Japanese defensive strategy...

[mdiehl]

KB had to come within strike distance of Midway A/C before it could launch it strike, how is it anymore dangerous for a bombardment force? The CVLs can provide direct cover while KB is providing distance cover out of range of Midway. How about if the night bombardment is followed by a dawn air attack? The minimal approach range for the Bombardment TF is increased substantially because the run out can be made at least partially during daylight. A bombardment/air-attack combo probalby could elimante a need for the second strike which intern elimates a lot of that over tasking you like talking about.

I agree that same could work in theory. But that was not part of the proposed operational plan that was offered so many posts ago. In THAT plan the idea was that Kido Butai is reserved solely for dealing with any USN CVs that might show up, because if Kido Butai is attacking Midway you are back in the exact historical circumstance that faced the real Japanese -- to wit, three imcompatible simultaneous tasks for the IJN CVs.

The problem with using the IJN CVs to deal with Midway is that they are then subject to surprise strikes from USN CVs.

6 BBs and some covering CAs and DDs cant operate together without colliding into each other? If the USN CVs launch a strike against the Bombardment TF they loose the initiative against the IJN CVs who now get a free crack at the USN CVs.

H3ll, 2 CAs and escorts couldn't operate together at Midway without colliding with each other. Mikuma and Mogami to be precise. That is why Mikuma was destroyed and Mogami limped away with nothing functional topside.

No, the IJN CVs don;t get a free crack at the USN. If the Japanese CVs are with this bombardment TF then they are the victims of a surprise USN air strike. As the range closes to Midway there is not the slightest possibility that the IJN TF will be undetected. If the IJN CVs are 250 miles to the rear, then the USN CVs can be 200 miles EAST of Midway sinking the bombardment TF and remaining wholly beyond IJN effective strike range. It just lets the USN wreck the IJN in detail.

I think all that this discussion has accomplished is to prove that the Japanese made the best general plan that they could at the time but lacked sufficient CVs in the main effort to accomplish the job. I reiterate my earlier opinion: with 6 IJN fleet CVs (3 dedicated to dealing with Midway and 3 dedicated to looking for USN CVs) you have a decent chance of taking Midway, even though the CV battle may require that you trade 1-3 IJN CVs for 1-2 USN CVs in the process.

[TIMJOT]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

[
Based on the size of the Atoll we are talking about, you would be better off sticking purely to the CL/DD's as their ROF is much higher and you really don't need plunging fire to deal with a perfectly flat little place like that ... The idea is to kill the guys and the equipment, not sink the Atoll [:D]

I think some 14" shell cratering would be disirable as far as shuting down the airfield is concerned.

[mdiehl]

No my statement is correct. Read my post.

Last time I check CV-based aircraft were part of USN.

Last time I checked the discussion was about the effectiveness of naval gunfire. In a discussion about the effectiveness of naval gunfire in bombardment you take me to task for failing to recognize that USN aircraft-dropped bombs are, in your very strange world, considered to be naval gunfire?

Like your nutty post on "chaos theory" you are simply now trying to pretend that you meant something other than what you said. Trying to obfuscate the issue with b.s. since you can't deploy a germane fact to save your argument.

[Sabre21]

Stats derived from official documents that list max ranges, bomb loads, max speed..and other aircraft stats are a bit deceptive. First of all, the people that usually provide this type of data to the government are the people that build the aircraft. Needless to say they are a bit biased. I have yet to see any aircraft actually meet the max range or max speed specs listed in the aircraft operating manuals. Next, when determining these values, the maximum combat load is not used. A load that consists of maximum fuel and a basic load of weaponry is used to determine combat radius. Maximum fuel and no weaponry is used to determine maximum range.

One of the tricks here is what constitutes a basic load. What I have found in my experience is that it is actually anywhere from 50% - 66% of the maximum load possible. Most aircraft cannot take off with a maximum weapon's load AND maximum fuel...especially when operating from carriers. Even from fixed base locations, fuel and ammo are traded off depending on the mission requirements.

Next, when determining these ranges, it is based on optimum fuel consumption in a straight line flight in a no-wind condition (no head, tail, or cross winds). Also the additional take off and landing fuel requirements are not taken into consideration. So as long as the pilot can maintain optimum engine rpm (no accelerations or decels and no banking turns which also increase drag and increase fuel flow), and do this in a no-wind environment..it is theoretical that the aircraft can reach it's max range or combat radius. Just to let you know, these figures are determined by an engineer with pen and paper (computer now adays) and not by actually going out to fly it.

So I wouldn't take for gospel any stats that have been derived from aircraft operating manuals. In my experience, take what is printed for combat radius and reduce it by a third to get a more exact figure, and just understand how max range is derived.

FYI, I flew military combat aircraft for 18 years primarily from fixed bases but also from naval platforms and have been assigned to or employed by a major US military aircraft manufacturer for the last 8+ years.

Sabre21

[mdiehl]

Two things. 1. Since we're talking about WW2, the stats that we are discussing are based on real working capabilities of a/c not manufacturer's pitches before a design board. 2. In the absence of other data, I take it as a workable solution to divide the 'loaded range' (which is the full load range for a 1-way trip), divide by 2 and back off about 20% from the result to get something approximating a realistic general combat radius. But that does not mean that strikes could not be or were not launched at maximum range.

[Damien Thorn]

Eight pages and mdiehl is still trying to defend his vision of Midway. mdiehl, I may think you operate in your own reality but I have to admire your persistence. You'll never convince any of us but this thread sure is entertaining. It's too bad my internet at home is down; I wil miss this tonight.

[Sabre21]

Mdiehl

Two things. 1. Since we're talking about WW2, the stats that we are discussing are based on real working capabilities of a/c not manufacturer's pitches before a design board. 2. In the absence of other data, I take it as a workable solution to divide the 'loaded range' (which is the full load range for a 1-way trip), divide by 2 and back off about 20% from the result to get something approximating a realistic general combat radius. But that does not mean that strikes could not be or were not launched at maximum range.

This is an incorrect asumption on your part. Obviously you are not aware of how aircraft are produced and how stats are truely derived. Official stats you see listed are derived from aircraft operating manuals in the manner I described above. Aircraft in WWII are less likely to have correct operating stats than aircraft produced today. Your speculation on what constitutes loaded and max range are false and not based on actual experience nor factual data.

Sabre21

[TIMJOT]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

No, the IJN CVs don;t get a free crack at the USN. If the Japanese CVs are with this bombardment TF then they are the victims of a surprise USN air strike. As the range closes to Midway there is not the slightest possibility that the IJN TF will be undetected. If the IJN CVs are 250 miles to the rear, then the USN CVs can be 200 miles EAST of Midway sinking the bombardment TF and remaining wholly beyond IJN effective strike range. It just lets the USN wreck the IJN in detail.
.

If the USN CVs are striking at the retiring Bombardment Force, They give away there presence and then what stops the IJN from attacking them with their reserve strike? I do not think any USN commander is going to strike a surface force while knowing a CV forces is lurking. Well maybe Fletcher.

Isnt it over tasking to ask the USN CVs to simutaneously stop/strike the surface Bombardment force while dealing with an enemy CV force in the area?

BTW, as you well know the Chikuma and Mogami collided while dodging air attack. They had a good track record keeping tactical formation in night ops.

[mdiehl]

This is an incorrect asumption on your part. Obviously you are not aware of how aircraft are produced and how stats are truely derived. Official stats you see listed are derived from aircraft operating manuals in the manner I described above. Aircraft in WWII are less likely to have correct operating stats than aircraft produced today. Your speculation on what constitutes loaded and max range are false and not based on actual experience nor factual data.

Uh, obiously I AM. None of the stats that I have quoted were derived from a/c operating manuals. The rest of your post is non-sequitur because of your assumption that they are. Your speculation is not based on any experience using WW2 aircraft nor, apparently, on what these a/c actually did.

[Damien Thorn]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Uh, obiously I AM. None of the stats that I have quoted were derived from a/c operating manuals. The rest of your post is non-sequitur because of your assumption that they are. Your speculation is not based on any experience using WW2 aircraft nor, apparently, on what these a/c actually did.

Your speculation on what constitutes loaded and max range are false and not based on actual experience nor factual data. The rest of your post is non-sequitur because of these speculations.

[herbieh]

Anybody who says 6BBs and escorts cant manouvre near an island at night, and conduct a bombardment with out collision is talking through his hat. You have just insulted 100 years of Naval proffessionalism in dozens of navies. Me thinks quite a few Captains and Admirals would love to set you straight on that score,
If a Japanese Admiral, or allied Admiral wanted to put his fleet at point X, at moment X, it will happen, and in the middle of a battle as well.
You show little knowledge of how Navies work, you might have read a bit, but you know little.[8|]

[mdiehl]

If the USN CVs are striking at the retiring Bombardment Force, They give away there presence and then what stops the IJN from attacking them with their reserve strike? I do not think any USN commander is going to strike a surface force while knowing a CV forces is lurking. Well maybe Fletcher.

Isnt it over tasking to ask the USN CVs to simutaneously stop/strike the surface Bombardment force while dealing with an enemy CV force in the area?

BTW, as you well know the Chikuma and Mogami collided while dodging air attack. They had a good track record keeping tactical formation in night ops.

1. How does the USN air strike "give away their presence" other than in the general sense that a/c are somewhere within 150-300 miles of the attacked TF?

2. If the IJN CVs are WITH the bombardment TF, then they're being attacked.

3. What "reserve strike?" If the CVs are 250 miles to the rear of the bombardment TF and the USN CVs are, say. 150 miles further out, Japanese a/c "reserve" or for that matter "primary" aren't going to have a clue where the USN CVs are located.

You only get a few basiic choice points in positing the alternative op plan.

1. To suppress Midway
a. via CV-baed a/c
b. via bombardment
c. both.

Decision 1b-c
Options b and c more or less require that the IJN CVs stay with the bombardment group and that the actual invasion TF hover safely to the rear until some sort of deterministic event occurs. If you choose option b or c, you can virtually guarantee that the location, disposition, and composition of the Japanese force is known, because it has to get within 24 miles of Midway to even have a prayer of hitting the target with a bombardment.

Your next choice: do not use the CVs to suppress Midway or not (b) or do use the CVs(c).

Case (b). Strike a/c operating from Midway attack your force, stressing the IJN CAP cac and risking the loss of CVs and secondary ships because, after all, one, just one bomb, can do for an IJN CV. Now you've got ships maneuvering under aerial attack. You can invoke the possibility of the Mikuma-Mogami event, along with the catastrophic arrival of a USN CV based strike while your CVs CAP are dealing with the Midway strike.

Case (c) Strike Midway with a/c. Now you're simultaneously managing CAP, trying to suppress Midway, and dealing with inbvound USN strikes.

Decision 1a is the same as decision 1c except that, since you're not 24 miles from Midway, there is a prayer that your TF will go undetected long enough to destroy everything on Midway and reset for potentially intervening USN CVs. That was the historical plan and that too was not going to work because of mission overtasking and American foreknowledge of your operational plan.

[byron13]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl


Now read, very carefully, the specs on the right hand side of the page. Observe that it says "Maximum Range: 1080 statute miles." The F4F wildcat is given a "combat radius of 324 nautical miles." There are numerous independent printed and web site sources that give similar figures, and NO current sources that limit the strike ranges to less than 200 nm.
[:D]

Not sure what the definition of "source" is, but the Naval War College Review printed an article in its Spring 2000 edition that uses the 175 mile combat radius for the TBD and the 200 mile radius for the F4F. Of course, this, in turn, cites to a 1948 study conducted by the Naval War College. I would think a study conducted somewhat contemporaneously with the war would be a fairly accurate statement on real-world operations as opposed to idealized manufacturers' specifications republished fifty years after the fact.

Not that I think this is the official combat radii of these aircraft - just a real world operational rule of thumb. If you want to launch these aircraft in a large, coordinated group from a carrier, the combat radius is reduced. As you've pointed out, this problem may be reduced when launching from Midway.

[tsimmonds]

BTW, as you well know the Chikuma and Mogami collided while dodging air attack. They had a good track record keeping tactical formation in night ops.

Just for the record, it was Mogami and Mikuma that collided, and they were maneuvering to avoid USS Tarpon, a surfaced submarine. The collision happened at 0200 or 0300, something like that, i.e. nighttime.

[mdiehl]

Anybody who says 6BBs and escorts cant manouvre near an island at night, and conduct a bombardment with out collision is talking through his hat. You have just insulted 100 years of Naval proffessionalism in dozens of navies. Me thinks quite a few Captains and Admirals would love to set you straight on that score,
If a Japanese Admiral, or allied Admiral wanted to put his fleet at point X, at moment X, it will happen, and in the middle of a battle as well.
You show little knowledge of how Navies work, you might have read a bit, but you know little.

Are you suggesting that Mikuma and Mogami did in fact NOT collide off of Midway during that engagement? That Nachi and Mogami did in fact NOT collide during the Surigao Strait engagement in 1944? That, indeed, under no circumstances in WW2 did two friendly vessels collide when engage in surface combat or when evading aerial attack?

It is amusing that you seem to think that this sort of thing never happened. Based on your knowledge here I'd say you haven't the first clue about the realities of operating ships. More's the worry if you were ever actually employed in some capacity by the USN, since you seem to think that nothing can ever possibly go wrong when maneuvering at flank speed.

[mdiehl]

Your speculation on what constitutes loaded and max range are false and not based on actual experience nor factual data.

They're based on more data than you've offered. Go back to Denial Land boy, or at least post some facts to support your theory.

[mdiehl]

Not that I think this is the official combat radii of these aircraft - just a real world operational rule of thumb.

That is, I suspect, why the figures differ. That said, it's not as though both sides never launched aircraft at targets that were farther away than their 'safe' operating range. Phillippine Sea for example. And, for that matter, all those IJN strikes from Rabaul to Guadalcanal.

In 1942, CVs seem to have worked with a theoretical upper limit between 200-250 or so miles when attacking enemy CVs.

[Damien Thorn]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
They're based on more data than you've offered. Go back to Denial Land boy, or at least post some facts to support your theory.

"Land boy"? Is that supposed to be some sort of insult? LOL. If you only knew how wrong you were, but I won't waste my time on that subject.

Your idea of the ranges of American planes are not based on any reality at all. Don't look in manuals, look at how they were used in real life. Look at al the battles in WW2 where the US launched Dive-bombers but didn't launch their torpedo-bombers. If the torpedo-bombers had anywhere NEAR the ranges you seem to think they do why didn't they launch too?

[mdiehl]

I'll clarify: 'Denial Land, boy.' Hope the comma helps.

I'll flip your argument back at you. If you think that the IJN could have dashed a bombardment TF in to Midway they'd have tried it? Do you think that there was maybe a reason why they decided not to do so?

If you think that it is a reasonable plan to count on bombardment shutting down airbases, where are all the examples that demonstrate that it could be done?

[mdiehl]

It's really a shame for the Japanese that they did not have any operational planners with the same capability as the wits lurking here. If only they'd known that you can just pretend that a major airbase operating within strike range of your ships is no threat because you can, with the wave of a wand, time the arrival of a bombardment TF such that the aircraft based there will not get an opportunity to attack you. If only they'd known that CVs could simply ignore land bases.

Heck, hard to figure out why the Japanese didn't invade Hawaii. All they had to do was park their ships 201 miles from the Hawaiian Islands and await nightfall. Then they could have suppressed every airfield on Oahu AND sunk all the ships in Pearl Harbor while simultaneously looking up from the telecast of Yamato's latest bridge game long enough to crush any USN CVs that might stumble into your Zone O Death.