Japanese defensive strategy...

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

(When I hear the phrase "They came to an understanding" I don't usally expect to then hear "And then they beat the crap out of one another")

Hey, I'm just hanging around making smart@ss conclusory assertions while I wait for WitP to come out.

Of course, "come to an understanding" is an idiomatic expression that means "agree." "To understand" means "comprehend." The U.S. and Japan "understood" each other well enough. Japan was feeling its oats after honking Imperial Russia's horn in 1904-05 ("Wow, look at us. We are a superpower and haven't even started building Toyotas yet"). The U.S. was wary of Japanese intentions, particularly in China, and slowly starting to gear up for the inevitable in 1939.

The nastiness that broke out in Europe didn't help, of course.

[Mr.Frag]

(When I hear the phrase "They came to an understanding" I don't usually expect to then hear "And then they beat the crap out of one another")

That's worthy of a tag line! [:D]

[byron13]

Do you even read and consider what people write, or do you just go off on a tear? I'm not disagreeing with you on everything. Please take the time to read my statement and your response:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Based on this, I would certainly expect a 4:1 result in favor of the U.S. to occur more often than a 3:1 result for the Japanese.

We disagree.

Priceless.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I don't think it is unreasonable to say that there was 25% chance that the Japanese would spot the U.S. first, or that the U.S. carriers would be spotted in time to launch the second reserve wave against the U.S. carriers before the U.S. strike arrived over the Japanese.

I think the chance of the IJN TF finding the USN TF first is less than 1 in 500. The problem remains the factor that you have conveniently ignored in your alternate formulation. Midway atoll.

Wrong. Laughably wrong. This just makes me ill. The fact that Midway is an atoll doesn't matter a wit for spotting except only extremely tangentially. A PBY launched from Midway cannot see through a cloud any better than a Kate launched from a carrier. The U.S. had three times the search aircraft out and, hence, were on narrower radii. The U.S. clearly had a better chance of spotting the Japanese. But just because Midway is an atoll simply will not alter the fact that, if a PBY flies past the Japanese carriers due to cloud cover, the U.S. has essentially lost its chance to spot them for a considerable period of time.

And the idea that just because the American plan was better - mostly because it was simpler - raises the outcome to virtual certainty is the biggest load of manure I've seen on this forum for awhile. Despite all the planning, the battle comes down to essentially who sees who first and is able to launch first. Despite your statements, there is little redundancy to any of this, and all the planning in the world will not correct the situation if your one scout plane that has the opportunity to spot the enemy fails to do so. In very raw terms, the battle could largely be said to have been boiled down to a few sets of eyeballs. I truly cannot think of another battle situation in which so much depends on so little and on something so simple. To argue that the odds of the Japanese spotting the U.S. first is preposterous to the point that I can't believe you make these arguments seriously.

And all the planning almost did not save the day. Chikuma's scout almost saw the U.S. carriers in time to allow the Japanese a mutual first strike. Had Tone's scout not misplaced the U.S. fleet farther than it was, Nugamo may not have attempted to recover the Midway strike force. Had the U.S. scout not misplaced the Japanese fleet closer that it really was, Spruance may have delayed his strike for up to an hour. Is this all woulda, shoulda, coulda? You bet. It's another way of saying that despite the planning, things could have very easily turned out differently. It's another waying of saying that the odds against the Japanese being 1,000:1 is way, way off the mark.

But I tire of this. I see little sense in us continuing to kick this horse long since turned to dust. I'd rather go back to the good old days of arguing whether the uber-Fortresses can win the war singlehanded.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi The problem is what do you do if the USN says "OK take Midway"?
The IJN can't stick around forever and Midway is a very close invasion target from PH. The IJN does not want to get in range of all those aircraft (Hawaii)

Well... in that case... Japanese planners should say "bummer"... and try to do something else...


Since going after Hawaii is out of question the only two reasonable possibilities then are:

#1
Going defensive everywhere - fortifying all gains.

#2
Continuing advance in south towards isolating Australia (Port Moresby and similar)...


Leo "Apollo11"

[sven6345789]

Sticking to their plan was the reason for the japanese loosing in the first place. The WHOLE PLAN including Port Moresby, Dutch Harbor, Attu, Kiska achieved only one thing. The Japanese gave up the major advantage over the US at that time. More carriers with better planes and better aircrews. All were spread out across the whole pacific. good idea
historical hindsight, here we go again.
The Japanese were infected with victory sickness at that time. There were plans for taking China, Australia, India, Midway, Hawaii, Central America and the western coast of the US. Sounds like saddam planing to take a seat in the white house to me.
The Japanese Admirality was fixed on the ONE DECISIVE BATTLE, best fought out with battleships (why do you think Yamamoto brought them all along, because of the looks?). That was what Midway was supposed to be (well, in a way it was).
Midway helped the allies in gaining the strategic initiative in the PTO. Guadalcanal was a result of midway. From that time on, the allies for the most part decided where the battles would take place. Without midway, no Guadalcanal. but without midway, or midway the other way around japanese victory, out of the question. the allied counterattack would have taken place a year or two later. and it would have reached japan a year or two later. by that time, with germany surrendered, and the whole equipment used against the germans now used against japan (8th Airforce, for example), not to mention the atomic bomb (how many did tthe US have in 1947?) , good night, Japan!!
Midway helped to shorten the war, true. But the result of japan loosing never was in doubt after they decided to attack Pearl.

[mogami]

Hi, Yes that is all mostly true. Japanese players of WITP will have to understand they are not trying to win the war. They are trying to win the game. This they accomplish by not surrendering. Everything that slows the Allies down is good. Everything that speeds up their progress is bad.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

About Hartmann...

his first kill was in August1942... all his 352 kills were in the eastern front, 7 P51 in 2 missions ( he killed em as "easy" as the russians ), nearly zero transporters (like a person here tried to implicate).
He was never wounded (but shot down 17 times), hat 1100 missions, 850 with enemy contact. Nearly allways he fought against superior numbers of enemies (his geschwader, JG52, shot down more enemy planes as any fighter group had done or will do (okay, to be fair, so many planes does not exist to be shot down ), he was an ace in killing Il2 Schlächter, the plane that was the most dificulitest in the world (even 20 mm cannon ammo couldn´t penetrate the heavy armor at the side and the front....)

So - the allied fan boy fraction has a huge problem with its "allies allways are superior" opinion.

Hartmann had missed the "lucky" time, shortly after the invasion of russia. The ratio of missions and kills is around 3,73 missions to one kill.

About japanese pilots and their ranks... sure it is possible that many kills were just damaged planes, but strange that some people here just belive that this happen to axis pilots, not allied ones..

About pilots in the western area of ww2 and the chance of american pilots compared to german aces... you can find facts for and against german superiority... at last, the americans had a lot more planes, better planes, more average/good pilots and so they had a lesser chance to find enemies... but also they survived longer because the odds their extremly in their favour...

why some (around 100) german pilots were so superior to the enemies is an interesting question. i think it was the experience of flying so long, beeing so succsessful and they mostly had no alternative... many aces were killed in the latest phase of the war, because they were mentally burned out.

The german pilot could attack one raid 2-3 times, but also he could be killed 2-3 times more... so anything is just mathematics.... well, at last hartmann needed many missions untill he got his first kill.

ORIGINAL: Rendova

Hartmann's records are genrally accepted as being correct, Although he had alot (all?) on the Eastern Front, which, was where the USSR was operating the a REALLY bad airforce and the Germans cut them to peices, not taking anything away from Hartmann I am sure he was a excellent pilot, but on the east front he had some a whole lot of bad planes flow by a whole lot of bad pilots. Another thing to remember is that all US pilots only served a set tour of duty, and were then rotated back to the US. Richard Bong was actually a test pilot back in the US when he was killed in an accident. Also US pilots flew less missions per pilot then did Japan or Germany (ie a P-51 Pilot would fly one escort mission for B-17's and a German Pilot would fly 2-3 missions agaisnt that same raid). Plus the US was active in the war for a much shorter period of time (if I remeber right Hartmann had most of his kills by the time the US got into the war). This is not to take away from the other countries' aces, just trying to explain why US scores are lower.

PS one more point. The US I believe had stricter standards for crediting kills which led to more "probables" and less "confirmed"

[Adnan Meshuggi]

BEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEER

this is the exactly "problem" with war games...

We know, if we play a Midway scenario as a japanese, that the USN have 3 carriers and they wait for us. So we will try to find and sink em.... no midway-paradigma at all.

Now, the important question is - should we try to "force" one side to act this way or the other ? No...

the same about pearl... if we use a what if-scenario, an ambush taskforce could be possible, but just at whatifconditions... not as some here try to say that it had been logical and normally the japs should not get the chance to kick navy asses in pearl...

in one what - if (call it the axis/jap-fanboy scenario) the carriers (2 of em) are tied to the pier, waiting for the lighter...

in the other what if (more interesting in my opinion), 2 seperated carriers could recive the japanese carriers at maximum speed with reduced planes (do you want to risk em by attacking the japanese planes ?)

and the allied-fanboy version is the ambush 3 carriers, knowing nearly exactly the japanese position, launch all planes...

But nobody can or should say "I know the truth what happend in this situation"... we only could guess... maybe the 3 american carriers will be sunk because stupid american pilots couldn´t damage any japanese ship or the japanese pilots are so exited about nice cv´s in the harbour they do not hit anything... we can´t say it.

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, All I know is when I am Japan. I will win Midway. I won't move there for any reason other to sink USN vessels beginning with CV. I'll know how many USN CV exist and plan for them all to be waiting. The only way the USN will win is if they are commanded by one lucky SOB.

(of course I could be wrong, I've lost CV battles in UV where I thought right up to the moment the combat ended "Boy is he going to get it")

[mdiehl]

Why wouldn't night naval bombardment work?

Mogami also see part 1 below.

Several reasons. (1) Because night time in the Central Pacific in late-May early-June at 30 degrees N latitude is about 10 hours long. Midway is at 28.15N. (2) A US air strike radius of about 250 miles exists around the atoll. So a TF making the bombardment would have to cover 500 statute miles and still have time enough to make an effective bombardment in less than ten hours. (3) None of the ships of the time could run at flank speed for ten hours anyhow. (4) One bomb can ruin a CA's day and patently mess with the upper works of any BB.

Japan had plenty 29-30 knot BBs with big guns that would vaporize anything on that small piece of land called Midway.

"Vaporize?" Eh, no. That was common thinking at the time. The first time an industrial strength bombardment was attempted (at Tarawa) it was assumed that a big gun bombardment of a small atoll would eliminate the defense. Ooops.

In my plan Japanese CVs would never be used for Midway suppression.

I understand that and it is an extremely weak point in your plan. You can't just pretend Midway is not there and your surface units can't be counted on to do the job. Even assuming that Midway is fully engaged in messing up your bombardment force, so it's not looking for Strike Force, you are still going to pay dearly in CAs and BBs.

Japanese CVs should only be used to protect other Japanese ships and to destroy US fleet if it comes to intervene.

A nice plan. Even assuming that you can ignore Midway, a 4 on 3 encounter with the USN, even if the USN and IJN find each other at the same time, will result in a draw.

Also, there is no force separation - there is force unification with CVs as core and strike force with all other forces to support and protect it.

Not following you there. Are you saying that your CV TF makes the run-in into Midway with your bombardment force? Talk about an opportunity for the US...

But Japan could have won some battles (many of which were historicaly lost).

True. They might as easily have lost all of the battles that they historically won.

The Midway was one of those since almost whole Japanese naval strength was in action and US forces were many many times smaller...

Smaller... true if you count the gun-line force and the invasion TF. In CVs the US force was about at parity. When you throw in Midway, of course, then Strike Force was outnumbered.

BTW, I would always bet on Japanese 6x CVs + 2x CVLs (and whole fleet with lost of CAs + BBs) against US 4x CVs + some CAs...

In a game, particularly GGPW, I would agree with you. In the real world I'd take that bet and bet on the US. The more BBs sucking fuel you add to your line, the more money I'd be willing to lay on the US, because your logistical problem is going to be so huge that you will have a plethora of opportunities for additional screw-ups.

[mogami]

Hi, How can IJN TF's bombard Lunga but not Midway? The TF only needs to reach the target before sunrise with enough time to bombard since after that the airfield will not be launching strikes. So the TF would not need to cover 500 miles but really less then 250 since there is a time before darkness falls that is still too late for Midway to launch a strike.
In order to attack the TF the night before the aircraft would need to launch in time to find the TF before dark. So the TF would only need to stay out of range till dark and then commence a 25kt run in.
Tarawa was slightly more dug in when compared to Midway and at Midway the object of the attack is a runway not mg/arty bunkers.
Midway is a much easier target then Tarawa. The aircraft at Midway in order to make early morning strikes would need to be fueled and armed during darkness just when the IJN would commence shelling the place.

I think your making this much harder then it needs to be. The bombardment component of the IJN could also be an attack in echelon with smaller faster ships beginning earlier and joined by TF's with larger slower ships as the night wore on. (a TF of DD/CL followed by a TF of CA, followed finally by a TF of BB) (the other TF's would have escorting ships as well)

[mdiehl]

And the idea that just because the American plan was better - mostly because it was simpler - raises the outcome to virtual certainty is the biggest load of manure I've seen on this forum for awhile.

You've obviously never been to the art of war forum or, for that matter, read your own posts. The American plan WAS better. It had a simpler objective and a force structure dedicated solely to that objective. It had multiple avenues to attempt to get at the IJN TF and it had multiple assets with which to conduct recon. It had foreknowledge of the general location of the Japanese TF, knowledge of the timing of Japanese air strikes, and used the knowledge to calculate the arrival of the USN air strikes at the time of least convenience to Japan. It was an outstanding plan with clear objectives and redundancy in the critical components of the plan.

Japan's plan was a joke. They knew it and, what's more, they knew it before the battle began. They, like you, chose to ignore the shortcomings.

Quote that the odds of the Japanese spotting the U.S. first is preposterous to the point that I can't believe you make these arguments seriously.

Tough. Maybe you should do a little research and figure out how many Japanese a/c were assigned to scout duty, and the ranges of the types flown.

And all the planning almost did not save the day. Chikuma's scout almost saw the U.S. carriers in time to allow the Japanese a mutual first strike. Had Tone's scout not misplaced the U.S. fleet farther than it was, Nugamo may not have attempted to recover the Midway strike force.

Had this could that couldawouldashouldathereforeitmusta. Whatever. I hope you play all your games with the premise that the fortuitous intervention of weather, the bushudo spirit, big white bunnies, or whatever, will save you from lousy operational planning. I'm looking forward to reading about you having your head handed to you on a pike, serially.

[mdiehl]

Hi, How can IJN TF's bombard Lunga but not Midway? The TF only needs to reach the target before sunrise with enough time to bombard since after that the airfield will not be launching strikes.

Mo. Leaving aside the Savo engagement, which occurred before Henderson Field was operational, the surface bombardments occurred in October and November 1942. Guadalcanal is roughly at 9 degrees South. In those months, daylight is about 12.5 hours. So the difference between Midway in May-June and Guadalcanal in Oct-Nov is about 1.5 hours more darkness at Guadalcanal. Now consider the ships that the IJN sent to do the job. CAs, CLs, DDs, and two of their fast CB-BBs. If you sent, for example, Yamato to make the attempt, she probably could not have gotten into and out of strike range of Henderson field. Not fast enough.

[mogami]

Hi, I think the idea is a ship only needs to avoid being attacked on the way in. On the way out the airfield will be closed.

The best time to commence fire on Midway would have been between 0400 and 0530. The aircraft on Midway launched at 0600 with the Japanese strike arriving at 0633.

[mdiehl]

For an hour or two, maybe, if the job is done right. Look to the best IJN bombardments at Henderson. There were still operational a/c by daylight.

A good bombardment gets you a free exit as long as the airfield does not receive reinforcements and the bombardment goes perfectly.

[mogami]

In the case of Catus new aircraft were also flown in after attacks. In the case of Midway there were no replacements to be had (read Nimitz's after action report stating Midway lost all it's fighters, divebombers and torpedo planes and no replacements arrived before battle was over)
The Midway aircraft would need to be armed and fueled and staged during hours of darkenss for them to pose a threat. This would leave them exposed to the naval gun fire. A few hours is very important in the context of the progress of the battle between opposing CV TF. Midway would not be a factor.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

First of all it was me who wrote what you quoted and not someone else... [:)]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Several reasons. (1) Because night time in the Central Pacific in late-May early-June at 30 degrees N latitude is about 10 hours long. Midway is at 28.15N. (2) A US air strike radius of about 250 miles exists around the atoll. So a TF making the bombardment would have to cover 500 statute miles and still have time enough to make an effective bombardment in less than ten hours. (3) None of the ships of the time could run at flank speed for ten hours anyhow. (4) One bomb can ruin a CA's day and patently mess with the upper works of any BB.

I already wrote this when I answered "Mogami" about same thing but here it is again:

Why wouldn't Japanese commander keep all his TFs in one single "armada" the whole time while approaching Midway?

The core of that "armada" would be carriers protecting (with CAP) their approach and on constant alert for possible sighting of US fleet (i.e. they would not suppress Midway at all).

The only thing Japan needs is heavy bombardment of Midway and it is closed 100% certain.

"Vaporize?" Eh, no. That was common thinking at the time. The first time an industrial strength bombardment was attempted (at Tarawa) it was assumed that a big gun bombardment of a small atoll would eliminate the defense. Ooops.

Midway is very very very small atol and very very very flat.

There is no way to hide.

All equipment (including parked aircraft) was in open (unprotected) and it would all be 100% vaporized by few Japanese BBs.

Please look at the Henderson field example in Guadalcanal for reference (what much lesser force did that in 100x less favorable conditions).

I understand that and it is an extremely weak point in your plan. You can't just pretend Midway is not there and your surface units can't be counted on to do the job. Even assuming that Midway is fully engaged in messing up your bombardment force, so it's not looking for Strike Force, you are still going to pay dearly in CAs and BBs.

Why?

If whole "armada" (various TFs) is kept together whole time of approach there is big CAP coverage from all Japanese CVs.

Also the range is so great that only unescorted high flying level bombers can even engage the approaching Japanese armada (and we know how useless such attacks are).

The only time bombardment TF peels off to do high speed dash for its bombardment run is the very last day when night falls (i.e. this is the only point when TFs would be separated)

A nice plan. Even assuming that you can ignore Midway, a 4 on 3 encounter with the USN, even if the USN and IJN find each other at the same time, will result in a draw.

The US had no matching forces in whole Pacific at that time.

It would be extremely uneven fight for US side...

Not following you there. Are you saying that your CV TF makes the run-in into Midway with your bombardment force? Talk about an opportunity for the US...

Please see above.

True. They might as easily have lost all of the battles that they historically won.

Of course!

This is all" double edged sword" thingie... [8D]

Smaller... true if you count the gun-line force and the invasion TF. In CVs the US force was about at parity. When you throw in Midway, of course, then Strike Force was outnumbered.

If all Japanese CVs (and CVLs) were kept together it would be very different thing...

My imaginary plan calls for just that.

In a game, particularly GGPW, I would agree with you. In the real world I'd take that bet and bet on the US. The more BBs sucking fuel you add to your line, the more money I'd be willing to lay on the US, because your logistical problem is going to be so huge that you will have a plethora of opportunities for additional screw-ups.

That's war... who makes less mistakes wins... [;)]

It's all imaginary anyway (or if you prefer it is "Academic discussion").

The only thing that makes this great is the possibility that we, Grognards, do try this in WitP!


Leo "Apollo11"

[Mr.Frag]

The basic problem is not could you take Midway or not. Of course you can take Midway if you want to.

Once you have Midway, now what?

It has a large airfield and a VERY small port. Not a good combination. Supplies to keep the troops alive will be unloading very slowly, supplies to keep aircraft flying offensive missions will be unloading very slowly.

The closest port large enough to use for Damaged ships is in the Home Islands, a fair distance away when you are trying to avoid having a ship sink on you. Japan damage control sucks, having the nearest disbandable port that far away should give you pause for thought.

On the other hand, look at the USA. The closest port is PH, a monster of a port with the best repair facilities one can offer.

It falls in the interesting catagory of "Now what?". Pretty to look at, but rather pointless. Seems more effective to me to let the USA load it up with aircraft and simply sweep it now and then with a fast BB bombardment group to maul the aircraft stacked there, gaining points quickly and wasting a lot of tasty USA prime aircraft.

[sven6345789]

You won't be able to stop the central pacific drive anyhow.

It seems to make more sense using your CV's and CVL's in the Noumea area. You might just be able to cut the supply line between the US and Australia, delaying the counterstroke in the New Guinea/Solomon area, thus keeping your defense perimeter alive a little longer.
Many games in UV seem to see a japanese invasion of one of the auto-victory hexes, not to mention PM being taken quite often too. With the whole Kido Butai assembled, The Solomons might just be yours, as PM. In the second half of 1943, the US CV force becomes a very dangerous adversary. At this time, the link between the US and Australia will probably be reopened, but this means that Rabaul will still be intact in the beginning of 1944, buying you time (which is all you can hope to gain).

[mdiehl]

Midway is very very very small atol and very very very flat.
There is no way to hide.
All equipment (including parked aircraft) was in open (unprotected) and it would all be 100% vaporized by few Japanese BBs.

That was exactly the thinking behind the bombardment at Tarawa. By the way, Tarawa is smaller than Sand Island (at Midway atoll), and every bit as flat. Your assumption that a few BBs or whatever will simply vaporize everything on the Island is incorrect and, moreover, it is demonstrably incorrect; it was attempted several times during WW2. It failed.

Since you have clarified that you would keep all your ships in one giant TF, so much the better for the USN. You have made recon/detection a 100% surety of success unless weather conditions are so foul that the IJN is incapable of flight ops. From a historical POV I would look forward with glee to all the IJN ships colliding and crashing into each other while under attack, as happened on numerous occasions when the IJN attempted to maneuver large task groups under battle rather than set-piece conditions. One huge IJN task force has ten times the likelihood of being squashed, as your mission-overtasked TFs attempt all the historically attempted missions and, in addition, providing CAP for a bloated fat tick of a TF strewn all over the ocean. In that event, the odds of IJN victory decline to something like 1/10,000.

[jnier]

That was exactly the thinking behind the bombardment at Tarawa. By the way, Tarawa is smaller than Sand Island (at Midway atoll), and every bit as flat. Your assumption that a few BBs or whatever will simply vaporize everything on the Island is incorrect and, moreover, it is demonstrably incorrect; it was attempted several times during WW2. It failed

Read his post.

He said all EQUIPMENT in the OPEN would be destroyed. That is very different, and more plausible, than saying EVERYTHING would be destroyed. Did any equipment left out in the open at Tarawa survive?