A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[warspite1]

Does anyone know what is supposed to happen to KB's attack if the APDs have to abort their landing on Maui? Does KB still go ahead? We really need an index.

warspite1

The story changes so much and is so vague that I struggle to keep up. I know that:

In answer to me, Curtis Lemay said:

There would be a point beyond which the raid couldn't be cancelled. Before the Betty's reached the point of no return, for example.

He also told KingHart, I believe, that the raid could be cancelled an hour before it was due to start - but don't quote me on that one.

Also if you recall, he said the Maui raid could happen but if compromised they would play hide and seek for 24 hours and then get picked up by the Japanese destroyer conversions.

Make of those three comments what you can.

As you can see, there are two issues here that are easily solvable:

a) providing a timetable that one could refer to stops all this confusion - but he won't provide one.
b) by referring to point of no return (rather than a set time) everything is get suitably flexible and vague.

[Buckrock]

Make of those three comments what you can.

Thanks. Probably explains why I didn't remember any specific mention of what would happen.

[warspite1]

Love how this plan takes the Japanese approach to logistics. It will work itself out.

Take Maui. Take Midway. How are they going to supply either, let alone hold it?

Their merchant marine couldn't do it. Tokyo Express style runs won't do it.

warspite1

To be fair, this 'plan' has two main features that are true to history in terms of Japanese planning style.

- Everything will work out - after all, its all about the will and we have the Code of Bushido
- The enemy will do exactly what we need them to do and we won't countenance anything different.

The third main feature of Japanese operations in WWII will also ensure the earlier than historic end of the War in the Pacific. Namely that once a decision has been made, loss of face means that there is no flexibility, no rational discussion on how to amend the plan or even - heaven forbid - admit defeat for the long term good.

So let's be clear. Once the Maui and Midway operations go wrong from the first moment, the Japanese can be relied upon to not write off 6 battalions, almost 100 Zeros and Bettys and their crew together with the ships caught up in this mess. No, in order not to lose face they will throw reinforcements piecemeal into the action a la Guadalcanal and get annihilated.

Meanwhile the one and only prize that Japan require at this stage of the war - the black gold of the NEI - becomes a hostage to fortune thanks to this diversion of resources, effort and focus to a totally irrelevant and pointless target in the Eastern Pacific.

[Curtis Lemay]

Not really. And not sure why you are submitting anything in triplicate. All you are being asked to do is support your ‘plan’ with some detail. Without this you have no plan. No plan = nothing for the army to approve or reject. Once you have a plan, there is something for the army to do. Unless what you’ve proposed is an obvious no brainer, the army will say no. And as we know, even if the plan is fantastic, the army wil say no.....

I repeat: I have provided all the detail necessary for a discussion on a history website. I don't need to provide enough detail to meet whatever the army required. The Japanese would provide that.

And we don't know what the army will or will not do under the right circumstances. This plan's reward is so huge, and the risk so small, it's a no brainer.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

You appear to be quoting an opinion as fact. By removing the aircraft that delivered the coup-de-grace to the air units on Luzon, you are giving Mac options. With Luzon quiet, the Southern PI now becomes a possibility for counter attack.

You have given the Americans options they never had in real life thanks to the aircraft you have just removed.

It is a fact that I'm only removing 15% of the historical air assets used. The Clark Field raid used 108 Bettys and Nells, and 84 Zeros. I'm leaving 108 Bettys and Nells and 75 Zeros. So...only 9 Zeros less and the same number of bombers. Things don't sound too good for the Clark Field forces.

warspite1

These numbers make no sense.

Only if you flunked math:

Historically, the Philipines operation had 541 aircraft assigned, including 156 Bettys and Nells and 107 Zeros.

156 - 48 = 108
107 - 32 = 75

[Curtis Lemay]

You have told me you don’t understand why war changes the SOP.....

Yep. Still waiting.

Firstly, why is there a problem?

- you erroneously believed that carrier planes remained on board when a carrier was in port.

Yet to be shown to be erroneous.

- that was perfect for your ‘plan’ because all those inconvenient carrier planes would sink along with their mother carrier during the raid.
- it was then correctly pointed out that your understanding was totally wrong.
- yet another unwanted reality check for your ‘plan’.
- and so what did you do? You find out that in real life, Enterprise kept some of her aircraft aboard.

An ugly fact.

- you raise this as proof that the carrier planes would have remained on board and thus been destroyed during the attack.
- you used this data point as a holy grail.

I'm just pointing out that it remains our only data point.

- one small problem though. The real life actions of Enterprise were under wartime conditions. Under your plan, Enterprise would act under SOP because in your scenario when the big E enters Pearl, the US is at peace.
- SOP would mean her aircraft would be transferred to shore prior to entering Pearl - and thus add to the US aircraft on Oahu to counter the Japanese attack and the hapless units on Maui.
- well that is not good is it? So what do you do? Although you don’t like using historical facts as part of these discussions, in this case you insist that what Enterprise did historically, is what she would have done in your scenario (conveniently forgetting that there is a difference betwen war and peacetime conditions).

Still waiting for a reason why it's OK for carrier planes to be kept unusable in wartime, but not in peacetime. I would think the opposite would be the case.

- But of course you have no reason to believe that.
- sure, SOP doesn’t mean Enterprise’s AOC would follow them. But, in the absence of any reason to believe he wouldn’t, SOP is our best data point.

The SOP is not a data point. A carrier sailing into Pearl is a data point.

- I readily admit if you could come up with evidence to show Enterprise’s AOC was a maverick who regularly ignored SOP or who showed a history of tearing up the rule book, then that data point would need to be caveated.
- but of course you can’t. There is absolutely no reason for SOP not to have been followed by Enterprise

Again, our only data point is what the Enterprise did on 12/7.

- so what do you do now? Well now you try and obfuscate by asking the frankly bizarre question of why war changes SOP.....
- well in real life, Enterprise is heading for Pearl now in a state of war.
- the USN need Enterprise back in Pearl to refuel and rearm as quickly as humanly possible so that she can get back out, get her aircraft in the air and go searching for the enemy (which she successfully did).
- under your scenario there is no reason to do anything other than follow SOP.

But she didn't follow SOP. She still have 2/3rds of her planes onboard.

And so I’m sorry that this is all a bit inconvenient for your plan, but the simple fact is, this is a counter-factual scenario. Therefore we can’t say what would have happened with 100% certainty for the simple reason it didn’t happen. What we can do is use the most relevant data point to try and decide what was most likely to have happened. The data point from history is no good because Enterprise was at war when she did what she did. Therefore the best data point is SOP - which is what Enterprise would have carried out under the conditions that would have existed under your ‘plan’.

I do hope you are now clear on this.

Again, the one data point we have is the Enterprise on 12/7. She didn't follow SOP. And all your blather above didn't even profer a reason why the SOP would be different in wartime.

[warspite1]

Not really. And not sure why you are submitting anything in triplicate. All you are being asked to do is support your ‘plan’ with some detail. Without this you have no plan. No plan = nothing for the army to approve or reject. Once you have a plan, there is something for the army to do. Unless what you’ve proposed is an obvious no brainer, the army will say no. And as we know, even if the plan is fantastic, the army wil say no.....

I repeat: I have provided all the detail necessary for a discussion on a history website. I don't need to provide enough detail to meet whatever the army required. The Japanese would provide that.

And we don't know what the army will or will not do under the right circumstances. This plan's reward is so huge, and the risk so small, it's a no brainer.

warspite1

No you haven’t and of course you do. If not then no counterfactual can ever be denied. My ‘plan’ for the British Army to take Berlin can’t be proven incorrect if all I need to do is spout vague, meaningless verbiage about pathfinders and ‘stuff’. It doesn’t make for an interesting, thought provoking debate.

[Zovs]

This back and forth reminds me of....

https://youtu.be/ohDB5gbtaEQ

[warspite1]

You have told me you don’t understand why war changes the SOP.....

Yep. Still waiting.

Firstly, why is there a problem?

- you erroneously believed that carrier planes remained on board when a carrier was in port.

Yet to be shown to be erroneous.

- that was perfect for your ‘plan’ because all those inconvenient carrier planes would sink along with their mother carrier during the raid.
- it was then correctly pointed out that your understanding was totally wrong.
- yet another unwanted reality check for your ‘plan’.
- and so what did you do? You find out that in real life, Enterprise kept some of her aircraft aboard.

An ugly fact.

- you raise this as proof that the carrier planes would have remained on board and thus been destroyed during the attack.
- you used this data point as a holy grail.

I'm just pointing out that it remains our only data point.

- one small problem though. The real life actions of Enterprise were under wartime conditions. Under your plan, Enterprise would act under SOP because in your scenario when the big E enters Pearl, the US is at peace.
- SOP would mean her aircraft would be transferred to shore prior to entering Pearl - and thus add to the US aircraft on Oahu to counter the Japanese attack and the hapless units on Maui.
- well that is not good is it? So what do you do? Although you don’t like using historical facts as part of these discussions, in this case you insist that what Enterprise did historically, is what she would have done in your scenario (conveniently forgetting that there is a difference betwen war and peacetime conditions).

Still waiting for a reason why it's OK for carrier planes to be kept unusable in wartime, but not in peacetime. I would think the opposite would be the case.

- But of course you have no reason to believe that.
- sure, SOP doesn’t mean Enterprise’s AOC would follow them. But, in the absence of any reason to believe he wouldn’t, SOP is our best data point.

The SOP is not a data point. A carrier sailing into Pearl is a data point.

- I readily admit if you could come up with evidence to show Enterprise’s AOC was a maverick who regularly ignored SOP or who showed a history of tearing up the rule book, then that data point would need to be caveated.
- but of course you can’t. There is absolutely no reason for SOP not to have been followed by Enterprise

Again, our only data point is what the Enterprise did on 12/7.

- so what do you do now? Well now you try and obfuscate by asking the frankly bizarre question of why war changes SOP.....
- well in real life, Enterprise is heading for Pearl now in a state of war.
- the USN need Enterprise back in Pearl to refuel and rearm as quickly as humanly possible so that she can get back out, get her aircraft in the air and go searching for the enemy (which she successfully did).
- under your scenario there is no reason to do anything other than follow SOP.

But she didn't follow SOP. She still have 2/3rds of her planes onboard.

And so I’m sorry that this is all a bit inconvenient for your plan, but the simple fact is, this is a counter-factual scenario. Therefore we can’t say what would have happened with 100% certainty for the simple reason it didn’t happen. What we can do is use the most relevant data point to try and decide what was most likely to have happened. The data point from history is no good because Enterprise was at war when she did what she did. Therefore the best data point is SOP - which is what Enterprise would have carried out under the conditions that would have existed under your ‘plan’.

I do hope you are now clear on this.

Again, the one data point we have is the Enterprise on 12/7. She didn't follow SOP. And all your blather above didn't even profer a reason why the SOP would be different in wartime.

warspite1

You appear to be getting rattled. That’s two craps, a blather and a nonsense I believe in the last few pages. I have explained why SOP would be different in war and peace - and the fact you need this explained is somewhat alarming.

And I am not going to rise to your rather tedious goading over what the definition of a data point is. A data point can be the most pertinent evidence we have for something happening. It may or may not be a factual event, it may be a set of standing orders, it may be reliant upon someone’s past performance. The point is whatever it is, we use the best we have in a counterfactual. The strength of the data point will depend on what it is and what (if its not an historical happening) evidence there is that it wouldn’t have happened.

In the case we have action in wartime - useless as a data point in time of peace, and SOP in time of peace - which is pertinent to this scenario.

[Curtis Lemay]

And you can also be wrong.
Which is what you are regarding the ranges of the Betty. Let me try again:
Max range (unloaded and unarmed): 3132 miles
Combat range: 1772 miles

See any contradition in those figures? 1772 x 2 = 3544 round trip. Half of that was with bombs!

Source - every online source using a simple google search. The link you provided included, if you had bothered to actually read the entire link.[/b]

Evidently I have to do everything over and over and over. Here are the links:

3749 miles transfer range unloaded:

http://www.aviation-history.com/mitsubishi/g4m.html

3132 miles transfer range loaded:

https://www.ww2-weapons.com/mitsubishi-g4m-betty/

You really continue to believe that a convoy of 12 Japanese APDs can sail undetected, on a Saturday evening, land a force of 2400 soldiers and their supplies (again undetected), sail 300 miles to rendezvous with KB and the mystery "ground crew ships", somehow transfer aboard the ground crews and more supplies (including 800-kg bombs), and then sail back 300 miles to Maui and unload? In 8 hours? Meanwhile, your invasion force is somehow avoiding detection while maneuvering to attack positions to seize both port facilities and the airfield. Do I have that right?

Pretty garbled. I suppose if I added steath fighters to the operation you'd be howling about how they will give the whole raid up. Because that's how detectable those APDs will be at night, on a weekend, in peacetime. The APDs initially land only the combat units. They come back to deliver the supplies after the raid has begun and the facilities are captured. The ground crews aren't transferred to the APDs. They also sail on their own ships to Maui after the raid has begun. The APDs don't sail 300 miles to the fleet. They just sail about 100 miles from Maui - where they started from - which is over 200 miles from Oahu.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

Irrelevant to the question.

Please confirm how you know the Japanese have enough destroyers given you've denuded the force by more than 10%, you've added extra operations, and the Japanese are about to start taking losses to their destroyer force.

If its gunfire they need, they will have more than historically via the releases from Luzon. If its ASW they need, the APDs will be back with that by the time they would have been released from Luzon.

warspite1

As said previously, this is irrelevant. I am asking about destroyers not light carriers or light cruisers or heavy cruisers or fast transports.

Please confirm how you know the Japanese have enough destroyers given you've denuded the force by more than 10%, you've added extra operations, and the Japanese are about to start taking losses to their destroyer force.

I repeat: The APDs will be back in only a few days.

[Zovs]

A man walks into an office.

Man: (Michael Palin) Ah. I'd like to have an argument, please.

Receptionist: Certainly sir. Have you been here before?

Man: No, this is my first time.

Receptionist: I see. Well, do you want to have the full argument, or were you thinking of taking a course?

Man: Well, what would be the cost?

Receptionist: Well, It's one pound for a five minute argument, but only eight pounds for a course of ten.

Man: Well, I think it's probably best if I start with the one and then see how it goes from there, okay?

Receptionist: Fine. I'll see who's free at the moment.

(Pause)

Receptionist: Mr. DeBakey's free, but he's a little bit conciliatory. Ahh yes, Try Mr. Barnard; room 12.

Man: Thank you. (Walks down the hall. Opens door.)

Angry man: WHADDAYOU WANT?

Man: Well, Well, I was told outside that...

Angry man: DON'T GIVE ME THAT, YOU SNOTTY-FACED HEAP OF PARROT DROPPINGS!

Man: What?

A: SHUT YOUR FESTERING GOB, YOU TIT! YOUR TYPE MAKES ME PUKE! YOU VACUOUS TOFFEE-NOSED MALODOROUS PERVERT!!!

M: Yes, but I came here for an argument!!

A: OH! Oh! I'm sorry! This is abuse!

M: Oh! Oh I see!

A: Aha! No, you want room 12A, next door.

M: Oh...Sorry...

A: Not at all!

A: (under his breath) stupid git.

(The man goes into room 12A. Another man is sitting behind a desk.)

Man: Is this the right room for an argument?

Other Man:(John Cleese) I've told you once.

Man: No you haven't!

Other Man: Yes I have.

M: When?

O: Just now.

M: No you didn't!

O: Yes I did!

M: You didn't!

O: I did!

M: You didn't!

O: I'm telling you, I did!

M: You did not!

O: Oh I'm sorry, is this a five minute argument, or the full half hour?

M: Ah! (taking out his wallet and paying) Just the five minutes.

O: Just the five minutes. Thank you.

O: Anyway, I did.

M: You most certainly did not!

O: Now let's get one thing quite clear: I most definitely told you!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh no you didn't!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: No you DIDN'T!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: No you DIDN'T!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: No you DIDN'T!

O: Oh yes I did!

M: Oh look, this isn't an argument!

(pause)

O: Yes it is!

M: No it isn't!

(pause)

M: It's just contradiction!

O: No it isn't!

M: It IS!

O: It is NOT!

M: You just contradicted me!

O: No I didn't!

M: You DID!

O: No no no!

M: You did just then!

O: Nonsense!

M: (exasperated) Oh, this is futile!!

(pause)

O: No it isn't!

M: Yes it is!

(pause)

M: I came here for a good argument!

O: AH, no you didn't, you came here for an argument!

M: An argument isn't just contradiction.

O: Well! it CAN be!

M: No it can't!

M: An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition.

O: No it isn't!

M: Yes it is! 'tisn't just contradiction.

O: Look, if I *argue* with you, I must take up a contrary position!

M: Yes but it isn't just saying 'no it isn't'.

O: Yes it is!

M: No it isn't!

O: Yes it is!

M: No it isn't!

O: Yes it is!

M: No it ISN'T! Argument is an intellectual process. Contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of anything the other person says.

O: It is NOT!

M: It is!

O: Not at all!

M: It is!

(The Arguer hits a bell on his desk and stops.)

O: Thank you, that's it.

M: (stunned) What?

O: That's it. Good morning.

M: But I was just getting interested!

O: I'm sorry, the five minutes is up.

M: That was never five minutes just now!!

O: I'm afraid it was.

M: (leading on) No it wasn't.....

O: I'm sorry, I'm not allowed to argue any more.

M: WHAT??

O: If you want me to go on arguing, you'll have to pay for another five minutes.

M: But that was never five minutes just now!
Oh Come on!
Oh this is...
This is ridiculous!

O: I told you... I told you, I'm not allowed to argue unless you PAY!

M: Oh all right. (takes out his wallet and pays again.) There you are.

O: Thank you.

M: (clears throat) Well...

O: Well WHAT?

M: That was never five minutes just now.

O: I told you, I'm not allowed to argue unless you've paid!

M: Well I just paid!

O: No you didn't!

M: I DID!!!

O: YOU didn't!

M: I DID!!!

O: YOU didn't!

M: I DID!!!

O: YOU didn't!

M: I DID!!!

O: YOU didn't!

M: I don't want to argue about it!

O: Well I'm very sorry but you didn't pay!

M: Ah hah! Well if I didn't pay, why are you arguing??? Ah HAAAAAAHHH! Gotcha!

O: No you haven't!

M: Yes I have! If you're arguing, I must have paid.

O: Not necessarily. I *could* be arguing in my spare time.

M: I've had enough of this!

O: No you haven't.

M: Oh shut up!

(Man leaves the office)

[warspite1]

If its gunfire they need, they will have more than historically via the releases from Luzon. If its ASW they need, the APDs will be back with that by the time they would have been released from Luzon.

warspite1

As said previously, this is irrelevant. I am asking about destroyers not light carriers or light cruisers or heavy cruisers or fast transports.

Please confirm how you know the Japanese have enough destroyers given you've denuded the force by more than 10%, you've added extra operations, and the Japanese are about to start taking losses to their destroyer force.

I repeat: The APDs will be back in only a few days.

warspite1

Not likely - although certainly possible at least some of the hapless converts would survive. But of course this doesn’t answer the question I asked.

And even if a number survive, your butchering of their armament and the age of the vessels, means they are no longer able to undertake many destroyer duties. You can’t just wipe over 10% of the destroyer strength from the OOB and not check on what effect this would have had.

[Curtis Lemay]

Again, the only data point we have is the one in which the Enterprise sailed into Pearl with 2/3rds of it aircraft on board.

I think you mean the only data point you have.

No. It's the only data point anyone has.

I don't care what the "SOP" was. What matters is how tightly they followed it.

They followed it "tightly" enough that it was considered standard procedure, hence the term. It will be the normal condition expected to be encountered if you attacked PH during peacetime while one or more CVs were moored there, hence it should be what any competent Japanese planners would have assumed. Even the historical Japanese treated it as SOP for US carriers at PH. And we know that because they supplied details for their plan.

Still only the one data point. Clearly they didn't follow the "SOP" on the 7th.

Unfortunately your data point is during wartime, it has no bearing on peacetime SOP. Find me a data point in peacetime where the USN CVs weren't landing their CAGs before mooring their ship for a 24+ hour stay at PH and then we can talk compliance. And I'm using the 24+ hour stay as that is what your whole plan is built around.

Still waiting for a reason why it's OK for a carrier to enter a port with unusable aircraft in wartime but not in peacetime.

Or just give us the details of your raid and I'll give you multiple referenced examples of that peacetime procedure.

And why would the "SOP" change between peacetime and wartime?

Seriously? The presence of a known hostile force operating close to Oahu that had attacked the previous day and could well be about to attack again tomorrow wouldn't warrant any reconsideration of a SOP that had been previously used because it met peacetime needs?

I'll give you a hint. The USS Enterprise intended to only enter PH and moor at dusk then complete refueling by midnight so as to be back out at sea and ready for battle against a real enemy before dawn. Hardly a peacetime situation.

Again, the Enterprise entered Pearl with 2/3rds of its aircraft unusable. Why would that be permisable in wartime but not in peacetime? What if something prevented Enterprise from leaving? This really sounds much worse in wartime than in peacetime.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

....and you still don't have anything approaching a plan.

Of course I do. And I've detailed it repeatedly. I don't include unnecessary trivia, like the water level in each canteen. Or the names of units (chrome). Just the critical factors.

warspite1

You have a selective idea about what constitutes critical factors in an amphibious landing operation. The Japanese are under massive constraints here:

- they cannot afford to be located (with all that means in terms of signals and illumination in the dead of night)
- they have to seize the airfield and the port, and defeat any resistance quickly without any transport and with only light weapons.

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

All of that will be figured out by the pathfinders. They have months to prep. Again, Maui is a backwater of a nation at peace on a weekend at night.

[warspite1]

It is a fact that I'm only removing 15% of the historical air assets used. The Clark Field raid used 108 Bettys and Nells, and 84 Zeros. I'm leaving 108 Bettys and Nells and 75 Zeros. So...only 9 Zeros less and the same number of bombers. Things don't sound too good for the Clark Field forces.

warspite1

These numbers make no sense.

Only if you flunked math:

Historically, the Philipines operation had 541 aircraft assigned, including 156 Bettys and Nells and 107 Zeros.

156 - 48 = 108
107 - 32 = 75

warspite1

Ever heard of the difference between actual numbers and operational aircraft?

[Curtis Lemay]

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

Again, the US is going to immediately tumble to every detail of the Jap plan like it was mid-war. The Japanese have strategic and tactical surprise on their side. And the Airfield is about 3 miles from shore.

[warspite1]

Of course I do. And I've detailed it repeatedly. I don't include unnecessary trivia, like the water level in each canteen. Or the names of units (chrome). Just the critical factors.

warspite1

You have a selective idea about what constitutes critical factors in an amphibious landing operation. The Japanese are under massive constraints here:

- they cannot afford to be located (with all that means in terms of signals and illumination in the dead of night)
- they have to seize the airfield and the port, and defeat any resistance quickly without any transport and with only light weapons.

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

All of that will be figured out by the pathfinders. They have months to prep. Again, Maui is a backwater of a nation at peace on a weekend at night.

warspite1

These miracle pathfinders that didn’t exist can do what they want - no one cares. You are putting foward a plan that you have absolutely no clue as to whether its even feasible. For all you know, had they existed, the pathfinders could have reported back:

- soz Yamamoto, there is no landing zone that meets your requirements anywhere near your airfield. Your timetable just wouldn’t work and there is little chance with this terrain of getting your magic 50 to the airfield. And as for the nearest port.....Best call it off.

There is as much chance of that being the feedback as anything else.

[Curtis Lemay]

I think the Midway portion of this plan would have faced some serious obstacles. So many historical narratives focus on the what-ifs of the naval aspect of the 1942 Battle of Midway, that the flawed nature of the planned Japanese invasion of the atoll never gets much attention.

The two islands at Midway are surrounded by an exposed coral reef through which one inlet called the Brooks Channel had been blasted in the 1930s. That channel was covered by coast defense guns. There are gaps in the reef on the far western end, but the Japanese rejected using these as they lead to shallows of varying depths in the lagoon and would not have constituted a useful approach. The plan the Japanese Army conceived in 1942 was to use their daihatsu barges to land troops on the south facing reef closest to the islands instead of forcing the channel. The tidal range at Midway is quite small, with a mean range of only nine inches and a diurnal range of fifteen inches, which means that there was never a tide high enough to float the barges over the reef. After being "landed" the troops would have had to wade unto the exposed reef itself. From there the troops would have to slog through 200-300 yards of waters ranging from ankle to chest deep to reach the beach. To make matters worse, most of the Marine heavy and light machine guns were sited to cover this stretch of water.

I don’t have a source for how many landing barges were assigned to the IJN invasion fleet at Midway in 1942, but there were only a dozen transport ships and about 5000 men. So, you are going to be landed on a reef just inches above sea level and then step off into a lagoon with irregular depths from 3-15 ft deep. You’ve still got several hundred yards to the beach itself and you are wading that distance, not running. Pushing your way through waist deep water is slow and tiring. You are trying to keep your footing while gunfire is bursting around you. There is zero cover. And gods help you if you step into a hole 6 or 7 foot deep or trip and end up face down in the water carrying 70-100 lbs of equipment on your back. More troops might drown in the lagoon as opposed to being shot.

That’s not to say nobody would make it across, the Japanese weren’t known for being sensitive to losses. But I don’t see how more than 1000 of the 5000 Japanese assigned to the assault at the time make it as far as the beach, and then still have to get off that beach. I'm doubtful that there would have been enough men left to overcome the garrison.

I think at best it would have been a Japanese Tarawa. The lagoon would have flowed red with blood.


Fringing Reef.jpg

Here's a news flash: Tarawa was captured!!! About 1000 US dead total.

The Japs will be supported by the BBs and cruisers of the raid fleet. Why not assault directly at the port?

[warspite1]

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

Again, the US is going to immediately tumble to every detail of the Jap plan like it was mid-war. The Japanese have strategic and tactical surprise on their side. And the Airfield is about 3 miles from shore.

warspite1

What shore???? What are the tides like, what is the shoreline made up of, what is the terrain to be negotiated? Where is the port? You can’t predict anything because you don’t have the answers to anything.