Relax Snubby . There is no need for name calling, It was not my intent to be condescending. I apologise if you took it that way. I was simply trying to point out that there was nothing personal in this debat and to support your statement that there were individual acts of bravery demostrated throughout the campaign.posted February 28, 2002 08:35 AM
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What’s this “just to show there’s no hard feelings” crap. Try not to be such a condescending prick Timjot.
MacAurthur
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
Snubby
Basically; 1 US Rgt., 2 Philipino Scout Rgts with an assortment of adhoc untrained underequiped PA Divisions? (The PA Divisions constituted a strength closer to a regt.)
Against; 1 Japanese Div. and 1 mixed Bgd. later rienforced by another Div and mixed Bgd.
As compared to Malaya
Basically; 4 UK Divisions against 3 IJA Div.
1. Why oh why, after 6 months of the Bataan defenders “Repulsing attack after attack” as you so dramatically put it, did the Japanese suffer only 10,000 casualties? (The same amount they suffered during just two months of fighting in the Malayan Campaign).
Well for one thing the battle for Battan was fought at relatively different scale than Malaya/Singapore.
Basically; 1 US Rgt., 2 Philipino Scout Rgts with an assortment of adhoc untrained underequiped PA Divisions? (The PA Divisions constituted a strength closer to a regt.)
Against; 1 Japanese Div. and 1 mixed Bgd. later rienforced by another Div and mixed Bgd.
As compared to Malaya
Basically; 4 UK Divisions against 3 IJA Div.
The Typical PA Div. strength was as follows2. Through this whole thread you have again been dramatically stating how little the Philippine defenders fought with. Well, they may not have had helmets, but apparently even after they had already lost some materials during the retreat to Bataan peninsula they managed to “find” just less than 200 artillery pieces and 3 (weak) divisions to defend the fortified “Abucay line”.
3 Rgts at 2/3 authorized strength
1 Rgt = 14 weeks training
1 Rgt = 4 Weeks training
1 Rgt = No weeks training
WWI Springfields for most men
1 x BAR per Company
8 x 30cal Mg per MG company
2 x 50cal Mg per Rgt.
3 x 3"motors per Rgt.
8 x WWI 75mm guns per Div.
According to the "US Army Center of Military History"; the Artillary strength of the Albucay line as Follows;
I Corps
31 x assorted 75mm and 2.95"inf guns
2 x 155mm Field guns
8 x 75mm SPMs
II Corps
28 x 155mm guns
2 x 155 Howitzers
40+ x 75mm and 2.95 inf guns
Reserve= 2 x 75mm SPM Batterys
Not quite 200 and most were small caliber ineffective infantry guns.
Fortified? There were no prepared defences on Battaan before the withdrawl. What defenses there were, were put up by the men taking up postions in the line.
Would you mind providing me with your references on the above statement?Originally posted by TIMJOT:
However you Aussies dont get a free pass. Many of whom went on a murdering, looting, and rapeing rampage through Singapore. .
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ]</p>
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.
I have to take your word for it because I dont have the exact Arty OOB, but it does seem a little low for what was "typical" for 4 UK Div and a Corps. Your right about the lack of HE shells for the coastal guns (Corregidor had the same problem by the way), but 15" and 9" HE shells were already in route from Ceylon and Mideast. Yet another reason to hold out a little longer.3. At Singapore Island Percival had 266 field artillery pieces and a whole lot of coastal guns that were useless because they had little or no HE ammunition. (Hmmm 66 pieces, not a lot). Also note the word, “fortified line”, something the blokes in Malaya never had.
RE fortified line; Yeah it was inexcusable, Percival had 2 months to fortify the landward side of Singapore, but refused to do so on the grounds it would be bad for moral. How about it just being prudent? That being said they did have 8 days from the withdrawl across the causway and the Japanese attack to dig in and prepare defences. On the other hand US forces completed the withdrawl to Battaan on Jan 7th, while Homma luanched his first attack on the 9th. Just 2 days to dig in.
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>
Homma's final attacked commensed on April 3rd, Battaan surredered April 9th. Now I have never been that good at math, but I think that makes 6 days. That was after 3 months of Siege and starvation.The Bataan defenders went down within 3 days once the Japanese had got re-enforcements and went on the offensive again. Its seems that the Japanese had bigger fish to fry than to bother to clean up Bataan Peninsula in a hurry.
You also completely ignore that Homma first attack started on 9th Jan. and lasted to 22nd Jan. He then tried from 22nd Jan to Feb 7th to outflank the Albucay line with a series of amphibious assualts in the rear. All these assualts were beaten off. Homma overlaped these attacks with his second attack on the Albucay line on Jan 26th to Feb 16th.
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>
The US forces in Bataan could hold out longer because the Japanese soldiers were in just as a pathetic condition as the Philippine defenders. The region is not known for its transportation network, and is VERY hilly. When the Japanese finally did get fresh troops (since theirs were just as worn out as the US troops) they were able to crack the defences. The Japanese broke through the first line of defence because the US commanders did not fortify Mt Natib (around 1/4 of their front!) and the Japanese just walked through (January 1941). The reason that it took so long (in April) was that there was relatively few roads leading from the 2nd Defensive Line to the main town of Mariveles in the South. Simple logistics of a military advance caused them to move so slow.
Malaya, for example, was much more heavily developed, especially when it came down to transportation networks. Supplies could be easily brought to the front line in Malaya.
The Indian Divisions in Malaya had only 2 of the established 3 Artillery Battalions, of which were understrength. The 8th Division had only 2 Artillery Battalions, one was originally equipped with 3" mortors, then hastily fitted with 25 Pounders. The 18th Division lost most of its artillery when one of its transports was sunk (the supply lines were FAR from open, and had to face a gauntlet of enemy aircraft and ships!). Sure, European British divisions had 72 artillery pieces, but remember, Malaya was a neglected theatre until January 1942, and by that time not much was around to send to it.
The Fighting quality of the troops is about equal. Entire Philippine Battalions vanished during their hasty retreat from their coastal positions to Bataan. The army on Luzon started off with 100 000 men under arms, and started its defence of Bataan with 80 000. The only way to truely judge the quality of these troops is to mark their performance when BOTH sides were fully supplied. This only occurred at the opening stages, where the 48th Division easily marched from Linguayan to Manila when it was up against the fully supplied and equipped Philippine and Philppine scout formations of I Corps. After this, both sides were short of supplies which made ANY offensive actions impossible. When the Japanese finally did recieve supplies and fresh troops they were able to fairly easily overcome II Corps and take the peninsula.
Corregidor fell in a day, and most casualties occurred because of losses in transporting the troops across to the island (due primarily to the guns of Fort Drum!), not on the island itself. Troops were steadily moving toward the Malinta Tunnel and the tanks landed only aided in the advance. The US had enough strength for one counter attack, which gained back some ground, but used up their entire strategic reserve.
Singapore Island fell primarily due to a miscommunication in orders which ended up in the Northern forces to give up the water reseviors which caused Percival to think about Surrendering to save the 1 000 000 civilians in Singapore from a repeat of Stalingrad. Forces were in relatively good order, and even the Malayan Brigades were holding their own.
Philippines...
16th Division (landed at Legaspi) War experience in China since 1939
48th Division (removed for action in the East Indies in January) War experience in China since 1938
65th Brigade - Reservists
4th Division - Reservists (Home Island garrison division)
Malaya
5th Division - war experience in China since 1937
18th Division - war experience in China since 1937
2nd Guards Division - war experience in China since 1937
So the forces that Japan sent to attack the Philippines were much less experienced, or did not stay long enough then those that fought during the entire Malayan campaign.
Also, most of the IJNAF and IJAAF aircraft were removed from the Philippines after the capture of Manila for action in the East Indies. IJNAF and IJAAF groups remained in the Malayan campaign throughout the entire period.
So, defending troops were of relatively the same poor quality, along with the same lack of heavy equipment (the US had 100 tanks, the British had 12). The British had about 80 000 troops maximum on the field at one time, the US had 100 000. The Japanese were usually outnumbered 3:4 in Malaya, but usually 1:2 in the Philippines. The Japanese also had high numbers of aircraft to call upon in Malaya, but were stripped of their air support in the Philippines. It is not possible to say that the troops in the Philippines were better, primarily because they never faced the same onslaught that the British experienced, nor were they up against as formidable a force.
Malaya, for example, was much more heavily developed, especially when it came down to transportation networks. Supplies could be easily brought to the front line in Malaya.
The Indian Divisions in Malaya had only 2 of the established 3 Artillery Battalions, of which were understrength. The 8th Division had only 2 Artillery Battalions, one was originally equipped with 3" mortors, then hastily fitted with 25 Pounders. The 18th Division lost most of its artillery when one of its transports was sunk (the supply lines were FAR from open, and had to face a gauntlet of enemy aircraft and ships!). Sure, European British divisions had 72 artillery pieces, but remember, Malaya was a neglected theatre until January 1942, and by that time not much was around to send to it.
The Fighting quality of the troops is about equal. Entire Philippine Battalions vanished during their hasty retreat from their coastal positions to Bataan. The army on Luzon started off with 100 000 men under arms, and started its defence of Bataan with 80 000. The only way to truely judge the quality of these troops is to mark their performance when BOTH sides were fully supplied. This only occurred at the opening stages, where the 48th Division easily marched from Linguayan to Manila when it was up against the fully supplied and equipped Philippine and Philppine scout formations of I Corps. After this, both sides were short of supplies which made ANY offensive actions impossible. When the Japanese finally did recieve supplies and fresh troops they were able to fairly easily overcome II Corps and take the peninsula.
Corregidor fell in a day, and most casualties occurred because of losses in transporting the troops across to the island (due primarily to the guns of Fort Drum!), not on the island itself. Troops were steadily moving toward the Malinta Tunnel and the tanks landed only aided in the advance. The US had enough strength for one counter attack, which gained back some ground, but used up their entire strategic reserve.
Singapore Island fell primarily due to a miscommunication in orders which ended up in the Northern forces to give up the water reseviors which caused Percival to think about Surrendering to save the 1 000 000 civilians in Singapore from a repeat of Stalingrad. Forces were in relatively good order, and even the Malayan Brigades were holding their own.
Philippines...
16th Division (landed at Legaspi) War experience in China since 1939
48th Division (removed for action in the East Indies in January) War experience in China since 1938
65th Brigade - Reservists
4th Division - Reservists (Home Island garrison division)
Malaya
5th Division - war experience in China since 1937
18th Division - war experience in China since 1937
2nd Guards Division - war experience in China since 1937
So the forces that Japan sent to attack the Philippines were much less experienced, or did not stay long enough then those that fought during the entire Malayan campaign.
Also, most of the IJNAF and IJAAF aircraft were removed from the Philippines after the capture of Manila for action in the East Indies. IJNAF and IJAAF groups remained in the Malayan campaign throughout the entire period.
So, defending troops were of relatively the same poor quality, along with the same lack of heavy equipment (the US had 100 tanks, the British had 12). The British had about 80 000 troops maximum on the field at one time, the US had 100 000. The Japanese were usually outnumbered 3:4 in Malaya, but usually 1:2 in the Philippines. The Japanese also had high numbers of aircraft to call upon in Malaya, but were stripped of their air support in the Philippines. It is not possible to say that the troops in the Philippines were better, primarily because they never faced the same onslaught that the British experienced, nor were they up against as formidable a force.
The amphibious assaults you are talking about were done by a total of ONE battalion. Hardly a formidable force. Homma also had with him only the 65th Brigade and 4th Division. Both under strength and under supplied. It was not until April when the 16th Division arrived.Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Homma's final attacked commensed on April 3rd, Battaan surredered April 8th. Now I have never been that good at math, but I think that makes 5 days. That was after 3 months of Siege and starvation.
You also completely ignore that Homma first attack started on 9th Jan. and lasted to 22nd Jan. He then tried from 22nd Jan to Feb 7th to outflank the Albucay line with a series of amphibious assualts in the rear. All these assualts were beaten off. Homma overlaped these attacks with his second attack on the Albucay line on Jan 26th to Feb 16th.
Have you looked at a map of the Bataan peninsula? Taking 5 days to march down it against a defending force is fairly fast when you seel the poor state of roads!
The IJA alloted 50 days for the capture of the Philipines. It took 150. They alloted 100 days to conquer Malaya and Singapore. It took 70.To say that the defenders of the Philippines performed any better or worse than the defenders of Malaya just shows your IGNORANCE. Individuals & unit-by-unit courage was amply shown in both campaigns. Both Campaigns had different features and in the end they both lost (which is, in the end, the real acid test of success isn’t it).
Pre-war planning called for forces in the Philipines to hold out for 180 days (Lord knows why since the Navy said it would take 2 years to reach the Islands) They held out for 150 days.
Pre-war planning called for the defence of the Malyan mainland to protect the Naval Base at all cost. Failing this Singapore Island itself was to hold out for at least 3 months to allow time to be sufficiently rienforced. At which time it was to hold out indefinitely. They held out for six days.
Call me ignorant, but who performed better???
Ask yourself this question. What would have constituted winning in the Philipines? Holding out until Dec 1944????
What would constituted winning at Singapore? Well, Wavel reckoned that 6 weeks would have given him enough time to turn the tide.
Hi Mike, I think the US army ordance board were snoking that stuff to, becuase Corregidor had the same problem no HE shells for most its big guns. This particularly puzzling since the army had alwasy planned to withdraw to BattaanOriginally posted by Mike Santos:
I'm not getting in the middle of this one, but one thing gets me...
What the hell was wrong with the British Beaurau of Ordnance in that they consistently failed to preceive the need for HE ammunition for their guns?
The 2pdr (40mm) tank gun never did get an HE round, while it was not until late 1942 that the 6pdr (57mm??) got one. Their 17pdr originally didn't have an HE roundeither, and the large 15 inch fortress guns at Singapore also had NO HE rounds. Let's see the results were british tanks mauled in the desert by infantry and AT guns that they could have taken out had they the proper ammunition and the worst defeat in British history bpartly because the 15" guns (which COULD point in the right direction) could only make small holes in the ground....
What was wrong with this group in London? Maybe they were smoking the same stuff as the US Navy Torpedo Ordnance board???
Well as to shells:
Read len Deightons book about pre-war Britain.
Seriously guys he isnt just a hack.
The book is a REAL eye-opener. It makes you stop
wondering about the disasters and start wondering
how they did so well.
As for shells, the shell production was held up for YEARS in the House of Commons because they
refused to agree WHO would get the contract.
You may recall, there was a depression going on
in the inter-war years. So when war broke out,
the Rodney was still using WWI shells, because
her captain felt that they had at least a chance of working. He only had 1/2 a load also.
His engines needed a MAJOR overhaul which they
NEVER got, for the entire WW2. Make you wonder
how they managed to avoid sinking at the dock.
Read len Deightons book about pre-war Britain.
Seriously guys he isnt just a hack.
The book is a REAL eye-opener. It makes you stop
wondering about the disasters and start wondering
how they did so well.
As for shells, the shell production was held up for YEARS in the House of Commons because they
refused to agree WHO would get the contract.
You may recall, there was a depression going on
in the inter-war years. So when war broke out,
the Rodney was still using WWI shells, because
her captain felt that they had at least a chance of working. He only had 1/2 a load also.
His engines needed a MAJOR overhaul which they
NEVER got, for the entire WW2. Make you wonder
how they managed to avoid sinking at the dock.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Timjot, just in case you miseed my last post, could you please provied me with the source for your statement as quoted aboveOriginally posted by TIMJOT:
a large portion of the blame for the fall of Singapore can be attributed by the mass desertions of the Austrailian 8th Div. Many of whom went on a murdering, looting, and rapeing rampage through Singapore.
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ]</p>
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Raverdave:
Would you mind providing me with your references on the above statement?
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ][/QUOTE
My primary source is "Singapore-The Pregnable Fortress(Elphick)which sites many sources regarding the desertions.Including but not limited the following
"Retreat in the East" Galagher
"Singapore to Colombo" Ingles
"Malay upside down" Kee
"Australians at War" Robertson
"Fall of Singapore" Hall
"Great was the Fall" An RAAF officer
"Escape from Singapore" Gough
"Odd Man Out" Smith
"New Light days of Singapore" Article;Murdoch
Australian and British Official Historian Records
Would you mind providing me with your references on the above statement?
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ][/QUOTE
My primary source is "Singapore-The Pregnable Fortress(Elphick)which sites many sources regarding the desertions.Including but not limited the following
"Retreat in the East" Galagher
"Singapore to Colombo" Ingles
"Malay upside down" Kee
"Australians at War" Robertson
"Fall of Singapore" Hall
"Great was the Fall" An RAAF officer
"Escape from Singapore" Gough
"Odd Man Out" Smith
"New Light days of Singapore" Article;Murdoch
Australian and British Official Historian Records
His plan was made months before and based on forces he was to have by April 42. You are right that in Dec.41 it had little hope of succeeding, but WPO3 offered no hope, only delayed defeat. His biggest mistake was not to commit his best troops the Philipine Div. at linguyan. when 48th Division was at its most vulnerable while landingSo MacArthur believed that his under-equipped, ill trained soldiers could defend a flat plain against a superior force? This was just bad planning. He changed his plan at the last minute, and never adequately prepared a contingency plan. The only real formation was the Philippine (12th) Division, of 1 regiment US troops, 2 regiments Philippine Scouts. These were professional soldiers, but still saw no service. There were not comitted until the later stages of the Battle of Bataan.
True, Macs excuse of Philipino Nuetrality doesnt hold water. However it was hardly decisive. 30 or so B-17s bombing a dozen or so airfields on formosa would have had a negligible effect. How many of those unescorted B-17s would have made it back?In regards to the loss of the Air Force. MacArthur REFUSED to give Bereton permission to launch an attack on Formosa. The best thing Bereton could do was to keep the bombers in the air (which they were all morning, and landed only to refuel and eat lunch, which was the wrong time!). In fact, had they launched a B-17 attack on Formosan fields, the result probably would have been that the Japanese suffered horrendous casualties because an early morning fog cancelled actions (and aircraft were on the ground, even after the fog cleared, which was about the time the planned strike would have arrived!).
Tom, Im curious what your source is, because none of mine make mention of the ATs on Corrigdore. There were some 37mm ATs on the mainland.Corregidor was defended by 2 battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment, plus 2000 soldiers who escaped from Bataan. The remaining 10 000 were rear-area troops and Coastal Artillery troops. There WERE anti-tank guns, 37mm in fact, fully capable of taking out Light Tanks. However, Wainwrigt had enough sense to realize that holding out will only result in the garrison getting weaker and weaker, and more deaths and wanted to avoid a repeat of the Bataan death march.
"The Fall of the Philipines"(Morton) States, Corridores beach defences guns consitsted of
1 x 155mm
23 x 75mm Inf guns
2 x 3" naval guns
Major Tom
Gordon Bennet left in secret without orders or permision. He did this before the surrender and after ordering his men to stand there ground.
Leaving Corregidor, to me, is not an issue, neither was Bennett leaving Singapore an issue. These Generals had gained VALUABLE combat experience (as seen in MacArthur since it was not until the 1950's when he repeated his errors of overconfidence in his troops, and severely underating his opponents). It is a pitty Bennett was not offered a chance to use his knowledge in the battles of New Guinea.
TIMJOT,
"a large portion of the blame for the fall of Singapore can be attributed by the mass desertions of the Austrailian 8th Div."
Sorry but I will have to strongly dispute your statement that a "large portion of the blame" is due to "mass" desertions by the men of the 8th Div. There were no "mass" desertions.
"Many of whom went on a murdering, looting, and rapeing rampage through Singapore."
Rubish...if it is as you state who were the witnesses ? Was anyone ever charged with rape or murder? I will allow that there were isolated cases of such crimes, but no where near the numbers or levels that you infer. There has been a push from the British side of things to dish out the blame for the fall of Singapore to the troops of the 8th Division. If anything it is the British whom must shoulder the main resposiblity for the fall of Singapore. I would like you to have a read of the speech given 0n the 15th of Feb 2002 by Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark from the Memorial's Military History Section :-
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Australian War Memorial. I am Chris Coulthard-Clark from the Military History Section here at the Memorial. It is my pleasure to be giving one of the short Roll of Honour talks that have been planned for delivery throughout this year, to mark the anniversaries of the many significant events of the Second World War which took place during 1942.
Today I will be talking about the surrender of Singapore, which occurred on this day sixty years ago. This event was one of the largest and most dramatic reverses suffered by British forces in the war, or indeed in modern British history, with 130,000 personnel becoming prisoners of the Japanese. Included in this total were 15,000 Australians, so that the impact of the defeat and its consequences for this country were hardly less serious. Understandably, Singapore has become a focus of major historical contention ever since.
It is not my intention to enter into the debate regarding the causes and factors behind the tragedy which Singapore's loss proved to be. My purpose today is primarily to commemorate the efforts of those Australian men and women who were part of this great event - in particular those whose names are recorded on the Roll of Honour as having died as a consequence. This can only be done, however, by providing the historical context which allows us to recall and reflect upon what happened.
When Lieut.-General Arthur Percival, the GOC of British forces in Malaya, ordered his troops to lay down their arms and cease resistance at 8.30 p.m. on 15 February 1942, the Pacific War was just ten weeks old. In that time, Japanese forces had steadily driven the British forces defending the Malay peninsula southwards in a relentless but short campaign, before bottling them up in Singapore Island at the peninsula's southern tip by 31 January. Then, in little more than a further two weeks, the island's defences, too, had been forced to capitulate.
The very speed and apparent ease of the Japanese victory was a major factor in the severe impact that this event had, both in Britain and Australia. For Singapore was supposed to have been an impregnable fortress, and had stood for many years as a potent symbol of British power in South-East Asia. Since the construction of a great naval base at Singapore began in the 1920s, Australian governments had been wedded to this (and the strategy of imperial defence that it encapsulated) as the lynchpin of Australian defence policy also.
In the event, Australians discovered too late that the fundamentals of the policy upon which reliance had been placed were unsound. Britain had promised to provide a fleet for the base, whenever needed to deter Japanese aggression, initially within six weeks although this was extended to three months in 1939. When that situation finally arose in November 1941, a matter of weeks before Japan struck at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere around the Asia-Pacific region, Britain was already heavily committed in Europe and had few ships to spare. What arrived early in December was not a great fleet but a small squadron based around just two capital ships, Prince of Wales and Repulse (one very new, the other quite old). Both big ships were quickly disposed of a few days later by the Japanese in the opening hours of their invasion of Malaya.
Singapore thus remained without the fleet that was its primary rationale. Worse than this, planning for the base had called for roughly between 350 and 550 aircraft to defend it from the air. But this requirement had never been met, either in the number of aircraft provided or effective types. Despite the best efforts of Malaya's aerial defenders, including three squadrons from the Royal Australian Air Force, Singapore found itself at the mercy of an enemy that was vastly superior in air power.
To oppose the three divisions which the Japanese deployed in their campaign against Malaya and Singapore, Percival mainly had an Indian corps of two divisions and the Australian 8th Division under Major-General Gordon Bennett. Ordinarily, military doctrine requires that an attacker needs a superiority of several times the strength of the defender for success to be achievable, but in this case such a margin was unnecessary considering the freedom the Japanese enjoyed in deploying forces and manoeuvring them. The Indian troops were outclassed by the Japanese, and although the Australians, once committed to action in Johore on 14 January, achieved the few allied successes of the campaign (at places such as Gemas, Bakri, Jemaluang and Muar River), the 8th Division was understrength with just two brigades and lost heavily over the course of the next fortnight's fighting.
Once pushed back into Singapore Island, the odds did not materially move in favour of the British forces. To defend the island's northern approaches across the Straits of Johore, Percival had mainly depleted units to cover a wide area. Although a fresh formation, the 18th British Division, was on hand, he chose to allocate the most vulnerable north-western sector to Bennett's two brigades, now reduced to half-strength. Spread too thinly over too wide a front, the Australians were unable to prevent Japanese amphibious landings which were launched on 8 February.
In the week of heavy fighting which followed, the defenders were unable to stem the Japanese advance. By 13 February the British perimeter had shrunk to a 40-kilometre line around Singapore city itself. Water supplies were soon critical, a situation which was not without consequence in a city then containing more than a million civilian residents and refugees, and conditions generally were steadily deteriorating under continuous Japanese ground and aerial bombardment.
It has been claimed in a contemporary British report finally released in 1992 that it was acts of indiscipline by Australian troops in these chaotic circumstances which undermined the British defence and directly contributed to the surrender. Acts of indiscipline there almost certainly were, on the part of some personnel - not all of whom would have been Australian. Such behaviour is typical of many such military situations, so there is also nothing especially unusual in that. Considering the underlying weakness in defensive arrangements, however, there can be no doubt as to where the real cause lay for the loss of Singapore.
Despite having fought bravely for the month leading up to the surrender, sustaining nearly three-quarters of all the battle-deaths suffered by British forces during both the retreat through Malaya and the siege, Australians now experienced to the full the bitterness of the defeat. There are many incidents and stories associated with the fall of Singapore which now have become firmly entrenched in our national history, such as the controversial escape by General Bennett back to Australia, and the sinking of the Vyner Brooke and the Banka Island massacre. There are also many popular myths which continue to this day, such as that regarding the fortress guns famously pointed in the wrong direction (when, in fact, nearly all these weapons did engage the Japanese, although there was a shortage of high explosive ammunition).
Perhaps no aspect arising from the loss of Singapore was more galling than the generally monstrous fate experienced by the Australians who became prisoners there. These men, and a small number of Army nurses, were subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of their captors. Those sent on work gangs for the Burma-Thailand Railway especially suffered from overwork, malnutrion, sickness and bashings from guards. Overall, more than a third of their number did not survive the war.
Singapore's fall was not the end or full extent of the grim situation faced by Australia in early 1942. Within four days of the surrender Japanese forces that had pressed on into the Netherlands East Indies would be bombing Darwin, and over succeeding days Australians in Timor and Java would also be fighting for their lives. But today we especially remember the loss of Singapore as, in many ways, the highwater mark in the dangerous situation which our nation faced during 1942, and we reverently pay our respects to the men and women commemorated here on the Roll of Honour.
The link for this speech ishttp://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.htm
As for your views on Gordon Bennet, I could not agree with you more...at least we agree on one thing eh?
<img src="wink.gif" border="0">
[ March 01, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ]</p>
"a large portion of the blame for the fall of Singapore can be attributed by the mass desertions of the Austrailian 8th Div."
Sorry but I will have to strongly dispute your statement that a "large portion of the blame" is due to "mass" desertions by the men of the 8th Div. There were no "mass" desertions.
"Many of whom went on a murdering, looting, and rapeing rampage through Singapore."
Rubish...if it is as you state who were the witnesses ? Was anyone ever charged with rape or murder? I will allow that there were isolated cases of such crimes, but no where near the numbers or levels that you infer. There has been a push from the British side of things to dish out the blame for the fall of Singapore to the troops of the 8th Division. If anything it is the British whom must shoulder the main resposiblity for the fall of Singapore. I would like you to have a read of the speech given 0n the 15th of Feb 2002 by Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark from the Memorial's Military History Section :-
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the Australian War Memorial. I am Chris Coulthard-Clark from the Military History Section here at the Memorial. It is my pleasure to be giving one of the short Roll of Honour talks that have been planned for delivery throughout this year, to mark the anniversaries of the many significant events of the Second World War which took place during 1942.
Today I will be talking about the surrender of Singapore, which occurred on this day sixty years ago. This event was one of the largest and most dramatic reverses suffered by British forces in the war, or indeed in modern British history, with 130,000 personnel becoming prisoners of the Japanese. Included in this total were 15,000 Australians, so that the impact of the defeat and its consequences for this country were hardly less serious. Understandably, Singapore has become a focus of major historical contention ever since.
It is not my intention to enter into the debate regarding the causes and factors behind the tragedy which Singapore's loss proved to be. My purpose today is primarily to commemorate the efforts of those Australian men and women who were part of this great event - in particular those whose names are recorded on the Roll of Honour as having died as a consequence. This can only be done, however, by providing the historical context which allows us to recall and reflect upon what happened.
When Lieut.-General Arthur Percival, the GOC of British forces in Malaya, ordered his troops to lay down their arms and cease resistance at 8.30 p.m. on 15 February 1942, the Pacific War was just ten weeks old. In that time, Japanese forces had steadily driven the British forces defending the Malay peninsula southwards in a relentless but short campaign, before bottling them up in Singapore Island at the peninsula's southern tip by 31 January. Then, in little more than a further two weeks, the island's defences, too, had been forced to capitulate.
The very speed and apparent ease of the Japanese victory was a major factor in the severe impact that this event had, both in Britain and Australia. For Singapore was supposed to have been an impregnable fortress, and had stood for many years as a potent symbol of British power in South-East Asia. Since the construction of a great naval base at Singapore began in the 1920s, Australian governments had been wedded to this (and the strategy of imperial defence that it encapsulated) as the lynchpin of Australian defence policy also.
In the event, Australians discovered too late that the fundamentals of the policy upon which reliance had been placed were unsound. Britain had promised to provide a fleet for the base, whenever needed to deter Japanese aggression, initially within six weeks although this was extended to three months in 1939. When that situation finally arose in November 1941, a matter of weeks before Japan struck at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere around the Asia-Pacific region, Britain was already heavily committed in Europe and had few ships to spare. What arrived early in December was not a great fleet but a small squadron based around just two capital ships, Prince of Wales and Repulse (one very new, the other quite old). Both big ships were quickly disposed of a few days later by the Japanese in the opening hours of their invasion of Malaya.
Singapore thus remained without the fleet that was its primary rationale. Worse than this, planning for the base had called for roughly between 350 and 550 aircraft to defend it from the air. But this requirement had never been met, either in the number of aircraft provided or effective types. Despite the best efforts of Malaya's aerial defenders, including three squadrons from the Royal Australian Air Force, Singapore found itself at the mercy of an enemy that was vastly superior in air power.
To oppose the three divisions which the Japanese deployed in their campaign against Malaya and Singapore, Percival mainly had an Indian corps of two divisions and the Australian 8th Division under Major-General Gordon Bennett. Ordinarily, military doctrine requires that an attacker needs a superiority of several times the strength of the defender for success to be achievable, but in this case such a margin was unnecessary considering the freedom the Japanese enjoyed in deploying forces and manoeuvring them. The Indian troops were outclassed by the Japanese, and although the Australians, once committed to action in Johore on 14 January, achieved the few allied successes of the campaign (at places such as Gemas, Bakri, Jemaluang and Muar River), the 8th Division was understrength with just two brigades and lost heavily over the course of the next fortnight's fighting.
Once pushed back into Singapore Island, the odds did not materially move in favour of the British forces. To defend the island's northern approaches across the Straits of Johore, Percival had mainly depleted units to cover a wide area. Although a fresh formation, the 18th British Division, was on hand, he chose to allocate the most vulnerable north-western sector to Bennett's two brigades, now reduced to half-strength. Spread too thinly over too wide a front, the Australians were unable to prevent Japanese amphibious landings which were launched on 8 February.
In the week of heavy fighting which followed, the defenders were unable to stem the Japanese advance. By 13 February the British perimeter had shrunk to a 40-kilometre line around Singapore city itself. Water supplies were soon critical, a situation which was not without consequence in a city then containing more than a million civilian residents and refugees, and conditions generally were steadily deteriorating under continuous Japanese ground and aerial bombardment.
It has been claimed in a contemporary British report finally released in 1992 that it was acts of indiscipline by Australian troops in these chaotic circumstances which undermined the British defence and directly contributed to the surrender. Acts of indiscipline there almost certainly were, on the part of some personnel - not all of whom would have been Australian. Such behaviour is typical of many such military situations, so there is also nothing especially unusual in that. Considering the underlying weakness in defensive arrangements, however, there can be no doubt as to where the real cause lay for the loss of Singapore.
Despite having fought bravely for the month leading up to the surrender, sustaining nearly three-quarters of all the battle-deaths suffered by British forces during both the retreat through Malaya and the siege, Australians now experienced to the full the bitterness of the defeat. There are many incidents and stories associated with the fall of Singapore which now have become firmly entrenched in our national history, such as the controversial escape by General Bennett back to Australia, and the sinking of the Vyner Brooke and the Banka Island massacre. There are also many popular myths which continue to this day, such as that regarding the fortress guns famously pointed in the wrong direction (when, in fact, nearly all these weapons did engage the Japanese, although there was a shortage of high explosive ammunition).
Perhaps no aspect arising from the loss of Singapore was more galling than the generally monstrous fate experienced by the Australians who became prisoners there. These men, and a small number of Army nurses, were subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of their captors. Those sent on work gangs for the Burma-Thailand Railway especially suffered from overwork, malnutrion, sickness and bashings from guards. Overall, more than a third of their number did not survive the war.
Singapore's fall was not the end or full extent of the grim situation faced by Australia in early 1942. Within four days of the surrender Japanese forces that had pressed on into the Netherlands East Indies would be bombing Darwin, and over succeeding days Australians in Timor and Java would also be fighting for their lives. But today we especially remember the loss of Singapore as, in many ways, the highwater mark in the dangerous situation which our nation faced during 1942, and we reverently pay our respects to the men and women commemorated here on the Roll of Honour.
The link for this speech ishttp://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/singapore/transcript.htm
As for your views on Gordon Bennet, I could not agree with you more...at least we agree on one thing eh?
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[ March 01, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ]</p>
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.
Originally posted by Tim OToole
Elphick is a very poor source to base your claims on. Elphick is an Author who is part of the British revisionist push that started in 1992, whom are trying to blame the fall of Singapore on the men of the 8th Div. The fact is that the Japanese lost half of their troops during the attack on Singapore itself, and the assault came through the Aussie lines...if the Aussies broke and ran as claimed by Elphick, then why did the Japanese loose so many men?Originally posted by Raverdave:
Would you mind providing me with your references on the above statement?
[ February 28, 2002: Message edited by: Raverdave ][/QUOTE
My primary source is "Singapore-The Pregnable Fortress(Elphick)which sites many sources regarding the desertions.
Elphicks main sources are second-hand hearsay, which he admits himself that he has not followed up. He claims that an Aussie Captain (Blackwood???) forced his way on board a ship leaving Singapore, yet there is no records of any such person ever being in the 8th Div!
No Australian from the 8th Div has ever been before a court-martial for looting or desertion in regards to Singapore.
Never argue with an idiot, he will only drag you down to his level and beat you with experience.