Actually they only yanked one division. It just so happened to be his best one. The 48th, which was slated to be used in the invasion of Java. They left him with 16th Div. Which was reinforced with the 65th Brigade. This unit was ment to be an occupation force only and really wasnt considered combat ready. It suffered badly in the Battaan attacks. In their defense they thought they were facing a few scattered remnants on Battaan. They had no idea so many troops had withdrawn there. After repeated failures to breach the Battaan line. The high command eventually reinforced Homma with the 4th Division (poor quality) and the 21 independent Bgd.(high quality). Even so, they suffered high casulties before they eventually overcame the defenders more defeated by starvation and sickness than the Japanese attacks.Originally posted by Chiteng:
Actually Homma wasnt too happy with the Japanese
High Command. They Yanked two of his frontline divisions from him and left him actually outnumbered if Mac had known.
MacAurthur
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
Yeah I agree. Especially when you compare it to the very poor showing of Brits in Malya. Who had a lot more going for them than Mac had in the PI.Originally posted by Von Rom:
TIMJOT:
Yes, I noticed you mentioned a few of the points I covered, but I just wanted to write it all out in one place <img src="smile.gif" border="0">
I agree with you, after a shakey start, MacArthur and the brave soldiers on PI acquited themselves well.
Even the Japanese commander respnsible for
invading the PI specifically praises MacArthur for his orderly, and strategic withdrawl to bataan. . .
It says a lot when your enemy praises you <img src="smile.gif" border="0">
Just been having a bit of a giggle, keenly seeing just how much wind you guys can blow up each others arse about how well the forces did in PI...
Its all horse****, the bottom line is they lost. By the way, how well did the 15000 defenders of corrigidor do once the landings on that island happened?
We have the same problem here in Australia, all this talk about how well we did in Singapore.
The bottom line is we lost. Through some bad command decisions and a lack of will on the part of the british government.
It annoys me that we glorify defeats of this sort of magnitude when, for the senior commanders at least, the opposite should be true.
The individual or collective (ie unit by unit) acts of heroism & tenacity that did occur should be applauded.
But the people who let it get to that stage (such as Macarthur, Percival & even Blamey for Kokoda later in the war) should not be revered or held above their failure!
I am an ex serviceman and I know of the Mission vs man conflict. Macarthur was a Joke. He shouldve stayed and gone down with his men.
Its all horse****, the bottom line is they lost. By the way, how well did the 15000 defenders of corrigidor do once the landings on that island happened?
We have the same problem here in Australia, all this talk about how well we did in Singapore.
The bottom line is we lost. Through some bad command decisions and a lack of will on the part of the british government.
It annoys me that we glorify defeats of this sort of magnitude when, for the senior commanders at least, the opposite should be true.
The individual or collective (ie unit by unit) acts of heroism & tenacity that did occur should be applauded.
But the people who let it get to that stage (such as Macarthur, Percival & even Blamey for Kokoda later in the war) should not be revered or held above their failure!
I am an ex serviceman and I know of the Mission vs man conflict. Macarthur was a Joke. He shouldve stayed and gone down with his men.
In the End, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
Well, Stubby. I wasnt praising Mac for the defense of the PI, but I was praising the soldiers under him doing the fighting. They held out for close to 6 months fighting off attack after attack . They were reduced to living on stavation rations and had little or no medincinces to fight off malaria and other tropical diseases. They did this while completely being cut off from the outside world and with no hope of relief.Originally posted by Stubby:
Just been having a bit of a giggle, keenly seeing just how much wind you guys can blow up each others arse about how well the forces did in PI...
Its all horse****, the bottom line is they lost. By the way, how well did the 15000 defenders of corrigidor do once the landings on that island happened?
We have the same problem here in Australia, all this talk about how well we did in Singapore.
The bottom line is we lost. Through some bad command decisions and a lack of will on the part of the british government.
It annoys me that we glorify defeats of this sort of magnitude when, for the senior commanders at least, the opposite should be true.
The individual or collective (ie unit by unit) acts of heroism & tenacity that did occur should be applauded.
But the people who let it get to that stage (such as Macarthur, Percival & even Blamey for Kokoda later in the war) should not be revered or held above their failure!
I am an ex serviceman and I know of the Mission vs man conflict. Macarthur was a Joke. He shouldve stayed and gone down with his men.
On the other hand. I dont see how anyone could say that anyone did well in Singapore. You are right Percival and the rest of the British high command were a complete joke. However you Aussies dont get a free pass. Your Gen. Gordon Bennet was a Coward and a deserter that should have been shot. You wont like this but, a large portion of the blame for the fall of Singapore can be attributed by the mass desertions of the Austrailian 8th Div. Many of whom went on a murdering, looting, and rapeing rampage through Singapore. It was this and not the British fairly tale of captured water supply that compelled Percival to surrender.
By the way. Corrigedor is a rock that is less than a mile wide at is widest and about 2 miles long. Of the 15,000 you mention only a few thousand were combat troops. The Japanese suffered severe calsualties during the landings, and were only able to make headway when they put ashore some tanks. The defenders had no AT guns and could do nothing to stop them despite numerous heroic acts. Besides contiunued fighting was pointless there was no relief forthcomming. What did you expect for them to do? Hold out until the fall 1944?????
One example of 'why' I detest Mac.
One the day war broke out, we can assume that
time was vital? Would you say that was correct?
Mac spent 3 hours signing his stock proxies
and giving them to a trusted freind to vote for him. At the end of the war, Mac had no worries concerning money. I suspect that his FIRST duty
was to the men of his command, not his pocket.
One the day war broke out, we can assume that
time was vital? Would you say that was correct?
Mac spent 3 hours signing his stock proxies
and giving them to a trusted freind to vote for him. At the end of the war, Mac had no worries concerning money. I suspect that his FIRST duty
was to the men of his command, not his pocket.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Cant say I ever heard that one before. Care to site a source? If its true, I would say that it would constistute a deraliction of duty. I suspect however that its a least an exageration. Three hours seems a bit much to sign proxies. I mean, how many did he have?Originally posted by Chiteng:
One example of 'why' I detest Mac.
One the day war broke out, we can assume that
time was vital? Would you say that was correct?
Mac spent 3 hours signing his stock proxies
and giving them to a trusted freind to vote for him. At the end of the war, Mac had no worries concerning money. I suspect that his FIRST duty
was to the men of his command, not his pocket.
"Of the 15,000 you mention only a few thousand were combat troops."
I’m sorry Timjot, are we only talking about combat troops?
So, of the Australians with their total battle casualties of 1789 dead & 1306 wounded (from the whole campaign) was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
Before you answer that, I’ll give you a few details to get you on your way:
At 23rd Dec 41, Australia made up 20% of a total Commonwealth force of 86,895 troops.
The Japanese force has been published at a number of different figures, ranging between 125,400 and 110,000 consisting 80,000 combat troops and 30,000 line of communication troops (be fair, lets just say 80,000. The comms troops probably didn’t see any action anyway).
Total Commonwealth battle casualties were about 8,700. Australians made up 35% of that.
The Japanese suffered 10,000 casualties in just over 2 months of fighting.
Fighting in the Campaign resulted in two of the 7 Australian battalion commanders being killed in action (one received a VC posthumously).
I cannot rightly comment on the performance (there were great ones) or otherwise of the other Commonwealth soldiers in the Campaign, that is for their people to comment on. You know my opinion of the Generals.
As far as Bennett goes, he was totally in the wrong, but we don’t shoot deserters in this country, never have (hopefully never will). But, nor do we shuttle them out on PT boats (I don’t care if God himself told Macarthur to get out, you don’t leave your men).
Finally. Yes, you did pass the subject “Singapore, the fall 101”, the desertion of the 3000 or so totally untrained re-enforcements from the front lines did indeed have a large part in accelerating the fall of Singapore island only. (Our armies darkest hour).
Strategically, the campaign was already fought and lost on the Malayan Peninsula.
But, they (the untrained recruits) should not have been brought in to fill the 50% losses of the 6 battalions anyway.
Last minute re-enforcements should be trained units. (Such as the the 2/4, which arrived just two weeks before the end to bring the total Australian combat force to 7 battalions). Sodding Australian General staff again!!!!!!!!
So, I will remind you of the question again. Was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or, the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
Every one of these men experienced their own Bataan.
I’m sorry Timjot, are we only talking about combat troops?
So, of the Australians with their total battle casualties of 1789 dead & 1306 wounded (from the whole campaign) was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
Before you answer that, I’ll give you a few details to get you on your way:
At 23rd Dec 41, Australia made up 20% of a total Commonwealth force of 86,895 troops.
The Japanese force has been published at a number of different figures, ranging between 125,400 and 110,000 consisting 80,000 combat troops and 30,000 line of communication troops (be fair, lets just say 80,000. The comms troops probably didn’t see any action anyway).
Total Commonwealth battle casualties were about 8,700. Australians made up 35% of that.
The Japanese suffered 10,000 casualties in just over 2 months of fighting.
Fighting in the Campaign resulted in two of the 7 Australian battalion commanders being killed in action (one received a VC posthumously).
I cannot rightly comment on the performance (there were great ones) or otherwise of the other Commonwealth soldiers in the Campaign, that is for their people to comment on. You know my opinion of the Generals.
As far as Bennett goes, he was totally in the wrong, but we don’t shoot deserters in this country, never have (hopefully never will). But, nor do we shuttle them out on PT boats (I don’t care if God himself told Macarthur to get out, you don’t leave your men).
Finally. Yes, you did pass the subject “Singapore, the fall 101”, the desertion of the 3000 or so totally untrained re-enforcements from the front lines did indeed have a large part in accelerating the fall of Singapore island only. (Our armies darkest hour).
Strategically, the campaign was already fought and lost on the Malayan Peninsula.
But, they (the untrained recruits) should not have been brought in to fill the 50% losses of the 6 battalions anyway.
Last minute re-enforcements should be trained units. (Such as the the 2/4, which arrived just two weeks before the end to bring the total Australian combat force to 7 battalions). Sodding Australian General staff again!!!!!!!!
So, I will remind you of the question again. Was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or, the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
Every one of these men experienced their own Bataan.
In the End, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
Well, God had no authority over MacArthur. Roosevelt did. When a US President gives an order to a U.S. general (to advance, retreat, evacuate, or whatever) the general darned well better obey orders. I, for one, do not fault Mac for obeying orders in 1942. Whether it did then or does now sit well with the rank and file is immaterial.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Stubby
First some facts; According to the official history of the "Australian Medical Services" The total caulties of the AIF up to the surrender on Feb.15th
Killed in action = 406
Died of wounds = 111
Missing = 1919
Wounded = 1364
First of all Stubby, before you take this personally. I was not belittling Australians as soldiers. The stellar combat records of the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions speak for themselves. It was you were unfairly belittle the soldiers of Corrigedore.So, of the Australians with their total battle casualties of 1789 dead & 1306 wounded (from the whole campaign) was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
First some facts; According to the official history of the "Australian Medical Services" The total caulties of the AIF up to the surrender on Feb.15th
Killed in action = 406
Died of wounds = 111
Missing = 1919
Wounded = 1364
Stubby
Actually the Austrailians may have made up 20% of the total commonwealth force. However this number is scewed becuase it includes large number of Fortress troops and Militias that so little or no actual combat. The principle combat formations were the 8th Aus. Div., the 9th and 11 Indian. Divisions. So in reality the Austrailians made over 30% of the force engaged in combat. Which is perfectly in line with your 35% calualty figure.At 23rd Dec 41, Australia made up 20% of a total Commonwealth force of 86,895 troops.
Stubby
You may not shoot deserters or shuttle commanders that have been ordered to leave by there leaders, but I guess you do desert you men on the eve of capitualation without the benefit of orders or permision by stoling aboard a Sanpan. Planning this by the way days before the capitualtion and after giving final orders to your men to stand their ground while you save yourself. Because thats exactly what Gordon Bennet commander Austrailian forces in Malaya did.
Mac was first asked (which he refused) then ordered by his commander and chief to leave. Even so he delayed his departure as long as possible and then only left under the pretex that he was to organize a relief force in Australia. Which he was led to believe was substantialAs far as Bennett goes, he was totally in the wrong, but we don’t shoot deserters in this country, never have (hopefully never will). But, nor do we shuttle them out on PT boats (I don’t care if God himself told Macarthur to get out, you don’t leave your men).
You may not shoot deserters or shuttle commanders that have been ordered to leave by there leaders, but I guess you do desert you men on the eve of capitualation without the benefit of orders or permision by stoling aboard a Sanpan. Planning this by the way days before the capitualtion and after giving final orders to your men to stand their ground while you save yourself. Because thats exactly what Gordon Bennet commander Austrailian forces in Malaya did.
First some more facts. There were 1900 totally untrained recruits not 3000. Yes it was wrong to send them there and ultimately the Australian government and high command must be held responsible. However these raw recruits alone dont totally explain away the large numbers of Australian deserters. Close to 80% by some reports.Finally. Yes, you did pass the subject “Singapore, the fall 101”, the desertion of the 3000 or so totally untrained re-enforcements from the front lines did indeed have a large part in accelerating the fall of Singapore island only. (Our armies darkest hour).
You might as well say that strategically that the campaign in the Philipines was lost at the succesful landings at Linguyan Gulf. Unlike the PI however there were strategic reasons to continue the fight and hold Singapore.Strategically, the campaign was already fought and lost on the Malayan Peninsula.
But, they (the untrained recruits) should not have been brought in to fill the 50% losses of the 6 battalions anyway.
Last minute re-enforcements should be trained units. (Such as the the 2/4, which arrived just two weeks before the end to bring the total Australian combat force to 7 battalions). Sodding Australian General staff again!!!!!!!!
One; you deny the enemy the use of the naval base and superb port.
Two; you deny the Japanese safe passage through the straights of Malacca to the Indian ocean.
Three; you buy time for preparing the defence of the DIE and the so called Malaya Barrier. Considered by the high command as a conerstone of the defence of Australia.
Four; unlike the PI, Singapore and Malaya were never cut off. It continued to recieve supplies and reinforcements right up to the end. In fact unlike the defenders of Battaan and Corrigedor there were strong forces in route including the 6th and 7th Aus.Divs. The 7th Armored Bgd. and substantial Airforces that might very well have tipped the balance back in their favor. No such relief force was forthcomming to PI defenders. Yet they battled on month after month with no hope of salvation.
By the way only 3 out of the 6 Bns recieved subtantial number of those raw recruits. Before you bemoan the poor quality and training of those troops. I should point out that 80% of Macs troops were Philipino Reservest. With little or now training at all. They were armed (if at all) with old WWI era springfields. Most had neither shoes or helmets and some had no uniforms what so ever. Yet there was suprisingly low desertion rate after the intitial shock of the Japanese attack and they settled into the defence of Battaan.So, I will remind you of the question again. Was it just the efforts of the 7 Australian Battalions and their 2 field regiments of artillery that you were belittling or, the 8th Divsion and its support units as a whole?
You say I am belittling the 8th Div. Well let me just say this. From all accounts it performed admirably in early actions on the mainland. However once the retreat commenced it lost all cohesion and dicipline. You can blame this as a reflection of poor leadership and I would agree. however it doesnt change the fact that it did not aquit itself well in the defence of Singapore. If you are going to put all the responsiblty on the leadership for the poor performance under duress. Then conversely you have to credit the leadership in the PI for the comparatively good showing of its troops under even more duress.
Stubby
Finally, just so there is no hard feelings. Men of the 8th div. earned a VC, one DSO, 4 Military crosses, a Distinguish conduct medal and four military medals. So certainly their were individual deeds of valor and heroics in the best traditions of the AIF.Fighting in the Campaign resulted in two of the 7 Australian battalion commanders being killed in action (one received a VC posthumously).
Regarding the defence of the Philippines in 1941-42.
MacArthur believed that his Philippino reservists were able to hold off a strong Japanese landing at Linguayan.
Only arund 1/3 of these soldiers had ever fired a gun, and those that did, only fired off a few rounds.
http://www.freeport-tech.com/WWII/013_usa/philippines/_usaffe.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/index.html
Divisions were composed of only 7000 men. Japanese Divisions were of 13 000. Wherever the Japanese landed (with the 48th Division) they would be of a superior force.
These divisions had virtually no artillery.
So MacArthur believed that his under-equipped, ill trained soldiers could defend a flat plain against a superior force? This was just bad planning. He changed his plan at the last minute, and never adequately prepared a contingency plan. The only real formation was the Philippine (12th) Division, of 1 regiment US troops, 2 regiments Philippine Scouts. These were professional soldiers, but still saw no service. There were not comitted until the later stages of the Battle of Bataan.
The main problem experienced by the Americo-Philippino forces was by the time of capitulation, they were so undernourished (due to no food or medical supplies) that a greater number died on the Death March that would had they have been adequately supplied. MacArthur refused to set aside enough transport to move the stockpiles from Clark Field and Fort Doneldson to their original depots in the Bataan peninsula. MacArthur even refused to confescate stockpiles from private storage, and downdressed officers who proposed such actions. MacArthur ordered Bataan defended to the last man, and was furious with General King (commander of Philippine forces on Bataan after Wainwright took over command at Corregidor) when he finally surrendered at Bataan when the Japanese broke through the last defensive perimeter.
He was disliked by many soldiers on Bataan (Dougout Doug), since, unlike during the later part of the war, he NEVER toured the front, and led from behind.
The defeat WAS inevitable, but it could have been less deadly to the defenders.
In regards to the loss of the Air Force. MacArthur REFUSED to give Bereton permission to launch an attack on Formosa. The best thing Bereton could do was to keep the bombers in the air (which they were all morning, and landed only to refuel and eat lunch, which was the wrong time!). In fact, had they launched a B-17 attack on Formosan fields, the result probably would have been that the Japanese suffered horrendous casualties because an early morning fog cancelled actions (and aircraft were on the ground, even after the fog cleared, which was about the time the planned strike would have arrived!).
Corregidor was defended by 2 battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment, plus 2000 soldiers who escaped from Bataan. The remaining 10 000 were rear-area troops and Coastal Artillery troops. There WERE anti-tank guns, 37mm in fact, fully capable of taking out Light Tanks. However, Wainwrigt had enough sense to realize that holding out will only result in the garrison getting weaker and weaker, and more deaths and wanted to avoid a repeat of the Bataan death march.
I saw a documentary on the Canadian History channel comparing what happened to Admiral Kimmel and General MacArthur, which directly stated that MacArthur refused to take any action for 10 critical hours, even after repeated requests by his air and land commanders to do something! There was nothing more that Bereton could do, other than sending the strike out without permission! Going directly against the order of his direct commander!
Leaving Corregidor, to me, is not an issue, neither was Bennett leaving Singapore an issue. These Generals had gained VALUABLE combat experience (as seen in MacArthur since it was not until the 1950's when he repeated his errors of overconfidence in his troops, and severely underating his opponents). It is a pitty Bennett was not offered a chance to use his knowledge in the battles of New Guinea.
80% desertion of the Australian 8th Division? I think not. This has been a comon misconception. Many people judged that any soldier seen with the tilly hat was an Australian soldier. This is not true. Most British soldiers in the theatre were issued this hat in Malaya. There were many British battalions in the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades. These were not professional first line troops. The Australians and the British 18th Division were the best units in the field. The Australians had 2 VERY understrength Brigades, which during the time of the Singapore landings was slated to defend an area that only 2 full divisions could. Chances are, most of the deserters seen were from the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades (which saw action only late in the battle, and were very green), or from the remnants of the British battalions of the 11th and 9th Indian Divisions.
50 000 Indian soldiers
30 000 British soldiers
15 000 Australian soldiers
Only about 50% of the British soldiers who were in the theatre were a part of the 18th Division, the remaining 15 000 were in the Malayan Brigades and Indian Divisions.
MacArthur believed that his Philippino reservists were able to hold off a strong Japanese landing at Linguayan.
Only arund 1/3 of these soldiers had ever fired a gun, and those that did, only fired off a few rounds.
http://www.freeport-tech.com/WWII/013_usa/philippines/_usaffe.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/index.html
Divisions were composed of only 7000 men. Japanese Divisions were of 13 000. Wherever the Japanese landed (with the 48th Division) they would be of a superior force.
These divisions had virtually no artillery.
So MacArthur believed that his under-equipped, ill trained soldiers could defend a flat plain against a superior force? This was just bad planning. He changed his plan at the last minute, and never adequately prepared a contingency plan. The only real formation was the Philippine (12th) Division, of 1 regiment US troops, 2 regiments Philippine Scouts. These were professional soldiers, but still saw no service. There were not comitted until the later stages of the Battle of Bataan.
The main problem experienced by the Americo-Philippino forces was by the time of capitulation, they were so undernourished (due to no food or medical supplies) that a greater number died on the Death March that would had they have been adequately supplied. MacArthur refused to set aside enough transport to move the stockpiles from Clark Field and Fort Doneldson to their original depots in the Bataan peninsula. MacArthur even refused to confescate stockpiles from private storage, and downdressed officers who proposed such actions. MacArthur ordered Bataan defended to the last man, and was furious with General King (commander of Philippine forces on Bataan after Wainwright took over command at Corregidor) when he finally surrendered at Bataan when the Japanese broke through the last defensive perimeter.
He was disliked by many soldiers on Bataan (Dougout Doug), since, unlike during the later part of the war, he NEVER toured the front, and led from behind.
The defeat WAS inevitable, but it could have been less deadly to the defenders.
In regards to the loss of the Air Force. MacArthur REFUSED to give Bereton permission to launch an attack on Formosa. The best thing Bereton could do was to keep the bombers in the air (which they were all morning, and landed only to refuel and eat lunch, which was the wrong time!). In fact, had they launched a B-17 attack on Formosan fields, the result probably would have been that the Japanese suffered horrendous casualties because an early morning fog cancelled actions (and aircraft were on the ground, even after the fog cleared, which was about the time the planned strike would have arrived!).
Corregidor was defended by 2 battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment, plus 2000 soldiers who escaped from Bataan. The remaining 10 000 were rear-area troops and Coastal Artillery troops. There WERE anti-tank guns, 37mm in fact, fully capable of taking out Light Tanks. However, Wainwrigt had enough sense to realize that holding out will only result in the garrison getting weaker and weaker, and more deaths and wanted to avoid a repeat of the Bataan death march.
I saw a documentary on the Canadian History channel comparing what happened to Admiral Kimmel and General MacArthur, which directly stated that MacArthur refused to take any action for 10 critical hours, even after repeated requests by his air and land commanders to do something! There was nothing more that Bereton could do, other than sending the strike out without permission! Going directly against the order of his direct commander!
Leaving Corregidor, to me, is not an issue, neither was Bennett leaving Singapore an issue. These Generals had gained VALUABLE combat experience (as seen in MacArthur since it was not until the 1950's when he repeated his errors of overconfidence in his troops, and severely underating his opponents). It is a pitty Bennett was not offered a chance to use his knowledge in the battles of New Guinea.
80% desertion of the Australian 8th Division? I think not. This has been a comon misconception. Many people judged that any soldier seen with the tilly hat was an Australian soldier. This is not true. Most British soldiers in the theatre were issued this hat in Malaya. There were many British battalions in the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades. These were not professional first line troops. The Australians and the British 18th Division were the best units in the field. The Australians had 2 VERY understrength Brigades, which during the time of the Singapore landings was slated to defend an area that only 2 full divisions could. Chances are, most of the deserters seen were from the 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades (which saw action only late in the battle, and were very green), or from the remnants of the British battalions of the 11th and 9th Indian Divisions.
50 000 Indian soldiers
30 000 British soldiers
15 000 Australian soldiers
Only about 50% of the British soldiers who were in the theatre were a part of the 18th Division, the remaining 15 000 were in the Malayan Brigades and Indian Divisions.
What’s this “just to show there’s no hard feelings” crap. Try not to be such a condescending prick Timjot.
A Few “facts” (you love that word don’t you).
1. Why oh why, after 6 months of the Bataan defenders “Repulsing attack after attack” as you so dramatically put it, did the Japanese suffer only 10,000 casualties? (The same amount they suffered during just two months of fighting in the Malayan Campaign).
2. Through this whole thread you have again been dramatically stating how little the Philippine defenders fought with. Well, they may not have had helmets, but apparently even after they had already lost some materials during the retreat to Bataan peninsula they managed to “find” just less than 200 artillery pieces and 3 (weak) divisions to defend the fortified “Abucay line”.
3. At Singapore Island Percival had 266 field artillery pieces and a whole lot of coastal guns that were useless because they had little or no HE ammunition. (Hmmm 66 pieces, not a lot). Also note the word, “fortified line”, something the blokes in Malaya never had.
Question time;
Could it be that the reason the Bataan defenders did last so long is that they were only facing 10,000 middle aged reservists once the 48th Japanese Division had pulled out after the retreat to Bataan?
Footnote; No doubt you already know this one Timjot, but just for average punter out there, the Commonwealth forces were facing 80,000 Japanese including their best Division “the Imperial Guards”.
The Bataan defenders went down within 3 days once the Japanese had got re-enforcements and went on the offensive again. Its seems that the Japanese had bigger fish to fry than to bother to clean up Bataan Peninsula in a hurry.
To say that the defenders of the Philippines performed any better or worse than the defenders of Malaya just shows your IGNORANCE. Individuals & unit-by-unit courage was amply shown in both campaigns. Both Campaigns had different features and in the end they both lost (which is, in the end, the real acid test of success isn’t it).
I tried to express this to you in earlier posts but I guess subtlety isn’t your strong point.
I’m Finished with this crap. Bring on UV.
A Few “facts” (you love that word don’t you).
1. Why oh why, after 6 months of the Bataan defenders “Repulsing attack after attack” as you so dramatically put it, did the Japanese suffer only 10,000 casualties? (The same amount they suffered during just two months of fighting in the Malayan Campaign).
2. Through this whole thread you have again been dramatically stating how little the Philippine defenders fought with. Well, they may not have had helmets, but apparently even after they had already lost some materials during the retreat to Bataan peninsula they managed to “find” just less than 200 artillery pieces and 3 (weak) divisions to defend the fortified “Abucay line”.
3. At Singapore Island Percival had 266 field artillery pieces and a whole lot of coastal guns that were useless because they had little or no HE ammunition. (Hmmm 66 pieces, not a lot). Also note the word, “fortified line”, something the blokes in Malaya never had.
Question time;
Could it be that the reason the Bataan defenders did last so long is that they were only facing 10,000 middle aged reservists once the 48th Japanese Division had pulled out after the retreat to Bataan?
Footnote; No doubt you already know this one Timjot, but just for average punter out there, the Commonwealth forces were facing 80,000 Japanese including their best Division “the Imperial Guards”.
The Bataan defenders went down within 3 days once the Japanese had got re-enforcements and went on the offensive again. Its seems that the Japanese had bigger fish to fry than to bother to clean up Bataan Peninsula in a hurry.
To say that the defenders of the Philippines performed any better or worse than the defenders of Malaya just shows your IGNORANCE. Individuals & unit-by-unit courage was amply shown in both campaigns. Both Campaigns had different features and in the end they both lost (which is, in the end, the real acid test of success isn’t it).
I tried to express this to you in earlier posts but I guess subtlety isn’t your strong point.
I’m Finished with this crap. Bring on UV.
In the End, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
- Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968)
"I’m Finished with this crap."
One could only hope. Timjot did not deserve all that. Forgive me if I don't start citing you as a credible source on the PI and Malay campaigns in 1942.
One could only hope. Timjot did not deserve all that. Forgive me if I don't start citing you as a credible source on the PI and Malay campaigns in 1942.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
I'm not getting in the middle of this one, but one thing gets me...
What the hell was wrong with the British Beaurau of Ordnance in that they consistently failed to preceive the need for HE ammunition for their guns?
The 2pdr (40mm) tank gun never did get an HE round, while it was not until late 1942 that the 6pdr (57mm??) got one. Their 17pdr originally didn't have an HE roundeither, and the large 15 inch fortress guns at Singapore also had NO HE rounds. Let's see the results were british tanks mauled in the desert by infantry and AT guns that they could have taken out had they the proper ammunition and the worst defeat in British history bpartly because the 15" guns (which COULD point in the right direction) could only make small holes in the ground....
What was wrong with this group in London? Maybe they were smoking the same stuff as the US Navy Torpedo Ordnance board???
What the hell was wrong with the British Beaurau of Ordnance in that they consistently failed to preceive the need for HE ammunition for their guns?
The 2pdr (40mm) tank gun never did get an HE round, while it was not until late 1942 that the 6pdr (57mm??) got one. Their 17pdr originally didn't have an HE roundeither, and the large 15 inch fortress guns at Singapore also had NO HE rounds. Let's see the results were british tanks mauled in the desert by infantry and AT guns that they could have taken out had they the proper ammunition and the worst defeat in British history bpartly because the 15" guns (which COULD point in the right direction) could only make small holes in the ground....
What was wrong with this group in London? Maybe they were smoking the same stuff as the US Navy Torpedo Ordnance board???
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...