They could be used via the southern islands.

The "southern islands" of the Philippines taken historically by the Japanese at this time were the island of Jolo and a small enclave around the port of Davao on Mindanao. The airfields at these two locations would have brought the JAAF no closer to the main US airfields on Luzon than the Japanese airfields on Formosa had.

Do you intend to do the historical invasions of the southern Philippines? If not, please supply the forces, places and times of your alternative plan for this area.

[Buckrock]

Just as an FYI, most of the forces you list here had gone on to bigger and better things within a week of the Lingayen/Lamon invasions. By the start of January, the IJN forces dedicated to the Luzon operations had dwindled to a CL, a ML, a couple of torpedo boats and about half a dozen auxiliaries. And they spent most of their time operating out of Lingayen and just patrolling the local waters.

As for the "huge air support", it was also gone by early January, leaving behind a small force of less than 70 aircraft to support Homma's efforts against Bataan.

Interesting how 70 aircraft on Luzon are "a small force", but 80 aircraft on Maui are not.

I don't recall making any comment about the number of Japanese aircraft you plan to have on Maui but "small" is a suitable descriptor for what was left for Homma in January given the context of what had been initially present for that Luzon operation.

The ground forces will require continuous huge ammo deliveries.

They didn't. Homma's forces primarily operated off what they had landed with at Lingayen and Lamon. They could do this because they did not fight the first of their major land battles until January. The last of Homma's army forces had arrived at the beginning of January. After that there were no supply or reinforcement convoys sent to Luzon until more than a month later.

And the battle went on for months.

The campaign, yes. The "battle", hardly. Other than a series of minor clashes during the US withdrawal, the only major action were the Japanese offensives against Bataan. The first started in early January and ended in early February. The Official US Army history described it as lasting less than a month before the Japanese pulled back and the two sides conducted little more than patrol actions until late March.

[Torplexed]

Couldn't US fight back somehow because of the loss of a few islands? .

Parts of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups armed with B-17Es were in California awaiting shipment to the Philippines in December 1941. One possible alternative for the US would be to stage them into Bellows Field from the mainland one evening. Turn them around for a night attack on this hastily constituted Japanese air base on Maui packed with several enemy air groups still sorting themselves out. An airfield with likely no tarmacs for dispersal, no revetments for protection, probably minimal AA defenses and no radar for early warning. Saburo Sakai (Japan's greatest surviving ace) stated that even with the Zero’s 20mm cannon, the big American bombers were very difficult to bring down even in the daytime. Even a worse prospect of doing that at night. And it's since it's a former US field those bombers know exactly where it is.

It's a hypothetical, but I'd wager on the Flying Fortresses.

[Sardaukar]

Couldn't US fight back somehow because of the loss of a few islands? .

Parts of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups armed with B-17Es were in California awaiting shipment to the Philippines in December 1941. One possible alternative for the US would be to stage them into Bellows Field from the mainland one evening. Turn them around for a night attack on this hastily constituted Japanese air base on Maui packed with several enemy air groups still sorting themselves out. An airfield with likely no tarmacs for dispersal, no revetments for protection, probably minimal AA defenses and no radar for early warning. Saburo Sakai (Japan's greatest surviving ace) stated that even with the Zero’s 20mm cannon, the big American bombers were very difficult to bring down even in the daytime. Even a worse prospect of doing that at night. And it's since it's a former US field those bombers know exactly where it is.

It's a hypothetical, but I'd wager on the Flying Fortresses.

One of the limited factors about Zeros vs. heavy bombers were limited amount of 20mm ammunition carried (60 rounds per cannon). After that, there was only 7.7mm machine guns left. Some later models had 100 rounds of 20mm per gun.

One of the more successful German planes in pure anti-bomber work was FW-190A-8, with 2 MG 131 with 475 rounds per gun, and four MG 151 20 mm, two with 140 rounds per gun and two with 250 rounds per gun.

[Curtis Lemay]

Low risk - high reward. A TWO YEAR delay in US response.

So how is the reasoning for this two year delay?

The number is directly out of Nimitz's mouth!

[Curtis Lemay]

We know that the Zeros would not come from the carriers. Unlike US practice, the carrier airgroups were permament to the carriers. It's Japanese doctrine. After Coral Sea, Zuikaku and Shokaku were not available for Midway. the former because of damage, the latter because of air group losses. There was no thought what so ever of putting Zuikaku aircraft on Shokaku.

And yet that's exactly what they did in the Solomons Campaign.

[Curtis Lemay]

So many ground forces have been freed up via postponing Luzon that the invasion force will be overwhelming.

warspite1

I know you think all Japanese are supermen with the power of Bushido - but even you know they can't walk on water right? How do these troops get there?

Same why they got to Luzon, historically. Whatever transport landed them on Luzon can take them to Midway.

[Orm]

Low risk - high reward. A TWO YEAR delay in US response.

So how is the reasoning for this two year delay?

The number is directly out of Nimitz's mouth!

Yes, and what he wrote must always be correct?

It just seems an unlikely, and unnecessarily long, delay to me.

[Curtis Lemay]

Radios don't help the Bettys when over PI and the airfield on Maui is still in US hands. Please keep up.

?? They hear the Tora! Tora! Tora! signal - then they know they are cleared to attack. You keep up!

Please give a timetable - hundredth request. When do the destroyers unload their troops for the attack on Maui? How long does it take to attack and secure the key port and airfield and subdue the defenders?

Try providing detail.

I'm providing tons of detail. They land during the night - guided by the pathfinders. They take the defenders and facilities by storm in the rear as soon as the Tora! Tora! Tora! signal is received.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

Thank-you for emphasising just how precarious the Japanese position was. A number of us have been making this point to you for sometime now, and it looks like you've finally understood. Just 50m barrels in September 1941 with no access to oil income. As said, and as you seem to have finally realised, NOTHING could get in the way of the earliest conquest of the NEI.

You must be really bad at math.

600,000 tons would only be 8% of 50,000,000 barrels.

warspite1

No, Maths is okay. What exactly does the above prove? You know the oil is needed for all ships, aircraft, vehicles and Japanese industry right?

It proves they had a huge stockpile. Put differently: The stockpile was enough to launch 12.5 Battles of Midway.

Just for the record that battle employed:

4 CV
2 CVL
7 BB
10 CA
3 CL
13 SS
35 Support ships
248 Carrier Aircraft
16 Float Planes.

And Midway is 2548 miles from Japan.

[Curtis Lemay]

Yep Luzon is postponed. We know. And that is a major problem for the Japanese. Big, big problems given they only have about 18 months of oil and, once the Pacific War starts, that oil is going to disappear even faster.

19 months. Any notion that the Japanese were running on fumes was a tall tale.

You can keep repeating the same boring mantra that everything comes from the Luzon operation, but until you actually put some detail on your plan, no one believes that the Luzon saving is enough and no one believes that the NEI operation is not, at best, delayed.

Any ground unit that was used in Luzon (and it was a corps-sized force) is available now for use elsewhere. Including the NEI.

With all the extra operations you have used so many destroyers elsewhere. The destroyers used in the PI were needed - and used - by Japan elsewhere. But with your unrealistic assumptions and insistence that WWII was fought in silos, you simply double up on the use of destroyers, carriers and key aircraft. Its a really poor effort to be honest.

More ground forces will more than make up for those 12 DDs.

[Curtis Lemay]

The timing makes no sense. Somehow these G4M Betty bombers are supposed to appear in the skies over Pearl simultaneously with the carrier attack? Could somebody explain to me how the Japanese seize both Midway and Wake ahead of time as preliminary stepping stones for this shuttle Betty raid without the garrison of either base getting an alarm out on the air to Pearl that they're under amphibious assault and thus blow the whole "surprise" element of a surprise attack? If Pearl gets word pre-dawn on December 7th that either of these mid Pacific installations just west of them are under attack, then Army air forces on Oahu assume Alert Two and the Fleet goes to Material Condition Zed. Even if it is Sunday and even if they aren't under attack yet.

The Bettys come from Eniwetok not Midway. Midway is taken after Pearl for Zeros replacements to be delivered to Maui.

[Curtis Lemay]

Frankly, the US would only need a few surviving fighters (and remember they will be immediately bolstered by the survivors from the carriers) to make total mincemeat of the exposed Bettys. This of course assumes the Bettys have a friendly owned airfield to land on in the first place....

For purposes of discussion this was the 7th Air Force tabulation of remaining active air strength on Oahu after the actual raid. It doesn't count Marine or Navy aircraft or spare planes that were still in shipment crates.


Appendix B.jpg

The critical numbers on that sheet are:

2 P-40C
25 P-40B.

And, remember, we've added the Bettys to the first strike. Even more ships and planes will be destroyed.

Note that the US can't fly replacement fighters to Oahu. The Japanese, with Midway, can fly Zeros to Maui. This is a losing situation for the US.

[Curtis Lemay]

The Zeros will come from a group from one of the carriers. Instead of coming back from the last strike on Pearl, they will just land on Maui instead. Then that group will be replaced by the group from the Luzon operation later.

And their maintenance crews, mechanics, armorers, spare ammunition, parts and aviation fuel fly magically along with them? Have you accounted for how many more destroyers you're gonna pull off duty to act as taxis for them and all their equipment? In the actual raid 111 Japanese planes were damaged, of which 15 were damaged so severely they were jettisoned overboard. If you want to keep these Zeroes flying somebody has to fix and service them. Unless you're planning on having the pilots practice do-it-yourself aircraft repair the same way the navy crews do DIY APD conversion.

The support staff of the air units taken from Luzon will be on transport with the carriers. They will get to Maui that afternoon.

In small anchorages, cargo had to be loaded onto lighters (barges or landing craft) that could put to shore, where the cargo was manhandled off the lighters. As can be imagined, this was a time-consuming and labor-intensive process and that's assuming you own the port. The idea that you're gonna magically land and set up two to three airbases in hostile territory for both fighters and bombers that are operational the same day is farcical. But I'm sure it'll all go smooth, flawlessly and by the numbers. Kind of like that first Japanese landing at Wake.

If the port is captured, as is likely, it won't be that hard.

There are Japanese spys on Maui providing pathfinding service.

Now suddenly we have spies! I love how this plan just gets spun up out of whole cloth as we go along.

It's called "planning". The HI are full of Japanese. Easy to infiltrate in advance.

[Curtis Lemay]

Regardless of your opinion, what I've described in my previous posts was based on Japanese accounts from the "Pearl Harbor Papers" and "The Pacific War Papers". Peattie's "Kaigun" even has an organization chart in chapter 13 confirming that division of authority in 1941. Pretty sure some of the USSBS reports covering the IJN touch on this aspect as well. The takeaway was that Japanese bureaucracies sucked.

Let me get this straight: You're saying that, in a time of war, a Japanese warship would be denied access to a Japanese controlled port that otherwise had space for it. I want to see real evidence for that.

LOL, I'm supposed to provide historical evidence about something the real Yamamoto would probably not have done in the first place, and all to disprove your comic book version of 1941 Japan.

Are you seriously saying you can't imagine the circumstances in 1941 where Yamamoto's orders for his destroyers might be unable to take precedence over existing orders and plans from those with superior authority to him? He could just decide to grab a port berth somewhere that has a crane and tie it up for 12 weeks and none of the relevant authorities could say boo? Even with all the frantic preparation work going on in 1941? Yeah, right.

Yamamoto was CinC of the Combined Fleet (just like there was a CinC of the China Area Fleet) but still subordinate to the Naval General Staff, headed by Admiral Nagano. The Navy General Staff were also one half of the IGHQ, the ultimate military authority. The other half of the IGHQ were the Army General Staff who added in the IJA's own needs. Then there was the Ministries of the Tojo Government, including the Navy Ministry which was led by Admiral Shimada. They also had authority regarding Japan's national infrastructure. Last but not least were the CinC of Strategic Ports and the CinC of Naval Bases. These two were not even subordinate to the Navy General Staff but reported direct to the Emperor, as effectively did the IGHQ and the Tojo Government.

Other than the near-feudal nature of Japan's military and civilian bureaucracies, none of this should have created insurmountable problems for those who operated within the limits of their own authority. I never said otherwise. It was you who decided to have Yamamoto go rogue in a system not known for its flexibility.

These hierarchies were real. I would have considered supplying you Peattie's chart from Kaigun but can't currently be bothered doing a scan&paste given the fact that all you're doing is spitballing stuff in the hope of making something stick.

I refuse to believe any of this garbage till it gets proven. Yamamoto - commander of the fleet - wouldn't be able to have a single berth in any port in the entire Japanese empire for months on end!!??

[RangerJoe]

Frankly, the US would only need a few surviving fighters (and remember they will be immediately bolstered by the survivors from the carriers) to make total mincemeat of the exposed Bettys. This of course assumes the Bettys have a friendly owned airfield to land on in the first place....

For purposes of discussion this was the 7th Air Force tabulation of remaining active air strength on Oahu after the actual raid. It doesn't count Marine or Navy aircraft or spare planes that were still in shipment crates.


Appendix B.jpg

The critical numbers on that sheet are:

2 P-40C
25 P-40B.

And, remember, we've added the Bettys to the first strike. Even more ships and planes will be destroyed.

Note that the US can't fly replacement fighters to Oahu. The Japanese, with Midway, can fly Zeros to Maui. This is a losing situation for the US.

Except that the Japanese don't have Midway, the attacking force was repulsed.

US fighters could fly to Oahu from Hilo.

[Curtis Lemay]

The "southern islands" of the Philippines taken historically by the Japanese at this time were the island of Jolo and a small enclave around the port of Davao on Mindanao. The airfields at these two locations would have brought the JAAF no closer to the main US airfields on Luzon than the Japanese airfields on Formosa had.

Do you intend to do the historical invasions of the southern Philippines? If not, please supply the forces, places and times of your alternative plan for this area.

They can capture Mindoro, which gets the short range fighters in range. Assets not being used for the invasion of Luzon would do the job.